AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

JUNE 1986
VOLUME 80 NUMBER 2

MANAGING EDITOR

Samuel C. Patterson
Department of Political Science
Ohio State University, 223 Derby Hall
Columbus, Ohio 43210-1373

BOOK REVIEW EDITOR

Robert H. Salisbury
Department of Political Science
Washington University, Campus Box 1063
St. Louis, Missouri 63130

EDITORIAL BOARD

Suzanne Berger
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

David W. Brady
Rice University

Charles V. Hamilton
Columbia University

John R. Hibbing
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

Harold Jacobson
University of Michigan

Milton G. Lodge
State University of New York
at Stony Brook

John M. Orbell
University of Oregon

G. Bingham Powell, Jr.
University of Rochester

Harvey Starr
Indiana University

Dennis F. Thompson
Princeton University

John C. Wahlke
University of Arizona

Raymond Wolfinger
University of California,
Berkeley

Diana D. McCall
Assistant Editor

Stephen A. Borrelli
APSR Intern

Josie Foo
Editorial Assistant

Janet McNaughton
Copy Editor

Steven C. Poe
APSR Intern

Sara Bateman
Designer

The *American Political Science Review* appears in March, June, September, and December of each year. It is published by the American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, and sent to all members. Dues: Regular Members with income: under $20,000, $40; $20,000-$29,999, $50; $30,000-$39,999, $65; $40,000 and over, $75; Student Members (limited to 5 years), $15; Retired Members, $20; Life Members, $1,000; Institutional Members, $75. Dues allocated for a subscription to the *APSR*: $10. Changes of address sent to the Membership Secretary of the APSA. Postmaster: Please send notification regarding undelivered journals to address above. Second-class postage paid at Washington, D.C. and at additional mailing offices. Copyright © 1986 by The American Political Science Association (ISSN-0003-0554).

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

CONTENTS

ARTICLES

Market Justice, Political Justice
Robert E. Lane 383

From Tragedy to Hierarchy and Back Again: Women in Greek Political Thought
Arlene W. Saxonhouse 403

Foucault's Challenge to Critical Theory
Stephen K. White 419

Thucydides on the Causes of Athenian Imperialism
Steven Forde 433

Soviet Elections Revisited: Voter Abstention in Noncompetitive Balloting
Rasma Karklins 449

Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action
Edward N. Muller & Karl-Dieter Opp 471

Reformulating the Cube Law for Proportional Representation Elections
Rein Taagepera 489

A Partisan Schema for Political Information Processing
Milton G. Lodge & Ruth Hamill 505

Schematic Assessments of Presidential Candidates
Arthur H. Miller, Martin P. Wattenberg & Oksana Malanchuk 521

The President and the Political Use of Force
Charles W. Ostrom, Jr. & Brian L. Job 541

Candidates and Policy in United States Senate Elections
Gerald C. Wright, Jr. & Michael B. Berkman 567

CONTROVERSY

Interpreting the 1974 Congressional Election
Gary C. Jacobson, Samuel Kernell, Eric M. Uslaner & M. Margaret Conway 591

RESEARCH NOTES

Strategic Politicians and Unresponsive Voters
Richard Born 599

Who Overreports Voting?
Brian D. Silver, Barbara A. Anderson & Paul R. Abramson 613

BOOK REVIEWS

Review Essay 631
Political Theory 640
American Politics 660
Comparative Politics 689
International Relations 711

EFFECTIVE JUNE 1, 1986

All new manuscripts should be sent to:

Samuel C. Patterson, Managing Editor
American Political Science Review
Department of Political Science
Ohio State University
Columbus, Ohio 43210-1373

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
JUNE 1986
VOLUME 80 NUMBER 2

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

PRESIDENT:
Aaron Wildavsky
University of California, Berkeley

PRESIDENT-ELECT:
Samuel P. Huntington
Harvard University

VICE PRESIDENTS:
Theodore J. Lowi
Cornell University

Dale Rogers Marshall
University of California, Davis

Donald Matthews
University of Washington

SECRETARY:
Myron Weiner
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

TREASURER:
Helen Ingram
University of Arizona

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR:
Thomas E. Mann

PROGRAM CHAIR:
Matthew Holden, Jr.
University of Virginia

MANAGING EDITOR, *APSR:*
Samuel C. Patterson
Ohio State University

COUNCIL, *1984-86:*
Brian Barry
California Institute of Technology

F. Chris Garcia
University of New Mexico

William R. Keech
University of North Carolina

J. Donald Moon
Wesleyan University

Victor A. Olorunsola
Iowa State University

Norman J. Ornstein
American Enterprise Institute

Benjamin I. Page
University of Texas at Austin

Bruce M. Russett
Yale University

COUNCIL, *1985-87:*
John Kingdon
University of Michigan

Stephen D. Krasner
Stanford University

Paula D. McClain
Arizona State University

Karen O'Connor
Emory University

Carole Pateman
University of Sydney

G. Bingham Powell, Jr.
University of Rochester

Kenneth Shepsle
Washington University

Nancy H. Zingale
College of St. Thomas

• GUNNELL • RIKER • ACHEN • LYNN •

APSA

announces the publication of

Political Science: The State of the Discipline

edited by

Ada W. Finifter

> *"a remarkable glimpse of a profession at work... An invaluable resource for any student or practitioner of current politics and policy-making in the U.S. – and indeed elsewhere in the world."*
>
> ***Choice** (February 1984)*

19 Chapters by many of the country's leading political scientists reviewing the present state and future directions of research in the subfields of the discipline.

614 pages with a detailed index to authors cited.

Paper:	$15.00* for APSA members $25.00 for non-members ISBN 0-915654-58-X
Cloth:	$35.00 ISBN 0-915654-57-1

---

*This rate effective for classroom adoptions placed through bookstores.

(Please include $2.00 to cover the costs of postage and handling)

Send your **prepaid order** to:

State of the Discipline
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

WALKER • CONLAN • BEAM • HANSEN • BAUM • RUSSETT • EPSTEIN •

INGLEHART • GITHENS • KEOHANE • REISELBACH • SHALALA • STOKES

• HANCOCK • MIGDAL • ASHER • KINDER •

ARTICLES

MARKET JUSTICE, POLITICAL JUSTICE

ROBERT E. LANE
Yale University

The defense of capitalism in America is rooted in a preference for the market's justice of earned deserts over the justices of equality and need associated with the polity. These preferences have structural roots in the way governments and markets serve different values and purposes, satisfy wants, focus on fairness or justice, enlist causal attributions, distribute or redistribute income, are limited by rights, and seem to offer either harmony or conflict of interest. Some of these "structural" differences, however, are themselves perceptual, and corrected by changed perceptions of the productivity of government and of our historic predecessors, and by a community point of view involving changed accounting systems, as well as by policies of full employment rather than guaranteed incomes. With few institutional changes, these altered perceptions may partially restore political justice to favor.

"Without some very considerable surge of moral anger . . . [political and social] changes do not occur" (Moore, 1978, p. 459). To account for "moral anger" is to contribute to our understanding of popular turbulence—or, more likely, to our understanding of "the cankers of a calm world and a long peace."

Our concern is with the American sense of justice and injustice regarding the distribution of valued goods by markets and democratic politics—how they compare with each other, and what structural and ideological factors explain the apparent preference for market justice over political justice. Inasmuch as the following analysis makes certain assumptions on contested issues, we turn to these first. For our purposes a standard definition of the market will do: it is the device for coordinating an economy by prices largely determined by relatively free, competitive transactions among firms guided by anticipated profits (Lane, 1978a, p. 4; Lindblom, 1977; Weber, 1947, pp. 179-83). Similarly, democratic politics embraces standard elements: competitive elections, a legitimate opposition, a relatively free (officially uncensored) press, and protection of minority rights. The relation between these two institutions offers more difficulty. While for certain purposes it is desirable to emphasize their close interrelation, for the purposes at hand it is desirable, and equally legitimate, to regard them as separable and alternative methods of coordinating production and distributing goods; neither is merely the disguised servant of the other. The public regularly makes this distinction: functions belong either to "business" or to "government," albeit with some confusion and overlap (Lipset and Schneider, 1983; McClosky and Zaller, 1985).

We assume that the perceptions and values we encounter and their institutional and material bases have reciprocal influences. Whereas the sociology of knowledge, like its Marxist origins, closely ties beliefs and values to their parent institutions and social locations (Mannheim, 1949), we follow a Parsonian (1951) and Weberian (1947) analysis, loosening

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 80 NO. 2 JUNE, 1986

these ties. Thus, in the analysis of structural roots we show the influence of social structures on perceptions, while in discussing perceptual changes we rely on the independent effects of perceptions on the interpretation of structures. We return to this problem later.

Popular perceptions of justice are related to, but distinct from, philosophical conceptions of justice. They are related in the sense that most philosophical treatments regard people's sense of justice as relevant, but certain treatments—such as Ross's (1939, p. 2) reliance on "a large body of beliefs and convictions," or J. S. Mill's (1910, p. 49) use of "the social feeling," or Edmund Cahn's (1964, p. 25) reliance on the "predisposition (of) . . . the human animal . . . to fight injustice"—are misleading, for they fail to preserve sufficiently the distinction between philosophical justice and the public's sense of injustice. In rejecting that tradition we take the further step of assuming, like others (e.g., Deutsch, 1975; Harman, 1983; Kaufman, 1973; Sidorsky, 1983), that conceptions of justice are partially dependent upon other goals simultaneously pursued, and upon institutional settings. There is evidence that the public follows this course (Barrett-Howard and Tyler, forthcoming; Hochschild, 1981), denying the universal applicability of such formulations of justice as those recently put forward by Rawls (1971), Nozick (1974), and Ackerman (1980).

Our aim is not to clarify philosophical justice; we do attempt to illuminate concepts of the legitimacy of markets and politics, to contribute to an understanding of the forces of social change, and above all, to help explain the tenacious hold of market capitalism on the public mind. There is an irony in the public's justice-based defense of the market, for that is the very point where many commentators have found it weakest (e.g., Rawls, 1971). It is uncertain whether this defense represents a social lag, a "contradiction" between institutions and perceptions, or, as we shall argue and then modify, a structurally induced perception based on the functioning of the market and its political alternatives.

Finally, the analysis helps to explain a historical anomaly, as well as a current situation. In his study, *The Pursuit of Equality in American History*, J. R. Pole (1978, p. xi) puzzles over the focus on political equality and the lack of attention to "such questions as the redistribution of wealth or an effective re-examination of the criteria by which economic rewards are allocated." The puzzle is made greater by the increasing economic inequality over most of this period (Williamson and Lindert, 1980). Two points are in order: (1) American concepts of justice were never predominantly directed toward equality of condition (Tocqueville, 1945, vol. 1, p. 51, but see vol. 2, p. 94; Potter, 1954); hence, sentiments of justice took other forms; and (2) for reasons we shall explain, Americans tend to prefer market methods to political methods.

Origins and Elements of a Sense of Injustice

Certain perceptions and beliefs favor the translation of deprivation into an "injustice." The minimum condition seems to be that people want something they do not have, and believe they deserve it (Crosby, 1982, chs. 1–2; Runciman, 1966). It is the genius of the market to stimulate wants without at the same time stimulating a sense of deserving more than one gets. Comparing oneself or one's group with some better-off relevant person or group, especially a member of an "in-group," makes deserving more salient, but in the market comparisons of this kind encourage effort and not an acute sense of injustice. Expectations are important, for both past expectations that by now one would possess some good and expectations that one will in the future possess that good affect justice sentiments. For the lay person, as for the philosopher, the sense of feasibility implied by these expectations influences justice sentiments (Galston, 1980, p. 110; Moore, 1978, ch. 14). As we shall see, the belief that the market follows natural laws makes market outcomes seem more inevitable than political outcomes. Finally, if one believes that outcomes are attributable to one's own acts—that the self is to be credited or blamed for one's own fate—one does not invoke justice sentiments. Again, this sense of controlling one's own destiny in the market, but not in politics, leads to more of a sense of political injustice than of market injustice.

Conceptually, the problems of a sense of distributive justice may be expressed in a question:

> *Who* distributes *what to whom,* in virtue of what *criterial characteristics,* by what *procedures,* with what distributive *outcomes?*

Employing this conceptual formula, we turn to a brief analysis of these six terms, comparing their market and political expressions.

American Perceptions of Market and Political Justice

Agent (who distributes). Although in the 1980s about three-quarters of the public agreed both that government favored "a few big interests" at the expense of the "benefit of all the people" and that business pursued "profits" at the expense of "the interests of the public" (surveys reported in Lipset and Schneider, 1983, pp. 17, 183), there is a difference in the legitimacy attached to these two perceived biases. As we shall see, it is more legitimate, and publicly beneficial, for business to pursue profits than for government to cater to the interests of "a few big interests." That difference is brought out in answers to questions on the fairness of the two systems. Answering a series of questions about the fairness of the American free enterprise system, very large majorities of national samples in 1958 and 1977 held that the free enterprise system is "fair and wise" (82%), "gives everyone a fair chance" (65%), and that it is a "fair and efficient system" (63%) (McClosky and Zaller, 1985, ch. 5). In contrast, in 1980 large majorities believed that "the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves" (70%), and that "you cannot trust the government to do what is right" most of the time (73%) (Center for Political Studies, in Lipset and Schneider, 1983, p. 17). The market is thought to be "fair and wise," but not the government.

Goods. People tend to exclude collective goods when thinking about their standard of living; thus, a large category of governmental distributions is omitted from justice calculations (Compton Advertising, Inc., 1975). Furthermore, although people seek and demand certain kinds of government payments, especially when they are in need, they prefer market income to transfer payments. In spite of Rawls's (1971, p. 440) belief that self-esteem, "perhaps the most important primary good," is distributed by government in the form of political rights, in fact it is the market (and small primary groups) that confers self-esteem (Lane, 1982). Finally, the government, through its police and courts, is seen as an agent of punishment as much as a distributor of goods, even though in concrete forms the services of the welfare state are often appreciated. Thinking concretely, the public appreciates these services; thinking generally, the public tends to derogate them as inefficient and wasteful (Katz, Gutek, Kahn, and Barton, 1975; Lipset and Schneider, 1983). Where benefits are thus discounted (at least in general) and punishments counted, any distributor of "goods" will suffer perceptions of injustice.

To whom. In assessing the market, the public tends to think only of those who are in the market, and more particularly of the full-time employed, forgetting the unemployed and the part-time employed. Reporting on this tendency, Lee Rainwater (1974, p. 166) suggests that "unemployment is the major factor responsible for a divergence in [actual] relative income shares from the shares our respondents judge to be fair." But the unemployed and the poor who are not in the labor market are justice problems for the government, and are perceived to be such (Hochschild, 1981; Rainwater, 1974). Beyond this, other data suggest that the American public tends, more than other publics, to define disadvantages in racial terms—therefore more suitable for political action—than in economic terms, where market justice would seem to be more relevant (Jennings, 1983). Defining the unemployed out of the market and injustice more as a matter of race than income tends to politicize the sense of injustice.

Criteria. As Hochschild (1981) has pointed out, people tend to apply the patently inegalitarian criteria of earned deserts to the market, and, with some anguish and ambivalence, the criteria of equality and need to the polity. Except for political resources, "the idea of essentially equal distribution of resources does not seem attractive to most people" (Rainwater, 1974, p. 168; see also Lane, 1959). One reason for this is the belief that the criteria of earned deserts enhances productivity, whereas the criteria of equality and need do not (see below). Preferring the market's criteria of earned deserts over the criteria of equality and need associated with the polity, the public tends to favor market justice over political justice.

Procedures. For the market to be considered fair, two related procedural requirements must be met: there must be perceived openness, if not equality, of opportunity, and the market must be considered responsive to effort—to hard work. For the polity to be considered procedurally fair, there must be "adherence to a general norm of political equality," at least among groups if not among individuals (Verba and Orren, 1985, p. 214), and one must believe that the government is responsive to one's influence. By and large, the market passes the test but the polity does not. Over the 1970s, about 65% of the public believed that "hard work is most important in getting ahead," while most of the time fewer than 10% held that "luck or help from others is most important" (NORC, 1981). In 1984 more than 85% of the public believed that: "America has an open society. What one achieves in life no longer depends on one's family background, but on the abilities one has and the education one acquires" (NORC, 1984). In contrast, a cross section of leaders rejected the view that there is equality of influence in the United States (Verba and Orren, 1985, ch. 9), and about half of the public has believed for over a decade that "public officials don't care much about what people like me think" (Miller, Miller, and Schneider, 1980, Table 4.7; Lipset and Schneider, 1983, p. 22). These interpretations are confirmed by direct questions on procedural fairness: Only about a quarter of a sample of 300 adult Chicagoans thought that the procedures used to decide tax levels were fair, and only two-fifths thought that procedures used to allocate benefits were fair (Tyler, Rasinski, and McGraw, forthcoming).

Outcomes. The crucial question, of course, is whether, in the end, people think that they get what they deserve. As we mentioned, a sense of deservedness is central to the concept of justice, at least among the lay public, if not always among philosophers (e.g., Rawls, 1971, p. 311; but see Rescher, 1966, p. 48). What is striking about the survey material is the high proportion of people who believe they do get about what they deserve. For example, in a small study comparing British and American adults in London and New Haven, 62% of the Americans stated that they "personally have the standard of living that [they] feel they deserve" (Perkins and Bell, 1980, p. 81). In a larger study of 400 employed men and women (including housewives), both men and women in high- as well as low-prestige jobs (almost equally in both cases) scored high on a "deservedness scale"—i.e., "they feel that they are receiving approximately what they deserve and what they expected to receive" (Crosby, 1982, p. 64). The unemployed are different only in a modest degree (Schlozman and Verba, 1979, p. 141). These judgments of the fairness of the market do not extend to the way others are treated (e.g., women referring to other women, the public referring to "most people"), but since correcting injustice to others implies political means, at that point we enter the political arena.

While similar questions on the fairness of the benefits one receives from government and the taxes one pays do not reveal "moral outrage," they do reveal a much lower sense of fairness than these studies of market fairness show. For example, compared with almost two-thirds of the New Haven sample reporting they received the incomes they deserved, only a little over a third of the Chicago sample thought that the taxes they paid and the benefits they received from economic policies were fair (Tyler et al., forthcoming). Similarly, in a comparison of leaders' assessment of income and assessment of political influence, political justice is considered less fair than market justice. When asked to construct a preferred income distribution among occupations, leaders of various social groups (labor, business, blacks, feminists, etc.) rank occupations by income in the same order in which these occupations are currently paid, and place themselves at approximately the same ordinal position as the one they now occupy. However, when they are asked to order a preferred distribution of political influence they radically revise what they perceive to be the current distribution in such a way that their own group's position is much improved. That is, people generally are seen to get about the relative magnitude of income they deserve in the market, but, given the norm of equal (group) influence mentioned above, other groups, but not one's own, are seen to have more influence than they deserve (Verba and Orren, 1985, chs. 8–9).

On balance, therefore, it seems that the public tends to believe that the market system is a more fair agent than the political system. People tend to include the problem cases in the political domain and exclude them from the market. They ignore many of the public benefits and, with certain exceptions, prefer market goods to political goods. They prefer the market's criteria of earned deserts to the polity's criteria of equality and need, and believe that market procedures are more fair than political procedures. They are satisfied that they receive what they deserve in the market, but much less satisfied with what they receive in the polity. By a different measure, they are much more satisfied with the general income distribution among occupations than with the distribution of influence among social groups in the polity. sum

There is a "deep structure" to these assessments residing in the very way these institutions distribute their goods, but, as we shall see, this "deep structure" is also partly a matter of perception.

Market and Political Invitations to Justice Complaints

Because their functions and responsibilities differ, our two institutions invite justice complaints in different ways. They differ in four ways. The first difference is in the way they enlist and frustrate individual beliefs, preferences, and levels of assessment. Among the many such beliefs and preferences—e.g., the goodness of human nature, the sources of authority, the reliability of various kinds of knowledge, and the unity or diversity of mankind (Lane, 1972, ch. 10)—we focus on four: dominant values, satisfaction of wants, preferred justice criteria, and level of assessment (process or outcome). Second, the perceived causes of agency allocations differ, relying on external circumstances in some cases and on the dispositions and values of the allocators in others. Here we focus on a systematic difference: firms are thought to be bound by circumstantial necessities, but governments are thought to be free to follow political discretion. Third, the justice process is rarely free from constraints, such as lack of resources or authority, legal limits, force majeure, and so forth. We will focus on two such constraints: the disadvantage of coming second in a distributive sequence, and the constitutional constraints imposed by rights. Finally, the perceived harmony or conflict of interests involved in market and political distributions alters perceptions of justice; we explicate these perceptions in terms of class conflict, the uses of profits, and competition.

Structured Differences in Individual Preferences and Levels of Assessment

Purposes and values. As mentioned, both philosophical discussion and research evidence point to the selection of justice formulae in order to serve other values (production, solidarity, personal development, and so forth). Thus the perceived purposes of our two institutions and the values they enlist affect the selection of justice principles. There are times, of course, when the nonmaterial purposes of government are ascendant, as in the case of war or when freedom is threatened, but for most people most of the time earning a living and related material values take precedence. In assessing public policy, for example, three times as many Americans give priority to policies promoting income stability and growth compared to policies promoting freedom, "more say in government," or other values (Inglehart, 1981). In that limited sense there are three times as many materialists as "postmaterialists" in America. Justice concerns may be important, but, as mentioned, people favor the justice of earned deserts—partly because that form of justice is thought to promote higher productivity and income, that is, material values. Furthermore, the market is conceived to be the agent of productivity, while politics is thought to be a burden on productivity, indeed, government is blamed more than the market for failures of the productive mechanism (Katona and Strumpel, 1978, p. 43). A justice system that encourages productivity and that produces income is therefore better than one that, at best, merely redistributes it.

Satisfaction of wants: individual or collective. Both markets and polities are want-satisfying mechanisms, the distinction being that markets satisfy wants individually, while polities satisfy collective wants, or, at least, wants grouped by categories (whose members, of course, individually may want what is offered). While the equal treatment associated with public goods appeals to some senses of justice, in general people prefer to tailor the satisfaction of their wants to their own particular tastes, something they can do in the market but not easily in their dealings with government. If they have the money they can buy the kinds of cars they want, but they cannot order the kind of road system they want. Therefore, the political method of collective satisfaction of wants creates more claims of injustice than does the market method of indvidual satisfaction of wants.

The distinction may be clarified by a contrast between two concepts of equality suggested by Douglas Rae (1981, ch. 5). *Lot-regarding* equality is achieved for a group whose members have identical goods such that each is indifferent to whose bundle he may have. *Person-regarding* equality is achieved when each person in a group has equal fungible resources to begin with, and with these acquires goods which leave him as well satisfied as every other person, tested by the availability of exchange among group members to the point where no further trades are desired. Notice that both equalities are "fair" in the sense that in both each person is treated identically, but the second is more satisfying to the group members.

Lot-regarding equality may be achieved by the public provision of, say, (1) a *rule* against smoking applying equally to smokers and non-smokers; (2) the provision of *collective goods,* e.g., public parks equally available to the well and the bedridden; or (3) equal allotments of *goods in kind,* e.g., food stamps for the urban hungry and for the farmer growing his own food. While such rules and offerings are fair in one sense, the smoker, the bedridden, and the farmer may complain that in another, important, sense they are unjust. The public method of allotment contrasts with the market's method of monetary rewards and transactions that permit individuated satisfaction of tastes.

The flaw in this analysis, of course, is that the market generates enormous inequalities of income, permitting some to satisfy a wide variety of individuated tastes and others to satisfy almost none. This argument will count heavily with egalitarians, but most members of the public "do not find gross inequity in the way income is [now] distributed" (Rainwater, 1974, p. 166). For many, including many of the relatively poor, market processes without equality will seem fairer than government-induced equality without market processes.

Justice criteria: the polity's reversal of earned deserts. Most people exhibit very considerable sympathy with those who are poor, handicapped, or unemployed through no fault of their own. But how can people be sure that such government beneficiaries are, indeed, without fault of their own? The "just world" syndrome (a tendency to justify all distributions) leads people to "blame the victim" (Lerner, 1980), and that corresponds with the favored justice of earned deserts. The confluence of sentiments of sympathy with sentiments favoring the justice of deserts is painful. Lee Rainwater (1974, p. 180), on the basis of extensive interviews, finds this pain stemming from the opposition of two principles: "Opposed to the principle that no one should live on so little money is the principle that everyone should have to work for what he gets." Transfer payments to relieve poverty present the public with the most acute difficulties in assessing justice, difficulties reflected in the lower evaluation of political justice than market justice.

The justice of taxes, especially progressive income taxes, is even harder to assess. For purposes of contrast we will compare four tax-related experiences and perceptions with partially comparable market experiences and perceptions. (1) People are often uncertain whether others similarly situated are paying the same amount of taxes as they do—the greatest single source of tax cheating (Lewis, 1982, ch. 8). At the same time, people either assume that others in the market pay the same price, or, if they pay less, that they are model consumers rather than cheaters ("I can get it for you wholesale"). (2) Tax payments are compulsory, market payments are regarded as voluntary. (3) The benefits of paying taxes are delayed, often obscure, and sometimes regarded with hostility (as when a pacifist pays for the defense appropriations he abhors). But market payments for goods and services are inevitably for something one wants, the yield in utility of which is visible and usually immediate. Finally, and most importantly in this analysis, (4) payment of taxes proportional to what is regarded as one's contribution to productivity reverses the normal interpretation of the justice of earned deserts: while in the market one is rewarded for such contributions, in the polity one is penalized. This seems unfair.

Level of assessment: fairness versus justice. Philosophers distinguish between *fairness*, as a method of, or criterion for, allocation, and *justice*, as the outcome of the allocation process (Feinberg, 1973, p. 117; Rescher, 1966, p. 90; but see Hart, 1961, p. 154). But there are times when justice may be defined by the outcome of fair procedures. Thus Rawls's (1971, p. 86) "pure procedural justice" refers, it seems, to market justice, where "there is a correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been properly followed." Rawls grounds his general theory in the rationality of persons in the original position, but there is another interpretation.

The psychologist Philip Brickman asked his subjects to allocate certain scarce goods fairly, but after they had done so they were dissatisfied with the shape of the resulting distribution, finding it too inegalitarian. In their own views, fairness did not produce justice. As Brickman and his associates say, "Even if all groups, as well as individuals, receive what their aggregate merits appear to deserve, the distribution of rewards in a system as a whole can be judged unfair" (Brickman, Folger, Goode, and Schul, 1981, pp. 174–75). Brickman also tested Rawls's hypothesis regarding decisions on distributional arrangements by persons in the original position. He found that people who did not know their own abilities in a certain situation—one in which those abilities would later earn them benefits—were more egalitarian in their preferences for distributional methods than those who knew they had great abilities. But beyond that, Brickman also found that both those who knew their own abilities and those who did not were more egalitarian when asked to plan a distributional system than when they were asked to decide on fair methods of allocation. Thus, while confirming Rawls's hypothesis regarding the greater egalitarianism of those behind a veil of ignorance, Brickman suggests that part of the egalitarian effect of the original position stems from the difference between looking at outcomes in contrast to looking at distributional criteria (Brickman, 1977).

The relevance to market and political justice both of this distinction between fairness and justice and of Brickman's experiments and hypothesis is plain. The market leads people to think about processes of allocation and deserts, whereas politics leads people to think about outcomes of allocation—the overall shape of a distribution where concepts of equality are more salient. This is true in part because the market has no machinery for adjusting outcomes, or even the conceptual apparatus for thinking about them, except as they emerge from market processes; as in Rawls's idea of "pure procedural justice," the market is a domain of transactions that sum to an unplanned distribution. But politics has machinery in its tax and transfer payment mechanisms for adjusting outcomes, and even the most casual political thinking must turn to questions of the poor and the rich, deprived groups and privileged ones. In politics everyone is to some extent forced to consider societal arrangements, in which other people's claims must be considered along with one's own. This is the very heart of the method of philosophical justice, in which, assuming reason, each person's claim must be treated as having a worth equal to another person's similar claim. Reason is defined as the process that recognizes identical instances as such, without regard for "accidental" personal differences (Hare, 1963).

Hochschild's (1981) important discovery of public "ambivalence" flowing from a tendency to employ a justice of deserts in the economic domain and, on occasion, the justices of need and equality in the political domain, can now be understood as more than a simple application of different social norms to the two different domains. In their discussion of fairness in the economic domain, people were looking at the process of allocation—the fairness of individual payments, or Brickman's "micro-justice." In their discussion of political justice, however, they were led by the perspective of that domain to consider the shape of outcomes—of social rather than individual justice, or Brickman's "macro-justice." Hence the confusion and ambivalence.

The consequence of this difference in perspective is a kind of asymmetry in the way procedures and outcomes are perceived in the market and in politics. While it is the case that market procedures are, in practice, considered more fair than political procedures, at an abstract level both procedures are considered fair in their respective domains. The main difference between them lies in the fact that the market escapes criticisms for unjust outcomes if it adheres faithfully to its criteria of allocation (contribution to productivity), because people apply to it the criteria of Rawls's pure procedural justice. But the polity does not escape such criticism. A fair procedure is sufficient justification in the market, but not in the polity. More than that, the polity may be called upon to redistribute (see below) what the market "fairly" distributed in the first place, for, from a political perspective, the outcome of that "fairness" is seen to be unjust, making the polity doubly vulnerable to allegations of both unfairness and injustice.

The Causes of Agency Behavior

②

Market necessity, individual responsibility, and government discretion. Interpreting the causes of an event exercises a powerful influence on the sense of grievance and, usually, though not necessarily, on the sense of injustice. Where the agent intended to inflict pain the sense of grievance and injustice are most acute; where the agent did not intend to inflict pain, but might have avoided it and did not, our sense of grievance and injustice is severe but less acute; where the agent did not intend and could not avoid the pain inflicted, we may feel grieved, but do not feel that an injustice has been done (Utne and Kidd, 1980). This gradation is securely lodged in our concepts of responsibility (Heider, 1958).

Consider now the way in which people interpret the causes of market and political outcomes. In the market people offer two kinds of attributions, both of them exculpating the market from injustice. On the one hand, people believe, with some room for difference (Lipset and Schneider, 1983, pp. 176–83) that a firm must do what it does do, constrained as it is by competition and the laws of supply and demand. If a firm pays more than market wages it risks bankruptcy. The firm cannot avoid inflicting pain. On the other hand, laymen, like economists, read backwards from rewards, a person's level of pay, to discover the source in his contribution to productivity—a doctrine of "revealed contribution" similar to the economist's concept of "revealed preference." Noone knows what his contribution is worth until he sees what he gets; there is no opportunity for discrepancy between worth and reward, no way in which a hypothesis about a person's worth can be falsified. Thus, by the magic of the market, a person gets what he deserves and a firm must pay what it pays. These two forms of attribution require a person to believe that if he is unemployed it is through some discretionary act of his own, but that if a firm lays him off it is because it could not do otherwise. No system could develop a more elegant device for avoiding attributions of injustice to the rewards and punishments it distributes.

In contrast, benefits received from government are not considered to be the inevitable and precise measure of some previous contribution or status or need; they are perceived to be the consequence of a partisan dispute in which one group won over another group—e.g., labor over managers and owners, dairy interests over the weaker spokesmen for consumers. What is revealed, or so it is said, is political muscle, which until might is converted into right affords only small purchase for a belief that justice has been done. The polity is, therefore, more vulnerable to claims of unjust allocations.

This distinction in vulnerability to claims of injustice is related to the general belief that in both the market and the polity people are animated by self-interest (Lipset and Schneider, 1983, p. 169). In the market, however, self-interest is thought to be both fruitful for the common good and policed by competition, while in the polity self-interest is seen as neither fruitful nor properly constrained. Unwilling to criticize the system of democracy, the public levels its criticisms at the political leaders: "[In recent decades] Americans continued to say that they were proud of our system of government. Their lack of confidence was clearly directed at the people running those institutions" (Lipset and Schneider, 1983, p. 309). Combining a perception of insufficiently constrained self-interest with the belief that politicians hold discretionary powers in allocating benefits and costs, the public is inevitably suspicious of the fairness of the resulting outcomes.

③ Constraints

Sequence: distribution versus redistribution. We turn to popular responses to an initial distribution of resources and compare them with the responses to a change in that distribution, a redistribution (Jouvenel, 1951). Consider first the concept so dear to the heart of economists, Pareto optimality, which says that, given the proscription against comparing interpersonal utilities, a situation is just when no transfers can be made that improve the lot, however small, of any one person without diminishing the lot, however large, of any other. By this reasoning, before the cake is divided all distributions are just; after it has been divided no further distributions are just. The market divides the cake in the first place; the government must then alter that distribution and, by Pareto optimality reasoning, nothing the government can do is just. The world pays little attention to Pareto optimality, but the point illustrates the problem of changing any distribution, for that involves taking something away from someone in order to give it to someone else.

The justices of need and equality seem to justify a process of redistribution. But how can they justify taking from an individual who has done nothing to deserve the punishment inflicted on him? As we have seen, the justice of earned deserts finds this taking a grave injustice, and that injustice occurs because the government comes second in the distribution process.

The asymmetry of the public's attitude toward giving and taking in redistribution is revealed in attitudes toward income floors and ceilings: in one survey ony 9% of the public favored a ceiling on incomes, while 32% favored a guaranteed minimum income and 81% favored guaranteed jobs so that people could earn a decent income (Verba and Orren, 1985, p. 81). Assuming tax and transfer methods, one might say that facilitating *earning* is best, *giving* to the truly needy is acceptable, but *taking*, even from the rich, is bad. Redistribution implies little earning, and both giving and taking.

Trespassing on rights by government and business. From their reserve of sovereignty the people have granted government certain powers which, if they are exceeded, lead to claims of injustice. These boundaries of legitimate governmental action are marked by rights, among which are the rights to property and contract. While it is certainly the case that corporations are granted their special rights by the state, business in general has not been granted its powers from any source. Rather, it seems, business powers derive, without such a grant, from the same reserved powers that serve as the source of governmental powers. Government, therefore, is more subject to claims of trespass than is business, and, being subject to such claims, more vulnerable to cries of injustice.

④ **Harmony and Conflict of Interest**

The problem of distributive justice arises only when there is a conflict of interest; it is moot when there is a harmony of interest (Barry, 1973, p. 15). Of course, businessmen and candidates for jobs know that they are in conflict with others, but the crucial question is the one that Marx (and others) identified: Is there a basic conflict of interests between owners and workers, management and labor? The answer to this question turns on whether one considers periodic pay disputes as "basic," or only as quarrels among allies in the productive process. Following that answer is the further question of the expression of such conflict as there may be in the economic and political domains. We examine these questions in three parts: class conflict, the uses of profits, and the nature of competition.

Class conflict. Of a national sample of Americans asked in the period 1975–1977 whether workers and management (1) "have conflicting interests and are natural enemies," or (2) "share the same interests in the long run," only 13% thought that workers and management have conflicting interests, while about two-thirds agreed that they have "the same interests in the long run" (McClosky and Zaller, 1985, Table 6-4). A different study with a comparable question (without reference to "natural enemies") conducted at the same time also showed about two-thirds holding that management and workers have "basically the same interests," but this time about a third held that they were "basically opposed." Moreover, this second study showed a declining relation between a belief in "basic opposition" and occupational level, such that by 1975 professional and managerial employees were scarcely different in this respect from blue collar workers (Schlozman and Verba, 1979, pp. 125, 130). Without a sense of class conflict the problem of justice between social classes is, as we have said, not a major issue.

But why does this weak or absent sense of class conflict and declining class division not also reduce the perception of conflict in politics? Some of the conditions for de-emphasizing class conflict in politics certainly exist. The two main parties have, over the years, followed the lines indicated: in the 1970s and early 1980s there has been very little difference in the class composition of the voters for the two main American parties (Ladd and Hadley, 1976; but see Pomper, 1985, p. 67). But it cannot be said that political conflicts have declined in intensity, for a variety of other issues—the Vietnam war, the Central American engagements, defense policy, prayer in the schools, racial issues—has kept the political conflict boiling. Structurally, then, the low sense of class conflict and apparently declining class divisions of the American public express themselves in a low sense of worker-management conflict in economic matters, where other issues are irrelevant, but not in a comparably low sense of political conflict, where other issues have become salient.

Profits. The idea of a harmony of interest is contained in market theory: as businesses prosper—that is, as they make larger profits—everyone prospers. Behind this thesis is the assumption, not that profits are deserved—though that will be said, for it is an economic theory and not a justice theory—but rather that profits are fruitful for the system: (1) they spur businessmen to greater effort, and (2) they are reinvested in the system, fructifying the economy. The harmony of interest lies, then, in the belief that "surplus value," to use an unfriendly term, goes back into the economy as the source of future prosperity, which, in turn, will benefit all, even if it is allocated quite unequally. The alternative theory, of course, is that surplus value—profits—goes to make the rich richer and does nothing for the ordinary person; in this version, all would be better off if smaller profits remained after earnings were distributed as wages and lower prices. There is evidence that the public is divided on this point (Lipset and Schneider, 1983, pp. 176–83), but the weight of the evidence lies with the harmony theory: profits are legitimate, both as earned income for owners, and—what is at stake here—as the source of "good times" and future income for workers.

Four different kinds of evidence may be cited. (*1*) Among the research findings are those from coded answers to open-ended questions showing that of those with opinions, two-thirds believed that profits were reinvested, and a large majority believed that a rise in profits meant "the good life" (Compton Advertising, Inc., 1975, questions 13a–13c). In answer to direct survey questions, twice as many respondents believed that "if business is allowed to make as much as it can . . . everyone profits in the long run" as believed that "the workers get less." The profit motive is thought by most people to be the cause of "higher productivity and investment" (McClosky and Zaller, 1985, Table 4-5). (*2*) A computer simulation of various labor strategies under circumstances in which profits might be used for owner consumption or for reinvestment found that the most advantageous strategy is not to maximize demands but to moderate them (Przeworski, 1980). (*3*) Studying labor union responses in Germany just prior to World War I, Barrington Moore (1978, p. 220) found that union discipline and restraint "received considerable support from the awareness that in the end jobs depended on the prosperity of German Industry." Finally, (*4*) the idea that profits are the source of benefits for all is supported by the overwhelming endorsement of the "free enterprise system" that embraces this tenet among its principles (Harris Survey, in Lipset and Schneider, 1983, p. 286). From such evidence it seems fair to say that people generally regard differences of opinion on the use of profits as family quarrels, and not as basic conflicts.

Skipping over the many objective reasons for public uncertainty on the uses of profits (ignorance of the meaning of the term, possible owners' uses for their own consumption, investment overseas or in nonproductive but lucrative instruments, concealment), let us examine one of the justice implications of this harmonic interpretation of the system. It is just for an owner, say, to take $100 from what may be interpreted as a common fund, when each employee takes, say, only $10. In the harmonic view, the owner is justified in an income ten times that of his employees, on the grounds that if he should invest, say, half of that in the firm—still living five times as well as his employees, given the non-progressive tax system—the employees' wages might rise to $12 in a future year. Meanwhile, the owner's income might fairly rise to $125, slightly increasing the inegalitarian ratio and substantially increasing the absolute difference. Thus, the belief that (a) profits will be reinvested, and (b) the benefits of reinvestment will return to the employees is, in this case, a powerful argument for inequality of income.

Where lie the deserts in this case? Assuming that the owner's rate of return was average, his claim for a reward for skill is minimal. His claim that he deserves the income for "waiting"—Marshall's (1938) argument, now obsolete (Robinson, 1958, p. 394)—is matched by the employee's claim to have waited just as long.

But even if there were a justification for increased gain on the part of the owner, what would justify the employees' higher salary in later years? It seems more realistic to waive all efforts to ground these outcomes in the justice of deserts, and to recognize the play of a self-interest justified only by the recognition by all parties of certain rules of the game—certain procedural requirements within which hedonistic motives are allowed because, shall we say, of the harmony of interest involved. In this sense, then, harmony of interest takes the place of justice, and claims of justice will be muted.

These considerations overflow into the political domain in several ways. In the first place, it has been said that "government policy favoring business is seen [by the public] not as a response to the special interests of business but as a policy that serves the economy more generally" (Verba and Orren, 1985, p. 216). Moreover, anything that makes the "business climate" unfavorable, as businessmen see it, is thought to reduce investment and increase unemployment, "the fiendishly clever" device that Lindblom (1982, p. 324) says imprisons us in a market society. In this context political justice is seen to be served by catering to market justice. Second, confidence in the free enterprise system stifles political reform, for the public strongly opposes at least two of the ways to alter the flow of profits: they do not want (by 73% to 13%) limits on profits (McClosky and Zaller, 1985, Table 6-2); and they oppose nationalization of industry even more strongly (Lipset and Schneider, 1983, pp. 265-69). One can imagine, indeed, that the fear of government intervention (in these, but not necessarily in more limited ways) is a source as well as a consequence of the more hopeful view of the harmony in the economic system, a kind of backflow following the overflow we mentioned.

But these limits on government do not lead to exculpation of the government for any injustices perceived in the market; in the end, the responsibility for rectifying any injustices of the economic system lies not with the market, but with the government. Rainwater (1974, pp. 180, 186) says of his respondents that "they look to government as the mechanism for developing policies for this improvement [in the fairness of the system] and then enforcing it," but that "they do so without conviction, because it is hard to imagine how the desirable end result . . . might be accomplished." Bricks without straw, ends without means, injustice lodged at the door of the government without any approved policy for rectifying it.

Almost as many Americans name politicians as being unfairly advantaged as name the rich and big business (Jennings, 1983). One reason for this attitude toward politicians may be that, in contrast to the belief that employees benefit from owners' profits, people not only believe high politicians' salaries do not benefit them, but that these salaries come from their own tax payments. There is no harmonic device here, but there is a conflict of interest.

Competition. In both markets and politics people welcome competition: power checking power, firm competing with firm, party with party, and indeed government and business checking each other. Members of the public "distrust power and its potential for abuse in any setting, public or private . . . [although] most Americans are more fearful of state power than of business power" (Lipset and Schneider, 1983, pp. 256-59). But there is a fundamental difference in the structure of the competition between firms and that of the competition between parties that makes market competition, at least for commodities, seem more benign than political competition. In the commodity market, the consumer is not a competitor, but an interested and favored third party. Not being a member of the competing firms, he has everything to gain from their competition, no matter who wins. In electoral competition, on the other hand, the citizen is a participant in the conflict; thus, like an owner of an enterprise, he can expect to win those things for which he voted only if his side wins. In the commodity market all consumers gain something from the competition, no matter who wins a greater share of the market, but in political competition, if it is closely contested, only a little over half the citizenry gains its partisan objectives.

Put differently, for third parties—like consumers in the market—competition is always a positive sum game, while in politics it is a zero sum game. Positive sum games permit greater harmony (indeed, they permit Pareto optimality), while zero sum games are patently antagonistic.

For the ordinary person the labor market is quite another matter, yet competition there occurs (as we have seen) within a general agreement about the hierarchy of income. There is, however, no such agreed upon hierarchy of political influence, in which each group would leap over the others and place itself at the top (Verba and Orren, 1985, ch. 9). Unlike competition for income, competition for influence takes place without any consensus as to who should have what, and is therefore bound to be more antagonistic in nature.

There is a more fundamental reason for these different assessments of justice in the very concept of conflict in the two domains. As suggested above, the market can claim that, in some sense, when one person gains something others gain something too. In this fashion economists from Adam Smith on have been able to claim—and a large section of the American public to accept—the idea of a harmony of interest. Democratic theory and its popular interpretations are less happily endowed. Except for Rousseau—and he only by assuming people abandoned their particular interests—democratic theory has located the harmony of interest in the preservation of a framework within which an accepted conflict of interest takes place. The "harmony" does not arise from the reciprocal advantages which each party to the conflict receives from the other's advantage, as in the market, but rather from an exterior, partially removed, joint advantage in maintaining that conflict in peace, if not in actual harmony. Democratic theory assumes a conflict of interests and seeks to channel it, while market theory assumes that underlying the conflict is a harmony of interests. Since questions of justice arise only in situations of conflict, the acute sense of conflict that is present in politics but not in markets stimulates the justice nerve with greater force and arouses sensitivity to political injustice.

Summary and Implications for Political Economy and Justice

The public is endowed with an active sense of justice, a sense that has been said to be "the basic template for organizing one's view of the world" (Lerner, 1981, p. 23). This sense of justice seems to influence judgments of candidates more than does perceived self-interest (Tyler et al., forthcoming); it is employed in interpersonal relations (Lerner, 1981; Mikula, 1980), and in appraising the police (Tyler & Folger, 1980), the courts (Sarat, 1977; Thibaut and Walker, 1975, Tyler, 1984), and not least, market processes (Curtin, 1977; Hochschild, 1981; Rainwater, 1974; Tyler and Caine, 1981). However, partly for the reasons given and partly because the market has been an enormously fruitful device for generating wealth and relieving poverty, the public favors the market.

What happens in a political economy in which the market is regarded as "fair and wise" and political practices, at least, are regarded as neither? In such a society, however much people sympathize with the unemployed, the handicapped, and even children, they will regard these nonproductive others as externalities, for in the market they are undeserving. People tend to prefer somewhat more egalitarian outcomes than the market provides, but their love of market methods inhibits them from advocating any solutions that seem to frustrate these methods. Even where the market's methods are thought to be unfair to certain groups, such as blacks or women, the intrusion of the government into the sacred market precincts is often regarded with suspicion, for the government's program of rectification trespasses on the evaluation of persons by the market's process of revealed contribution. Where government purposes are approved, their implementation is stifled, at least partly because such implementation violates market fairness norms. Belief in these norms weakens the belief, say, that a worker's child does not have a fair chance at success (Schlozman and Verba, 1979, p. 110), as well as a veridical perception of one's own life chances. Astigmatism of this sort also weakens collective effort, through unions and labor parties, to alter life chances. Minimal government is assured and people are endowed with more commodities and fewer collective goods. The dynamism of history is confined to market dynamics—technical and material, but not ethical. In an imperfect world, employing imperfect mechanisms to achieve these flawed results may be the best we can do, but to give up so easily is contrary to people's belief in their capacity to control their own destinies.

Perceptions and Structures

We have argued that the preference for market justice over political justice has deep structural roots in the purposes and values of the two institutions, in the way they satisfy wants, in their differential employment of justice criteria, and in the levels of popular justice assessments in the two domains. We have seen how the attributions of causes, how the differences between initial distribution and redistribution, and how the application of rights differentially affect justice claims. The perceived harmony of interest in the market was contrasted with the perception of conflict in politics. While these structural effects are indeed significant, at an even deeper level they are themselves partly perceptual, ideological. That is, social structures are vulnerable to variable "definitions of the situation" (Magnusson, 1981; Mischel, 1968), to the "social construction of reality" (Berger and Luckman, 1967)—in short, to ideology (Geertz, 1964; Lane, 1962). Ideologies are, on the one hand, the joint products of both culture and what people bring to an interpretation, and on the other, "structures"—or what may be said to be "objectively" there—of dispositions and circumstances, of culture and science (Kardiner, Linton, DuBois, and West, 1945, p. 34; Nisbett and Ross, 1980). While interpretations of justice, as parts of ideologies, are more cultural and dispositional than other parts, they take their cues from perceptions of circumstances. They are not given in a situation; they are constructions placed upon situations.

At least three kinds of current evidence support the independence of perceptions (including what we shall call "the community point of view") from structural determination and from perceived material self-interest: (1) research showing that concepts of justice are only loosely related to perceptions of self-interest (e.g., Tyler et al., forthcoming); (2) research showing that people seem to vote more according to national news of unemployment and inflation than according to their own perceived benefits and burdens (Kiewiet, 1983; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979); and (3) research documenting what we have called "sociological release" (Lane, 1978b). On this last point, it has been found that it is their ideologies, quite independent of their relative incomes, that determine people's attitudes toward income distribution and their perceptions of social advantage and disadvantage (Jennings, 1983; Verba and Orren, 1985, p. 180). Like Mannheim's (1949) intellectuals, people have already been partially liberated from the perspectives of their social positions, and therefore from structural determination.

Without greatly modifying (except for a change in policy emphasis) the institutions that have served us reasonably well, without weakening the justice of earned deserts that is both ethically honorable and psychologically rooted in our desire to be the cause of our fate, and without going against the grain by undermining materialist values, can we reconceptualize social structures to offer a different, and, I think, more veridical construction of reality? We focus on two reconceptualizations: (1) contributions to production, often slighted by egalitarian socialists (e.g., Harrington, 1973) and by philosophers of justice (see comments by Galston, 1980, p. 223; Rescher, 1966, p. 89), and (2) taking a community point of view.

Contributions to production. (*1*) Instead of being based on personhood, or on the idea that we deserve equal concern from government because we are "human beings with the capacity to make plans and give justice" (Dworkin, 1977, p. 82), public justice might be based on the idea that we all contribute to society—not, it is true, that we contribute equally, but that we all contribute something. In a full employment society (this is the policy change), the problem of deserts is partially solved: while children and the handicapped are embraced by an unambiguous justice of need, everyone else—including those contributing to child care in the home—is embraced by a justice of earned deserts. Although difficult to achieve, a full employment society is not impossible (viz. Sweden) and it is better than guaranteed incomes which both erode work efforts (Danziger and Associates, 1981) and violate the justice of earned deserts. We may keep the market's preferred "fair wage" measured by private net marginal productivity (provided this productivity is everywhere equal, and equal to social net marginal productivity [Pigou, 1949, pp. 549–50; but see Thurow, 1973, pp. 70–73]), and publicly supplement the incomes of those who are below some minimal standard of living. Since people's unfavorable assessments of welfare payments are based on the suspicion that the payees are not trying to earn, rather than that they are not actually "earning," their incomes, supplementary benefits escape popular obloquy. And with this change come some of the benefits of the republican ideal: we are all members of the Republic because we all contribute to it.

(2) Employing the justices of equality and need in its educational and health policies, the government creates human capital that promotes productivity quite as efficiently as does physical capital. Thus, the justices of equality and need can also add to productivity. By these and other means the government creates

wealth, and does not merely redistribute it. As a producer, government may fairly claim its own income by the justice of earned deserts.

(3) To accept the market's criteria of "contribution to production" is to ignore history, the history of the many previous contributions to productivity that make possible the current high level of payments to members of affluent societies. If we are pygmies standing on the shoulders of giants, what is owed to the pygmies and what to the giants, or to the giants' inheritors, society? Without a method and without consideration of incentive effects, Hobhouse's (1922, pp. 161–63) argument along these lines remains barren, but it has far-reaching implications that deserve attention: wages, interest, and profits owe so much to society that their allotments by the market are arbitrary, because they do not accurately reflect contributions to productivity. Social benefits, then, may be seen as society's return to individuals of its inherited contribution to productivity. Taxes may be seen as payment to society for its trusteeship of the giants' past contribution.

(4) By one set of calculations, the market rewards people as much on the basis of luck and chance as on the basis of performance (Jencks, 1973). As a kind of Darwinian device, the market's reward to chance factors does not alter its productive efficiency, nor the fruitfulness of its incentives, but it does alter its justice—and therefore the injustice of "taking" mentioned earlier. This consideration relaxes the relationship between justice and productivity that forms one basis for the preference of the market's justice of earned deserts.

The community point of view. Without giving up their cherished individualism, people can take a community point of view with at least six relevant effects. (1) As we have seen, viewing the world from the bottom up, people see processes rather than outcomes, emphasizing individual deserts rather than the overall shape of a resulting distribution. The community point of view restores a more egalitarian attention to distribution.

(2) Government, market, and other partial accounting systems are always incomplete from the community point of view, for there are always costs and benefits representing externalities for the unit involved: governments issue regulations for which firms pay the administrative costs; firms profit from relocations, pollution, and possibly unemployment, for which communities bear the costs; government policies have unintended effects for which "community impact," "family impact," and other impact studies are commissioned. In some sense these represent "injustices," that is, undeserved or unmerited benefits and burdens. While economic rent and windfall profits and their opposites are inevitable, accounting systems that embrace these externalities (e.g., Bauer and Fenn, 1972; Schultze, 1977; Sheldon and Moore, 1968; Terleckyj, 1975) reveal the deficiencies of market and governmental accounting by incorporating more of the community point of view. Inevitably, the preference for market justice and the concept of earned deserts is affected by the changed perspective.

where is
#3?

(4) The segmented accounting systems of individuals, like those of the market and government, distort perceptions affecting justice assessments. For example, popular perceptions of government discretion, and therefore of unconstrained bias, often rest on the failure to see the necessity of government tradeoffs, especially, but not solely, in terms of the logic of taxes, expenditures, and deficits, leading to a "something for nothing" mentality (Sears and Citrin, 1982). In a segmented accounting system it is "costless" to want everything and to see injustice in any denial. The community point of view

asks the public to internalize these choices: "What am I willing to give up for the policies and services desired?" Thus some of the constraints seen to apply to firms in the market are also seen to apply to government choices, and governments may be perceived as applying justice with less freely available discretion.

(5) The market's advantage over the polity seems to lie in its solution to the problem of free riders pursuing "the logic of collective action" (Olson, 1971)—a moral problem as well as an economic one. But introduce any common good, such as clean air or a healthy and safe environment, and market forces lead to a less felicitous solution, sometimes called "the tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968), collectivizing injustice as well as impoverishment. While the community point of view seems to rely on moral incentives, in the tragedy of the commons it enlists material incentives and the value of productivity discussed above. Indeed, in the tragedy of the commons, market calculations of individually earned deserts lead to lower productivity.

(6) From the community point of view political conflicts are like labor-management quarrels over the disposition of profits: they are frankly quarrels. As in the harmonic view of the market, benefits to others are also, if in lesser degree, benefits to the self, partly because of the market itself: the grocer, made unhappy by the taxes he pays to support welfare, is happy to receive the custom of his welfare clients. The community point of view makes the connection.

Without entering here into the crucial economic implications of these changes in perception, it is clear that reinterpreting productivity and looking at the world from a community point of view somewhat erode the structural advantages of market justice over political justice; these perspectives represent counterweights in the scales of justice now so unevenly tilted against political justice in favor of market justice.

Note

An earlier version of this paper was delivered as the inaugural Hugo Wolfsohn Memorial Lecture, May 1, 1985, Melbourne, Australia. I wish to thank the History of Ideas Unit, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, for hospitality while I prepared this paper, and the Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University, for its continuing generous support.

References

Ackerman, Bruce A. 1980. *Social Justice in the Liberal State.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Barrett-Howard, Edith, and Tom R. Tyler. Forthcoming. Procedural Justice as a Criterion in Allocation Decisions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.*

Barry, Brian. 1973. *The Liberal Theory of Justice.* Oxford: Clarendon.

Bauer, Raymond A., and Dan H. Fenn, Jr. 1972. *The Corporate Social Audit.* New York: Russell Sage.

Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckman. 1967. *The Social Construction of Reality.* Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Anchor.

Brickman, Philip. 1977. Preference for Inequality. *Sociometry,* 40:303–10.

Brickman, Philip, Robert Folger, Erica Goode, and Yaacov Schul. 1981. Microjustice and Macrojustice. In Melvin J. Lerner and Sally C. Lerner, eds., *The Justice Motive in Social Behavior.* New York: Plenum.

Cahn, Edmond N. 1964. *The Sense of Injustice.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press. (Originally published in 1949.)

Compton Advertising, Inc. 1975. *National Survey of the U.S. Economic System: A Study of Public Understanding and Attitudes.* New York: Compton.

Crosby, Faye J. 1982. *Relative Deprivation and Working Women.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Curtin, Richard T. 1977. *Income Equity Among U.S. Workers: The Bases and Consequences of Deprivation.* New York: Praeger.

Danziger, Sheldon, and Associates. 1981. How Income Transfer Payments Affect Work, Savings, and Income Distribution: A Critical Review. *Journal of Economic Literature,* 19: 975–1028.

Deutsch, Morton. 1975. Equity, Equality, and Need: What Determines Which Value Will Be Used as the Basis of Distributive Justice? *Journal of Social Issues,* 31:139–49.

Dworkin, Ronald. 1977. *Taking Rights Seriously.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Feinberg, Joel. 1973. *Social Philosophy.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Galston, William A. 1980. *Justice and the Human Good.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Geertz, Clifford. 1964. Ideology as a Cultural System. In David Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent.* New York: Free Press.

Hardin, Garrett R. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. *Science,* 162:1243–48.

Hare, Richard Mervyn. 1963. *Freedom and Reason.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Harman, Gilbert. 1983. Justice and Moral Bargaining. *Social Philosophy and Policy,* 1:114–31.

Harrington, Michael. 1973. *Socialism.* New York: Bantam.

Hart, H. L. A. 1961. *The Concept of Law.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Heider, Fritz. 1958. *The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations.* New York: Wiley.

Hobhouse, Leanard Trelawney. 1922. *The Elements of Social Justice.* London: Allen & Unwin.

Hochschild, Jennifer L. 1981. *What's Fair? American Beliefs about Distributive Justice.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Inglehart, Ronald. 1981. Post-Materialism in an Environment of Insecurity. *American Political Science Review,* 75:880–900.

Jencks, Christopher. 1973. *Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America.* New York: Harper, Colophon Books.

Jennings, M. Kent. 1983. Trends in the Perception of Social Injustice. Presented at the annual meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Oxford.

Jouvenel, Bertrand de. 1951. *The Ethics of Redistribution.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kardiner, Abram, Ralph Linton, Cora DuBois, and James West. 1945. *The Psychological Frontiers of Society.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Katona, George, and Burkhard Strumpel. 1978. *A New Economic Era.* New York: Elsevier North Holland.

Katz, Daniel, Barbara A. Gutek, Robert L. Kahn, and Eugenia Barton. 1975. *Bureaucratic Encounters: A Pilot Study in the Evaluation of Government Services.* Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research.

Kaufman, Walter. 1973. *Without Guilt and Justice: From Decidophobia to Autonomy.* New York: Wyden.

Kiewiet, Roderick D. 1983. *Macroeconomics and Micropolitics: The Electoral Effects of Economic Issues.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kinder, Donald R., and Roderick D. Kiewiet. 1979. Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgements in Congressional Elections. *American Journal of Political Science,* 23: 495–527.

Ladd, Everett C., and Charles D. Hadley. 1976. *Political Parties and Political Issues.* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Lane, Robert E. 1959. The Fear of Equality. *American Political Science Review,* 53:35–51.

Lane, Robert E. 1962. *Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does.* New York: Free Press.

Lane, Robert E. 1972. *Political Man.* New York: Free Press.

Lane, Robert E. 1978a. Autonomy, Felicity, Futility: The Effects of the Market Economy on Political Personality. *Journal of Politics,* 40:2–24.

Lane, Robert E. 1978b. Interpersonal Relations and Leadership in a "Cold Society." *Comparative Politics,* 10:443–59.

Lane, Robert E. 1982. Government and Self-Esteem. *Political Theory,* 10:5–31.

Lerner, Melvin J. 1980. *The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion.* New York: Plenum.

Lerner, Melvin J. 1981. The Justice Motive in Human Relations. In Melvin J. Lerner and Sally C. Lerner, eds., *The Justice Motive in Social Behavior.* New York: Plenum.

Lewis, Alan. 1982. *The Psychology of Taxation.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

Lindblom, Charles E. 1977. *Politics and Markets: The World's Politico-Economic Systems.* New York: Basic Books.

Lindblom, Charles E. 1982. The Market as Prison. *Journal of Politics,* 44:324–36.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, and William Schneider. 1983. *The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and Government in the Public Mind.* New York: Free Press.

Magnusson, David, ed. 1981. *Toward a Psychology of Situations.* Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Mannheim, Karl. 1949. *Ideology and Utopia.* Trans. Lovis Wirth and Edward Shils. New York: Harcourt, Brace.

Marshall, Alfred. 1938. *Principles of Economics,* 8th ed. London: Macmillan.

McClosky, Herbert, and John Zaller, 1985. *The American Ethos: Public Attitudes Toward Capitalism and Democracy.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Mikula, Gerold, ed. 1980. *Justice and Social Interactions: Experimental and Theoretical Contributions from Psychological Research.* Bern: Huber.

Mill, John Stuart. 1910. *Utilitarianism.* In *Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government.* London: Dent.

Miller, Warren E., Arthur H. Miller, and Edward J. Schneider. 1980. *American National Election Data Sourcebook, 1952–1978.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Mischel, Walter. 1968. *Personality and Assessment.* New York: Wiley.

Moore, Barrington, Jr. 1978. *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt.* New York: Macmillan.

Nisbett, Richard, and Lee Ross. 1980. *Human*

Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgement. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

NORC (National Opinion Research Center) Survey. 1981. *Public Opinion,* 4(Aug./Sept.):27.

NORC 1984. *Public Opinion,* 17(Oct./Nov.):30.

Nozick, Robert. 1974. *Anarchy, State, and Utopia.* New York: Basic Books.

Olson, Mancur. 1971. *The Logic of Collective Action,* rev. ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Parsons, Talcott. 1951. *The Social System.* Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Perkins, Wesley H., and Wendell Bell. 1980. *Alienation and Social Justice in England and the United States: The Polity and the Economy.* Vol. 3 of *Comparative Social Research.* Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Pigou, Arthur C. 1949. *The Economics of Welfare,* 4th ed. London: Macmillan.

Pole, J. R. 1978. *The Pursuit of Equality in American History.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Pomper, Gerald M. 1985. The Presidential Election. In Gerald M. Pomper, ed., *The Election of 1984.* Chatham, NJ: Chatham.

Potter, David M. 1954. *People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Przeworski, Adam. 1980. Material Bases of Consent: Economics and Politics in a Hegemonic System. In Maurice Zeitlin, ed., *Political Power and Social Theory.* Vol. 1. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Rae, Douglas. 1981. *Equalities.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Rainwater, Lee. 1974. *What Money Buys: Inequality and the Social Meaning of Income.* New York: Basic Books.

Rawls, John. 1971. *A Theory of Justice.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Rescher, Nicholas. 1966. *Distributive Justice: A Constructive Critique of the Utilitarian Theory of Distribution.* Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

Robinson, Joan. 1958. *The Accumulation of Capital.* London: Macmillan.

Ross, W. David. 1939. *Foundations of Ethics.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Runciman, W. G. 1966. *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Sarat, Austin. 1977. Studying American Legal Culture: An Assessment of Survey Evidence. *Law and Society Review,* 11:427–88.

Schlozman, Kay L., and Sidney Verba. 1979. *Injury to Insult: Unemployment, Class, and Political Response.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Schultze, Charles L. 1977. *The Public Use of Private Interest.* Washington, D.C.: Brookings.

Sears, David O., and Jack Citrin. 1982. *Tax Revolt: Something for Nothing in California.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Sheldon, Eleanor B., and Wilbert E. Moore, eds. 1968. *Indicators of Social Change: Concepts and Measurements.* New York: Russell Sage.

Sidorsky, David. 1983. Contextualization, Pluralism, and Distributive Justice. *Social Philosophy and Policy,* 1:172–95.

Terleckyj, Nestor E. 1975. *Improvements in the Quality of Life: Estimates of Possibilities in the United States, 1974–1983.* Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association.

Thibaut, John, and Laurens Walker. 1975. *Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis.* Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Thurow, Lester. 1973. Toward a Definition of Economic Justice. *The Public Interest,* no. 31: 56–80.

Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1945. *Democracy in America.* 2 vols. Trans. H. Reeve; ed. Phillips Bradley. New York: Knopf.

Tyler, Tom R. 1984. The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants' Evaluations of Their Courtroom Experience. *Law and Society Review,* 18:51–74.

Tyler, Tom R., and Andrew Caine. 1981. The Influence of Outcomes and Procedures on Satisfaction with Formal Leaders. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 41:642–55.

Tyler, Tom R., and Robert Folger. 1980. Distributional and Procedural Aspects of Satisfaction with Citizen-Police Encounters. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology,* 1:281–92.

Tyler, Tom R., Kenneth Rasinski, and Kathleen McGraw. Forthcoming. The Influence of Perceived Injustice on the Endorsement of Political Leaders. *Journal of Applied and Social Psychology.*

Utne, Mary K., and Robert E. Kidd. 1980. Equity and Attribution. In Gerold Mikula, ed., *Justice and Social Interaction: Experimental and Theoretical Contributions from Psychological Research.* Bern: Huber.

Verba, Sidney, and Gary R. Orren. 1985. *Equality in America: The View from the Top.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Weber, Max. 1947. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations.* Trans. T. Parsons. New York: Oxford University Press.

Williamson, Jeffrey G., and Peter H. Lindert. 1980. *American Inequality: A Macroeconomic History.* New York: Academic Press.

Robert E. Lane is Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520.

FROM TRAGEDY TO HIERARCHY AND BACK AGAIN: WOMEN IN GREEK POLITICAL THOUGHT

ARLENE W. SAXONHOUSE
University of Michigan

The earliest attempts at a theoretical understanding of politics occur in the city-states of ancient Greece. Women had no place in the politics of those cities. However, the Greek tragedians and philosophers raised questions about the fundamental assumptions underlying political life by introducing women into their writings. Thus, women appear in some Greek tragedies as a counter to the male sense of political efficacy—the sense that men can create through speech and ignore the facts of physical creation entailed in the process of reproduction. A discussion of two tragedies, The Seven Against Thebes *and the* Antigone, *suggests how the failure of male political leaders to acknowledge the demands of the physical and that which is different brings on tragedy. The Socratic response in the* Republic *is to overcome tragedy by making the male and the female the same. Aristotle attempts to incorporate sexual difference in the theoretical framework of hierarchy. Finally, there is a brief consideration of the role of the pre-Socratic philosophers in setting the agenda for the Greeks' confrontation with the problems of incorporating difference into the political community.*

The Greeks introduced the concept of politics to the Western world; their city-states, or poleis, were the arenas in which citizens might act together, sometimes seeking domination over other cities, sometimes creating orderly sets of rules by which they might govern themselves, sometimes finding in their communal actions glory as cities or as individuals. The Greek philosophers, reflecting on the nature of the polis, gave to the city its theoretical meaning as a realm of potential justice as well as of conflict, of human nobility as well as of fatuity. But always this was the world of men; men were the actors, the seekers of glory, the pursuers of power. They were the ones who debated in the assemblies, who decided on public policies, who gave expression to the values of the city. The women of Greece were not part of that world.

Conceptions of politics and the models employed to analyze political relations still reflect their origins in the masculine world of the polis, with its concern for domination, self-rule, order, and glory. While the Western intellectual tradition may have accepted the practice of the Greek polis as revelatory of the original meaning of politics, the philosophers and playwrights of ancient Athens reflected critically on that world. In particular, they questioned for their audiences the

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 80 NO. 2 JUNE, 1986

focus on power and its pursuit, and the centrality of rationality and its efficacy in ordering the chaotic world of experience. To raise questions about the masculine world of power and reason—a world focused on male potency—they turned to the female, for in her difference from the male she revealed a diversity in nature that threatened the physical order and rational control at which the polis aimed. The male in the Greek tragedies seeks a simplicity, a uniformity, a world he can comprehend through the intellect. When confronted with the female, he must face the problem of difference and complexity, for she introduces the issue of reproduction, which underscores the male's dependence on what is other. The female forces the Greek authors to raise questions and reservations about the ancient polis as a realm of domination and simplicity. These authors indicate for us how the female and the questions she raises about the efficacy of reason and the centrality of power and authority must be acknowledged in all understandings of the nature of the political world, and in the attempt to incorporate that world into theoretically simplified structures.

The life of citizen women in fifth century B.C. Athens was a sheltered one, brief and limited primarily to the production of citizens for the polis and sons to carry on the family religion. However, the portrayal of women in the works of the Athenian playwrights and philosophers is far more complex and sophisticated than the facts of women's daily lives might lead us to believe. Though women themselves probably did not attend theatrical performances, the city of adult males saw on stage powerful women—women whose existence, as the poets reflected on the human condition, could not be denied (Gomme, 1937; Just, 1975; Kitto, 1951, pp. 219–34; Lefkowitz, 1981, pp. 4–11; Pomeroy, 1975, pp. 58–60). Into their vision of themselves as human—somewhere between gods and animals—the poets introduced the female as a constant reminder of the diversity out of which the world was made, and as a constant warning against the attempt to see the world as one, as uniform and therefore subject to simple answers and rational control. The closeting of women in the home did not shut out their existence from the consciousness of the male poets or of the male citizens for whom they wrote.

The aphorism "know thyself," originally engraved on the Greek temple at Delphi, has often been adopted by political theorists of the modern age. Hobbes, for example, uses it to indicate that we must know our passions, those interior motions that drive us into conflict with others. Rousseau recalls the motto in order to underscore our need to discover our origins, what we were before fateful accidents of history took away knowledge of our true selves. Both Hobbes and Rousseau take the motto as an exhortation to discover one's own nature. For the Greeks it had a somewhat different meaning. "Know thyself," *gnothi seauton,* meant to know the limits of human activity or power, to recognize that as human one was not immortal, and more importantly, that one was not omnipotent—particularly that one could not control all through human reason. The female on the Greek stage forced men into an awareness of the inadequacies of the attempt to control all, of the inability of human courage and human intelligence—often expressed through political action—to dominate the natural world through the denial of variability. He who tried to dominate may have gained stature as the hero, but he was the tragic hero, since such attempts at power and at the imposition of simplicity brought only disaster. Women brought the hero back to what we might call a variable, empirical reality; their presence suggested that there was something other than the abstract city the men had created, and for which they fought.

It was in the structure of the city that the male showed his most courageous attempt to create by giving birth through institutions, thus ignoring the importance of the female for human reproduction. Many of the Greek tragedies, though, indicate the inadequacy of such assertions of political power when they are not moderated by recognition of the variability of nature—a concept of nature based on physical rather than intellectual generation, which thus arises from diversity rather than from simplicity. The male on the Greek stage who tries to live without acknowledging the female and the diversity she reveals encounters tragedy. The female, even in her varied manifestations on stage, illustrates the dependence of the human being on others. She, as different from the male, but also needing the male, underscores the diversity of the world, and the falsity of any vision of self-satisfied independence, omnipotence, or simplicity. This is not to suggest that all women in the Greek plays are the same; certainly there are many differences among the female characters themselves. Rather, in whatever role they appear, women raise for men the problem of difference. Tragedy, as the Greek playwrights portray it, is not caused by women, but rather by the failure of the hero to recognize man's relationship to a diverse natural world and the need to adapt to that diversity. The male, in the rational construction of political order, thinks he can accomplish too much. Greek tragedies reveal the limits of human rationality and human art. For the Greeks, it is women, absent themselves from the audience of citizens watching the plays, who cause men to know themselves.

In this essay I will consider two very different Greek tragedies, Aeschylus's *The Seven Against Thebes* and Sophocles' *Antigone*, to illustrate some of the themes suggested above.[1] I will then offer some comments on how the philosophers of the fourth century B.C. unsuccessfully tried to deal with and ease the tensions explored by the playwrights of the previous century. I conclude by returning to the earliest philosophers, the so-called pre-Socratics, to suggest how they laid the foundations for the Greeks' intellectual assessment of the city and the female.

Tragedy: The Failure of Male Omnipotence

Aeschylus's *The Seven Against Thebes*

Aeschylus's *The Seven Against Thebes* is the final play of his version of the Oedipus cycle.[2] Oedipus has died cursing his two sons, the offspring of his incestuous marriage. His sons, Eteocles and Polyneices, agree to take turns ruling Thebes, but Eteocles then refuses to yield his power. Polyneices, eager to claim his turn, returns to Thebes with an army from the neighboring city of Argos. The structure of the play is simple: the hostile army with Polyneices at its head has attacked; Eteocles presents himself as the calm leader of a besieged city; a chorus of terrified townswomen sing of their fears. Eteocles worries that they will instill fear and disorder among his soldiers. During the middle part of the play a Theban messenger describes the Argive warriors who wait for battle at Thebes' seven gates. At the seventh gate stands Polyneices, and it is at that gate that Eteocles and Polyneices meet and kill one another in the subsequent battle. At the end, Antigone and her sister Ismene mourn their brothers, and a decree enacted by the city council is announced, proclaiming that Eteocles is to be given full burial rites, while Polyneices' body is to be cast unburied outside the city.

As with all Greek tragedies, the story of *The Seven Against Thebes* is embedded in a series of myths that lie behind the action and are subtly referred to throughout the play, thereby underscoring its central themes. For our purposes, the myth of autochthony, or birth from the earth, gives meaning to the action of the play. Thebes was first founded by men born of dragon teeth planted in the earth—that is, the earth was mother, not the human female. The play begins with Eteocles' appeal to his earthborn ancestor, Cadmus (1; cf. 9).[3] He looks towards origins that exclude the female, and thereby denies human motherhood (Caldwell, 1973). In so denying his own origins, he envisions the perfection of a city without women. However, it is a perfection both nature and the playwright deny him.

After reminding us of his autochthonos ancestry, Eteocles portrays himself as a captain of a ship "with hand upon the tiller" (3). As such he urges the defense of the city, equating it with the earth, the beloved mother who nourishes her offspring (15-20; cf. 69). The women, who will make up the chorus, are not perceived as mothers; defending the city is not for the sake of the women within its walls, as it was for the Trojan heroes of Homer's *Iliad* (bk. 6), but for the earth that has replaced the human female.

Into this vision of male exclusiveness intrude the Theban women. They are in a panic, beseeching the gods to save them from the violence raging outside the city's walls. Their screams and their disorderly movement call forth from Eteocles, who has just presented himself as the captain with a firm hand on the tiller, one of the most famous misogynist speeches from ancient tragedy. *Thremmata,* he calls them, vile things (181). Can't you keep still? You endanger the city with your disordered screams. Like the women who complained about the sounds of the approaching army, Eteocles now uses vivid verbs to describe the wailings of the female chorus, howling like dogs, hateful to those who practice moderation (186). Then he implores, "Whether in good or evil times, may I never live with the race of women" (188-89). Women filled with terror, as are the ones before him, cause evil to the household and to the city (191). Eteocles refuses to acknowledge that without this "evil" there would be neither household nor city. The age of earthborn men is past, despite his invocations and his dreams. If the city is to survive, if the household is to survive, then he must live with the race of women. But Eteocles sees the female only as a danger, because she alerts men to what is other than the city and the earth out of which it grows. Eteocles' reaction to the women is to deny them a place in the city, and to deny that there is anything other than the city. The city is the whole of Eteocles' existence. He believes it would be better if the city could do without women, and creativity could again come from the earth to which he is willing to devote himself. Eteocles' vision is of a city that is one, rather than divided between male and female.

Much of the first third of the play is a confrontation between the fearful females and Eteocles' masculine rejection of their fear. Often this conflict is couched in terms of speech and silence. Eteocles, wishing to live without women, states they must not partake in the counsel of the city; that is, he calls for the women to be silent. They respond by asking him to speak (200-201, 230-32, 261-63). Eteocles, the man with his hand upon the tiller, has and uses logos, while the female, whose shrill wailings spread fear throughout the city, must learn silence. Eteocles, as leader, uses speech to create order by dismissing the feminine passions. The first third of the play concludes with the male controlling both the city and the chorus of women.

During the central part of this play a herald describes each Argive warrior waiting at the gates. Eteocles then sends Theban heroes to meet each one, exhorting them on occasion to fight for their mother—meaning the earth—or recalling their earthborn origins (416, 474). Meanwhile, he ignores the women who live in the city and comprise the chorus. When Eteocles learns that Polyneices stands at the seventh gate, Eteocles resolves to meet him, setting the stage for their mutual death. The chorus reacts strongly to this killing of brother by brother. There is no *geras*, "no old age" for such a pollution (683). The language is suggestive: "No old age" means the pollution is always present; there is no growth, no generation, for this pollution is the denial of generation. The chorus reaffirms the focus on kinship ties, ties which may be in opposition to those created by the city. By denying women earlier in the play, Eteocles acknowledged only the bonds of the city, where all come from the earth and are governed by his reason. By claiming the earth as mother he avoids the complexity of multiple ties of relationship. Because Polyneices is attacking the land, the city, nurture in a common womb is ignored. Meanwhile, the chorus describes Eteocles as a man eager for a killing "not allowed" (694).

The women plead that he be persuaded by them, though he may loathe them (712). Eteocles allows the women to speak, "but briefly," he admonishes (713). They enjoin him, "Do not go to the Seventh Gate" (714), but though they repeat the warning about the stain of shedding his brother's blood, the words of women have no power over him. "You with speech (*logoi*) do not blunt the edge of the sharpened spear," he rebukes them (715). The chorus now sings of the self-killing (*autoktonos*) which will occur when the brothers meet (734). The chorus sees the bond between the two, but Eteocles, as leader of his city, will not allow such ties to muddy the clear distinctions between friend and foe. The simplicity of the definitions of the city cannot, for him, be undermined by the diversity of natural ties.

A messenger enters to report that the city fares well, but the brothers have been joined in the earth, in their common grave. At this point Antigone and Ismene enter to mourn the deaths of their brothers; they describe the common sufferings of the family of Oedipus, this closest of all families, which Eteocles and Polyneices both wished to ignore. The unity which Antigone and Ismene in their mournful song affirm, however, is torn asunder at the final appearance of the messenger, who now reports the decree that will impose distinctions between the brothers. He says, "It is necessary for me to proceed to announce what has seemed best and was approved by the council of this city of Cadmus" (1005–1006). This is the formal language of the assembly. They have met and they have spoken. "It was decreed," the messenger reports, "to bury Eteocles for his loyalty to the land (*chthonos*) with the beloved tomb of the earth (*ge*)" (1008). The city also passed a decree concerning the corpse of Polyneices: it is to be thrown outside the city's walls, where, unburied, it will be fodder for the birds and dogs. This is the punishment for he who warred against the Cadmean land (*chthonos*). Through their speech (1020, 1025), the men of the Cadmean city have separated the brothers.

Antigone rejects this artificial distinction and announces that if no one else is willing to bury Polyneices, she herself will bury him, accepting whatever risk may come from burying her own brother (1026–29). She is not ashamed to disregard the speech of the city, for she is concerned with the community (*koinon*), the wondrous community (*deinon to koinon*) that exists between herself and her brother, who had grown (*pephukamen*) in the self-same womb, child of the same suffering mother and ill-starred father. She is eager to share (*koinonei*) his miseries (1033). In defiance of the city's sense of its own potency, she says, "Let it be decreed by no one (*me dokesato tini*) that hollowbellied wolves will eat his corpse" (1035–36). Against those man-made decrees she stands as a woman: "I, although I am a woman, shall devise this" (1038). When the messenger warns that the city will be forced in these things, Antigone ignores, even mocks, his threats, and in her turn orders that he limit his speech (*me makragorei*) (1053). It is speech on which the city is based. She acts on the basis of bonds of kinship, not the bonds created by the words of assemblies.

The chorus of Theban women watching the interchange between Antigone and the messenger is torn in two directions, capturing the tension of the preceding action. Half of the chorus denies the decree and sides with Antigone. They acknowledge the problem in the justice of human decrees: it has no consistency over time, whereas the ties of the family appear natural and eternal, always to be respected. The other half of the chorus bends to the city's decree, accepting the unity between justice and the speech of the city, and thus the distinction between brothers that the city can impose. The play leaves us with no happy conclusion. Though Thebes still stands, the brothers are dead and the women are divided. Eteocles, fulfilling the curse of Oedipus, pollutes the city by shedding his brother's blood. Eteocles' misogyny, based on his rejection of what is other and his desire to see the world as simple and orderly, had been necessary for him to face his brother in battle. After his death the city, now dependent on its own reason, continues to deny the diversity of ties offered by women. Aeschylus's play ends unresolved, and we learn from Sophocles' *Antigone* that the tragedy continues.

Sophocles' *Antigone*

Sophocles wrote the *Antigone* partially in homage to the work of his predecessor, Aeschylus, for the play begins where *The Seven Against Thebes* leaves off.[4] In Sophocles' version, though, it is not the counsel of elders, but Creon, brother to Jocasta and uncle to Oedipus's children, who decrees that the body of Polyneices shall not be honored with the rites of burial. Sophocles' play begins as Antigone announces her plan to defy Creon's orders: She will bury the body of her brother and asks for Ismene's aid. Ismene resists, pleading with Antigone not to attempt the burial, for women are weak and have not the strength to fight against the decrees of the male in the city. Ismene equates speech and power. Antigone scorns such an equation. Neither Creon's speech nor his physical resources threaten her. She envisions forces which transcend the speech of the city. These are the gods of the dead, who stand as an affirmation of the limited strength of the political world that Ismene, with her focus on the present, fears.

The tragedy moves on inexorably as Antigone performs the burial rites, is caught, confronts Creon, and is sent to certain starvation in a cave outside the city. Choosing immediate death and union with those who are beloved to her —i.e., those who have died—she hangs herself. Creon's son Haemon, Antigone's betrothed, follows Antigone to her death, whereupon Creon's wife also commits suicide and Creon, who at the beginning of the day was the firm and certain ruler in a city just recovering from a traumatic war, is shattered; he has learned the importance of custom and respect for the gods that in his arrogance he had originally ignored by passing a decree denying the importance of kinship.

Near the beginning of the *Antigone* there is a powerful and justly famous choral ode in which the chorus of Theban elders sings about the "wonders" of man. The translation "wonders" does not, however, capture the tension of the term *deinos*, a word that entails terror as well as wonder. It is precisely this ambiguity which embodies the tragedy of the play, for the wonders of man include all the actions of man's intellect, whereby he has been able to conquer the natural world around him, but which in turn may destroy him.

> Many the wondrous things, and none is more
>   wondrous than the human
> who walks upon the earth . . .
> And she, the greatest of gods, the earth—
> ageless she is, and unwearied—he wears her away
> as the plows go up and down from year to year. . .
> He controls with craft the beasts of the open air,
> walkers on hills . . .
> Speech and windlike thought
> and the feelings which are part of rule in the town
> he has taught to himself.[5]
>
> (332–56)

The portrait is of man the creator against nature. Only death has he been unable to conquer.

The choral ode's optimism about man's capacity to rule matches precisely Creon's vision of himself as the leader of Thebes. He views law as a human creation that springs forth from human speech. Throughout the play there are references to Creon's "orders." Antigone begins the tragedy by asking her sister whether she has heard the "announcement" (*kerugma*) (8; cf. 32, 192, 446). Ismene had accepted Creon's speech as law, and therefore as equivalent to power. Creon's son Haemon views the political as speech as well, asking his father to listen to what the people are saying as they whisper in the corners of the city. Only Antigone denies the efficacy of human speech, scornfully dismissing the spoken decrees of the city's leader. The laws she follows are worthy of respect precisely because they are unwritten and unspoken by men. As such they have always been, and were never the creation of the human intellect. Thus, they are similar to nature, which always exists, but which Creon in his sense of potency feels he can dismiss, and which the chorus praises man for conquering. The uncreated, unwritten laws of the gods stand as a counter to the spoken decrees of the city that Creon rules.

Antigone, though, in denying the efficacy of speech, denies any form of creativity. Her name itself captures her stand: *anti-gone,* against birth. As Antigone becomes devoted to the world of the dead, unmoving and unvaried, she herself is transformed into a male in both the language she uses to describe herself and that used by Creon to refer to her (Pomeroy, 1975, p. 100). In her focus on what has always existed—i.e., on what cannot be created through human efforts and human speech—she fails to understand her own dependence on that which is other: the city and the male. She focuses on a nature that always is, that never comes into being or grows. She herself denies the prospect of marriage, unmoved by Ismene's pleas that she think of her forthcoming marriage to Haemon. Marriage entails creation; the piety Antigone espouses is an anti-life piety, and like the male Homeric heroes, she becomes the warrior whose glory can be achieved only at the moment of death, in the denial of life and of change.

Creon, in turn, thinks too much of creativity and power. Furthermore, his is a creativity of speech against nature rather than within nature, as abstracted from the creative powers of the family as Antigone's piety. Creon's assertion of male potency is set off by his pride in his masculinity, a masculinity he constantly feels is threatened by Antigone's resistance. She has denied his capacity to make and enforce decrees, to create and order the city. "I am not a male (*aner*), but she the male if she rules in this thing," he says (484–85); and later in his discussion with Haemon he asserts, "While I am alive no woman (*gune*) shall rule over me" (525; cf. 670). Throughout the play Creon and Antigone stand in opposition to one another. Their opposition brings on the tragedy, which would not occur were Antigone to yield to the pleas of her sister to allow male potency full expression of itself (in terms of both Creon's decree and the prospective marriage with Haemon), or were Creon's attempts at self-assertion to yield to Antigone's denial of the capacity for human creativity. Antigone, rejecting creativity, relies only on what is, and thus must turn to death itself, while Creon, looking only at what comes into being, ignores—according to Antigone—the demands of what is.

While Antigone may alert the audience to unchanging laws which exist above the city, and to the paltry role of human speech, her presence must be supplemented by Ismene, who, while submitting herself to the power of the city, continues trying to remind both Antigone and Creon of the processes of birth—that is, of the dependence of both on the diversity of nature, which each wishes to deny. During the confrontations between herself and Antigone and between Antigone and Creon, Ismene asks Creon, "Will you kill the bride of your own son?" (568). Creon's vulgar response, "There are the arable fields of others," reveals his refusal to acknowledge the particularity of Antigone (Benardete, 1975, p. 23). For Creon, Antigone differs no more from other women than money-grubbing prophets differ from one another (1055). Creon's mind perceives uniformity and simplicity, while Ismene tries to remind him of the unique harmony between Haemon and Antigone (570). The two protagonists of the play, each defending opposing visions of certainty, destroy each other. Ismene preserves her own status as a female, standing between Antigone and Creon reminding them of marriage and family, yet unable to move the adamantine will of either as each focuses on her or his own vision of the simple and uniform.

Into this world of conflict between Antigone and Creon, which neither Haemon nor Ismene is able to resolve, comes the seer Teiresias, one who knows the ways of the gods and interprets auguries and sacrifices for the leaders of Thebes. He is an intermediary between the gods and men. He also is an intermediary between the male and the female, for upon killing the female of a pair of coupling snakes he was himself transformed into a woman for part of his life. Teiresias thus understands the perspective of both the male and the female, and his role as an intermediary between gods and humans is in part dependent on this double vision.

Unlike Antigone, Teiresias does not deny the value of the city. Rather, he assists in its guidance. When Teiresias first appears, Creon comments that previously he has never deviated from Teiresias's advice. Teiresias responds that therefore Creon has kept the ship of state upright (993-94). But unlike Creon, Teiresias is unwilling to depend entirely on human reason for such guidance. Human intelligence must accept diversity in the world—the gods of the dead as well as the gods of the living, the male as well as the female—and not attempt to transform that diversity into simplicity. Teiresias offers Creon the means of escape from the tragedy about to befall him, but Creon is arrogant in the power of his own intellect and capacity to understand human motivations: "The race of seers all love silver" (1055). Refusing to accept the advice and vision of the prophet, a male turned female and back again, Creon must endure the tragic destruction of his world, a destruction reason is unable to prevent.

The *Antigone* and *The Seven Against Thebes* suggest, in very different ways, how women stood as threats to the masculine image of potency in ancient Greece, reminding men of what they must escape in order to found and preserve the city: the fundamental diversity of nature, which did not yield easily to the imposition of rational simplicity. For Eteocles there was the chorus of Theban women. For Creon there is Antigone, though she herself may want the same simplicity as he, and thus stands as a worthy opponent. Nevertheless, she threatens Creon with her status as different, as set apart from the city which should be, as Creon sees it, seamless. For Creon and Eteocles, the simplicity each desires depends on the denial of the female. Tragedy reveals that such denial is destructive of the polis, which could not survive without reproduction—the process of birth that depends on the commingling of opposites.

Let me now turn to the next century. The problem of women for the polity is always present, raising questions about male rationality and the attempt to create a city that does not depend on what is other. Both Plato and Aristotle try to respond to the threat of women and the tragedy that results from ignoring them.

The Philosophers' Response

Callipolis: Socrates' Escape from Tragedy

The Socrates of Plato's *Republic* is famous—perhaps infamous—for his condemnation of poetry. In the metaphysical critique of poetry in Book X, Socrates describes the poet or artist as being three removes from what is real. In the moral critique of poetry in Books II and III, the gods are shown to be less than divine in their immoral lives. Behind both critiques is a rejection of poetry because it encourages men to see the multiplicity of the world of men and gods (Nichols, 1983a). In Book X Socrates the artist portrays specific—i.e., diverse—objects, rather than uniform or simple ideas—e.g., the idea (or form) of a chair. Artistic representations distract us from simplicity and make us focus on the particular. The critique in Book II is that the epic poets make the gods appear diverse rather than uniform and simple. For example, Socrates asks Adeimantus whether he supposes that "the god is a wizard able treacherously to reveal himself at different times in different *ideas,* at one time actually changing himself and passing his own form into many shapes" (380d).[6] They both conclude, "The god would least of all have many shapes" (381b). Similarly, the recitation of poetry must be excluded, for in the process of reciting poems or acting on stage, men may "undertake seriously to imitate in the presence of many . . . thunder, the noises of winds, hailstorms, axles and pulleys, the voices of trumpets . . . even the sound of dogs, sheep, and birds" (397a). Even laughter disappears, since it is a mode of changing from one form to another—i.e., an acknowledgment of diversity within the world and, worst of all, within a man himself (380c).

Art and the human expression of art is variable and diverse. In Socrates' Callipolis, as he calls this most perfect of all cities, there is to be no changing, no variability. No tragedies, no epics, no comedies will disturb the beautiful unity of the city. However, to achieve this condition of perfection—of completion and wholeness—of which his treatment of poetry is but one manifestation, it is necessary that Socrates conflate the situations of the male and female members of his perfect city. The differences between them must be ignored. Any differences that have defined male and female in the past are to be attributed to convention rather than nature. The natural world, in Socrates' understanding of it in this dialogue, pursues the uniform, not the diverse. It is the conventions of society which have accentuated differences.

This portrait of a natural world of uniformity rather than diversity is what Socrates tries to enforce when in Book V he suggests, "We'll suppose that our guardians and their women must practice the same things" (454d–e). The life of the female in the guardian class in Socrates' city is to be as little different from that of the male as possible. The activities surrounding the distinctive characteristics of the female body—namely, the processes of giving birth—are to be eliminated as much as possible. Making this point, Socrates asks Glaucon, "Do we believe the females of the guardian dogs must guard the things the males guard along with them and hunt with them, and do the rest in common; or must they stay indoors as if they were incapacitated as a result of bearing and rearing the puppies, while the males work and have all the care of the flock?" (451d). The state of pregnancy is ignored and once the child is born to a woman, that child is placed in a pen along with other babies. The mother laden with milk will nurse a child, at intervals determined by her other activities, but she will not know her own child, nor will the care of the child be hers (460c–d). It is, as Glaucon remarks, "an easy-going kind of child-bearing for women guardians, as you tell it" (460d). The processes of birth appear as brief as the moment of conception—hardly to be noticed at all.

The consequences of this conflation of the male and the female in the guardian class are many (Elshtain, 1981, pp. 29–35; Okin, 1979, ch. 1–3), but for my purposes here we must see how it overcomes the ideas of the tragedies of the fifth century. The oppositions between male and female, physical and intellectual, nature and art, and the many and the one, are denied precisely by eliminating the family, the female, and the physical from the city. The tensions thus disappear. But by doing this Socrates creates a city which is a static moment in time. Like the gods he seeks to create in Book II, it has no motion, no capacity for change, and no capacity for self-regeneration. Callipolis is the creation of human speech, the speech of the dialogue engaged in by Socrates and his friends as they talk through the night in Cephalus's house. This speech has no relation to human bodies, which grow, change, give birth, and die—or even eat. The dinner promised (328a) is never served to these men, who devour only words (354a).

When Socrates tries to deal with the question of the regeneration of his city, all sorts of problems and internal contradictions arise. He tries to make prohibitions against incest, but as Aristotle would point out later, the prohibitions do not work. As Socrates goes on and on with his proposals for the proper modes of reproduction, Glaucon notes that the city's rulers must rely on a certain residual eroticism to make the plans work (458d). This is because they have previously eliminated any focus on the body, which could turn a guardian from the whole of which he is a part to an individual body with passions capable of erotic arousal. Furthermore, Socrates' claims concerning the equality of the male and the female are undermined when women are handed over as prizes for the men who are most valorous in battle.

In Book VIII Socrates traces the downfall of the monistic ideal he has envisioned through speech, in the prayers of men who are bound to the cave and to the fundamental variety of the natural world of physical beings (592a–b). The city's failure comes precisely from the incapacity to understand fully the process of regeneration—an incapacity to control, through mathematical knowledge, the seasons and the ways of sex. Because of their failure to combine adequately their mathematical knowledge with the exact movements of the seasons, the guardian rulers arrange for births not propitious for the preservation of the city; decay thus sets in (546a–d).

As the city declines from the aristocracy of Callipolis to the reign of a tyrant, women become distinct from men and their peculiar characteristics become more and more important. In the timocratic regime, the wife, having values different from those of her husband, complains to her son that she is not married to one of the rulers, and that because of her husband's lack of ambition she is at a disadvantage. Her son, she hopes, will do better (549c–d). The point of complete deterioration is when the male has become the female in the description of the tyrant. He is one confined for the most part to his house, where "he lives like a woman, envying any of the other citizens who travel abroad" (597b–c). The circle is completed and we are back again at the conflation of male and female, only here it is the male ruler who becomes the female, not the female ruler who becomes the male. In this respect the similarity in Plato's work between the best, Callipolis, and the worst, tyranny, is striking, and perhaps suggests the inadequacies of both the attempt to impose the male view as the totality of existence and the attempt to make the female dominant. Both lack the capacity for regeneration, and thus both die ignoble deaths. Tyranny is for Socrates the end of the descending regimes. We must wait several centuries for Polybius to turn the decline into a cycle where degeneration can also lead to rebirth.

Socrates' city fails because men do not have the capacity to abstract from nature and make all simple. His desire to create in speech what is abstracted from the physical is evident in his attempt to destroy the boundaries between male and female. Socrates tries to escape the tragedy depicted by the playwrights by obliterating that which brings on tragedy, but he errs as the tragic heroes did by overemphasizing the efficacy of logos. The human body calls him back into the cave, to the tragic fall of his beautiful city to the petty issues of reproduction. The heroic city Socrates has created has a deathlike quality. There is no creativity, no art, no birth; it is a world in which neither male nor female exists, in which the masculine model of rational omnipotence has reigned to create a vision of monist simplicity from which variable poetry, among other things, must be excluded. In a sense, such a city calls forth its own tragedy, for it is a denial of itself. Callipolis becomes a wasteland—a beautiful city which survives only in the speech of its creator.

Aristotle: The Failure of Hierarchy

In the first six chapters of Book II of the *Politics*, Aristotle explicitly rejects Socrates' conflation of male and female, accusing him of turning his city into an individual and ignoring the impious consequences of his proposals (Dobbs, 1985; Saxonhouse, 1982). In contrast, Aristotle tries to deal with observed diversity in the world, not through denial, but through separation and hierarchy. Aristotle recognizes the relation between logos, mind, and the world of the senses, and thus acknowledges variety. He tries valiantly to resolve the problem of diversity by imposing hierarchy, rather than by ignoring or conflating differences. Yet because he is committed to a hierarchy that ensures the rule of the best, he leaves us dissatisfied with what hierarchy can achieve, for while it orders relations among humans, it is not always possible for humans to ensure that its ordering is just. Tragedy thus reappears, as Aristotle recognizes the limits of human reason and reveals the inadequacies of the political world. Tragedy on stage arose from men's discovery that they could not achieve the perfection of the gods. In Aristotle's politics the tragic surfaces not with the violence that we see on stage, but with the acknowledgment that the best is beyond human endeavors. Aristotle attempts to deal with this human failure to achieve divine status not with mournful laments or resignation, but through accepting the second best and acknowledging its limited satisfactions (Zuckert, 1983).

Behind Aristotle's political philosophy lie the twin principles of hierarchy and teleology. According to Aristotle both give order to the natural world. Teleology assures that, undisturbed, the natural growth of animals and plants is in the direction of what is best—that is, toward the most complete expression of its particular form. This is the highest form a living creature can attain, in which, as Aristotle would say, it fulfills its nature and reaches its end: e.g., the colt becomes a horse and the acorn an oak. Motion is purposive. Related to this is hierarchy, which for Aristotle ensures the priority (the authority) of the better over the inferior. On the most basic level, Aristotle claims, this means the authority of the soul over the body (1.5.1254a31).[7] If the soul does not rule, the individual lives a disordered life, in opposition to nature, a condition harmful to the individual (1.5.1254b5–8). Simply put, the mind must rule over the body or the body will not be fed. Hierarchy gives both meaning and a means of survival to the natural world, for it establishes what is best and allows what has come into being to continue to exist. This model is transferred in Aristotle's political work to the social relations within the community, where the better must rule over the inferior, and, according to his first assessment, the master should rule over the slave and the male over the female.

Aristotle's claim concerning the inferiority of the female is based on a variety of assumptions, and is derived from his discussion of the female in his biological works. The female of any species comes into being as a defect of nature, the result of the absence of adequate heat at the moment of conception. Thus, those eager for sons are well advised to conceive when the wind is not blowing from the north, or when the couple is at the height of passion (*Generation of Animals*, 2.1.732a6–7; 3.1.765b10ff., 766a30ff.; 3.2.767b8ff.). Yet while the female may be a defect of nature, she is necessary to keep the species in existence, and Aristotle acknowledges the mutuality of the sexes in the process of production, an acknowledgment Eteocles wished to deny and Socrates to minimize. However, though she may be necessary, she is nevertheless defective, and consequently, in a hierarchical world must be under the authority of the male, who is not defective. The principles of teleology and hierarchy are for Aristotle clear. It is the application of these principles to the world around us which ensures, according to Aristotle, an orderly society in which the inferior accepts the authority of the better, and each individual moves towards that end prescribed by his, her, or its nature.

However, Aristotle was an observer, one who did not wish to deny the power of sight. "We see," begins the discussion of the *Politics*. To write the *Politics* he studied 150 constitutions and their histories. They revealed a world that is not orderly, a world often convulsed by revolutions and political conflicts, as Book V of the *Politics* so vividly records. These conflicts arise because the criteria for determining the hierarchy of better and worse have never been carefully articulated, and men disagree. The criteria, as Aristotle understands them, must refer to what is unseen, what is in the soul. To place those who are better in positions of authority over those who are worse, we must know who is better and who is worse. How are we to do this? Political systems establish such criteria through speech—wealth, birth from citizen parents, education at certain universities or colleges, membership in a certain religious group. But these criteria are external and not based on Aristotle's concept of a natural hierarchy. While hierarchy is Aristotle's attempt to deal with diversity, he sees a fundamental problem with the concept, precisely because our sight does not always reveal who is better and who is worse.

Aristotle reveals the problems with this principle of hierarchy as applied to the political community in Book I of the *Politics*, almost immediately after he has presented it. He turns from generalizations about the growth of a polis to a discussion of the parts of the household, and particularly the master/slave relationship. There are two kinds of slavery: one is conventional, the other according to nature (1.3-5). Conventional slavery, having no basis in nature, is founded only on the principle of conquest, which for Aristotle has nothing to do with better and worse (1.6.1155a25-32). Only corrupt societies—those not based on nature—use conquest as grounds for enslaving people and keeping their children as slaves. Though most slaves are the result of such conquests, this is not, in Aristotle's understanding, sufficient justification for slavery. In a corrupt society such as Athens we find slaves according to convention, but not according to nature—that is, men who are not slaves by nature, but who because of particular circumstances are kept as slaves. The problem is that we cannot see or know the soul, that which, more than the body, defines the natural slave. "It is not entirely easy," Aristotle remarks with due reserve, "to see the beauty of the soul as of the body" (1.5.1255a1).

Though the rule of the worse over the better is not likely to occur in the relations between the male and the female, where the differences between bodies are more apparent than between the bodies of the natural ruler and the natural slave, on occasion a superior female is subject to an inferior male. Though according to Aristotle this is against nature, it can happen. Aristotle does not state that all men are better than all women, only that this is natural; yet, he argues, we cannot be assured that nature is in control at all times. Nature does not always arrange that the child of a slave is slavish, nor that the soul of the female is always inferior to that of the male. To treat all those who live in conquered cities as slaves or all those born female as lacking in sense is to fail to recognize the diversity of nature. The classic example of this is the story of Tecmessa, the wife of Ajax. In Sophocles' play the *Ajax*, when Tecmessa tries to calm Ajax down, urging him not to put on his armor in his present state of rage, she is told by her husband that silence is beautiful in women. Ajax in his madness proceeds to kill all the cattle of the Greeks, thinking that he is killing the Greek heroes themselves. The attempt to silence Tecmessa was a sign of Ajax's failure to see the wisdom in her soul, which outshone his own, though clearly his body—that of the great warrior—was more beautiful than Tecmessa's defective (because female) body (Nichols, 1983b, pp. 181-82).

The problem for Aristotle, the scientific observer of animals and constitutions, known for his empiricism, is precisely the limits of observation; namely, that we cannot see the soul, though this is where we must look if we are to understand goodness. Observable criteria such as wealth, birth, or sex are used by polities to establish worth and hierarchical order. But hierarchy in the city is according to convention, not nature, and thus, while it may be convenient for ordering the social world, is not best.

Plato's Socrates, along with Creon and Eteocles, assumed the capacity of the logos to overcome the problems presented to them by the sexual dimorphism of the human species. The male heroes of the tragedies tried to deal with women by denying them, ignoring their demands and assuming the priority of the creative logos. Socrates tried to eliminate the female by fusing the male and the female. Aristotle accepted the existence of the female, and offered a theoretical construction, hierarchy, that could incorporate in the social structure the diversity of natural and human forms. However, in his investigation of the problem he found that the theory, the logos, resisted application because of the limits of human observation. Sight, which had told

Aristotle so much about the workings of the natural world, was of no use in elaborating accurate criteria of virtue, which could not be seen.

In Book III of the *Politics* Aristotle leads us away from problems of sexual differentiation, which had been critical throughout the first two books, and into the world of citizens, in which the polity makes men equal. He eschews the permanent hierarchies he had tried to find and justify in nature. Yet always behind Aristotle's theories of democracy and oligarchy, stability and revolution, are the questions he has raised about slaves, the subordination of women, and what we can really know about the better, the worse, and the foundations of justice. The artificial equality of citizens in a polity is a practical solution, but one which means the failure of Aristotle's theory, for such equality denies what he would understand as the rule of the best.

Conclusion

Early Greek philosophy of the sixth and early fifth centuries confronted the question of unity and diversity. The philosophers saw a world of variety—a world of animals, humans, plants, stones—beneath which they searched for a source that could unify it all. Some of the early philosophers turned to an underlying substance such as fire, water, or air, explaining that the diversity we see around us derives from the varied forms of that one fundamental element.

This understanding of the world forced these so-called nature philosophers in many cases to deny their senses. The senses did not offer us knowledge of the fundamental elements at the base of the world we observed. The senses perceived a world that was constantly changing. In contrast, the mind was able to look behind the diversity and find unity and order (Snell, 1960, ch. 7). The mind, indeed, was able to show the fallibility of the senses, as in the famous paradoxes of Zeno: An arrow, for example, could never reach a target. In order to do so it would have to travel half the distance to the target, but since there are an infinite number of halves, which the arrow could never cross, it never reaches the target. And yet, the eyes see the arrow hit the target, a fact which the mind knows is impossible, because it knows the arrow can never reach the end of infinity. Therefore, according to the logic of the time, the senses are unreliable and fallible. The eyes see motion and change, whereas in fact there is none.

In the conflict between the mind and the senses, the mind was declared the winner. The males of fifth-century tragedy also declared the mind the winner. They sought simplicity and unity as they ruled over the city. They hoped not to need to deal with a world which might turn them away from the priority and unity of the city, but in so doing they had to deny women, difference, and human reproduction, and thus act much as the philosophers who said that the arrow could not hit the target. Socrates, in *The Republic*, also tried to deny the senses in his abstraction from body and consequent willingness to equate the male and the female. Only Aristotle tried to retain a vision of the world as multiple, and to be valued precisely for its variability. His vision leads, however, to a hierarchical structure that must fail when applied to political life, since for him, as for the other Greek philosophers, the unseen becomes more important than the seen. Again, the tragedy comes from the inadequacy of the human intellect, which cannot transform what is variable and multiple into simplicity, and can neither demand complete silence of women who fear an invading army nor transform the female into the male, as Socrates tries to do. In their diverse roles throughout the corpus of Greek literature, women give the lie to the male's dangerous and tragic love of his own imagined potency, creativity, and intellect, and reveal the potential limits of the masculine political perspectives that we have inherited from the Greeks.

Notes

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1985 annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, as well as at Carleton, Reed, Rutgers, the University of California at San Diego, and the University of Washington.

1. The selection of plays has been determined in part by the desire to study carefully plays I have not discussed before (cf. Saxonhouse, 1980, 1984). *The Seven Against Thebes* will receive more extensive treatment, since political scientists are likely to be less familiar with it than with the *Antigone*. For other treatments of the Greek plays also focusing on the significance of the female, though not always from the same perspective as mine, see Euben (1982), Foley (1981), Pomeroy (1975, pp. 97–119), and Zeitlin (1978).

2. The ideas in this section owe much to Benardete (1967), and Orwin (1980).

3. The numbers in the parentheses here and throughout the discussion of the plays refer to the lines of the Greek texts. The Oxford Classical Texts are used for all Greek authors, unless otherwise indicated. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

4. Particularly helpful in this section were the discussions of the *Antigone* in Knox (1964), and Benardete (1975). Other readings of this tragedy that focus on its significance for those concerned with women in political theory include Elshtain (1982) and the critique of Elshtain by Deitz (1985, pp. 26–30).

5. Apart from the first and last sentences, the translation is that of Elizabeth Wychoff in Grene and Lattimore (1960). See also Segal (1964) for a full discussion of this passage.

6. I cite Plato according to standard Stephanus pagination. I have used Bloom's translation.

7. I cite Aristotle according to the standard reference form, including book and chapter. Unless otherwise noted, all references are to the *Politics* and all translations are my own.

References

Aeschyles. 1972. The Seven Against Thebes (in Latin). In *Tragedies*. Oxford Classical Text.

Aristotle. 1957. *Politics* (in Latin). Oxford Classical Text.

Aristotle. 1965. *Generation of Animals* (in Latin). Oxford Classical Text.

Benardete, Seth. 1967. Two Notes on Aeschylus' *Septem*. *Weiner Studien*, 80:22–30.

Benardete, Seth. 1975. A Reading of Sophocles' *Antigone*. *Interpretation*, 4:148–96, 5:1–55, 148–84.

Caldwell, Richard. 1973. The Misogyny of Eteocles. *Arethusa*, 6:197–231.

Dietz, Mary. 1985. Citizenship with a Feminist Face: The Problem with Maternal Thinking. *Political Theory*, 13:19–37.

Dobbs, Darrell. 1985. Aristotle's Anticommunism. *American Journal of Political Science*, 29:26–46.

Elshtain, Jean. 1981. *Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Elshtain, Jean. 1982. Antigone's Daughters. *democracy*, 2:46–59.

Euben, J. Peter. 1982. Justice and the Oresteia. *American Political Science Review*, 76:22–33.

Foley, Helene P. 1981. The Conception of Women in Athenian Drama. In Helene P. Foley, ed., *Reflections of Women in Antiquity*. New York: Gordon and Breach.

Gomme, Arnold W. 1937. The Position of Women in the Fifth and Fourth Century B.C. In Arnold W. Gomme, *Essays in Greek History and Literature*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Grene, David, and Richmond Lattimore, eds. 1960. *Greek Tragedies*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Just, Roger. 1975. The Conception of Women in Classical Athens. *Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford*, 6:153–70.

Kitto, Humphrey Davey Finley. 1951. *The Greeks*. Baltimore: Penguin Books.

Knox, Bernard. 1964. *The Heroic Temper: Studies in Sophoclean Tragedy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lefkowitz, Mary. 1981. *Heroines and Hysterics*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Nichols, Mary. 1983a. Poetry in the *Republic*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

Nichols, Mary. 1983b. The Good Life, Slavery, and Acquisition: Aristotle's Introduction to Politics. *Interpretation*, 11:171–83.

Okin, Susan M. 1979. *Women in Western Political Thought*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Orwin, Clifford. 1980. Feminine Justice: The End of the *Seven Against Thebes*. *Classical Philology*, 75:187–96.

Plato. 1968. *The Republic*. Allan Bloom, trans. New York: Basic Books.

Pomeroy, Sarah. 1975. Goddesses, Whores, Wives and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity. New York: Schocken Books.

Saxonhouse, Arlene W. 1980. Men, Women, War and Politics: Family and Polis in Aristophanes and Euripides. *Political Theory*, 8:65–81.

Saxonhouse, Arlene W. 1982. Family, Polity and

Unity: Aristotle on Socrates' Community of Wives. *Polity*, 15:202-19.
Saxonhouse, Arlene W. 1984. Aeschylus' *Oresteia:* Misogyny, Philogyny and Justice. *Women and Politics*, 4:11-32.
Segal, Charles P. 1964. Sophocles' Praise of Man and the Conflicts of the *Antigone. Arion*, 3: 46-66.
Snell, Bruno. 1960. *The Discovery of the Mind: The Greek Origins of European Thought*. R. G. Rosenmeyer, trans. New York: Harper Torchbooks.
Sophocles. 1928. Antigone (in Latin). In Fabulae. Oxford Classical Text.
Zeitlin, Froma I. 1978. The Dynamics of Misogyny: Mythmaking in the *Oresteia. Arethusa,* 11: 149-84.
Zuckert, Catherine. 1983. Aristotle on the Limits and Satisfactions of Political Life. *Interpretation,* 11:185-206.

Arlene W. Saxonhouse is Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109.

FOUCAULT'S CHALLENGE TO CRITICAL THEORY

STEPHEN K. WHITE
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Power, subjectivity, otherness, and modernity are concepts that contemporary political theorists increasingly find to be closely interwoven. In search of an adequate comprehension of the interrelationships among these concepts, I examine the work of Michel Foucault and Jürgen Habermas. I argue that Foucault, although he is provocatively insightful on a number of key points, ultimately provides a less satisfactory account than Habermas. The core problem is Foucault's inability to conceptualize juridical subjectivity, something which is necessary if he is going to connect his notion of aesthetic subjectivity with his endorsement of new social movements.

In the last few years, philosophers and political theorists, particularly those on the Continent, have become increasingly occupied with the interrelationships among the concepts of power, subjectivity, otherness, and modernity (Dallmayr, 1981, 1984b). The key issues involved in this nexus of concepts can be brought into sharp relief if one compares the work of Jürgen Habermas with that of Michel Foucault. My intention in this paper is to consider which theorist offers the most adequate overall perspective on power, subjectivity, otherness, and modernity. I will argue that although Foucault brings a number of significant insights to critical theory, his analysis is ultimately less persuasive than Habermas's. More specifically, Habermas's work provides a framework that can incorporate many of Foucault's key ideas without at the same time leading us into a conceptual cul de sac involving subjectivity.

Before turning to this discussion, a few general remarks may be useful in regard to why the four concepts under analysis demand the attention of those interested in the study of politics. No one of course would question the centrality of power to politics, but its connections to the other concepts may not be immediately apparent. Subjectivity, as it will be used here, refers to an account of the human subject or agent, usually developed in terms of concepts such as rationality, intentionality, responsibility, mutuality, interest, etc. Now most political theorists would subscribe to the proposition that any conception of power must in turn presuppose, at least implicitly, some account of subjectivity. And yet, if one admits the truth of this proposition, there remains a real problem with subjectivity to which Foucault and others have drawn our attention: Are the conceptions of subjectivity dominant in the modern world not themselves phenomena shot through with power (Foucault, 1977)? In other words, are the notions associated with the modern subject and used in our constructions of conceptions of power not themselves already an effect of power? If so, a political theory that moves from such notions of the subject to a conception of power may have rendered itself blind to a

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 80 NO. 2 JUNE, 1986

whole range of inconspicuous but significant constraints specific to modern life. Social and political life in modern society enforce a whole range of constraints that are embodied in our views about what is rational and normal for subjects. Outside of this range lies the sphere of "otherness" —that which is excluded and devalued. This exclusion and devaluation may operate intersubjectively, that is, upon other individuals or groups whose forms of life are sufficiently different from our own; or it may operate intrasubjectively, that is, upon the body or dimensions of psychological life that threaten the smooth functioning of the normal, rational subject in modern society. In either case, these operations are fraught with political implications.

Interpretation, Power, and History

One way of locating Foucault's work is to see it as occupying an important position in that contemporary philosophical movement often referred to as "textualism" (Rorty, 1982, pp. 139–59; Shapiro, 1984, pp. 387–91). The texts referred to here can be literary or social. The key idea is that the interpretation of a text can no longer be understood as the excavation of its "real" meaning. For social and political theory this implies, for example, that it is a self-deception to see the real meaning of Western modernity as the slow struggle of humanistic subjects to construct institutions of liberty. Such a Whiggish view of modernity as the rise of the liberal, juridical subject is merely one of an infinite number of possible interpretations (Rorty, 1979, p. 341).

Freeing up our thinking about interpretation also means calling attention to the ultimately arbitrary quality of all interpretation, and to call attention to this is immediately to raise the question, Why does one or another interpretation predominate at a given time and place? The textualist answer to this question draws one almost inexorably to the phenomenon of power. One interpretation prevails over another not because of some rational superiority, but because it reflects a certain relation of power. Thus, textualism is often characterized by a "hyperpoliticizing consciousness" (Shapiro, 1984, p. 391).

Probably more than anyone else, Foucault (1980a, pp. 198ff.) has attempted to elaborate a theory of power which would be compatible with textualism (see also Shapiro, 1984, p. 391). The connection between the two is made patently clear in his work. Foucault refers to the "development of humanity" as "a series of interpretations." For him, interpretation is

> the violent or surreptitious appropriation of a system of rules, which in itself has no essential meaning, in order to impose a direction, to bend it to a new will, to force its participation in a different game.

In sum,

> Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; [rather] humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination. (Foucault, 1984a, pp. 85–86)

This perspective is perhaps best illustrated in Foucault's study of punishment and prisons since the eighteenth century. What he finds there is not the story of the slow struggle of Whiggish subjects to change barbaric institutions into those more appropriate to free men. On the contrary, he finds merely the displacement of one form of penal discourse and practice by a new, modern one, in which power simply manifests itself in a less conspicuous form. Modern power does not reveal itself spectacularly in the form of the executioner and bodily dismemberment. Rather, modern power operates in conjunction with the human sciences, and proceeds by means of the continual and authoritative categorization, grading, and monitoring of human behavior. The discourse of the human sciences creates an expanding net of permissions and exclusions, which categorize increasingly large areas of human behavior into normal and abnormal. The expansion of this new mode of "power/knowledge" is the hallmark of modernity. Foucault (1977, pp. 209, 216, 218ff., 296ff.), in his typically arresting way, wants us to consider the implications of living in an increasingly "disciplinary" or "carceral" society.

Thus, for Foucault, social texts are shot through with power, and modern society with a particularly insidious form. Correspondingly, subjectivity is not to be understood as something behind events and discursive practices, pushing them forward, as it were. Subjectivity is rather something constructed or constituted within such practices. Subjects are effects of strategies of power, and strategies of power are strategies "without a subject" (Foucault, 1980a, p. 204; 1977, pp. 29, 104). Given these claims, the task of the social theorist becomes one of making clear the different ways in which power relations arise through discursive practices, and the different ways in which subjectivity is thereby constituted at different periods in history. These are the ends which Foucault's archeological-genealogical method is designed to serve (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p. xxv; Poster, 1984, p. 89).

Foucault's Challenge

What makes Foucault's work so challenging to critical theory? At bottom, it is the fact that his method, like Nietzsche's, discovers power operating in structures of thinking and behavior that previously seemed to be devoid of power relations. In effect, Foucault provides us with an incisive way of interrogating the structures of culture. His specific targets are the cognitive and institutional structures of modern life. He wants to jolt us out of our self-assured assessment of these structures as necessarily superior and uniquely privileged. He wants to show us that structures we take to be thoroughy enabling are always simultaneously constraining. This orienting intention of all of Foucault's work is clearly expressed in the following: "It seems to me that the critical question today [is:] in what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent and the product of arbitrary constraints?" (1984b, p. 45).

This question and Foucault's method of analysis command the attention of critical theory because the latter has always claimed to be on its guard against mistaking new forms of mystification for enlightenment and new forms of subjugation for emancipation. There is thus much in Foucault's work which can give fresh impetus to critical social analysis (Poster, 1984). However, the totalistic quality of Foucault's position—history as the "endlessly repeated play of dominations"—constitutes a sharp break with the Frankfurt tradition of critical theory.

The ambivalence of critical theory in relation to Foucault is captured succinctly by Habermas (1979a): critical theory must try "to formulate an idea of progress that is subtle and resilient enough not to let itself be blinded by the mere appearance [*Schein*] of emancipation. One thing, of course, it must oppose: the thesis that emancipation itself mystifies."[1] "Emancipation" here has the juridical sense of a society in which there is a just arrangement of freedom (Habermas, 1979a, pp. 56-59). Hence, Habermas is saying that critical theory cannot give up the idea of more enabling political structures, nor the inherently related idea of juridical subjectivity—since the concept of politically enabling structures only has sense when one can say for whom those structures are more enabling. Furthermore, Habermas's notion of the possibility of emancipation, as well as his account of subjectivity, are inextricably tied to the emergence of certain modern structures of consciousness.

Here the lines of controversy between Foucault and Habermas emerge clearly. The latter cannot accept the former's totalistic critique of either modernity in general or modern notions of juridical subjectivity in particular. Foucault debunks the latter, Whiggish notion, and takes the theoretical position of a detached observer in regard to the spreading networks of normalization in modern life.

In *The Theory of Communicative Action*, Habermas (1981a, 1984a) lays out his own conception of modernity. Although Foucault is not mentioned, the conception which emerges from this work engages Foucault's work at a number of key points. The reason for this is that Habermas is explicitly attempting to find a way out of the dilemmas of Horkheimer and Adorno's (1972) own version of a totalistic critique in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*.

Habermas pursues this goal by developing a two-level interpretation of modernity. On the one hand, he presents a critique of the social processes of modernization. Extending and modifying the project originally envisioned in his *Legitimation Crisis* (1975), Habermas (1981a, pt. 4) sees in modernization a growing "colonization of the lifeworld" by the imperatives of the administrative-political and economic subsystems. For present purposes, the specifics of this argument are not important. The reason is that there are strong similarities between Habermas's idea of the "colonization of the lifeworld" and Foucault's idea of increasing normalization (Habermas, 1985, pp. 420–21; White, 1985, ch. 5). The key source of controversy thus arises not at this level, but at the second level of Habermas's analysis of modernity.

Basically, Habermas argues that the phenomenon of *modernization* must be separated from certain more basic characteristics of "modern structures of consciousness" that together constitute "cultural *modernity*" (italics mine). Rather than pursue a totalistic critique that tries to establish its critical standpoint "above" or "outside" of modernity, Habermas uses this second level of analysis to secure the standpoint from which modernization processes can be critically assessed. In short, he argues that "cultural modernity" establishes a "potential for reason" that has not been given full play, but rather has been utilized in a one-sided way in the process of Western modernization (Habermas, 1981a; 1984a, ch. 2, pt. 1, and p. 221).

It is this analysis of the underdeveloped potential of modern structures of consciousness that provides Habermas with a way of approaching the problem of modern subjectivity in general and juridical subjectivity in particular. It is from this potential, which is always present in the linguistic interaction of modern subjects, that he develops the idea of a minimal, communicative ethics. The resulting framework gives Habermas a distinctive way of reading the significance of new forms of social and political opposition. He sees movements among women, radical ecologists, antinuclear activists, gays, and countercultural types as functioning, at least partially, outside the normal parameters of political give-and-take in contemporary capitalism. In his terms, they are fighting a protracted "border conflict" (*Grenzkonflikt*) along those points in modern society where the colonization process is pressing forward (Habermas, 1981a, pp. 575–86; 1985, p. 423). In addition to this distinctive way of conceptualizing what such movements have in common, Habermas's model provides a certain normative orientation to these forms of collective action. In short, he is able to locate new social movements in relation to modern power phenomena and the possibility of expanding freedom.

Interestingly enough, Foucault (1984b, pp. 46–47) also emphasizes the significance of such new social movements. He sees them as types of authentic resistance to modern forms of power. Thus, Foucault and Habermas both take a clear step away from Marxian notions of a single collective subject whose role is to reorganize thoroughly the social totality. Both are seeking theoretical modes that show such global projections to be fraught with danger (Foucault, 1980b, pp. 80–81; Habermas, 1985, ch. 12).

However, Foucault's endorsement of new modes of collective resistance raises a serious problem for his work, as a number of his critics have pointed out (Poster, 1984, pp. 4, 148; Taylor, 1984). To single out and endorse such movements means that Foucault must move out of the detached perspective assumed in the archeological-genealogical analysis of fields of behavior and into the analysis of situations of action. But to adopt an action-theoretical perspective requires one to speak of subjects of action in a way that cannot be grasped in archeological-genealogical categories.

Foucault's dilemma is that he wants to explicate the significance of and normatively endorse "new kinds of subjectivity" and collective action (1983, p. 216). But such a discourse is highly problematic for him both normatively and methodologically. Foucault's own theory seems to tell us that such discourse about action can have no other status than that of another act in the "endlessly repeated play of domination." This raises the problem of how his discourse about new social movements can recommend itself to us in a normative sense. Or, to put the problem slightly differently, if Foucault is recommending a particular conception of subjectivity and resistance, is he not violating his own basic methodological canon?—Thou shall not privilege any interpretation (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, pp. 257–58; Frazier, 1983, p. 64ff.; Poster, 1984, p. 4).

A New Kind of Subjectivity

Foucault was notoriously reluctant to engage in extensive speculation about a new kind of subjectivity. Yet in some of his last work, the outlines of such a conception do appear. In examining this view of subjectivity, I want to focus primarily on whether or not it provides a conceptual basis adequate to justify his endorsement of new social movements.

Basically, Foucault offers an account of an *aesthetic* subject, whose character is extraordinarily interesting in the sense of highlighting some aspects of subjectivity that have been systematically excluded and devalued in the modern world in favor of cognitive and juridical aspects.[2] However, I will argue that Foucault's aesthetic account is flawed for at least one reason: It provides no resources for moving from aesthetic criteria to juridical criteria; or, to be more precise, it does not provide the sort of criteria one would have to have in order to distinguish clearly just those sorts of movements he wants to endorse.

The point at which to start thinking about subjectivity in Foucault is where he speaks of the resistance to the process of normalization offered by "bodies and pleasures," as well as by the "*insurrection of subjugated knowledges*" (1980c, pp. 155–59; 1980b, p. 81). Although for a long time Foucault refused to flesh out these somewhat cryptic remarks, they nevertheless gave the reader of his genealogies of the penal system and sexuality the haunting sense of a lost potential of human being in the modern world. The presence of this sense gave those genealogies their intense moral undertone. However much Foucault wished for his analysis to be that of a detached observer, one cannot help hearing the voice of a subject deeply injured by the social processes under observation. In fact, the reader of Foucault cannot help sensing the implicit presence of a distinctive subject any more than the reader of Rousseau's *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences* (1964). Both draw our attention to disturbing unlearning processes that are being driven forward in modern ways of life. And for Foucault, that process is one of the subjugation of the body and aesthetic-expressive capacities that is enforced by our modern fixation on cognitive and juridical subjectivity. In short, Foucault allows us to glimpse in an arresting manner the degree to which the predominant ways of conceptualizing subjectivity in modernity close off access to the subject's own pre-rational, embodied otherness.

Foucault's shadow subject emerges, as I have said, in some of his last work. There he begins to articulate a model of a reflective self that is more open to the body and aesthetic pleasure. This subject is one who is oriented not around making the body and its needs the object of knowledge or juridical regulation, but rather the object of an aesthetic attitude. Foucault finds some elements of such a conception of the subject among the early Stoics, who began to distance themselves from the classical Greek *techne* (system) of life focused on the city and to envision a different sort of *techne*—one focused on "the *bios* as a material for an aesthetic piece of art"—in short, "an aesthetics of existence." In addition to this aesthetic focus on the *bios* (individual course of life), Foucault is also attracted to the associated early Stoic idea of a "strong structure of existence without any relation with the juridical per se, with an authoritarian system, with a disciplinary structure" (1984d, p. 348).[3]

This theme of an aesthetics of everyday life finds a nineteenth-century counterpart, according to Foucault, in Charles Baudelaire's idea of *"dandyism."* The dandy is the individual "who makes his body, his behavior, his feelings and passions, his very existence a work of art." And again, this elaboration of the self is produced exclusively by attention to the body, pleasures, and aesthetic form, not by attention to the social or political realms (Foucault, 1984b, pp. 41-42).

Foucault thus provides us with hints toward a different way of thinking about subjectivity, one which is constituted so as to give a central place to the body, spontaneity, and expressiveness. What remains unclear is how he can bridge the gap between this aesthetic subject and his endorsement of new forms of collective action, particularly given the explicit distancing of his notion of subjectivity from whatever is juridical, that is, intersubjectively normative.

Juridical and Aesthetic Subjectivity in Habermas

Before confronting Foucault with this question it is important to try reversing it, confronting Habermas with the resulting query: Does his approach to subjectivity, which emphasizes juridical aspects, offer any link to aesthetic subjectivity? If Foucault is right about the exclusion and devaluation of the body and aesthetic-expressive capacities, then critical theory is obliged to press this question upon itself. For, as I said, critical theory must continually hold itself open to the possibility that its own concepts make it blind to some dimensions of power and self-deception.

In order to show what place the aesthetic dimension has in Habermas's thought, it is necessary to look very briefly at how he treats the whole notion of subjectivity and its relation to modernity. Habermas's model of the subject emerges out of his attempt to reconstruct the basic presuppositions of the ongoing linguistic interaction of everyday life. What is reconstructed is an actor's "communicative competence," the know-how he or she manifests in speaking and acting. Habermas claims that ongoing linguistic interaction, or "communicative action," presupposes an actor's having the ability to raise and be accountable for redeeming a differentiated, universal set of validity claims. These three claims are truth, normative rightness or legitimacy, and truthfulness or authenticity; and, corresponding to them, there are three general pragmatic functions of language: cognitive, interactive, and aesthetic-expressive (Habermas, 1979b, pp. 50ff.; 1984a, pt. 1, ch. 3).

Habermas's project has, of course, hardly been immune from criticisms (Held and Thompson, 1982). For present purposes, however, I am going to leave these aside and focus on a couple of the implications of this project. First of all, the analysis of communicative action serves as the framework for thinking about the normative or juridical aspects of subjectivity. More specifically, the idea of a mutual accountability between speakers and a possible unconstrained consensus between them provides Habermas with a way of interpreting equality and the mutual recognition of subjects in situations of normative conflict. From this basis for juridical subjectivity, Habermas also gains his minimal ethical perspective on politics in general and new social movements in particular.[4]

Secondly, it is the notion of a basic set of differentiated validity claims that provides Habermas with the key to his two-level interpretation of modernity. He interprets the shift from magical-mythical societies to modern ones as a process in which these claims not only become clearly differentiated in everyday life, but also become institutionalized in respective, relatively autonomous "cultural spheres of value." These are constituted by the practices and institutions of science and technology, modern law and post-conventional morality, and modern art and aesthetic criticism (Habermas, 1984a, pt. 1, ch. 2; pt. 2, ch. 1, esp. pp. 165ff.).

It is this differentiated and reflective quality of "modern structures of consciousness" that Habermas wants to emphasize as the hallmark of "cultural modernity." These qualities give modernity its unique and privileged potential for learning. Clearly this claim of superiority brings with it a heavy burden of proof and a strong suspicion of ethnocentrism (Bernstein, 1985). For present purposes, what is distinctive about this claim is that Habermas wants to assert that learning processes go on not only in the scientific-technological sphere, but also in the moral-practical and the aesthetic-expressive spheres. In fact, it is cultural modernity's three-fold potential for learning that provides the critical perspective from which one can begin to speak of a "one-sided," scientific-technological manifestation of this potential in the social processes of modernization. In short, Habermas is arguing that the resources of cultural modernity are adequate for illuminating the pathologies and unlearning that have accompanied modernization (1984a, pp. 183, 221, 232, 239–40). The upshot of this line of thought is that the critique of modern society can be adequately pursued within the parameters of modern consciousness. One does not need, and in fact cannot make sense of, notions of a radically post-modern critical standpoint.

The foregoing synopsis of Habermas's position on juridical subjectivity and modernity allows one now to locate more precisely the place of the aesthetic-expressive dimension in his work. My point of entry here will be to ask, Exactly what sort of learning process is manifested within the aesthetic dimension? And in what sense is this learning process one which is particularly sensitive to what has been excluded, devalued, marginalized—in short, "unlearned"—in modern life? This line of inquiry should keep the controversy between Habermas and Foucault in sharp focus.

One can begin to answer these questions by examining what Habermas means by authentic self-expression; that is, what is claimed in the expressive use of language. An authentic self-expression is one which claims to express a speaker's real or true needs. Now Habermas offers us no philosophical device by which "true" needs can be unequivocally separated from "false" needs for any given person (White, 1985, chs. 3–4). One can only examine ongoing behavior for clues as to whether someone has truthful interpretations of his own needs or not. Clues would be constituted by evidence that, say, a person's need interpretations are or are not self-debilitating or self-deceptive. However, such substantive criteria are notoriously difficult to apply and they involve a substantial assumption of authority on the part of the observer. There is nevertheless a procedural criterion which, while hardly unambiguous, also gives some basis for evaluating the authenticity claim. As Habermas (1984a, p. 20) says, "We call a person rational . . . if he can adopt a reflective attitude to the . . . [cultural] value standards through which desires and feelings [*Bedürfnisnatur*] are interpreted."

Now how does this notion of truthful or authentic self-expression connect with the aesthetic dimension and some sort of associated learning process? One way to imagine such a learning process is to think of a progressive accumulation of epistemic contents in works of art, the way such contents are said to accumulate in scientific theories. Habermas, however, suggests something different:

> What accumulates are not epistemic contents, but rather the effects of the inner logical differentiations of special sorts of experience: precisely those aesthetic experiences of which only a decentered, unbound subjectivity is capable. (Habermas, 1984b, pp. 235–36)

In order to understand what Habermas is getting at here, one must understand his interpretation of what is implied in the process by which the aesthetic dimension became an autonomous cultural sphere in the modern world. Already in the eighteenth century, idealistic aesthetics began the separation of "the beautiful and the sublime, on the one hand, from the useful and the desirable, on the other." In the course of the nineteenth century there emerged out of this romantic spirit the radicalized consciousness of "aesthetic modernity." Like Foucault, Habermas sees the work of Baudelaire as the first clear manifestation of this consciousness. Baudelaire was the first to radicalize the distinctiveness of aesthetic experience, divorcing it completely and unequivocally from the claims of tradition, morality, and society. The distinctly modern aesthetic experience is thus seen as emerging when "the categories of the patterned expectations of organized daily experience collapse, . . . the routines of daily action and conventions of ordinary life are destroyed, and the normality of foreseeable and accountable certainties are suspended." Implied in such experience is an "unbounding of subjectivity," a willingness to transgress the normal, a playfulness, imaginativeness, and inventiveness (Habermas, 1984b, pp. 235–36; 1981b, pp. 4–5; 1982, p. 25).

This distinctiveness of modern aesthetic experience, this radical questioning of everything, even other shibboleths of modernity, both cognitive and juridical, must nevertheless be recognized as itself dependent upon modern structures of consciousness in general. What ties the ethos of "aesthetic modernity" to "cultural modernity" as a whole is that the "reflective experiences of an 'unbound' subjectivity" partake of that general experimental or "hypothetical approach" to phenomena and experiences that modern structures of consciousness in general first make possible (Habermas, 1984b, p. 240). A radicalized aesthetic consciousness is thus, like scientific thinking and post-conventional ethical consciousness, something socially available only to the modern subject.[5] This point must always be kept firmly in mind whenever an appeal to the aesthetic sense is used by totalist critics of modernity.[6] Briefly, it means that the aesthetic sense cannot be employed as the basis of a critical perspective that claims somehow to observe modernity's problems from a detached perspective.

Turning back now to the original question of learning, what exactly is there in the modern aesthetic experience that allows the accumulation of some sort of insight? Apparently, the key is greater fluidity and flexibility in modes of access to our desires and feelings. The radical decoupling of the aesthetic sense from the imperatives of society and tradition has the potential for informing consciousness about how we normally interpret our desires and feelings in ways that unreflectively mirror the prevailing value standards of the culture around us. The modern aesthetic sense thus has a unique potential to make subjects more reflective in relation to who and what is actually structuring the interpretation of their *Bedürfnisnatur.*

This aspect of insight, while important for Habermas, would hardly be adequate for someone like Foucault. For here one finds the subject engaged in a discipline of self-interrogation, and it is just such a procedure that Foucault is always wary of. He is at his best in exposing the darker side of modes of self-discipline. In this sense, one can be justly suspicious of the compulsive implications of some of Habermas's (1973, p. 252) early remarks about making the self progressively more "transparent." However, this ambivalent aspect of reflection is only one side of what is made available in the modern aesthetic experience. The other side conforms less to a model of interrogation and more to one of unexpected discovery of things exceeding the confines of any rational, methodical, self-disciplining interrogatory framework. It is this latter sort of insight that has at least the potential for generating more sensitivity to the subordination of the pre-rational and embodied aspects of human being. One common characteristic of the modern aesthetic consciousness from Baudelaire to the avant-garde in the twentieth century is its inextricable involvement with the shocking, the unexpected, the unknown—with what shatters normal patterns of seeing, thinking, and feeling (Habermas, 1981b, pp. 4–5). A central feature of this consciousness is thus its

> increased sensitivity to what remains unassimilated in the interpretive achievements of the pragmatic, epistemic, and moral mastery of the demands and challenges of everyday situations; it effects an openness to the expurgated elements of the unconscious, the fantastic, and the mad, the material and the bodily, thus to everything in our speechless contact with reality which is fleeting, so contingent, so immediate, so individualized, simultaneously so far and so near that it escapes our usual categorical grasp. (Habermas, 1984b, p. 236)

Hence one way to think about the value of a modern work of art is in relation to its capacity to keep the rational, reflective consciousness exposed to what is pre-rational, or what is left out or unassimilated in any given conceptual framework or set of cultural standards. In short, it leaves the cognitively and juridically rational subject with an awareness of the irony of its own achievement; that is, with the insight that the structures within which this subject moves are always constraining in potentially serious ways, even when they appear on balance to be the most enabling ones available (Connolly, 1983a). One can now see that one thing which is crucial about aesthetic learning for Habermas is the openness it offers to awareness of the unlearning that necessarily accompanies the other dimensions of cultural modernity and their institutionalization in processes of modernization.

From Aesthetics to Community

If the foregoing analysis is correct, it appears that Habermas's project has conceptual resources on the basis of which he can comprehend at least some of the insights to which Foucault draws our attention with his aesthetic subject. In short, Habermas is able to locate aesthetic subjectivity within a broader conception of subjectivity in the modern world that links aesthetic-expressive, juridical, and cognitive aspects.

I want to return now to the original question posed for Foucault. Does his framework possess the conceptual resources that would allow him to connect his aesthetic subject to his endorsement of new social movements? Can one find an opening from his aesthetics into an ethics and a politics?

Foucault himself clearly sees his "aesthetics of existence" as having ethical implications. It has at its core, he says, an idea of self-control, of "the kind of relationship you ought to have with yourself, *rapport a soi.*" What Foucault means by this is an ongoing formation and articulation of the self according to aesthetic criteria. The primary criterion apparently is the will to "live a beautiful life and to leave to others memories of a beautiful existence." Such an ethics, Foucault hopes, could in no way be implicated in "an attempt to normalize the population" (1984d, p. 341).

What is striking about Foucault's ideas here is that he defines ethics simply as this activity of self-formation: "*rapport a soi,* which I call ethics." Thus any reference to other subjects, and even the possibility of more liberating or consensual forms of common life, seems problematic from the start. Foucault speaks of the process of aesthetic self-formation as involving "asceticism in a very broad sense." He intends for this phrase to call attention to the practice of self-control that is part of any ethics; but in the case of his own aesthetics of existence, the phrase seems also to have the unavoidable connotation of solitude (1984d, p. 355; 1980a, p. 208). Ironically, in the process of constructing such a provocative mode of access to the self's own pre-rational, embodied otherness, Foucault seems to have simultaneously cut off access to intersubjective otherness. At this point it becomes difficult to see how Foucault could possibly bring his aesthetics of existence into any coherent relationship with his endorsement of some forms of collective political action; yet it seems just as clear that he intends some connection. In the context of discussing the early Stoics, he says rather explicitly that "recent liberation movements suffer from the fact that they cannot find any principle on which to base the elaboration of a new ethics" (Foucault, 1984d, p. 343).

Even if Foucault himself is not very helpful in establishing a link between aesthetic and juridical aspects of subjectivity, one can try to speculate about how such a link might be established. One might point out, for example, that an aesthetics of existence could not literally be a private activity any more than speaking a language. What constitutes art must always be related to some public, shared understanding of style and form (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p. 258). Although true, this insight does not take one very far toward any normative conceptions.

Another possible avenue might be the one hinted at by Adorno, whose totalistic critique of modern society and its cognitive and juridical forms of consciousness was also accompanied by an appeal to aesthetic consciousness (Adorno, 1966, 1984; Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972). What appealed to Adorno about aesthetic consciousness was the nongrasping, nondominating way it related to its object. Thus he found in the aesthetic dimension a model of intersubjective reconciliation —of a community that allows intersubjective otherness to flourish (Dallmayr, 1981, pp. 133-43; Wellmer, 1984-1985).

Perhaps Foucault's aesthetics of existence could be thought through in a similar fashion. I doubt, however, if this would really be possible. The problem with thinking that the aesthetic dimension can be a model for community has been clearly stated by Albrecht Wellmer:

> The aesthetic synthesis represented by the work of art, even if we concede to Adorno that it contains a *promesse du bonheur*, can hardly be understood as a model of dialogical relationship *between* individuals, who recognize each other in their individuality, as equals and as absolute others both at the same time. If beauty is a promise of happiness, of reconciliation with our internal and with external nature, the work of art would be a *medium* of this transcending experience rather than a *model* of reconciliation itself. For at least the *moral* "synthesis" of a dialogical relationship can only be *mediated*, but not be brought to *appearance* by the aesthetic synthesis of the work of art. Even if, as Adorno stresses, the subject, which comes to speak in the work of art, is a "we" (and not the individual artist), this collective subject speaks with *one* voice, speaking to itself, as it were; i.e., the rules of "synthesis" of this trans-subjective speech cannot possibly prefigure the open rules of a dialogue with *many* voices. Aesthetic synthesis is no possible model for a state of society free from repression. (1983, p. 94)

If we use this distinction between model and medium we might be led to think in ways which build on both Foucault and Habermas. Foucault's image of an aesthetics of existence might be interpreted as a provocative way of thinking about the process of self-formation, in which aesthetic criteria might come to have a constitutive significance for the way a subject thinks and acts in general. Thus, Foucault might be seen as giving us a way of conceptualizing how the aesthetic dimension's potential for tapping into the self's pre-rational, embodied otherness can be released in such a fashion that its effects can infuse all aspects of everyday life. By this I mean that the aesthetic sense can be seen as permeating not only our need interpretations, but also our moral-political judgments about the kinds of social institutions and technological infrastructure we find satisfying and self-empowering, as well as our judgments about what sorts of knowledge we find worth seeking.

Taken in this light, it is likely that Habermas would find Foucault's ideas suggestive, since his own speculations about art and everyday life have a similar ring. He argues that when aesthetic experience is infused into everyday life, it then

> no longer only affects our evaluative language or only renews the interpretation of needs that color our perceptions; rather it reaches into our cognitive interpretations and normative expectations and transforms the totality in which these moments are related to each other. (Habermas, 1984b, p. 237)

But as Wellmer suggests, and Habermas is aware, such a role for aesthetic subjectivity cannot replace an at least partially independent elaboration of juridical subjectivity. A useful way of clarifying this point is to look at recent feminist thought. A recurrent theme there, as in Foucault, is how modern society and consciousness deny our character as embodied creatures and suppress our aesthetic-expressive capacities. Women's experience in this society is seen as making them especially sensitive to these problems. So an important question for feminist thinkers is how this sort of gender-based sensitivity can infuse everyday life in a transformative way. Part of this inquiry involves asking what this means for how we might reconceptualize moral and political life.

Some feminists have argued that the different experience of women can be used as a model for this reconceptualization. Thus "mothering" and "attentive care" become new models for the moral-political community (Elshtain, 1982; Ruddick, 1980). This view has been countered, correctly I think, by other feminists, who, while not denying the importance of an emphasis on embodiment, aesthetics, and expressiveness as mediums for reconceptualizing the substantive qualities a community might have, nevertheless feel that the form of moral-political relationships among equals cannot be modeled on maternal thinking (Dietz, 1985; Ferguson, 1984, pp. 170–73).

Conclusion

What finally hangs on Foucault's failure to bridge the gap between the aesthetic and the juridical, while he nevertheless endorses political resistance to the normalizing processes of modern life? The most immediate implication revolves around the fact that without any way of conceptualizing juridical subjectivity, Foucault's recommendation of collective resistance has such a blind and undifferentiated character as to be almost politically irresponsible (Connolly, 1983b, p. 332). He provides us, ultimately, with no way of distinguishing the resistance of the women's movement or the Polish Solidarity movement from, say, the Ku Klux Klan or Jim Jones's People's Temple. Of course, Foucault himself would have never endorsed such things. But that is not the point; the point is that his denials have an ad hoc quality.[7]

What about the broader theoretical implications that emerge from the foregoing analysis, particularly in regard to the possibility of mutual enrichment of Foucault's work and critical theory? As I suggested earlier, there are some interesting parallels between Habermas's and Foucault's theories of power. In this regard especially, the latter's work is provocative. If the critical theorist is to take seriously the social and political dimensions of the emerging "informational revolution," then Foucault's distinctive approach to the inherent relation of discourse and power is likely to be a useful vehicle of analysis (Luke, 1983; Luke and White, 1985; Poster, 1984, ch. 6).

Moreover, the critical theorist might, as William Connolly (1983b, p. 331) suggests, accept "Foucault as a double," in the sense of always keeping his or her categories open to "the voice of the other." This sort of recommendation is, as I suggested earlier, one that critical theory has an obligation to embrace, given its own traditional theoretical goals. Thus, for example, Habermas's categories should be pushed even to the point of asking what constraints or subjugations haunt the very idea of an ideal speech situation.[8] However, one thing must be kept firmly in mind in this game of "double." As such questions are posed and played out, there comes a point where we must face the problem of weighing degrees of constraint against degrees of enablement implicit in any concepts or recommendations about the structures of social life.[9] Such a weighing process only becomes possible and comprehensible by the light of some notion of juridical subjectivity.

It might be objected at this point that my criticism of Foucault is too heavily premised on an implicit argument that Habermas's conception of juridical subjectivity has no problems of its own. Clearly, I have not here submitted Habermas to the same degree of scrutiny as Foucault. But that is not fatal to my argument, because it depends less on whether Habermas's particular arguments are entirely correct, and more on the fact that his theory, unlike Foucault's, confronts a certain necessary range of philosophical problems. "Necessary" here is to be taken in the sense of necessary if social theory wants to avoid the extremes of endorsing either blind actionism or ethical-political quietism.

Notes

A number of the ideas in this paper were generated out of the lively intellectual atmosphere of William Connolly's 1984 National Endowment for the Humanities Summar Seminar on "Genealogy and Interpretation." I would like to express my thanks to him, the other seminar participants, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and my colleague, Timothy W. Luke.

1. I have corrected a translation error in this text. In the last sentence, "enlightenment" was incorrectly inserted in place of "emancipation."

2. On the general theme of "aestheticism" in Foucault's work, see Megill (1985, pp. 2-4 and chs. 5-6).

3. Foucault (1984d, p. 354) attributes to later Stoicism the more familiar juridical ideas of universal reason and community.

4. For how this communicative model of ethics is particularly open to intersubjective otherness, see White (1984) and the exchange between McCarthy (1984) and Dallmayr (1984a). Habermas has been particularly concerned recently (1981a, 1984a, 1985) to emphasize that an account of subjectivity arising out of the communicative model does not suffer from the deficiencies of accounts arising out of the monological "philosophy of consciousness" that has dominated Western thought and been appropriately criticized by Foucault and others.

5. Cf. Charles Taylor's (1982, pp. 98-100) remarks about the difference between our symbolic activity and that of primitive societies.

6. Habermas (1982, pp. 23ff.) suggests that Nietzsche, in his critique of modernity, is also guilty of forgetting this point.

7. See, for example, his affirmations of "consensual politics" and "consensual disciplines" (Foucault, 1984c, pp. 378-80). While laudable, such notions have a rather oxymoronic quality when viewed from within Foucault's own theoretical perspective.

8. Cf. Frazier (1985, pp. 178ff.). Habermas (1979a, pp. 57-59) considers this possibility himself.

9. In the same interview where he speaks of "consensual politics," Foucault (1984c, p. 379) also admits this problem; but again, his theory gives us no insight into it.

References

Adorno, Theodor W. 1966. *Negative Dialectics*. E. B. Ashton, trans. New York: Seabury.

Adorno, Theodor W. 1984. *Aesthetic Theory*. C. Lehnhardt, trans. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Bernstein, Richard. 1985. *Habermas and Modernity*. Cambridge, MA: MIT.

Connolly, William. 1983a. Discipline, Politics and Ambiguity. *Political Theory*, 3:325-41.

Connolly, William. 1983b. The Dilemma of Legitimacy. In John S. Nelson, ed., *What Political Theory Should Be Now*. Albany, NY: SUNY.

Dallmayr, Fred. 1981. *Twilight of Subjectivity: Contributions to a Post-Individualist Theory*. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts.

Dallmayr, Fred. 1984a. Response by the Author. *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 2:121-27.

Dallmayr, Fred. 1984b. *Polis and Praxis: Exercises in Contemporary Political Theory*. Cambridge, MA: MIT.

Dietz, Mary. 1985. Citizenship with a Feminist Face: The Problem with Maternal Thinking. *Political Theory*, 1:19-37.

Dreyfus, Hubert L., and Paul Rabinow. 1983. *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*. 2d ed. Chicago: University of Chicago.

Elshtain, Jean. 1982. Antigone's Daughters. *Democracy*, 2:46-59.

Ferguson, Kathy E. 1984. *The Feminist Critique of Bureaucracy*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Foucault, Michel. 1977. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Alan Sheridan, trans. New York: Random House.

Foucault, Michel. 1980. *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*. Colin Gordon, ed., trans.; Leo Marshall, John Merpham, and Kate Soper, trans. New York: Pantheon.

Foucault, Michel. 1980a. The Confessions of the Flesh. *See* Foucault 1980.

Foucault, Michel. 1980b. Two Lectures. *See* Foucault 1980.

Foucault, Michel. 1980c. *The History of Sexuality*. Vol. 1, *An Introduction*. Robert French, trans. New York: Random House.

Foucault, Michel. 1983. Power and the Subject. In Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, eds., *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*. 2d ed. Chicago: University of Chicago.

Foucault, Michel. 1984. *The Foucault Reader*. Paul Rabinow, ed.; Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, trans. New York: Pantheon.

Foucault, Michel. 1984a. Nietzsche, Genealogy and History. *See* Foucault 1984.

Foucault, Michel. 1984b. What is Enlightenment? *See* Foucault 1984.

Foucault, Michel. 1984c. Politics and Ethics: An Interview. *See* Foucault 1984.

Foucault, Michel. 1984d. On the Genealogy of Ethics. *See* Foucault 1984.

Frazier, Nancy. 1983. Foucault's Body Language: A Post-Humanist Political Rhetoric? *Salmagundi*, 63:55-70.

Frazier, Nancy. 1985. Michel Foucault: A Young Conservative? *Ethics*, 96:165-84.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1973. Wahrheitstheorien (Theories of Truth). In Hellmut Fahrenbach, ed., *Wirklichkeit und Reflexion* [Reality and reflection]. Pfullingen: Neske.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1975. *Legitimation Crisis.* Boston: Beacon.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1979a. Consciousness-Raising or Redemptive Criticism. *New German Critique,* 17:30-59.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1979b. What is Universal Pragmatics? *Communication and the Evolution of Society.* Thomas McCarthy, trans. and introd. Boston: Beacon Press.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1981a. *Theorie des kommunikatives Handeln* [The theory of communicative action]. Vol. 2, *Zur Kritik der functionalistischen Vernunft* [Toward a critique of functionalist reason]. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. (English translation forthcoming from MIT Press.)

Habermas, Jürgen. 1981b. Modernity versus Postmodernity. *New German Critique,* 22:3-14.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1982. The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment. *New German Critique,* 26:13-30.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1984a. *The Theory of Communicative Action.* Vol. 1, *Reason and the Rationalization of Society.* Thomas McCarthy, trans. and introd. Boston: Beacon.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1984b. Questions and Counterquestions. *Praxis International,* 3:229-49.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1985. *Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne: Zwölf Vorlesungen* [Philosophical discourse on modernity: twelve lectures]. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. (English translation forthcoming from MIT Press.)

Held, David, and John B. Thompson, eds. 1982. *Habermas: Critical Debates.* Cambridge, MA: MIT.

Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor W. Adorno. 1972. *Dialectic of Enlightenment.* John Cummings, trans. New York: Seabury.

Luke, Timothy W. 1983. Informationalism and Ecology. *Telos,* 56:59-73.

Luke, Timothy W., and Stephen K. White. 1985. Critical Theory, the Informational Revolution and an Ecological Modernity. In John Forester, ed., *Critical Theory and Public Life.* Cambridge, MA: MIT.

McCarthy, Thomas A. 1984. Shadows in the "Twilight of Subjectivity." *Philosophy and Social Criticism,* 2:115-19.

Megill, Allan. 1985. *Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida.* Berkeley: University of California.

Poster, Mark. 1984. *Foucault, Marxism and History: Mode of Production versus Mode of Information.* Cambridge: Polity.

Rorty, Richard. 1979. *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University.

Rorty, Richard. 1982. Nineteenth Century Idealism and Twentieth Century Textualism. *Consequences of Pragmatism.* Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1964. Discourse on the Arts and Sciences. In Roger D. Masters, ed., *The First and Second Discourses.* Roger D. and Judith R. Masters, trans. New York: St. Martins. (Original work published in 1749.)

Ruddick, Sara. 1980. Maternal Thinking. *Feminist Studies,* 6:342-67.

Shapiro, Michael J. 1984. Literary Production as Politicizing Practice. *Political Theory,* 3: 387-422.

Taylor, Charles. 1982. Rationality. In Steven Lukes and Martin Hollis, eds., *Rationality and Relativism.* Cambridge, MA: MIT.

Taylor, Charles. 1984. Foucault on Freedom and Truth. *Political Theory,* 2:152-83.

Wellmer, Albrecht. 1983. Reason, Utopia and the Dialectic of Enlightenment. *Praxis International,* 1:83-107.

Wellmer, Albrecht. 1984-1985. Truth, Semblance, Reconciliation: Adorno's Aesthetic Redemption of Modernity. *Telos,* 62:89-115.

White, Stephen K. 1984. Habermas' Communicative Ethics and the Development of Moral Consciousness. *Philosophy and Social Criticism,* 2:25-47.

White, Stephen K. 1985. *Habermas on Reason, Justice and Modernity: Toward a Critical Research Program.* Unpublished manuscript.

Stephen K. White is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061.

THUCYDIDES ON THE CAUSES OF ATHENIAN IMPERIALISM

STEVEN FORDE
Michigan State University

Thucydides' investigation of Athenian imperialism is in part an investigation into whether imperialism as such is based on universal human compulsions, and hence cannot simply be condemned. It is generally recognized that for Thucydides, Athenian imperialism is connected to the Athenian national character, but it has not been widely appreciated that Thucydides provides a detailed account of the foundations of the Athenian character in human nature itself. That account revolves around what he calls "daring" and the human impulse of eros. *The erotic and daring character of the Athenians is connected by Thucydides both to the unique democracy of the city and to its unique experience in the Persian Wars. The unique Athenian character stems from an unprecedented liberation of certain impulses of human nature. This produces Athenian imperialism and dynamism, but also destroys the city in time.*

The conspicuous theme of Athenian imperialism in Thucydides forms a crucial part of his broader investigation into the place of justice in relations among states. The phenomenon of imperialism poses what is surely the threshold question concerning the place of justice in international affairs: If the unprovoked subjection and rule of weaker states by stronger cannot be unambiguously condemned, the applicability of moral categories to international politics altogether must be seriously compromised. Imperialism is ordinarily considered a grave injustice in those who practice it, but there is an argument in Thucydides, championed most vigorously by the imperial Athenians, that imperialism cannot be blamed, because it is only a reflection of certain universal compulsions—compulsions of power and of human nature. The Athenians assert that, in acquiring and maintaining their empire, they have done no more than any other state in their position would have done, indeed would have been "compelled" to do by these universal forces (e.g., 1.75-76, 5.105).[1] Thucydides' investigation of Athenian imperialism, especially its causes, is in large part an attempt to explore and test this notorious Athenian thesis on justice and empire, and turns very much on the question of whether or to what extent Athenian imperialism is rooted in deeper principles of human nature. Thucydides' presentation of Athenian imperialism in fact represents a prototypical study of political psychology in foreign and domestic politics, and of the ramifications of this psychology for the question of justice in international politics especially. To explore the deeper levels of Thucydides' analysis of Athenian imperialism is the primary object of the present study.

Daring and the Athenian Character

When we ask the question about the

causes or roots of Athenian imperialism in Thucydides, we are immediately thrown into a consideration of what we can only call the Athenian character (Bluhm, 1962, p. 22; Connor, 1984, p. 39; Cornford, 1907, p. 167; Ehrenberg, 1947, p. 47; Finley, 1967, p. 143; Romilly, 1963, p. 77; Shorey, 1893, pp. 72–73; Thibaudet, 1922, pp. 113–14). Friends and enemies alike speak of the Athenian character and Athenian manners when called upon to explain Athenian imperialism; Thucydides, in his own portrayal, appears to do likewise. If we bring together all that is said about the Athenian character in the course of Thucydides' History, whether by Thucydides himself or by his speakers, we get what is in fact a remarkably consistent portrait of the Athenians, revolving around certain commonly acknowledged core traits. The most prominent of these, and the one most widely held to separate the Athenians from other men, is called "daring" (*tolma*) by all who broach the subject. This becomes almost a technical term in Thucydides.[2] The Athenians are daring in the History; the Spartans are the opposite (cf. 8.96.4–5). Brasidas is the single Spartan exception that proves the rule (cf. 5.7.2; 2.87; 2.89.5). The Syracusans alone succeed in countering the Athenians by becoming, like them, daring (6.69.1; 7.21.3–4; 8.96.5).

The Corinthians are the first to emphasize this trait, in their famous description of the Athenian character in Book 1 (1.70.3). Daring is closely linked by them and by others in the History to Athenian restlessness and expansiveness, and hence to Athenian imperialism. It seems to describe precisely the frenetic, astoundingly bold, even reckless quality the Athenians display in their many far-flung enterprises. As a character trait, however, it is rather enigmatic, not only because it is virtually unique to the Athenians, but because it seems to replace other, more ordinary or traditional qualities, in particular courage.[3] Daring is the first puzzle presented by the Athenian character in Thucydides.

Our investigation of this peculiar Athenian trait may appropriately begin with the most famous description of the Athenian character in Thucydides, Pericles' Funeral Oration. Pericles' speech is given over primarily to praising Athenian greatness, including the empire, and he rates the Athenian character as highly as such things as laws and institutions in attributing the cause of that greatness. Yet when it comes to describing the Athenian character, "courage" is barely alluded to by Pericles, who speaks instead of the "virtue" of his countrymen, or, more pointedly, of their "daring."[4] The men who have died, he says, showed a daring that should be the model for those who survive (2.43.1). The Athenians as a race are characterized by a native daring that allows them, without toil, to be the equal of others who take great pains to cultivate virtue (2.39.4). The greatness of the empire, which makes the city of Athens uniquely worth dying for, was built, according to Pericles, by the daring and dutifulness of the present Athenians' ancestors (2.43.1). Pericles goes so far as to boast that the Athenians have "compelled" every sea and every land to yield access to their daring, enabling them to leave "immortal" monuments of themselves "everywhere" (2.41.4).

In Pericles' presentation, the daring of the Athenians is not only one of their most praiseworthy traits, but one very closely connected with their empire. The primary effect of Athenian daring seems to be the empire, and both are treated by Pericles as uniquely glorious Athenian achievements. Yet there was a time, in fairly recent historical memory, when Athens did not have an empire. Pericles remarks that the empire was built only by the previous generation, a feat for which that generation deserves greater praise than any that preceded it in the city

(2.36.2). If that is so, however, we are forced to wonder if not only Athenian imperialism but Athenian daring was born with that generation.

Thucydides' presentation of the rise of the Athenian empire appears to bear out this hypothesis. In Book 1 of the History he shows elaborately how the Athenian empire first grew out of circumstances connected with the second great Persian invasion of Greece, an invasion in which the Athenians were driven, in order to help defend the Greeks, to abandon their homeland and fight the enemy at sea. Before that time Athens was not even a particularly great power in Greece; after that time the Athenian naval power and empire grew dramatically and with astonishing rapidity. Pericles, in a speech prior to the Funeral Oration, ties together this general sequence of events in the following way: The Athenians of that time, he says, beginning literally with nothing, not even their homes and possessions, succeeded in both defeating the Persians and building the empire by dint of resolve and daring more than by luck or power (1.144.4). Thus, in Pericles' view, the Athenian deeds in the Persian Wars are of the same stuff as the Athenian imperialism that followed, at least so far as the fundamental character traits that made them possible are concerned. As to the pivotal moment of the Persian Wars itself, the first time Thucydides mentions it he says that as the massive Persian force advanced, the Athenians resolved to abandon their city, and packing up their goods, embarked upon their ships and "became sea-men" (*nautikoi egenonto*, 1.18.2). The formulation connects this moment and these deeds somehow with a transformation in the character of the city itself.

Thucydides and Pericles are not the only ones to attribute special significance to the Athenian feat of abandoning the city to fight the Persians. Their attitude was, in fact, the common one at Athens, as Thucydides indicates by giving perhaps the fullest description and greatest praise of those deeds to certain anonymous Athenian envoys who speak at Sparta before the war (1.73–78).[5] What they say is relevant to the question before us. These anonymous envoys, like Pericles, dwell on Athenian daring. Their presentation, however, places greater emphasis on the period of the Persian Wars; they imply that the Athenian actions at that juncture were paradigmatic—that is, those most illuminating for anyone desiring to know what kind of a city Athens is.[6] It required the most extreme daring,[7] the envoys correctly say, for the Athenians to abandon their city when all up to their borders had been enslaved, to rely on themselves as their last, slender hope, and face the Persian throng at sea (1.74). This Athenian action, as the anonymous envoys note, was the most important contribution to the Greek cause, as it was the most amazing. As such, it could not but be welcomed by the other Greek cities. Thucydides indicates, however, that there was something in this daring action that aroused apprehension in the other cities as well. When the Athenians were returning to an Athens devastated by the Persians, and were undertaking to rebuild its walls, the other cities opposed it, fearing, Thucydides says, not only the size of the newly enlarged Athenian navy, but the daring the Athenians had displayed in the war as well. More specifically, Thucydides says that they feared the daring that had "come into being" in the Athens during the Persian invasion (1.90.1). The Athenians were not alone in viewing their own actions during that crisis as a great watershed in Athenian experience, and in the development of the Athenian character. The Athenian character—in particular its daring side—was formed, or at any rate came into its own, only at the time of the Persian Wars. The cities saw this, and were not heartened by the sight. The great period of Athenian imperialism followed.

Daring and Athenian Imperialism

The question that arises on the basis of this account of the birth of the Athenian imperial character is how we can understand the traumatic moment of the second Persian invasion to have shaped the Athenian character, and given it in particular the volatile and expansive daring that became its hallmark. To recur to Thucydides' terse, early formulation, at that moment the Athenians packed up their things, got into their ships, and became sea-men (1.18.2). That Athens was a naval power is sometimes taken to be sufficient explanation of the Athenian character and Athenian imperialism (Finley, 1967, p. 143, and 1963, p. 90; Romilly, 1963, pp. 67, 69, 70; Thibaudet, 1922, p. 79, cf. pp. 84-85), but other cities, such as Corinth or Corcyra, were maritime or sea-faring cities as well, and none of them resembled Athens in the crucial respect. It is not just that Athens was sea-faring, but the manner in which it was sea-faring that explains the Athenian character and imperialism. Of no other city could it have been said that "becoming nautical" involved such a baptism, or that its citizens became sea-men in so complete or literal a sense.

In order to grasp the political significance that this has in Thucydides' account, we need first to think about all the things that a fixed location means to a political community, and what it means to give that up. It seems that the least we would have to say is that in becoming, however briefly, men without place, the Athenians in some way severed connections with all the fixed things around which the life of a community normally revolves, and that normally serve as its stable, conservative base.[8] There is, however, another aspect of the matter to which I believe we must give equal or greater weight, an aspect to some extent peculiar to the Greek cities, and which has to do with Greek piety.

Generalizations about Greek piety are always difficult to make, because that piety consisted of numerous elements that were often inconsistent with one another and are not fully known to us.[9] Nonetheless, some of its most significant elements, especially for the life of the city, were inextricably bound to place—to sacred ground, to temples or shrines, to ancestral graves. From the point of view of this piety, the city was in effect constituted by common rites and sacred festivals, inasmuch as citizenship was identical with competence to participate in the common cults. These festivals and rites included the city's guardian divinities as well as its generations of ancestors, divine and spiritual beings believed to inhabit more or less immovably the places associated with their cults. When the Athenians abandoned their city to the Persians, therefore, they would also have abandoned their holy places, the abodes of their gods and their ancestral graves. It would be a real question within the conventions of Greek piety whether a city could have any being at all under such circumstances. This is the thought that seems to be in the background when the anonymous Athenians emphasize at Sparta that part of what was amazing about Athenian behavior at the time in question was that they did not simply disperse (1.74.2), did not consider the city to have been ruined or dissolved (1.74.4), and joined the common fight although they were in effect issuing from a city that was no more (1.74.3).[10] The Athenians did not disband, and went on instead to glorious victory. However, the principle or foundation of their community could not help being altered in some way by the experience.

From the point of view of the other Greek cities, the unexampled zeal exhibited by Athens in the Persian Wars would thus have not only an admirable, but a terrible or shocking quality as well. The astonishing deed of the Athenians, which seems to display the greatest courage, seems also to bear a certain tincture of impiety. It might go beyond what merely human courage is permitted. It is audacity; it is daring. In any event, it would certainly be mistaken to assume, as the Athenians sometimes seem to (e.g., 1.74.4; 6.82.4), that the cities that refused to abandon their land as the Persians advanced surrendered to them purely out of cowardice.

It is sometimes said that the defeat of the Persian hordes ushered in a new era of Greek self-assurance by giving apparently indisputable proof of the superiority of the polis and freedom over barbarism and Persian despotism (see Bury, 1909, p. 44; Ehrenberg, 1968, p. 77). Thucydides suggests that in the case of the Athenians in particular, the self-assurance gained from this experience was of a revolutionary, not to say hubristic, kind. It is the peculiar character of this self-assurance that leads the Athenians from the desperate, defensive action against the Persians to the offensive explosion of imperialism that followed. For one might say that what the Athenians discovered as a body on their ships is the enormous potential of purely human power—that is, human power standing on its own and bereft of its traditional supports, terrestrial or otherwise. It would be difficult to overestimate the political significance of such a discovery for a community, for traditional piety acts not only as a support, but as a restraint on the activities of men and states. Therefore, insofar as daring among the Athenians represents a transformation of and a replacement for traditional courage, it is an innovation predicated in part on overcoming the inhibitions imposed by piety. Those inhibitions include restrictions on the accumulation of power and on its exercise, in the name of justice. Amorality is at the core of what daring signifies in Thucydides' Athenians.

The speech of the anonymous Athenians at Sparta is a good index of this. What those Athenians say shows that they have liberated themselves in thought as well as action from the restraints that the Greeks and others had thought applied to cities in their relations among themselves. The Athenians at Sparta are the first to voice the thesis that, in establishing their empire, they were simply acting in accord with certain universal compulsions that affect nations: fear, honor, and profit (1.75–76). These Athenians, it is true, temper their argument with assertions to the effect that they hold their empire "not inappropriately" (1.73.1), that they are in some sense worthy of rule (1.76.2), and that their rule is "more just" than necessary. These things are undeniably important to the Athenians' vision of their empire, but they do not disguise—and are not meant to disguise—the fact that the empire and their speech about it represent at bottom an unapologetic overturning of the principles of justice ordinarily supposed to apply to relations among states (cf. 1.76). They altogether refuse to submit to judgments stemming from the supposed precepts of justice. In that respect, at least, their position does not differ from that later voiced by the Athenian envoys on Melos (5.85–113).[11]

Pericles, the premier statesman in Athens at the time of the anonymous Athenians' speech, is in accord with the new Athenian manner. He has nothing but praise for Athenian daring. His Funeral Oration is devoid of any serious reference to the gods, which is particularly striking given that it is, after all, a funerary speech over those who have died in war. Moreover, Pericles shows by deed that he is willing to abandon Attica, doing so for the first time since the Persian Wars. In connection with that policy, Pericles in effect tells the Athenians that they should consider the land as something of no significance to the city: human beings are what make the city what it is (1.143.5). In the Funeral Oration he depicts Athens, Athenian power, and Athenian greatness as monuments purely of human endeavor. His reduction of the city to its human beings—and even the present generation of its human beings (cf. 2.36.1-3)—is, to be sure, typical of this imperial Athens; but that is only to underscore its revolutionary character. Pericles' "humanism," of which these remarks are primary examples, is often noted by commentators. The radically anti-traditional and even impious implications of this humanism have received much less attention, yet they are as important as any other facts in Thucydides' understanding of Periclean Athens. They also prove to be crucial in explaining the problems with Pericles' policy and the fate of Athens after his death.[12]

Individualism and the Policy of Pericles

There is one other aspect of Athenian humanism or liberation that must be explored before its full bearing on the subject of Athenian imperialism can be appreciated. When Pericles praises Athenian freedom in the Funeral Oration, he has in mind less the freedom of the city as a whole from traditional restraints on its behavior than the freedom of individual Athenians from the myriad conventional restraints that regulate the lives of men in traditional cities. This unprecedented internal freedom at Athens has created, according not only to Pericles but to other observers in the History as well, a novel political form (cf. the remarks of the Corinthians, 1.70.6). This form represents perhaps the nearest approximation to what we could call "individualism" in all of ancient politics.[13] The liberation of individual talent and initiative at Athens is one source of the city's great power and dynamism, as Pericles correctly points out (2.41.2). Athenian individualism is for this reason one of the things that made Athenian imperialism possible. Athenian individualism and imperialism are also connected—and more intimately so—through their common abandonment of traditional restraints. If the city is willing to dare so much, it is in part because the Athenians individually have freed themselves from conventional inhibitions. Athenian individualism represents, in that sense, the domestic correlate to the city's daring in its relations abroad. Not surprisingly, it is also the point at which important problems with the whole Athenian project begin to appear.

The Athenian experiment with individualism, if we may call it that, produced a city of great energy and many devices, but also had to confront the one great problem always connected with individualism, the problem of political cohesion. The tremendous success of Athens from the time of the Persian Wars through the period of Pericles' ascendency seems to indicate that Athens solved this problem. Thucydides, on the other hand, draws our attention as early as his eulogy of Pericles to the fact that Athens was later devastated by internal quarrels and factionalism, which were the real reason for her defeat in the war (2.65.7, 10-12). These problems came into the open only after Pericles' death. Nevertheless, Pericles himself, in his Funeral Oration, can be seen to address the problem of the cohesion of the city, in addressing what can make the individualists he has praised dedicate themselves to its good. In the Funeral Oration he is confronted with this problem in its most extreme form, for he must find an argument that can induce Athenians to die for their city, as have those being eulogized in the speech.

Percles responds to this problem in a very striking way, and in doing so introduces what altogether becomes a very important theme in Thucydides' treatment of Athens. Throughout his speech, Pericles appeals to the Athenians' love of glory: Athens is the most glorious of cities, a monument to the virtue and daring of her citizens. Contemporary Athenians, in serving and even dying for the city, share in that glory (2.42.1, 2.43.3; see also Palmer, 1982b). This argument in itself, however, does not sufficiently meet the problem, if only because glory held in common is scarcely glory at all, especially from the point of view of true individualists. Therefore Pericles, at the climactic moment of his speech, has recourse to quite another appeal, one that appears to be as novel as the problem it is meant to address. It is an appeal to erotic passion. In the passage in question, Pericles allows that calculations of advantage are not, of course, to be excluded in serving the city, but he says, finally, that Athenians should become devoted, willing servants of the city by beholding its power, manifested every day in deeds, and becoming lovers of it (2.43.1).[14] It is by means of a kind of erotic attachment that each Athenian should ultimately become a patriot.

Pericles' sudden recourse to erotic passion as the centerpiece of Athenian cohesion or community is striking because we are not at all accustomed to thinking of patriotism in these terms, although it is a seldom-noticed fact that *eros*, or human eroticism as such, is a significant, if somewhat concealed, theme in Thucydides' work.[15] The word *eros* and its derivatives appear only seven times in the History, but each appearance is at a crucial juncture, and each plays a significant role in Thucydides' treatment of Athenian imperialism and the political psychology of Athens.[16] The Greek notion of *eros* is of course broader than ours, embracing potentially all objects of desire, but it still differs from other kinds of desire, both in its intensity and in its unexpungeable sexual reference. Pericles' appeal to *eros* in this context would be striking and paradoxical to Greek audiences as well as to modern ones, though somewhat less so.[17] With regard to this passage, we might upon reflection agree that an appeal to this kind of passion is appropriate to the Athenian case, particularly given the warmth of Pericles' praise of the city. Erotic passion may, after all, be the one thing capable of attaching even the most individualistic human beings to something outside of themselves. Erotic passion is individualistic, even egoistic, yet leads to the most intense devotion and willingness to sacrifice. In any event, it is clear that Pericles, whose Athens has largely forsaken traditional supports to community and patriotism, must have recourse to extraordinary devices.[18] Patriotism or "love of city" (*philopoli*) of the ordinary kind, based in such things as traditional civic piety and subordination of self, is no longer sufficient grounds for community at Athens. The Athenians have all but abandoned public piety, and Athenian individualism owes its very existence to the abandonment of the kinds of conventional strictures that cement the political community in a city like Sparta. Pericles' appeal to *eros* circumvents or supplants those conventional mechanisms of community, and seeks to bind the Athenians directly or immediately to the city, depicted as a beloved object.

The question is whether this new alternative proposed or supported by Pericles is itself sufficient to the task of holding the city together. For Pericles of course, that includes its ability to keep Athens under his direction and guided by his policy—and his policy, according to Thucydides, was a very measured or restrained one, both in general and with reference to the war against the Spartans (2.65.5). His policy for the war in particular is to resist all temptation to indulge in imperial expansion for the duration (1.144.1; 2.65.7). Thus, when Pericles exhorts the

Athenians in his Funeral Oration to become erotically attached to the city, it is a relatively moderate or restrained policy and vision he has in mind.

This is precisely the part of Pericles' policy that proved most untenable after his death. The Athenians did not follow his advice and in fact, according to Thucydides, after his death they did "everything" contrary to what he had said (2.65.7). Among other things, they proved unable to resist the imperial temptation, and embarked on a vast project to conquer the island of Sicily. They did so, according to Thucydides, under the influence of erotic passion. In what is his only explicit authorial reference to the eroticism of the city as a whole, Thucydides says that when the deliberation concerning the Sicilian expedition finally drew to a close, an erotic passion fell upon all alike to sail for Sicily; the passion was so overwhelming that if anyone still opposed the vote, he was cowed into silence by the "excessive" desire of the city as a whole (6.24).

Pericles appealed to the *eros* of the Athenians in the cause of a general policy of restraint, but when that policy is finally and definitively overthrown by Athenian *eros,* the development, in retrospect, looks all but inevitable. When Athenian passion reaches its height, forces its way to the surface of Thucydides' narrative, so to speak, it expresses itself as a longing for the most spectacular increase of power, the most audacious project of imperial expansion since well before the war. Nicias, in his futile speech against the expedition, pleads with the Athenians, at least the old Athenians, not to succumb to an unhealthy or perverse erotic passion (*duseros,* 6.13.1) for things faraway. His hope is as vain as the hope of Pericles. Indeed, it seems that erotic passion is naturally enflamed more by the splendid, the faraway, and the grand than by any vision of restraint. It powerfully resists domestication, even if a man of Pericles' stature makes the attempt. And in the Athenian case this passion lies at the core of the city's imperialism.

The Sicilian expedition is the most erotic of all Athenian undertakings during the war—perhaps of all Athenian undertakings—as it is the most daring. It is in this respect a peak of what Athens represents in the History. It is not inappropriate, therefore, that Thucydides should use the sequence of events connected with and surrounding the Sicilian expedition to reveal more clearly than elsewhere his own understanding of the Athenian character and imperialism. The expedition shows the failure of the Periclean policy of imperial restraint, but Thucydides uses the opportunity it provides to record more comprehensively his view of the regime of democratic individualism at Athens. Thucydides' view, as opposed to Pericles', accounts for the decline and eventual failure of the Athenian experiment in politics.

Eros, Daring, and the Athenian Democracy

It appears that for Thucydides, Athenian imperialism is compounded out of a volatile combination of erotic passion and daring, qualities woven into the fabric of the Athenian regime. Thucydides understands the dynamics of this combination better than a man like Pericles, and better, we may add, than the Athenians themselves. The last point is of particular interest because it appears to be the reason why Thycidides, in connection with some of the events surrounding the launching of the Sicilian expedition, inserts a peculiar but very interesting digression on the alleged tyrannicide of Harmodius and Aristogeiton (6.53; 6.54–59; 6.60). The digression, he says, is intended to correct some important defects in Athenian self-understanding. It draws our attention not only for this reason, but because its subject turns out to be Athenian daring and *eros*; it contains more references to *eros*, in particular, than are found in the rest of the History put together.[19]

The Athenian characteristic immediately in question at this point in the History is the excessive suspicion shown by the Athenian democracy toward virtually all outstanding men. The Athenians' suspicion is excessive, according to Thucydides, because of a memory in the city of the hated tyranny of the Peisistratids. It was this tyranny that provoked the legendary attack of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. According to Thucydides, however, the Athenians are mistaken both about the character of the tyranny, which was actually rather mild until attacked (6.54.5-6; 6.59.2), and about the story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton itself. Thucydides begins his account by saying that the "daring deed" of Harmodius and Aristogeiton was actually undertaken incident to a love affair (6.54.1; cf. 6.56.3; 6.59.1). Harmodius and Aristogeiton were lovers; when Hipparchus, the brother of the tyrant Hippias, threatened their affair, the two of them plotted to overthrow the tyranny. They failed to kill Hippias but managed to kill Hipparchus, and as a result came to be regarded as champions, and practically as founders, of the democracy at Athens after its reestablishment. Indeed, the remembrance of the "tyrannicide" came to occupy a place in Athenian lore as significant as that occupied by the memory of the city's heroism during the Persian Wars.[20] The legend became a keystone of the democracy's self-understanding, and a parable in particular for the city's extreme love of freedom.

One of the first things that strikes us about Thucydides' presentation of this episode is that it controverts in one important respect the impression we get from Book 1—namely, that Athenian daring made its first appearance at the time of the Persian Wars. Thucydides now speaks of a daring in Athens prior to that time, a daring connected with the foundation of the Athenian democracy. He seems to agree with ordinary Athenians that the story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton captures the essence of the Athenian democracy and character. As formulated by Thucydides, the story thus corroborates the view that Athens is a city characterized by a kind of erotically charged daring. However, Thucydides' rendition represents, in precisely that respect, a fundamental correction of the popular understanding. He introduces the digression, once again, for the purpose of correcting the popular understanding; the first and most important of these corrections has to do with the motives that the Athenians attribute to their heroes. The Athenians suppose them to have been public-spirited champions of democratic liberty; Thucydides shows that their motivation, being erotic in nature, was private, even selfish, and aimed at public benefit only incidentally, if at all. Their jealousy toward the tyrants was a purely private, erotic jealousy, and the freedom they sought was primarily what we might call private erotic freedom. Within its context, Thucydides' retelling of the story implies, first of all, that the excessive Athenian suspicion of prominent men in the city is something that presents itself, and understands itself, as a laudable and public-spirited defense of liberty, but is in fact a thing rooted in a rather questionable private jealousy. Thucydides seems to suggest, moreover, that the basis of the jealousy and, altogether, of the devotion to the democracy is not dedication to the common good as such, but rather to a kind of private freedom from restrictions of all sorts, a freedom to follow where one's passion might lead. The force of this passion can inspire those under its sway to acts of the greatest daring on its behalf.

Thucydides' rendition of the Harmodius and Aristogeiton story provides us with a vivid and revealing image of Athenian individualism and the intense love of freedom that characterizes it. It also provides us with a specific link between the character of the Athenian regime and Athenian imperialism, inasmuch as their psychological foundations now appear to be the same. We may speculate about the historical transition from private *eros* and its ancillary daring to the collective *eros* and daring of Athenian imperialism. The Athenians loved freedom with unequalled passion, and there is a genuine sense, appreciated by all the Greeks, in which rule over others is simply the most perfect form of freedom (see Romilly, 1963, pp. 80–82; Thucydides, 8.68.4). In this sense the empire does represent the crowning emblem and achievement of Athenian freedom. The empire also represents the greatest guardian of Athenian freedom against external attack, a fact the Athenians never lost sight of (e.g., 1.75; 6.82). This consideration may have been particularly important in the historical transition from the democratic love of freedom to the imperialistic impulse forged at the time of the Persian Wars. Reflection on the experience of foreign invasion may have led the Athenians to the conclusion that, just as their heroes Harmodius and Aristogeiton eventually were compelled to enter the public realm merely to safeguard their private freedom, so would the city have to expand externally in order to safeguard its own freedom and the freedom of its citizens (see especially the reflections of Themistocles, 1.93.3–8). Thucydides, at any rate, concludes his narration of the Harmodius and Aristogeiton story with the following terse summary of events: after three years the tyrant Hippias was deposed and fled to the court of the Persian king, whence he returned many years later with the Persians on their expedition to Marathon (6.59.4). Thus the fight against Hippias and tyranny was transformed literally, at least, into the fight against the Persians and its aftermath.

Decline and Fall

It is a long way, of course, from deciding that imperialism is advisable for the safety of the city to justifying it openly for that reason—to say nothing of the justifications from honor and profit that the Athenians simultaneously offer for their empire (1.74–75; 2.63–64). The audacious amorality required for these justifications or exonerations, and thus for the uninhibited development of the imperial project as a whole, is the specific ingredient that Thucydides appears to trace to the daring of the Persian Wars. The unique democracy at Athens provided or bred intense and excessively jealous attachment to freedom; such erotic love of freedom may always verge on simple hatred of all restraints, sacred or profane. Consequently, the democracy also tapped a tremendous source of human energy, but it took the catalyst of the city's experience in the Persian Wars, as well as the opportunities opened up by the Persian defeat, to set the Athenian character definitively on the imperial course. This combination of things produced a city of unprecedented vitality and power, but also a city that in effect destroyed itself within three or four generations after the Persian Wars. The decay of Athens and Athenian imperialism must be traced to the same causes that brought the city such great success in its prime.

We already know from Thucydides' eulogy of Pericles that Athens was eventually consumed by factionalism and internal decay (2.65.7, 10–12). In Pericles' time the city was still a solid and cohesive community, due in significant part to the influence of Pericles himself (cf. 2.65.8). It was Pericles' belief that the Athenians had a kind of native respect for law and for each other (2.37.2–3), and that deference to good leaders was their characteristic trait (2.37.1). Thucydides' view, epitomized in the Harmodius and Aristogeiton story, is that excessive suspicion and jealousy toward leaders was Athens' most characteristic attitude, one derived from the core traits of the Athenian character. It is much easier on the basis of Thucydides' digression than on that of Pericles' Funeral Oration to understand how Athenian erotic passion could lead to faction and internecine strife. Pericles could exhort his fellow citizens to focus their erotic passion on the city as a whole, and with a certain measure of success, but the fundamental character of that passion was private, individual, or individualistic. This is apparent not only from the digression, but from Thucydides' description of the city's erotic passion for Sicily. Thucydides' description indicates that the motives of that passion were widely different for three different types of people in the city (6.24.3). For at least two of those types, comprising the great majority of the population, it was a desire motivated by the prospect of some kind of gain or personal gratification: the prospect of faraway sights for the young, the prospect of present and "eternal pay" for the majority (6.24.3).[21] The pronounced trifurcation of erotic passion at this point, as well as its predominantly private thrust, shows how ambiguously it is related to the common good. In that respect it is a genuine heir to the tradition of Harmodius and Aristogeiton.

Daring plays a more sinister role in the history of Athens and its imperialism. Pericles praises daring without qualification in his Funeral Oration, but in the plague at Athens, which Thucydides describes immediately after the Funeral Oration (2.47–54), daring shows itself in the city in a rather more questionable light. With an eye to the dissensions that later devastated Athens, Thucydides says that greater lawlessness was first introduced into the city by the plague, as men dared more openly to pursue their own private pleasure in contravention of all restraint (2.53.1). This imperial quality proves conspicuously less praiseworthy when directed against fellow citizens than against outsiders. Even more to the point is Thucydides' description of the civil wars that destroyed a great many cities during the war. In a famous passage detailing how all the moral categories and the words that denote them were turned on their heads during these upheavals, the first, and perhaps controlling, transformation is said by Thucydides to be the supplanting of loyal courage by "irrational daring" in the minds of the citizens (3.82.4; cf. 3.82.6).[22] The passage that begins this way culminates in Thucydides' pronouncement that respect for the divine law then ceased any longer to be a basis of trust or community among men, as oaths lost all their force under the pressure of almost universal lawlessness (3.82.6–7).

These remarks, which represent Thucydides' most systematic pronouncements in his own name on the character of daring certainly give us pause when it comes to considering the case of Athens. Athens has replaced courage with daring in the precise sense of disembarrassing itself of the traditional restraints of justice and "divine law." The resulting freedom is what has allowed Athens as a city to accumulate such vast power and such an empire—to run circles, so to speak, around its more traditional and more inhibited opponents, in particular the Spartans. Daring undeniably represents the discovery of an "effectual truth" about the character of international politics. It also represents, however, a very corrosive incubus at the heart of the Athenian regime, though it is one that takes its time to develop.[23] It takes its toll not only on the internal cohesiveness of the city, but on the character of Athenian imperialism itself.

The question as to whether, in what sense, or to what extent Athenian imperialism changes over the course of

Thucydides' History is a very vexed one.[24] The foregoing analysis suggests that it remains constant, inasmuch as amorality and impiety are at its core from the moment of its inception. On the other hand, the Athenian consciousness of and attitude toward this amorality undeniably changes, giving Athenian imperialism a much different cast over time. Thus the anonymous Athenians who speak at Sparta before the war proclaim that justice does not apply to their empire, and yet maintain that their rule is "appropriate," that they are "worthy," even that the empire is an expression of their powerful love of honor (1.73, 75-76). In the Funeral Oration, Pericles' very theme is the worthiness of Athens and the appropriateness of the position she holds. In his third and final speech, under the sobering influence of the plague and the continuing war, Pericles concedes that the empire is a tyranny or is like a tyranny (2.63.2); however, he still holds that it is a glorious and honorable thing to maintain (2.63.1; 2.64.5-6). It is precisely the argument or belief that the empire is somehow honorable, however, that decays and finally disappears under the impact of the harsh reality of imperial rule—under the dawning awareness of what it really means to dare to rule over others in defiance of justice, and to admit that one's rule is a tyranny. The amorality of such a project destroys in the long run any claims to higher motives or sanctions, because empire and tyranny simpy are not an honorable business. This is the logic that is starkly revealed in the Melian dialogue (cf. Jaeger, 1939, pp. 401-402; Finley, 1963, p. 89; and n. 11). Even at the moment of Sicilian enthusiasm, which seems a much more generous manifestation of the imperial impulse at Athens, we note that, according to Thucydides' description, there was no group that was in love with the glory or "honor" of the enterprise (6.24). Their only goals were safety or profit understood in one way or another. In that respect, at least, the Sicilian episode is legitimate kin to the Melian dialogue, which Thucydides juxtaposes it to. The extractive and exploitative elements in the imperial impulse and the empire in the end undo all the higher pretenses that Pericles and the Athenians liked to pride themselves on. The reality of imperialism is much harsher than that.

Our final question—that with which we began—concerns whether Athenian imperialism, based on the impulses Thucydides traces to it, reflects a universal compulsion of human nature, as the Athenians argue, and if so, whether its compulsive character, as the Athenians also argue, exonerates imperial powers from moral blame. That communities that follow the impulse to empire are likely thereby to destroy themselves does not alter the state of this question on the level of principle. Thucydides, in tracing Athenian imperialism to human erotic passion, does indeed ground it in the deepest strata of human nature. That the Athenians, in their daring, have to an unprecedented extent unleashed this erotic impulse from traditional restrictions makes them unique, but does not alter the naturalness of their imperial impulse. What is unprecedented about the Athenian regime in general is precisely its liberation of human nature.

There is one passage in Thucydides uniquely relevant to this point, containing the one reference to erotic passion we have not yet discussed, and that is the speech of the Athenian Diodotus in the debate over the rebellious Athenian ally Mytilene (3.42-48). The central portion of Diodotus's speech is a highly theoretical discussion of the relation of human nature to law and restraints of all kinds. It is, in fact, the most sustained theoretical treatment of this issue in Thucydides, and both *eros* and daring figure prominently in it (3.45).[25] Diodotus argues that human nature is irrevocably hostile to restraint, because it is governed by a powerful and promiscuous erotic impulse (3.45.5). This impulse is responsible, according to him, for human *hubris* and human daring (3.45.4). Although his argument points in the first instance to an erotic impulse that has led the Mytilenaeans to revolt, he makes it clear enough that his argument applies to Athens and Athenian imperialism in equal or greater measure: the human erotic impulse, he says, is the more irresistible the greater the objects it has in view; the greatest of these objects is independence for some, and rule over others for those who have the power (3.45.6). Diodotus's implicit account of the basis of Athenian imperialism and its relation to human nature in general is fundamentally the same as that of Thucydides. It also seems to endorse the Athenian conclusion that moral blame cannot attach to this imperialism, any more than the Mytilenaeans can be blamed for revolting from the empire.[26] Both are equally compulsive. The world of recurring, equally justified or unjustified domination and revolt that emerges from Diodotus's speech is indeed a world where traditional notions of justice and law among nations are suspended or greatly restricted.

The only conspicuous vindication that justice or divine law receives in Thucydides, then, is the unhappy spectacle of Athens destroying herself after daring systematically and self-consciously to deny that law in its dealings with others. That does not in retrospect alter the truth of the Athenian denial, and certainly does nothing to help cities in the position of Melos, or even to justify their resistance. It invites compassion more than condemnation for those overcome by the hubristic impulses of human nature, but also yields a counsel of prudence to future statesmen. Thucydides is best understood as an educator of statesmen (see Bruell, 1974, p. 11; Connor, 1984, pp. 12-13; Finley, 1963, p. 309; Romilly, 1956; Strauss, 1977, p. 202n; Wettergreen, 1979, p. 93; White, 1984, p. 88) and statesmen who have been enlightened by Thucydides will not, to be sure, adhere foolishly to the pious hopes and moralistic illusions of the Melians or of Nicias; neither will they heedlessly praise and advance qualities like daring and unbridled erotic passion in their states, like Pericles did. The conventions that restrain these impulses do not have the divine sanctions they were once supposed to have, and they do represent restrictions on or suppressions of powerful elements of human nature. As Diodotus says, such conventions can never be wholly effective, especially when great temptations to empire arise. We nevertheless learn from Thucydides that the integrity of political communities and the maintenance of those human values that cuture or civilization does serve are in the long run dependent on those conventions. To the extent that culture or civilization represents a genuine peak of human flourishing—and Thucydides clearly thinks that it does—those conventions could even be said to have a grounding in nature themselves.

Notes

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1984 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. I thank Clifford Orwin and Richard Zinman for their helpful comments on drafts of this paper. I worked on this essay while I was Culpepper Fellow at Dartmouth College and Killam Fellow at Dalhousie University.

1. I cite Thucydides by the standard form: book, chapter, and, where appropriate, section. For convenience, I will refer to Thucydides' work as the History, capitalized but not italicized, to reflect the fact that Thucydides never himself gave his work this or any other title (cf. Edmunds, 1975, p. 6; Finley, 1963, p. 3n; Strauss, 1977, p. 143).

2. The patterns of the use of this word can be traced with the help of any word index to Thucydides, for example, that of Bétant (1961). The patterns, as indicated, are quite striking, though to my knowledge they have gone virtually unnoticed in the literature. See e.g. Huart (1968, pp. 431-36) and Hunter (1973, p. 26). Interpreters have often noted that Thucydides' presentation of Athens revolves

around certain significant words—e.g., *polypragmosune* (Ehrenberg, 1947) and *gnome* and *techne* (Edmunds, 1975)—and all with justification. *Tolma* is one of these and, I believe, in some respects the most important.

3. It should be noted that the Greek word *tolma* covers the same range as the English word "daring," from courage to rashness (courage proper is in Greek *andreia*). In fact, the rarity with which the word "courage" is applied to the Athenians is quite as striking as their corner on "daring" in Thucydides, a distinction lost or blunted in all translations I am aware of, which are as likely to translate "courage" as "daring" for *tolma*.

4. Pericles does speak of the "courage" of the Athenians once, when he is developing a specific contrast to the Spartans (2.39.4; cf. 2.39.1). This, if I am not mistaken, is the sole instance of the direct application of this word to the Athenians in the History (cf. also 2.64.2).

5. Their anonymity seems designed to indicate that they speak for the city as a whole (cf. Pouncey, 1980, p. 62; Romilly, 1963, pp. 108, 242). For a different view, see Jaeger (1939, p. 393).

6. This seems to be the reason for the peculiar way they introduce their account of these Athenian actions. They will refrain, they say, from speaking of ancient things that are not to the point, but are "compelled" to mention the deeds of the Persian Wars (1.73.2): they are repeating the story because it is indispensible to the point of their speech, which is to show how great or formidable a city Athens is (1.72; 1.73.1). Narrations of quasi-mythic ancient deeds were, in fact, common in speeches of a certain kind—e.g., the Scholiast mentions possible tales about the Amazons or the Heraclids. See for example Isocrates *Panegyricus* 20-32; 68-72.

7. This appears to be the only occurrence of the superlative "most daring" in the History.

8. The traumatic character of the abandonment of the land can be judged in part from 2.15. For interpretations of that passage relevant to our present purposes, see Thibaudet (1922, p. 199) and Palmer (1982b, p. 827). For an ironic but also important view of it see Pseudo-Xenophon *Athenaion Politeia* 2.14.

9. See e.g. Dodds (1951, chs. 2, 6, et al.), Grundy (1948, vol. 2, pp. 87, 88), and Glotz (1904). The following discussion owes much to Fustel de Coulanges (1980).

10. It should be noted that dispersal was a common (though not a universal) fate for peoples ejected from their cities in the war.

11. Cf. Adkins (1960, p. 222), Connor (1984, p. 153), De Ste. Croix (1972, p. 14), Ehrenberg (1947, p. 52), Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover (1945-1970, vol. 4, p. 184), Romilly (1963, pp. 65, 250), White (1984, pp. 77, 81), and Woodhead (1970, p. 17). The Athenian remarks on Melos are of course much meaner in tone than the earlier statement, which does reflect a changed vision of Athenian rule (cf. Cogan, 1981, p. 89). This question will be addressed in greater detail in the concluding part of this essay.

12. On Pericles' "humanism" see Grene (1950, p. 90), Grundy (1948, vol. 2, pp. 7-8), and Bury (1909, p. 146). On the impiety of this humanism see Cochrane (1965, pp. 23, 55), Edmunds (1975, pp. 26, 39, 45-46, 76, 82), and Connor (1984, p. 72n).

13. Individualism is sometimes supposed to be the exclusive preserve of modern politics. On individualism as characteristic of Periclean Athens, see Cochrane (1965, p. 23), Grundy (1948, vol. 1, p. 171, vol. 2, p. xv), Gomme (1962, pp. 139-55), and Finley (1963, pp. 49, 301; 1967, p. 149). For somewhat different views see Adcock (1963, p. 50), and Grene (1950, p. 31).

14. I have attempted in my paraphrase to retain an ambiguity of the original: it is not clear whether Pericles exhorts his listeners to become lovers of the city or of its power.

15. One of the few studies to take this theme seriously is Cornford's (1907), but he takes it in a "mythic" sense, which I believe is unjustified. See Bury (1909, p. 124), Wallace (1964, p. 256), Dodds (1951, p. 186), and Huart (1968, p, 391).

16. The seven appearances are at 2.43, 3.45, 6.24, 6.54 (twice), 6.57, and 6.59, not counting one reference by Nicias to *duseros*, bad or unhealthy erotic passion, at 6.13. All of these references will be discussed in the course of this essay.

17. See Euripides *Phoenissae* 359, and Finley (1967, p. 21), who refers to Euripides *Erechtheus* Frag. 360.54.

18. Some perceptive observations in this vein regarding Pericles' appeal to erotic passion may be found in Thibaudet (1922, p. 25), who speaks of an unusual political "crystallization" of erotic passion at Athens; Cochrane (1965, p. 55), who speaks of *eros* here as a substitute for ordinary patriotism based upon piety; and Immerwahr (1973, pp. 27-28), who connects it to the "pathological" course Athenian policy later took.

19. There has been a great deal of scholarly commentary on this digression, much of it assuming the passage does not have great significance for the History as a whole. See the summary in Gomme et al. (1945-1970, vol. 4, pp. 317-29), which concludes with the suggestion that the digression derives from the historian's obsession with setting the record straight. Bury (1909, pp. 89-90) believes its aim is simply to correct popular misconceptions, apparently of no great significance. Finley (1967, p. 168) and Romilly (1963, p. 217) suggest that the digression has a deeper purpose, which they do not however attempt to identify. For other treatments that take the passage seriously, see Rawlings (1981, pp. 100-113), Palmer (1982a, pp. 105-109), and Connor (1984, pp. 178ff).

20. Among other things, the Athenians erected a statue of them in the agora, not once but twice. See

Lang (1955).

21. The desire of the old men in the city seems to revolve more exclusively around the question of simple safety.

22. The phrase "irrational daring" is used by Thucydides on one other occasion: to describe the act of Harmodius and Aristogeiton (6.59.1).

23. The general point that the amorality of the Athenian empire caused Athens itself to degenerate is one that has been argued before. See Grene (1950, p. 32), Strauss (1977, pp. 192-209), and Ehrenberg (1947, p. 53).

24. The literature on this subject cannot even be canvassed in a note. Romilly (1963, pp. 59, 65) sees no development, but the presence of two opposed and coexisting strains; White (1984, ch. 1) describes a complicated process of degeneration that embraced the whole Greek world. See also Jaeger (1939, pp. 401–402), Finley (1963, p. 89), and note 11, above.

25. It is agreed by perhaps most of the commentators who address the issue that, within the context of the debate over Mytilene, Diodotus's speech reflects Thucydides' own views. See Shorey (1893, pp. 67–70), Romilly (1963, pp. 329f), Cornford (1907, pp. 121, 135), Grene (1950, pp. 59, 66), Ehrenberg (1947, p. 51), Bury (1909, p. 137), Finley (1963, p. 83), and De Ste. Croix (1972, p. 21). There is disagreement as to whether Diodotus is uniquely close to Thucydides in his views. This, at least with regard to the points raised in the text, is my interpretation. See Strauss (1977, p. 231), and Bruell (1974, pp. 16–17).

26. This is not to say that justice is as completely absent from Diodotus's argument as he claims. For one thing, it now becomes "unjust" to blame the Mytilenaeans indignantly, as Cleon does, though not to punish at least some of them for reasons of expediency. See also Orwin (1984).

References

Adcock, Frank E. 1963. *Thucydides and His History.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Adkins, Arthur W. H. 1960. *Merit and Responsibility.* Oxford: Clarendon.

Bétant, Elie Ami. 1961. *Lexicon Thucydideum.* Hildesheim, W. Ger.: Georg Olms.

Bluhm, William T. 1962. Causal Theory in Thucydides' Peloponnesian War. *Political Studies,* 10:15–35.

Bruell, Christopher. 1974. Thucydides' View of Athenian Imperialism. *American Political Science Review,* 68:11–17.

Bury, John B. 1909. *The Ancient Greek Historians.* London: Macmillan Co.

Cochrane, Charles Norris. 1965. *Thucydides and the Science of History.* New York: Russell & Russell. (Original work published in 1929.)

Cogan, Marc. 1981. *The Human Thing.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Connor, W. Robert. 1984. *Thucydides.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cornford, Francis M. 1907. *Thucydides Mythistoricus.* London: Edward Arnold.

De Ste. Croix, G. E. M. 1972. *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War.* London: Duckworth.

Dodds, Eric R. 1951. *The Greeks and the Irrational.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Edmunds, Lowell. 1975. *Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Ehrenberg, Victor. 1947. Polypragmosyne: A Study in Greek Politics. *Journal of Hellenic Studies,* 68: 46–67.

Ehrenberg, Victor. 1968. *From Solon to Socrates.* London: Methuen & Co.

Euripides. 1930. Phoenissae [The Phonecian Women]. In Vol. 3 of *Euripides.* With translation by Arthur S. Way. London: Heinemann.

Finley, John H., Jr. 1963. *Thucydides.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Finley, John H., Jr. 1967. *Three Essays on Thucydides.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Fustel de Coulanges, Numa Denis. 1980. *The Ancient City.* Willard Small, trans. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. (Original work published in 1864.)

Glotz, Gustave. 1904. *La Solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce* [The solidarity of the family in criminal law in Greece]. Paris: Albert Fontemoing.

Gomme, Arnold W. 1962. *More Essays in Greek History and Literature.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Gomme, Arnold W., Anthony Andrewes, and Kenneth J. Dover. 1945-1970. *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides.* 4 vols. Oxford: Clarendon.

Grene, David. 1950. *Man in His Pride.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Grundy, George B. 1948. *Thucydides and the History of His Age.* 2 vols. Oxford: Blackwell.

Huart, Pierre. 1968. *Le Vocabulaire de l'analyse psychologique dans l'oeuvre de thucydide* [The vocabulary of psychological analysis in the work of Thucydides]. Paris: Librarie C. Klincksieck.

Hunter, Virginia. 1973. *Thucydides the Artful Reporter.* Toronto: Hakkert.

Immerwahr, Henry R. 1973. Pathology of Power and Speeches in Thucydides. In Philip A. Stadter, ed., *The Speeches in Thucydides.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Isocrates. 1966. Panegyricus. In Vol. 1 of *Isocrates.* With translation by George Norlin. London: Heinemann.

Jaeger, Werner. 1939. *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture.* Gilbert Highet, trans. Oxford: Blackwell.

Lang, Mabel. 1955. The Murder of Hipparchus. *Historia*, 3:395–407.

Orwin, Clifford. 1984. The Just and the Advantageous in Thucydides: The Case of the Mytilenaean Debate. *American Political Science Review*, 78:485–94.

Palmer, Michael. 1982a. Alcibiades and the Question of Tyranny in Thucydides. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 15:103–24.

Palmer, Michael. 1982b. Love of Glory and the Common Good. *American Political Science Review*, 76: 825–36.

Pouncey, Peter R. 1980. *The Necessities of War.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Pseudo-Xenophon. 1976. *Constitution of the Athenians [Athenaion Politeia].* With translation by Hartvig Frisch. New York: Arno.

Rawlings, Hunter R., III. 1981. *The Structure of Thucydides' History.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Romilly, Jacqueline de. 1956. L'Utilité de l'histoire selon Thucydide [The function of history according to Thucydides]. In *Histoire et historiens dans l'antiquité* [History and historians in antiquity]. Genève: Vandoeuvres.

Romilly, Jacqueline de. 1963. *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism.* Philip Thody, trans. New York: Barnes & Noble.

Shorey, Paul. 1893. On the Implicit Ethics and Psychology of Thucydides. *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, 24:66–88.

Strauss, Leo. 1977. *The City and Man.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Thibaudet, Albert. 1922. *La Campagne avec Thucydide* [The campaign with Thucydides]. Paris: Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française.

Thucydides. 1980. *Thucydides.* 4 vols. Charles Forster Smith, trans. London: Heinemann.

Wallace, W. P. 1964. Thucydides. *Phoenix*, 18: 251–61.

Wettergreen, John A. 1979. On the End of Thucydides' Narrative. *Interpretation*, 9:93–110.

White, James Boyd. 1984. *When Words Lose Their Meaning.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Woodhead, A. Geoffrey. 1970. *Thucydides on the Nature of Power.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Steven Forde is Assistant Professor of Political Science, James Madison College of Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824.

SOVIET ELECTIONS REVISITED: VOTER ABSTENTION IN NONCOMPETITIVE VOTING

RASMA KARKLINS
*University of Illinois
at Chicago*

This analysis of voters and nonvoters in a large sample of recent emigrants from the Soviet Union shows that nonvoting is correlated with high interest in politics, a critical political outlook, and dissident modes of behavior. Thus, voter abstention in noncompetitive balloting can be hypothesized to constitute a significant political act rather than passivity. Single-party states use single-candidate elections for a variety of purposes, one of these being the psychological reinforcement of unity between regime and subjects. In this context, the only choice left to the dissenting citizen is not to vote at all. In the contemporary Soviet Union, nonvoting is regionally focused on Moscow and Leningrad, and is associated with post-Stalinist generational change. The covert nature of vote evasion and its informal tolerance provide a new perspective on the character of the Soviet system and its political culture.

Research on elections has focused mainly on democracies, on the assumption that there is little point in studying state-controlled, noncompetitive elections, since their outcome is preordained. This assumption bears reevaluation. Elections in nondemocratic systems have functions other than selecting leaders, and the extent to which these functions are fulfilled can tell us much about the nature of the systems.

Three theories have been put forward to explain why undemocratic systems hold elections: (1) the elections, although noncompetitive, help legitimate the regime; (2) noncompetitive elections politically socialize the masses; and (3) such elections help mobilize populations (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1966; Jacobs, 1970; Schapiro, 1967). These and other theorists (Rose and Mossawir, 1967) have also alluded to an intent on the part of the regime to inculcate allegiance and undermine any inclination toward dissent among the population. This last aspect has been highlighted by Guy Hermet (1978) in his recent reconceptualization of the functions of no-choice elections. He notes that in this context, even numerically minor voter abstention attains significance as a deliberate act of disaffection. Based on this line of argument, we intend to analyze the meaning and implications of recent trends in nonvoting in one of the most thoroughly state-controlled political systems of this age, the Soviet Union.

Past research using nonvoting and negative voting in the USSR as an indicator of trends in dissent has been based

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 80 NO. 2 JUNE, 1986

exclusively on official election statistics (Gilison, 1968; Maggs, 1968). Here other sources will be used as well—mostly interviews with former Soviet citizens now living in the West. As past research has shown, circumspect use of this unconventional source can contribute to both factual and analytical knowledge about the Soviet system (DiFranceisco and Gitelman, 1984; Gitelman, 1977b; Inkeles and Bauer, 1961; White, 1978).

In the case of Soviet elections, several recent studies providing major new insights have made extensive use of in-depth interviews with recent emigrants (Friedgut, 1979; Zaslavsky and Brym, 1978). Building on this work, the present article incorporates a new empirical and analytical dimension by using the results of the Soviet Interview Project, the most systematic emigrant survey to date. A sample of 2,973 former Soviet citizens who came to the United States between January 1, 1979, and April 30, 1982, were interviewed by Russian-speaking, trained interviewers using a highly structured questionnaire. While every effort was made to safeguard the scientific character of the survey, no claim is made here that the sample constitutes a representative cross-section of the Soviet population. Rather, the internal variance and patterns of association found in this sample more likely than not reflect similar associations in an urban European Soviet referent population (see appendix for more details). In light of the lack of opportunity for Western social scientists to conduct independent survey research in the USSR itself, surveys of this proxy population must do.

The first part of this article will demonstrate that nonvoting in single-candidate elections constitutes a dissident political act by analyzing the role of such elections in the perpetuation of single-party systems, and by examining the electoral process in action. The second part will focus on an empirical substantiation of the argument by an analysis of the emigrant survey data. Results suggest that nonvoting is significantly correlated with various modes of dissident behavior and with an intense and critical interest in politics. Since a high interest in politics is one of the primary attitudinal correlates of voting in democracies, this suggests that nonvoting in undemocratic systems is comparable to voting in democracies.

The Soviet Electoral Context and the Significance of Unanimity

Elections are taken very seriously in the Soviet Union. As calculated by Hill (1976, p. 590), Soviet citizens are exposed to election campaigns for an average of one and a half months per year. There are elections for the formal parliaments of the USSR and of the union republics, as well as for a substructure of lower-level councils, or "Soviets," as they are officially called. Enormous efforts are expended on the electoral process. Every campaign results in a flood of exhortative articles in the press, in dozens of meetings at places of work and in neighborhoods, and in the building up of a huge apparatus of electoral officials. The enormous flurry of activity culminates in election day. Always a Sunday, it is marked by a festive atmosphere, with bands playing and banners flying as streams of voters arrive in the polling places. Typically, the Soviet voter takes his ballot with the single candidate's name on it and drops it unmarked into the ballot box—this constitutes an affirmative vote.[1] It is widely publicized that every voter is given a chance to participate, even if he lives in the remotest region, travels on a train or ship, or is confined to his bed. The results are noted with gratification: a voter turnout of 99% or more, with the same percentage voting for the official candidates. In an acclamation of the significance of this event, *Pravda* (March 7, 1979) writes:

> The results of the elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the unanimous election to the country's supreme body of state power of the candidates of the indestructible bloc of Communists and non-Party people provide striking new evidence of the monolithic unity of the Party and the people and of the working people's full support for the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] and the Soviet state. The elections have convincingly shown the thoroughly democratic nature of the world's first society of developed socialism and the working people's firm resolve to persistently strive for new successes in all sectors of communist construction.

This summarizes the themes of the election, which, while exhorted as the high point of Soviet democracy, focuses on demonstrating the lack of divisions in the society. The 99% is repeated over and over again as if it were a magic number safeguarding the future.[2]

As pointed out by Linz, this striking insistence on unanimity is at the core of a regime's intent in staging totalitarian elections. Referring to the work of Simmel, Linz (1978, p. 47) argues that this insistence has a deep ideological and political significance, symbolically anticipating the result of concrete battle and coercion. Other analysts of the purpose of noncompetitive elections in the Soviet or comparative frameworks have advanced variations of this argument. Hermet (1978, p. 14) speaks of the alienating role of such elections in creating the psychosocial conditions for the system's smooth working, and Zaslavsky and Brym (1978, p. 371) argue that the demonstration of fictitious democracy is a means of buttressing the regime, since it prompts the population to show that it has accepted as legitimate what in fact is illegitimate. Or, in the words of Reshetar (1978, p. 198):

> The elections also have a psychological significance because the voter is not permitted to boycott the balloting ritual but must participate and make a commitment to the regime. Thus, the voter is periodically reminded by means of this mass loyalty test and exercise in assent that there is no alternative to the Communist party and its regime, and that dissent is not permitted.

The logic behind mobilized political participation is similarly explained in most definitions of totalitarian systems, and this is taken as a major trait distinguishing them from authoritarian regimes, which are more reliant on the apathy and passive obedience of subjects (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1966, pp. 163–65; Linz, 1978, p. 43).

This is not to posit that the contemporary Soviet Union fits a conventional definition of the totalitarian state, but rather to raise the question about the significance of the USSR's retention of certain totalitarian trappings, of which the demonstration of unanimity on election day is one. The current electoral system was adopted at the height of Stalinism, and the first general elections under it were held in 1937. Such continuity in a major aspect of Soviet politics bears investigation to determine how real it is and whether there is evidence of change under the surface.

Indeed, some change has taken place. There has been a trend toward nonvoting, but this change is unsystemic and is due to individual grassroots impulses that have been allowed to take their course through the connivance of low-level electoral officials who themselves have been coopted for the voting exercise. And although the nonvoters engage in evasion, which suggests passivity, it does entail considerable symbolic and real activity.

To elaborate first on the symbolic aspects, let us return to the psychological and socializing role of noncompetitive elections. The Soviet election process demonstrates a striking formal thoroughness and elaborate organizational structure. It is not just that the media and officials give extensive, ritualized coverage to the elections and that an enormous amount of time, money, and effort are expended on them. A major point is also made of the democratic nature of the process itself. There are painstakingly detailed rules and regulations about nominations and the establishment of electoral districts and commissions, as well as guarantees of the equality of the vote, its secrecy, and the fairness of the count (Grigoriev and Zhdanov, 1980; *Kommentarii*, 1977, 1979). But it is not for nothing that so much political workmanship goes into this elaborate artificial structure. It is designed to have a deep psychological impact on the voter, who either will accept its democratic nature at face value or will feel intensely alienated. Even if the latter is the case, going through the motions of voting induces compliance.

The balloting epitomizes the gaps between theory and practice that the voter is expected to accept happily. Roy Medvedev (1975) focuses on one of these gaps when he cites the instructions to the voter to "leave the name of the *one* candidate for whom you wish to vote and cross out the remaining ones." Since there is always only one name on the ballot, this is patently absurd. Similarly absurd is the regulation that "ballots are filled out by voters in rooms for secret balloting" (Electoral Law, Art. 53, passed on June 6, 1978). This too is theoretically in line with democratic procedure, but in practice there is nothing to fill out, because a vote for the single candidate is not marked and the ballot is simply deposited in an urn. Affirmative votes, far from being secret, are demonstratively open. This also takes away secrecy from the rare voter who enters a voting booth, since the implication is that he intends to strike out the name of the candidate and thus cast a negative vote.[3]

In the Soviet Union as well as other single-party systems, voting is primarily an act of allegiance to the regime. The citizenry's involvement in regime-directed routines and rituals fosters habits of compliance and instills a perception of the leadership's omnipotence (Almond and Powell, 1984, pp. 319–20). Seen in this light, electoral evasion is a political act. We now turn to the question of how this evasion occurs and how extended it is.

The Mechanics and Extent of Nonvoting in Soviet Elections

Nonvoting in the USSR occurs in four ways: (1) by not being registered on the electoral rolls; (2) by simply failing to vote; (3) by one's ballot being cast by somebody else; or (4) by requesting an absentee ballot and not using it. Only the second way is acknowledged by official sources, and then only partly. The other forms of nonvoting are evident from incongruities in Soviet data as well as from unofficial sources such as *samizdat* (self-published work) and interviews with emigrants.

As noted by Powell (1982, pp. 113–15), the calculation of electoral turnout depends on one's definition of the universe of potential voters, and is most accurately measured by reference to all eligible voters, and not just those who are registered. Because Soviet calculations of turnout are based only on the number of registered voters, one has to consider how many eligible voters are being omitted from the electoral rolls. Since this question has not previously been addressed in the literature, it is beyond the scope of this article to venture more than a rough estimate that the relevant number is several million, or between 1% and 3% of the Soviet population. Keeping complete lists of eligible voters is a complex task (Rose, 1974, p. 69). There are at least two groups that constitute a special problem. The first consists of migrants striving for permanent residency in the larger cities, which are the most desirable places to live but require hard-to-obtain permits. Hundreds of thousands of these migrants end up as illegal residents (Grandstaff, 1980, p. 16), which means that they are unlikely to be on the electoral rolls prepared by official bodies. People in prison and labor camps are also unlikely to be on the rosters. While the legal restrictions on the electoral rights of individuals convicted of crimes were annulled in 1958, and theoretically there is "universal suffrage for citizens who have reached the age of eighteen, except the legally insane" (*Kommentarii*, 1979, p. 14), there are indications that people who are "in custody" do not vote (Latov, 1974, p. 25; Reshetar, 1978, p. 194). The total imprisoned population in the USSR is estimated to be in the millions.[4]

Leaving aside the problem of voter registration, one still has to assess how many of the people who are on rolls do in fact cast their ballots. According to Soviet electoral statistics, voter turnout has always been extremely high, and reached the 99.99% mark in the 1984 elections to the Supreme Soviet. In other words, it is claimed that only 23,039 out of 184,029,412 voters failed to vote, and in the case of the Turkmen SSR just 1 voter out of 1,531,610 (*Pravda*, March 7, 1984). This claim is likely to strain anyone's credulity. It appears that the actual percentage range is somewhere between 90% and 95%. While there appears to be little outright falsification of returns, some votes are cast by persons other than the voter, and another contingent of voters is striken off the registers and does not affect the final calculation of the turnout. This method of arriving at the desired 99.99% figure illuminates Soviet political culture and should be considered in some detail.

Voting in the USSR is not legally mandatory, but intense psychological and social pressures are applied to get the vote out. Especially important is the use of a network of "agitators," who are enlisted by electoral commissions to contact from 20 to 30 voters before the election, provide a political educational talk, and enjoin them to be sure to vote. In effect, the agitator is made responsible for "his" (or "her") voters, and is called to task by the Communist party (agitators usually are party members) or others if the assigned voters should fail to vote. Feeling highly pressured to fulfill his norm, the agitator transmits pressure to the voters. His message—"it is your duty to vote, please do not get me into trouble," and "you yourself may be in this role one day"—becomes most insistent on election day if the voter fails to show up at the polling place early and is therefore visited at home. If a voter cannot be found, refuses to vote, or turns out to be incapacitated, the pressure remains on the agitator to do something about it. The easiest way is to cast the ballot for the voter, and this is what happens with some regularity (Friedgut, 1979, p. 114).

Soviet electoral law stipulates that "each voter has one vote" and "each voter casts his ballot in person" (*Kommentarii*, 1979, arts. 3 and 46). Thus it is illegal to cast ballots in somebody else's stead, but apparently this practice is tolerated relatively widely (Friedgut, pp. 115-16; Schmemann, 1984). In the words of Roy Medvedev (1975, p. 143):

> Commissions in charge of polling places sometimes allow a daughter to vote on behalf of her mother, a husband for his wife, or one neighbor for another. It often happens that members of the commission themselves cast votes for people who are late or have failed to appear.

In one case, an Estonian biologist working at Tartu State University voted not only for his wife, but also for 30 of his students, apparently because the student turnout was only around 70%,[5] and he simply took it upon himself to take care of the "problem."

If a nonvoter wants to be sure that nobody casts a ballot in his name, the way to do so is to request an absentee voting certificate and then not use it. Any voter may request an absentee ballot by stating that he will be out of town on election day, and this ballot can be cast in any other electoral district in the country. (One may note that this undermines the principle of direct electoral representation.) While some absentee ballots are, of course, cast—Latov (1974, p. 45) claims that in June 1970 half a million Moscovites did so—emigrants report that not doing so is a popular means of vote evasion. It is a technique welcomed by agitators and other members of electoral commissions, since absentee voters are stricken from their electoral rolls, thereby absolving them of any further responsibility (Friedgut, 1979, pp. 116-17; Zaslavsky and Brym, 1978).

How extensive is nonvoting? In the most thorough study to date, Friedgut (1979, p. 108) concludes that although it "may reach as high as 5 percent of the electorate, it almost certainly does not reach 10 percent." His estimate is based on interviews as well as on a comparison of the number of registered voters with census data about the voting age population. The resulting discrepancy of several million—ca. 2.5% of the Soviet population in 1970—represents the theoretically eligible voters who "wilfully, or by negligence, avoid the election system" (1979, p. 117). Although quite convincing, Friedgut ignores the group of migrants mentioned above, who are unaccounted for in either statistic since they are not living at a legal residence,[6] and he does not count as nonvoters people whose ballots have been cast for them by somebody else, and who in our definition are nonvoters.

Another estimate of vote evasion is provided by respondents in the Soviet Interview Project who had at one time or other served on electoral commissions. Of the sample, 459, or 16.4%, had done so, most as agitators. This rate is credible since the system puts a premium on coopting many people into electoral commissions: in a single election (1975), 5.7% of the electorate served in this capacity (Soobshchenie, 1975, p. 20). Individuals who had this experience were asked how many eligible voters voted in their districts. While quite a few did not remember (26%), the largest group (45%) said that the turnout was 99% or 100%, another 20% said it was in the 88% to 98% range, and 9% chose a figure lower than that. References were primarily to local elections, which are more frequent, and to elections held between 1973 and 1981. Percentages reported for the Russian Union Republic (RSFSR) tend to be lower than for other regions.

These reports both support and challenge our proposition that only 90% to 95% of the Soviet voting-age population cast their ballots in elections held in the 1970s. The support comes from those mentioning turnouts of 98% and below, and, indirectly, from those who could not remember, since 100% is easier to remember than anything under it. But many did cite the official figure of from 99% to 100%. However, it is not known whether they were using the definition of nonvoting we have established here, which includes the nonuse of absentee voting certificates, voting by others, and omission from electoral rolls. As these are relative "fine points" more evident to individual abstainers than to persons serving on the commission, they could easily be overlooked.

We contend, therefore, that from 5% to 10% of the eligible voters in the USSR did not, in fact, vote during the 1970s. As the pursuant discussion will show, nonvoting is more prevalent among the sample of emigrants surveyed, for several reasons. For one, the sample is not representative of the entire Soviet population; it is, for example, more highly educated (see appendix) and presumably more disaffected. Both these factors are correlated with nonvoting, as we will show. In addition, it is conceivable that some respondents misreported their voting behavior, a tendency that is also known to affect calculations of voter turnout based on survey results in other systems. But as Sigelman (1982) has indicated, the substantive conclusions about the factors that influence voting or nonvoting are largely unaffected by the misreporting phenomenon, since the basic correlations remain the same.

There is one more reason why the rate of nonvoting is larger in our sample than we expect it to be for any single Soviet election. The relevant survey question refers to several elections falling into a five-year "last normal period" (LNP) before the respondent's life was significantly changed due to emigration plans. The question asked: "Did you yourself always vote in elections to the soviets during your last normal period, or did you sometimes not vote?" Reply categories distinguished among "always voted" (69%), "sometimes did not vote" (20%), and "never voted in LNP" (11%), but since there is little distinction between respondents who chose one of the latter two categories, they are merged here. Nevertheless, the reader should be aware that a subgroup of nonvoters failed to vote only sometimes. Since three elections were held during the primary period of reference, 1975–1979, the "sometimes" usually refers to one or two elections.[7]

Having discussed the general significance of nonvoting in undemocratic systems as well as its mechanics and extent in the USSR, we now turn to a closer analysis of its meaning, as discerned from the data of the Soviet Interview Project. We hypothesize that nonvoting is not haphazard, but is more often engaged in by specific subgroups of the Soviet population. Furthermore, nonvoting is, to a significant degree, an expression of political disaffection and active concern with politics rather than of apathy. While this will be shown through data analysis, it can also be concluded from our examination of the mechanics of nonvoting, which, we have seen, usually involves more of an effort than voting.

Data and Discussion

The Demographic Profile of Nonvoters

The first step of our analysis is to outline the demographic profile of the nonvoters and, by implication, that of the voters as well. Once the main fault lines of demographic differentiation are identified, the rest of the analysis will focus on an explanation of them.

Demographic characteristics such as age, sex, region, education, and occupation reveal major differentials. Thus, older Soviet subjects are much more likely to vote than younger ones. Females vote more often, and so do the less educated. Occupationally speaking, blue collar workers and service personnel are most likely to vote, whereas professionals and "others"—of whom those holding high-level technical jobs are most significant—are less likely to do so.[8] Regional comparisons show a major emphasis on nonvoting in the RSFSR as contrasted with the rest of the USSR, with the partial exception of the Baltic and Caucasian republics. These patterns of under- and overrepresentation of subgroups among the nonvoting population are summarized in Figure 1.

Setting aside the Soviet regional phenomenon, this demographic profile of nonvoters tends to support the proposition that nonvoting in the Soviet Union is a political act qualitatively similar to voting in democratic systems. In the latter the same subgroups—males, the middle-aged, younger people (except the very young), and those with higher educational and occupational standing—tend to be overrepresented among voters. This phenomenon was first noted in Merriam and Gosnell's (1924) pioneering study of nonvoting in Chicago, and has since been confirmed in numerous other studies (Lipset, 1960, pp. 182–85; Rose, 1974, p. 698; Verba and Nie, 1972). As to the slightly curvilinear pattern of electoral participation by age found in democracies, our survey again shows a reverse equivalent for the youngest age-group, which was more likely to have voted than the preceding cohort (64% compared to

Figure 1. Demographic Profile of Nonvotes, Index of Representation (%)



[a]The cutting point is between the people born before and after 1931, with 1977 the median reference year for age during the "last normal period" in the USSR.

55%). In the Soviet case this higher participation rate—and at the same time lower evasion rate—may be due to the special attention paid to first-time voters, who are welcomed at polling places with speeches and flowers (Friedgut, 1979, p. 110).

While it is of some interest to note the demographic profile of nonvoters in the USSR, its real significance emerges only in the analytical elaboration to be pursued below. Region is an exception, as it appears largely to stand on its own. It is a contextual variable reflecting the properties of various communities rather than the individual characteristics of respondents. The higher rate of nonvoting in the RSFSR—which primarily reflects respondents from Moscow and Leningrad—remains in force even if one controls for other variables, including the political ones to be discussed below. This regional phenomenon is confirmed by other sources, including official Soviet election statistics.[9] It may be explained by a global awareness of politics present in the political centers of the country. Moreover, nonvoting is associated with a critical attitude toward Soviet politics, and for the two population groups represented in our sample—Russians and Soviet Jews—Moscow and Leningrad are the centers of attitudinal and behavioral nonconformism. While the link between dissent and nonvoting can be shown once we examine individual-level correlations, the nonconformist atmosphere in these two cities also has a group effect on respondents.

As for the other demographic variables, some are correlated with each other and are partly spurious. Thus, occupation is strongly correlated with education, which in turn is correlated with age ($r=0.39$) and with region ($r=-0.27$).[10] The association between nonvoting and education is considerably weakened if one controls for age and region, which emerge as being more influential variables. Therefore, although the demographic profile of the nonvoters shows that they tend to have more education, we will omit further analysis of this variable due to its intercorrelation with the other demographic variables focused on here.

The impact of the remaining demographic factors—age, region, and sex—is linked to intervening variables such as interest in politics, nonregime political values, unsanctioned behavior, and loss of fear of sanctions. But before proceeding to these points, it is useful to consider the intensity with which the three main demographic variables are associated with nonvoting behavior. While Figure 1 already indicates the relative and cumulative effects of the demographic variables, Table 1 does so more precisely. Cumulatively, the largest differential, 45%, is between younger males from the RSFSR and older females from other regions.

A comparison of the cells also shows

Table 1. Generational Differentials in Nonvoting, by Region and Sex

Region, Sex, and Age	Percentage Not Voting	Number of Cases
Russian Union Republic (RSFSR)		
Males:		
46 years old and younger	57	209
Over 46 years old	34	151
Females:		
46 years old and younger	45	458
Over 46 years old	19	269
Other Republics		
Males:		
46 years old and younger	33	458
Over 46 years old	16	212
Females:		
46 years old and younger	18	498
Over 46 years old	12	298

considerable consistency in the direction and intensity of nonvoting under various control conditions. An analysis of the relative effects of these variables shows that the influence of region is most intense, with an average percentage differential of 19%, closely followed by age (18.3%), with sex coming in third (11.5%).[11] Although the technique used here is simple, it meets the standards of methodological sufficiency and has the advantage of showing the thrust of the findings clearly.

Nonvoting Related to Nonconformist Political Attitudes and Behavior

Interest in politics. The analysis of competitive elections shows that people who are interested in public affairs vote more often than those who are not (Verba and Nie, 1972, pp. 118–19). If, in noncompetitive elections, nonvoting is in fact a more political act than voting, one would expect nonvoting to be similarly associated with a higher interest in politics. Our data about the Soviet case overwhelmingly suggest that this indeed is so. As illustrated by the first row in Table 2, respondents who were "very" or "somewhat" interested in public affairs were much more likely not to have voted than those who had no interest or only a slight interest in politics.

When delving deeper into this relationship by bringing in additional variables, some of the demographic factors stand out even more, while others tend to disappear. The significance of sex, for example, virtually disappears among those "very interested" in public affairs, which for our analysis is substantively the most important subgroup. Nevertheless, Table 2 also shows that the significance of gender differences reappears increasingly strongly with decreasing political interest, which suggests that some other as yet unexplained variables are associated with the lower level of nonvoting among Soviet women. While noting this finding, we shall not try to explain it, since the political activism gap between men and women constitutes a pervasive and difficult to explain crosscutural phenomenon (Verba, Nie, and Kim, 1978, chap. 12).

In contrast to sex, nonvoting differentials by age and region emerge even more prominently among the respondents who

Table 2. The Effect of Interest in Politics on Nonvoting Controlling for Sex, Age, and Region

Sex, Age, and Region	Percentage Not Voting[a] Very Interested in Politics	Somewhat Interested in Politics	Only Slightly Interested in Politics	Not at All Interested in Politics
Sex				
Men	47 (447)	35 (439)	31 (148)	28 (169)
Women	43 (298)	27 (611)	20 (295)	12 (370)
Age				
46 years old and younger	52 (531)	36 (764)	28 (288)	22 (245)
Over 46 years old	28 (214)	17 (286)	16 (155)	13 (298)
Region				
RSFSR	55 (443)	39 (480)	31 (188)	23 (166)
Other	30 (302)	24 (570)	18 (255)	14 (373)
Total[b]	45 (745)	31 (1050)	24 (443)	17 (539)

[a] Numbers in parentheses are *N*s.

[b] Chi-square = 129.04; *df* = 3; significance = .00; Pearson's *R* = −.21; significance = .00.

are very interested in politics, and show a decreasing effect with decreasing interest (Table 2). This suggests that both these factors have an inherent significance for nonvoting behavior. In the case of region, the special characteristics of the RSFSR, as compared with other republics of the Soviet Union, are again highlighted. As for age, its role is likely to be partly linked to the life cycle—the elderly tend to be more passive—but there also appears to be a major generational difference that has little to do with physical age, but rather reflects a specific set of experiences associated with historical eras. As will be argued at more length below, the behavioral gap between the older generation and those who are young or middle-aged seems to reflect the different political experiences of the generations molded in the Stalinist and post-Stalinist eras. Those raised within the Stalinist system seem much more likely to "go along" against their own inclinations. If so, this is a major empirical confirmation of the longstanding proposition that the death of Stalin in 1953 marked a turning point in Soviet politics, the consequences of which are still unravelling. What may be even more significant is the nature of the change our data reflect—namely, change in the behavior of the citizenry. The initial changes triggered after the great dictator's death were regime and policy changes; our data suggest that there has also been a long-term change in the political behavior of sizable population groups.

Political outlook. The association between a high interest in politics and

Table 3. Divergent Associations Between Nonvoting and Various Motives for Emigration

Motive for Emigration, by Frequency Mentioned	Percentage Not Voting	Number of Cases
Politics[a]		
0	21	1630
1	41	805
2	48	318
3	62	40
Discrimination[b]		
0	31	1672
1	30	901
2	26	205
3	40	15

[a] Chi-square = 171.1; *df* = 3; significance = .00; Pearson's *R* = .24; significance = .00.

[b] Chi-square = 2.76; *df* = 3; significance = .43; Pearson's *R* = −.02; significance = .16.

nonvoting is just one indication that the latter is linked to critical attitudes toward Soviet politics. This relationship is further illuminated by respondents' replies as to why they left the Soviet Union. Up to three responses were recorded to an open-ended question. They provide a rough but adequate indicator of basic political attitudes toward the Soviet system. If a respondent mentioned one or more political reasons for exit, we take this to signify a critical attitude toward the system; if no political reasons are mentioned, we take this to mean that political disaffection is not a significant component of the individual's outlook.

This operationalization of the "why did you leave" variable deliberately challenges the assumption that emigration per se signifies political disaffection. As empirical studies of emigration from the USSR have shown (Gitelman, 1977a; Karklins, 1981), a host of factors are involved, among which traditional motives for migration, such as the search for a better life or family reasons, are the most significant. In the case of Soviet Jews and Soviet Germans, a quest for cultural religious autonomy and escape from ethnic discrimination are also important, but while these may be construed to be political in a broad sense, they hardly constitute a form of direct political disenchantment with the Soviet system of government. Thus, we take the view that the emigrant respondents represent a varied group of people, and unless they specifically note politics as a reason for emigrating, we assume that their attitudes toward the Soviet regime are either neutral or positive.

From this we hypothesize that individuals who mention a political motive for emigrating are less likely to have voted in the state-organized elections than those who did not. By the same token, one can show the explicitly political nature of nonvoting in the USSR by the voting behavior of those individuals who cite other motives for emigration, such as ethnic discrimination: the expectation here is that nonvoting is not significantly associated with this motive. As Table 3 shows, both expectations are confirmed by the data: while nonvoting is significantly more prevalent among the politically motivated emigrants (42% of the total sample), this is not the case for those for whom discrimination is the motive for emigration.

Figure 2. Demographic Profile of Dissidents, Index of Representation (%)



^a The cutting point is between people born before and after 1931, with 1977 the median reference year for age during the "last normal period" in the USSR.

A critical attitude toward the Soviet regime is similarly correlated with nonvoting if other indicators are used. Thus, responses to a question about what is worth keeping in the Soviet system show that those saying "keep nothing" have the highest incidence of nonvoting (44%).[12] The nonvoting rate is 32% among respondents who thought that something was worth keeping (usually education or health care), and just 21% among those who said "don't know," or who gave no answer at all.[13] This illustrates that nonvoting is more prevalent among people more hostile to the Soviet system, while voting tends to be strongest among those who have no opinions or do not want to express them.

Dissident behavior. Having linked nonvoting to political nonconformism by showing its correlation with an expressed interest in politics and with a political motivation for emigration, the next step is to test its relationship to overt unsanctioned behavior. In turning from an attitudinal tendency to actual behavior, the expectation is that here the association between the two phenomena will be even closer if it is indeed true that nonvoting signifies deliberate political action rather than apathy.

The interview project included a sequence of questions about dissidence ranging from the attending of unofficial art shows to participation in open protest against some Soviet policy.[14] While the latter is much more political in nature than the former, and one might weight them in a more refined index of dissident behavior, a simple summary score is sufficient to tap the broad range and differential intensity of unsanctioned behavior.

For some purposes it even suffices to use a dichotomous measure for the involvement in unsanctioned activities, such as in the summary demographic profile presented in Figure 2. A comparison of Figure 2 with Figure 1 shows that the overall pattern in the demographic profile of nonvoters and nonconformists is closely congruent, suggesting that the two behaviors may be associated. As Table 4 illustrates, the relationship is in fact of considerable strength, and intensifies as the dissidence score increases. Among those respondents who had engaged in more than one of the listed behaviors, nonvoting occurred in more than 50% of the cases.

The association between nonvoting and unsanctioned behavior is similarly strong if one uses other measures of dissent. The reading of unofficial publications (*samizdat* and *tamizdat* [work published abroad]) might even have been added into the unsanctioned behavior scale, but this was rejected because the patterns of association are so similar that nothing is gained analytically. In addition, including the *samizdat* question poses a methodological disadvantage: It was only asked of a third of the respondents, and this decreases the potency of the data. Nevertheless, there is one dimension that is

Table 4. Nonvoting and Participation in Unsanctioned Activities

Activity	Percentage Not Voting	Number of Cases
Number of dissent activities engaged in[a]		
0	24	2119
1	44	451
2	61	129
3 to 6	78	94
Reading *samizdat* or *tamizdat*[b]		
Yes	51	280
No, not available	25	364
No, no interest	15	228
No, unexplained	12	52

[a] Chi-square = 235.13; *df* = 3; significance = .00; Pearson's *R* = .29.

[b] Chi-square = 96.87; *df* = 3; significance = .00; Pearson's *R* = −.07; significance = .01.

illuminated by a closer look at the *samizdat* variable, namely, the role of opportunity. Many forms of dissident behavior cannot be engaged in alone, but are linked to the presence of like-minded individuals and specific activities. One cannot attend an unofficial art show or join an unofficial study group if none is present in the vicinity. Similarly, one cannot read *samizdat* if none is available. Since nonvoting is not linked to opportunity, it can occur among people who have not participated in any other unsanctioned activity. This is clear from the second part of Table 4: a comparison of "no, not available" and "no, no interest" indicates that nonvoting tends to be higher among individuals who gave the former reply. Thus, a part of the gap between nonvoting and other unsanctioned behavior may be due to a lack of opportunity for the latter.

Another gap exists between a critical view of the Soviet system and actual behavior expressing this stand. This is illustrated by Table 5 and the significant subgroup of respondents ($N = 525$) who had a high interest in politics and mentioned political dissatisfaction as a cause for emigration, but never participated in dissident activity. While this is theoretically to be expected, since social science has often noted a gap between attitudes and behavior, the fear of sanctions plays a special role in a system such as the Soviet one, a point which is to be elaborated upon below.

It is the conclusion of this part of the analysis that nonvoting in the USSR is indeed associated with an explicit interest in politics, with critical political attitudes, and with dissident types of behavior. This finding is summarized in Table 5, which also shows the cumulative and relative effects of the three variables. Cumulatively, the respondents who expressed an interest in politics, who gave at least one political motive for emigration, and who had engaged in at least one form of dissident activity have the highest incidence of nonvoting (59%). In contrast, the lowest percentage score (16%) is found among those who were hardly interested in politics, listed no political motive for emigration, and had not participated in dissident activity. A calculation of the relative effects of the three variables on nonvoting shows dissident activity coming in first, with an average differential of 18%, followed by a critical view of the Soviet system (15%), and interest in politics (12%).[15]

Table 5. Nonvoting and the Relative Effects of Interest in Politics and Dissident Outlook and Behavior

Political Interest, Motive for Emigration, and Dissidence	Percentage Not Voting	Number of Cases
Interested in politics[a]		
Political motive for emigration		
Dissident	59	388
Not dissident	38	525
No political motive for emigration		
Dissident	47	158
Not dissident	21	724
Hardly interested in politics		
Political motive for emigration		
Dissident	51	57
Not dissident	25	187
No political motive for emigration		
Dissident	26	69
Not dissident	16	669

[a] Dichotomized versions of the previously cited variables are used here; in the case of the "interest in politics" variable, the categories "very" and "somewhat" interested, and the categories "only slightly" and "not" interested, were collapsed.

The Role of Sanctions and Fear

Students of Soviet politics have traditionally assumed that much compliant mobilized behavior is due to a fear of sanctions. This assumption has also applied to electoral participation, although the form of sanctions against vote evaders has remained unspecified, implying a general black mark leading to negative consequences sooner or later (Mote, 1965, p. 78). One of the more interesting findings of the interview project is that in the 1970s practically no official sanctions for nonvoting were implemented, and that fearfulness is diminishing, although it persists among part of the population.

The survey raised the issue of sanctions by asking nonvoters: "Were any official actions taken against you as a result of this?" Only 1.8% said "yes," and the sanctions reported consisted mostly of reprimands, warnings, or threats. Thus, in essence, no major sanctions were applied, a finding that coincides with that of Friedgut's in-depth interviewing. He adds, however, that among his respondents "there was general consensus that a refusal to vote out of simple political passivity would be noted somewhere and could at some point in the future cause unpleasantness to the nonvoter" (Friedgut, 1979, pp. 114–15).

Several points should be considered in this regard. For one, as noted in our analysis of the mechanics of nonvoting, this usually occurs in a nonconfrontational manner, through evasion. If nonvoting occurs openly or demonstratively the consequences are likely to be more severe.[16] Furthermore, the nature of the pressures used to get the vote out—primarily peer pressure by "agitators"—suggests that the negative consequences of vote evasion may be similarly unofficial and indirect.

While official sanctions for nonvoting appear to have been rare in the 1970s, the fear of sanctions has not necessarily dissipated, and can still affect voter turnout. As comparative studies have shown

(Irwin, 1974; Powell, 1982), the threat of sanction is sufficient to make many people comply with official pressures to vote. Unfortunately, our survey did not directly address the question of the role of fear and the perception of potential sanctions in voting decisions, but there is a way of testing the association by proxy. In one series of questions, respondents were asked about topics they talked about with various people in the USSR, including with whom they would have criticized a governmental official. While 83% would have criticized a governmental official with members of their families, only 55% would have done so with their closest friends. The percentages for others are much lower: 25% for relatives other than close family, 12% for co-workers, 4% for a boss, and 9% with no one. This constraint with close friends is a rough indicator of apprehensiveness about potential sanctions. Given the political development of the Soviet Union, the older generation is much more likely to feel such anxieties than the younger one, as the illustration in Figure 3 of a major breaking point between individuals born before and after 1931 dramatically confirms. Since the system began "softening" almost immediately after Stalin's death in March 1953, this break makes sense as a watershed between the generations who reached adulthood with and after Stalin's death, and those who spent most or all of their adult lives under Stalin.

This conclusion is confirmed if one examines the alternative life-cycle hypothesis that older people might be less likely to criticize government officials with their friends because they tend to be less interested in public affairs. As visually illustrated by Figure 3, the "interested in politics" line is quite close to the "would have criticized' line for younger age groups, but there is a noticeable gap for those born before 1931, indicating that something other than lack of interest explains the older generation's reticence to discuss politics with friends. Viewing the respective relationships in another manner—by the crosstabulation in Table 6—one notes that compared to generational difference, the "interest in politics" variable explains less variance. While the percentage difference between generations remains in the 20% to 34% range, even if one controls for interest in politics, the difference between people within the same generation but with different levels of interest ranges between 11% and 15%.[17] Thus, interest in politics is somewhat associated with the expression of criticism, but relatively less so than age is, supporting our thesis that this variable reflects the perception of how freely one may talk about politics, and the generational differences associated with this perception.

Figure 3. Generational Gap in Percentage of Those Who "Would Have Criticized Government Official Among Friends," Compared with Age-Related Trends in Interest in Politics



Table 6. Generational Differences in Fear to Criticize, by Interest in Politics

	Percentage Feeling Free to Criticize Officials With Friends:			
Age	Very Interested in Politics	Somewhat Interested in Politics	Only Slightly Interested in Politics	Not at All Interested in Politics
46 years old and younger	79 (165)[a]	68 (264)	53 (105)	54 (80)
Over 46 years old	45 (65)	43 (89)	33 (51)	23 (78)

[a]Numbers in parentheses are *N*s.

Lack of openness in expressing one's views on public affairs, even among friends, is found mostly among the older generation. This may be largely explained by historical experiences and long-term effects of the atmosphere of fear created in the Stalin era, but the fact that the middle-aged and younger respondents also include fearful individuals should not be disregarded. If fear limits the likelihood that people will engage in unsanctioned political behavior, this helps explain why some of the people we would expect not to vote in Soviet elections—namely, those who are interested in politics and critical of the Soviet system—nevertheless did vote, as Table 7 shows. Among respondents who were very or somewhat interested in politics, those who felt that they could criticize officials with their friends were much more likely to abstain from voting than those who were fearful. Similarly, people who felt free in discussions with friends and had a critical attitude toward the Soviet system were much more likely to evade voting than those who held similar attitudes but did not talk freely with their closest friends. In sum,

Table 7. Fearfulness and Nonvoting Among Politically Interested and Critical Respondents

Political Interest, Motive for Emigration, and Fearfulness	Percentage Not Voting	Number of Cases
Political Interest		
Interested in politics, feels free to criticize		
Yes	46	378
No	25	205
Not interested in politics, feels free to criticize		
Yes	26	134
No	22	180
Motive for Emigration		
Political motive for emigration, feels free to criticize		
Yes	51	268
No	33	130
No political motive for emigration, feels free to criticize		
Yes	29	244
No	19	257

fear inhibits nonvoting among individuals who are inclined toward it, but to a significantly lesser degree among the post-Stalinist generation.

Conclusions

In a political system where a choice between candidates is not part of the election process, and where elections are designed to enhance the position of the regime, the only option left to the dissenting citizen is not to participate. Typically, the authorities organizing noncompetitive elections are aware of this single remaining choice, and make every effort to prevent its being taken. Vote evasion, therefore, tends to become a political act both in principle and in form, since nonvoting frequently involves more effort than casting a ballot.

The meaning of voting and nonvoting must be assessed within the context of regime objectives. The goals most directly challenged by the nonvoter are the demonstration of unanimity and the regime's wish to have every single voter "accept a truth about the value of which there can be no doubt" (Linz, 1978, p. 48). In state-organized, single-candidate elections, the citizen is not only "acted upon" by the state, but is also required to be active himself, most of all in the affirmation of the regime's legitimacy and power and, by implication, of the illegitimacy and hopelessness of any alternative politics. Participation in the great charade of totalitarian and authoritarian elections is highly valued by the regime, because the act of each citizen in being part and parcel of it is a small but significant politico-psychological victory that is a key to general relations. Evasion thus constitutes a first step toward challenging other facets of the regime's claim for a monopoly of political thought, word, and activity.

While the political significance of nonvoting can be shown theoretically and contextually, the empirical substantiation of our argument for the Soviet case has consisted of newly available emigrant survey data. Based on the assumption that such data can be useful for the study of variance in social and political phenomena, we have compared the voters and nonvoters in our sample and found that the two groups differ in their demographic and political profiles. Compared to those respondents who stated that they had always voted in Soviet elections, the nonvoters are younger, more frequently male, more highly educated, and more often from the RSFSR, especially Moscow and Leningrad. Politically, they tend to be more interested in public affairs than the voters, their attitudes toward the Soviet political system are more critical, and they have more often been engaged in unsanctioned cultural and political behavior. The nonvoter tends to be a nonconformist and dissident, and is also less fearful than others, especially the older generation.

These findings have several implications for our understanding of the Soviet system. The diminished fearfulness among the middle-aged and younger generations reflects a significant long-term movement away from the legacy of the Stalin era that is still noticeable in the behavior of the older generation. This change is bound to become more pronounced with time. Regionally speaking, Moscow and Leningrad emerge as centers of dissent, which is significant, since they also are the centers of official politics. What is more, the style of vote evasion provides insights into the contemporary political culture of the Soviet Union. Nonvoting is mostly nonconfrontational, and involves the pretense of absentee voting and illegal vote casting by third persons, the latter being not only tolerated, but even promoted by election workers concerned about fulfilling their official voting norm. These low-level representatives of the system, who themselves often have been pressed into service, collude with the citizenry in circumventing one of the primary goals of the electoral process—namely, making every citizen individually cast his vote. This shows disbelief in the purpose of the process, as well as a propensity toward avoiding "true" nonvoting, which might be seen as a direct challenge to the system and might have major consequences. This circumvention rather than confrontation constitutes the prevalent form of unsanctioned political behavior, a finding closely in accord with other recent studies of Soviet political culture (DiFranceisco and Gitelman, 1984; White, 1979).

As noted above, the authoritarian regime's acceptance of citizen passivity and evasion, as contrasted with the totalitarian regime's insistence on activism, has been defined as a major criterion distinguishing the two. In the case of the Soviet Union and its contemporary electoral processes, although the regime insists on keeping the outward form and the official claim of 99.9% unanimity, it allows covert evasion and circumvention. This suggests a systemic change toward a quasi-totalitarian system that is authoritarian at heart.

Appendix: Sampling Frame Population and Sampling Procedures

The population eligible for the survey was composed of Soviet emigrants who arrived in the United States between January 1, 1979, and April 30, 1982; who were between the ages of 21 and 70; and who were listed by immigration aid societies, permitting the development of a systematic list of this population. Biographical abstracts yielded a sampling frame population totaling 33,618 individuals, of which 3,738 were selected into the general survey sample. The response rate was 79%.

The primary goals of sampling were to safeguard the principle of random selection, while at the same time approximating certain characteristics of the Soviet population more closely than a purely random sampling would allow. Consequently, a stratified random sample was selected, the four sampling dimensions being nationality, region of last employment in the USSR, highest education attained, and size of the city where last employed. Since 98.4% of the people in the sampling frame were Jews, all non-Jews in the sampling frame were included in the sample, in order to maximize ethnic diversity (resulting in 13% of the respondents being Russians and other non-Jews). The regional distribution of the emigrant population was quite varied, and thus the Soviet model could be approximated. As the sampling frame population was more highly educated than the Soviet adult population in large cities, the latter were used as a proportional guideline for stratifying on education. Only limited adjustments could be made for the overwhelmingly urban origin of the emigrants, although people from medium-sized cities were oversampled.

The referent Soviet population whose experiences the survey population can be expected to resemble most closely is the adult European Soviet population in large and medium-sized cities (Silver & Anderson, 1986; Tourangeau, O'Brien, and Frankel, 1983).

Notes

I should like to thank Garth Taylor and Ed Hamburg for helpful comments, and Robin Gillies, Vida Kuprys, and Helen Hicks for their assistance. Data for this study were produced by the Soviet Interview Project. This project was supported by Contract No. 701 from the National Council for Soviet and East European Research to the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, James R. Millar, Principal Investigator. The analysis and interpretations in this study are those of the author, not necessarily of the sponsors.

1. Write-in candidates are not allowed, and if one nevertheless shows up on the ballot and the name of the official candidate is left untouched, the vote is counted for the official candidate. If the

official candidate is crossed out, the ballot is counted as a vote against him (*Kommentarii*, 1979, art. 49). Although we are not focusing on negative votes, it should be mentioned that a number of such votes are cast in every Soviet election. According to official Soviet electoral statistics, and calculating for the entire USSR, the number of negative votes has never surpassed 1% in the postwar period. It usually is 0.02% in elections to higher-level bodies, and ca. 0.3% in elections to local soviets (*Itogi*, 1971, 1975; *Pravda*, March 4, 1979, March 1, 1980, June 26, 1982, March 4, 1984). In lower-level council elections, where the number of electors per district is only in the dozens, a candidate on rare occasions fails to receive the required 50% of the vote; thus 61 candidates out of 2.2 million failed to get elected in 1977 (*Izvestiia*, June 25, 1977).

2. See translations of official Soviet election returns as provided by the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (e.g., vol. 36, no. 10, pp. 13–14), or entire reports on elections (e.g., *Itogi*, 1971, 1975), which repeat the 99% for pages and pages.

3. Only from 1% to 5% of the electorate enter booths (Friedgut, 1979, p. 112; Mote, 1965, p. 80). Although people intending to cast a negative vote are most likely to enter booths, so are individuals intending to write a slogan or request on the ballot.

4. Juviler (1976, p. 106) states that the most conservative estimate entails one million prisoners, but that the actual number could be double. No official Soviet statistics are available.

5. The regime's sensitivity to this low rate is illustrated by the fact that dissident Juri Kukk's reporting of it to a Western acquaintance by telephone was made into one point in the criminal charge against him. Kukk later died in a Soviet labor camp (Taagepera, 1984, pp. 76, 96).

6. The various reasons for statistical inexactness in Soviet census data are discussed in Anderson and Silver (1985).

7. Elections to union and autonomous republic soviets as well as lower level bodies were held in June 1975; local soviet elections occurred in June 1977, and elections to the Supreme Soviet in March 1979 (*Izvestiia*, June 21, 1975, June 25, 1977, March 7, 1979). On the basis of the 1977 USSR Constitution (Article 90) the interval between elections for the USSR, union-republic, and autonomous-republic supreme soviets was changed from four to five years, while that for the local soviets was changed from two to two and a half years.

8. Closer analysis of the associations of occupation with nonvoting shows that although there are some differences in addition to the rough one mentioned here, they are interrelated with age and sex, and detailed analysis does not yield any significant additional insights.

9. In the 1979 elections to the Supreme Soviet, 86% of the abstainers, as compared with 55% of the voters, were from the RSFSR (*Pravda*, March 7, 1979). The high incidence of nonvoting in Moscow and Leningrad is remarked upon by Zaslavsky and Brym (1978) and Friedgut (1979, pp. 117–18). Lev Kopelev (1984) notes that at one time reports circulated in Moscow that nearly one and a half million voters had abstained in an election, which would come to about 25% of the Moscow electorate.

10. The variables used here are in the form of a detailed categorical education variable, and dichotomous variables for age (born before and after 1931) and region (RSFSR/other).

11. In calculating the relative effect of the variables, I followed the logic and technique outlined in Rosenberg (1968, chap. 7).

12. The question was asked of a third of the respondents, and read: "Think for a moment about the Soviet system with its good and bad points. Suppose you could create a system of government in the Soviet Union that is different from the one which currently exists. What things in the present Soviet system would you want to keep in the new one?"

13. This subgroup is relatively large (13%). Those citing something as worth keeping were 69% of the sample; 18% fall into the "keep nothing" category. The association with nonvoting is significant at the .0002 level.

14. The questions were: "During your last normal period, did you ever . . . (a) attend an unofficial art show, poetry reading, or concert? (b) take part in an unsanctioned study or discussion group? (c) distribute *samizdat* [self-published] or *tamizdat* [published abroad]? (d) take part in an open protest against some Soviet policy? (e) take part in a strike or protest at work? (f) belong to any (other) unofficial groups or take part in any (other) unsanctioned activities?"

15. For methodology see source listed in note 11.

16. The refusal to vote of the well-known dissenter, Larissa Bogoraz, was part of the reason cited by the authorities to reject remission of her exile. Demonstrative voting has also been used as a pretext for denying exit visas (Friedgut, 1979, p. 124). Zaslavsky and Brym (1978, p. 368) note that the refusal to vote has led to students being expelled from university. There is also one documented case in which the writing of an "anti-Soviet" comment on a ballot in 1971 led to an arrest and a five-year sentence in a Soviet labor camp (*USSR News Brief*, April 30, 1983, p. 3).

17. Since the variables have different subcategories, and this could provide misleading results (Rosenberg, 1968, pp. 176–77), a test was made to determine whether the relative difference remains the same if only two categories are used for both. This in fact is so (28% vs. 18%).

References

Almond, Gabriel A., and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., eds. 1984. *Comparative Politics Today: A World*

View. 3d ed. Boston: Little, Brown.

Anderson, Barbara A., and Brian Silver. 1985. "Permanent" and "Present" Populations in Soviet Statistics. *Soviet Studies,* 37:386–402.

DiFranceisco, Wayne, and Zvi Gitelman. 1984. Soviet Political Culture and "Covert Participation" in Policy Implementation. *American Political Science Review,* 78:603–21.

Electoral Law. *See* Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Friedgut, Theodore H. 1979. *Political Participation in the USSR.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Friedrich, Carl J., and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. 1966. *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy.* 2d ed. New York: Praeger.

Gilison, Jerome M. 1968. Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent: The Missing One Percent. *American Political Science Review,* 62:814–26.

Gitelman, Zvi. 1977a. Soviet Jewish Emigrants: Why Are They Choosing America? *Soviet Jewish Affairs,* 7:31–46.

Gitelman, Zvi. 1977b. Soviet Political Culture: Insights from Jewish Emigres. *Soviet Studies,* 29: 543–64.

Grandstaff, Peter J. 1980. *Interregional Migration in the USSR: Economic Aspects, 1959–1970.* Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Grigoriev, V. K., and V. P. Zhdanov. 1980. *Vybory v Verkhovnye Sovety soiuznykh, avtonomnykh respublik, v mestnye Sovety narodnykh deputatov i poriadok ikh provedeniia.* Moscow: Iuridicheskaia literatura.

Hermet, Guy. 1978. State-Controlled Elections: A Framework. In Guy Hermet, Richard Rose, and Alain Rouquie, eds., *Elections Without Choice.* New York: John Wiley.

Hill, Ronald J. 1976. The CPSU in the Soviet Election Campaign. *Soviet Studies,* 28:590–98.

Inkeles, Alex, and Raymond Bauer. 1961. *The Soviet Citizen.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Irwin, Galen. 1974. Compulsory Voting Legislation: Impact on Voter Turnout in the Netherlands. *Comparative Political Studies,* 7:292–315.

Itogi vyborov i sostav deputatov mestnykh Sovetov deputatov trudiashchikhsia RSFSR 1975 g. 1975. Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia.

Itogi vyborov i sostav deputatov Verkhovnykh Sovetov soiuznykh i avtonomnykh respublik, 1971 g. 1971. Moscow: Izvestiia Sovetov deputatov trudiashchikhsia SSSR.

Jacobs, Everett M. 1970. Soviet Local Elections: What They Are, and What They Are Not. *Soviet Studies,* 22:61–76.

Juviler, Peter H. 1976. *Revolutionary Law and Order: Politics and Social Change in the USSR.* New York: Free Press.

Karklins, Rasma. 1981. Emigration from the USSR: Failure of Socialization? Presented at the Midwest Slavic Conference, University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana.

Kommentarii k nekotorym stat'iam Polozheniia o vyborakh v mestnye Sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia RSFSR. 1977. Moscow: Iuridicheskaia literatura.

Kommentarii k nekotorym stat'iam Zakona o vyborakh v mestnye Sovety narodnykh deputatov RSFSR. 1979. Moscow: Iuridicheskaia literatura.

Kopelev, Lev. *See* Kopelew, Lew.

Kopelew, Lew. March 20, 1985. Meine erste Wahl. *Die Zeit.*

Latov, Vitali. 1974. *The Soviet Electoral System.* Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House.

Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet. July 8, 1978. *Pravda.* Trans. August 23, 1978, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* pp. 11–17.

Linz, Juan J. 1978. Non-Competitive Elections in Europe. In Guy Hermet, Richard Rose, and Alain Rouquie, eds., *Elections Without Choice.* New York: John Wiley.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1960. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics.* New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc.

Maggs, Peter B. 1968. Negative Votes in Soviet Elections. In Adolf Sprudzs and Armins Rusis, eds., *Res Baltica.* Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff.

Medvedev, Roy A. 1975. *On Socialist Democracy.* E. de Kadt, trans. and ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Merriam, Charles E., and Harold Foote Gosnell. 1924. *Non-Voting: Causes and Methods of Control.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Mote, Max E. 1965. *Soviet Local and Republic Elections.* Stanford, CA: The Hoover Institute.

Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. 1982. *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Reshetar, John S., Jr. 1978. *The Soviet Polity.* 2d ed. New York: Harper and Row.

Rose, Richard, ed. 1974. *Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook.* New York: Free Press.

Rose, Richard, and Harve Mossawir. 1967. Voting and Elections: A Functional Analysis. *Political Studies,* 15:173–201.

Rosenberg, Morris. 1968. *The Logic of Survey Analysis.* New York: Basic Books.

Schapiro, Leonard. 1967. *The Government and Politics of the Soviet Union.* New York: Vintage Books.

Schmemann, Serge. March 5, 1984. Public Pomp Amid Private Yawns: Russians Vote in Uncontested Elections. *The New York Times.*

Sigelman, Lee. 1982. The Nonvoting Voter in Voting Research. *American Journal of Political*

Science, 26:47–56.

Silver, Brian D., and Barbara A. Anderson. 1986. Descriptive Statistics for the Sampling Frame Population: The Eligible Population for the Soviet Interview Project General Survey. Soviet Interview Project Working Paper, #2 (revised).

Soobshchenie ob itogakh vyborov v verkhovnye Sovety soiuznykh, avtonomnykh respublik i mestnye Sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia. 1975. *Sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia*.

Taagepera, Rein. 1984. *Softening Without Liberalization in the Soviet Union: The Case of Juri Kukk*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Tourangeau, R., F. O'Brien, and M. Frankel. October 5, 1983. Procedures for Selecting the General Sample of the Soviet Interview Project. Memorandum. National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago.

Verba, Sidney, and Norman H. Nie. 1972. *Participation in America*. New York: Harper and Row.

Verba, Sidney, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-On Kim. 1978. *Participation and Political Equality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

White, Stephen. 1978. Continuity and Change in Soviet Political Culture: An Emigre Study. *Comparative Political Studies*, 11:381–95.

White, Stephen. 1979. *Political Culture and Soviet Politics*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Zaslavsky, Victor, and Robert J. Brym. 1978. The Functions of Elections in the USSR. *Soviet Studies*, 30:362–71.

Rasma Karklins is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL 60680.

RATIONAL CHOICE AND REBELLIOUS COLLECTIVE ACTION

EDWARD N. MULLER
University of Arizona
KARL-DIETER OPP
Universität Hamburg

A basic problem for a rational choice theory of rebellious collective action is to explain why average citizens would participate in such behavior, since they have nothing to gain (they will receive benefits of successful rebellion, in terms of public goods, regardless of whether they take part or not), but much to lose (rebellious behavior may be quite costly). According to the conventional private interest or "by-product" theory, the incentive to participate must come from the expectation of receiving selective benefits; but since average citizens in a general case cannot expect substantial private material rewards, the relevant selective benefits must be psychological in nature. In contrast to the model of private interest theory, a public goods model is proposed, stipulating that the value of rebellion in terms of public goods can be a relevant incentive for participation. Using data from surveys conducted in New York City and Hamburg, West Germany, we investigate the relationship between participation in rebellious political behavior and measures of the incentives of public goods and private interest. The results do not support predictions of the private interest model in regard to nonmaterial selective incentives. Hypotheses of the public goods model are supported.

Consider the following situation: An individual, for whatever reasons, holds a very negative opinion of the political system under which he or she is governed, and there exists an opportunity to participate in a social movement that seeks to effect political change by means of rebellious collective action. This individual is faced with a decision between two courses of action: taking part in rebellious behavior, or staying at home while wishing the rebels well. Rational individuals will compare the benefits and costs of participation with those of inactivity, and choose the course of action in which their expected utility is maximized.

If rebellious collective action is stipulated by definition to refer to behavior by nonelites that (1) deviates from legal norms regarding acceptable forms of political participation, and (2) has broad political objectives of changing governmental structure, policy, or personnel, then it can be shown (Salert, 1976) that, under conventional assumptions, the rational choice of an average citizen in the general case is to be an inactive "free rider," reaping the public benefits of rebellious collective action should it be successful, while avoiding the private costs. However, history of course shows that average citizens do take part in rebellious collective action, sometimes in quite large numbers. Therefore, from a conventional rational choice perspective, most participants in instances of rebellious collective behavior would appear to be acting nonrationally.

In this paper we review the motivational assumptions of a rational choice explanation of rebellious collective action, propose a public goods alternative to the conventional private interest model, and conduct empirical tests of the public goods argument versus the private interest argument by means of survey research.

Rational Choice Models of Rebellion

A simple benefit-cost model of the expected utility of participation versus inactivity may be stated as:

$$E(R) = (p_n + p_i)V - E(C_r) \tag{1}$$

$$E(I) = p_nV - E(C_i), \tag{1a}$$

where $E(R)$ is the expected utility of rebellious collective action; V is the value of rebellious collective action in terms of public goods; p_n is the probability of success of rebellious collective action given that the individual is neutral; p_i is the individual's estimation of the probability that participating in rebellious collective action will make a difference in the likelihood that public goods will be the result; $E(C_r)$ is expected private costs to the individual of participating in rebellious collective action; $E(I)$ is the expected utility of inactivity; and $E(C_i)$ is expected private costs to the individual of inactivity.

Now for a person who is not a leader of a social movement, p_i will be approximately equal to zero, since the participation of a single average citizen will have a negligible impact on the likelihood of success of rebellious collective action. Given that $p_i = 0$, the model reduces to

$$E(R) = p_nV - E(C_r) \tag{2}$$

$$E(I) = p_nV - E(C_i). \tag{2a}$$

Under this condition the public goods value of revellious collective action, V, cannot be an incentive to participate. Whether the outcome of successful rebellious collective action is a change in public policy or a transformation of the entire governmental structure (a revolution), this good will be provided to all citizens regardless of their participation. Consequently, unless the costs of inactivity exceed the costs of participation, the rational choice for any average citizen is to be an inactive free rider. The simple benefit-cost model thus reduces to the postulate that average citizens participate rationally in rebellious collective action only under the pressure of coercion.

A coercion model of rebellious collective action is implausible, however, since most dissident groups do not have sufficient resources to force very many average citizens to join the movement against their will. In the special case of a dissident group that controls territory, coercion could be an incentive; but in order to control territory the group must be relatively large, and the coercion model cannot explain how the movement initially attracted enough members to become relatively large. Therefore, if it is reasonable to assume that $E(C_i)$ will be approximately equal to zero in the general case, the simple benefit-cost model reduces further to

$$E(R) = p_nV - E(C_r) \tag{3}$$

$$E(I) = p_nV. \tag{3a}$$

According to this specification of an average citizen's decision calculus, in the general case there can be no incentive for such individuals, if they are rational, ever to participate in rebellious collective action.

In order to explain why it might be rational for an average citizen to take part in rebellious collective action, Olson (1971), Tullock (1971), and Silver (1974) introduce the factor of selective incentives: private personal rewards that the individual can expect to receive only by participating. Olson and Tullock emphasize material inducements such as power and status rewards, as well as financial gain resulting from direct payments or looting. Tullock also includes an "entertainment" motive—enjoyment of the adventure of rebellious collective action for its own sake. And Silver (1974, pp. 64–65), in addition to private material rewards, expands Tullock's entertainment motive to include, under the rubric of "psychic income," "the individual's sense of duty to class, country, democratic institutions, the law, race, humanity, the rulers, God, or a revolutionary brotherhood as well as his taste for conspiracy, violence, and adventure." The private interest model of Olson, Tullock, and Silver may be written as:

$$E(R) = E(M) + E(P) - E(C_r), \qquad (4)$$

where $E(M)$ is expected private material benefits from rebellious collective action, and $E(P)$ is expected private psychological benefits from such behavior.

Neither Olson nor Tullock attach much causal significance to the $E(P)$ term in equation (4). However, as Salert (1976, p. 44) points out, the problem with a private interest theory which emphasizes the $E(M)$ term is that if an average individual's expectation of receiving material benefits is assumed to be reasonable, power and status incentives must be assumed to be negligible, leaving income rewards as the principal private material benefit. But it is implausible a priori to postulate that most participants in rebellious collective action are either mercenaries or else are taking part in the hope of personal gain from pillage and plunder. This is why Mueller (1979, p. 146) concludes that "the economic theory of revolution based on the individual maximizing calculus seems much better suited to explaining the coup d'état, where the number of actors is small, the odds calculable, and the stakes seemingly large, than it is at explaining 'grass roots' revolutions."

The dilemma of the private interest theory is that if $E(M)$ and $E(P)$ are negligible in the general case, then individually rational, average citizens will be free riders. And if average citizens choose to be free riders, then rebellious collective action is likely to fail, resulting in a continuation of the status quo. Thus what is individually rational is collectively irrational, since individuals who attach a high public goods value to rebellious collective action and choose to free ride are likely to obtain a less preferred outcome than if they all behave irrationally and participate.

It follows that collectively rational individuals might estimate p_i to be significantly greater than zero because they recognize that free riding is collectively irrational in the case of rebellious collective action, where group size and cohesion can be a factor of critical importance. And if p_i cannot be assumed necessary to be negligible, then the public goods value of rebellious collective action becomes a relevant consideration in the decision calculus of a rational average citizen.

An alternative way of reintroducing the public goods component, V, into a rational choice model is to stipulate an additional p term, derived from social learning theory. Bandura (1973, p. 206) states that vicarious reinforcement—perception of positive outcomes accruing to others—is a powerful source of motivation, and that "observational incentives play an especially important role in social activism, for here the chances of quick success are poor, but protest behavior is partly sustained by the long-range attainments of groups that have persevered in their efforts." The individual responding to contingencies of vicarious group reinforcement can be likened to a "calculating Kantian" for whom, as Hardin (1978, p. 5) argues, "the issue will not be whether he himself benefits more from his own contribution than the latter costs him (as in Olson's logic), but whether he and the group of like-minded activists benefit more from their group actions than those actions cost." This introduces the possibility that the influence of the group on the provision of public goods, denoted p_g, may play a role in the decision calculus by which a rational individual chooses whether to participate in rebellious collective action.

Returning to the simple benefit-cost model of equation (3), rejection of the assumption that $p_i = 0$ and introduction of group influence on the provision of public goods, p_g, results in the following specification:

$$E(R) = (p_n + p_g + p_i)V - E(C_r) \tag{5}$$

$$E(I) = p_n V. \tag{5a}$$

According to utility theory, R occurs if $E(R)$ is greater than $E(I)$; that is, if $[E(R) - E(I)] > 0$. If $E(R) - E(I)$ is replaced by the right-hand sides of equations (5) and (5a), we obtain

$$[(p_n + p_g + p_i)V - p_n V - E(C_r)] > 0. \tag{6}$$

Solving the brackets, we obtain

$$[p_n V + p_g V + p_i V - p_n V - E(C_r)] > 0. \tag{7}$$

Since $p_n V$ is irrelevant, we get as a condition for performing R

$$[(p_g + p_i)V - E(C_r)] > 0. \tag{8}$$

Thus, the higher the value of $(p_g + p_i)V$ and the lower the value of $E(C_r)$, the more often R is expected to occur in a population. This is a model for a public goods theory of rebellious collective action.

Now let us expand the model to include selective incentives. We assume that for average citizens in the general case, expected private material benefits, $E(M)$, are negligible. This leaves expected private psychological benefits. Tullock's entertainment motive is one example of intrinsic psychological gratification derived from rebellious collective action. Silver's shopping list of "psychic income" is essentially a residual factor that encompasses anything conceivably intangible. We focus more specifically on a class of "soft" nonmaterial selective incentives that entail social rewards (see Opp, 1986). In particular, individuals may expect to receive (1) affiliation rewards such as meeting new friends and feeling solidarity with a group, and (2) psychological gratification from conforming to the expectations of reference persons about how they should behave, if such expectations are subjectively important. The full model, including public goods and soft selective incentives may be written as

$$E(R) = (p_g + p_i)V + E(F) + E(A) + E(O) - E(C_r), \tag{9}$$

where $E(F)$ is the expected entertainment or "fun" value of participation in rebellious collective action; $E(A)$ is the expected social affiliation value of participation; and $E(O)$ is the expected value of conforming to behavioral norms of important others.

Research Design

Empirical evaluation of rational choice models of rebellious collective action requires a research design in which the individual is the unit of analysis. Experimentation under controlled laboratory conditions would be the most appropriate method for testing rational choice hypotheses, but, since rebellious collective action is illegal and may involve the use of violence, an experimental design is not feasible due to problems of verisimilitude and ethical constraints. Thus the realistic alternatives are either to engage in armchair speculation using anecdotal evidence (e.g., Tullock, 1971), or to test hypotheses by means of survey research.

The disadvantage of survey research is that the context of particular choice situations is uncontrolled. An interview schedule can be designed to collect data on respondents' current assessments of the value of public goods, their current estimation of individual and group influence on the provision of public goods, their current expectation of receiving soft rewards from rebellious collective action, and their current expectation of the cost of such behavior. However, it must be assumed that the values and expectations measured at the time of the interview are applicable to past behavioral decisions and future decision potentials, regardless of variation in the context of the choice situation. This is a well-known and much-debated general problem inherent to survey research on the relationship between attitudes and behavior, for which there is no satisfactory solution. Therefore, while acknowledging that survey-based tests of the relationship between attitudes and behavior never can be decisive, due to the problem of uncontrolled situational factors, we use the survey method on the grounds that, in the absence of a more feasible alternative, survey evidence is better than no evidence.

Assuming that one does not reject the survey method per se, the study of rebellious collective action by means of survey research still must overcome two basic obstacles. First is the problem of variation. Acts of rebellious political behavior are rare events in societies not actually undergoing a mass rebellion, yet the population chosen for the survey must be one in which rebellious behavior has occurred with sufficient frequency to permit statistical analysis. Second, the environment of the survey must be conducive to free expression.

The structural condition most conducive to freedom of expression is the presence of a democratic political system. The frequency of rebellious collective action has been comparatively low, however, in most contemporary democracies. If one is effectively restricted to democratic nations, the United States and West Germany are appropriate sites because of the relatively high levels of political protest that occurred in the former country from the mid-1960s until the mid-1970s, and in the latter country from the late 1960s, with ebbs and flows, until the present.

Appropriate populations to study within the United States are residents of urban areas, especially nonwhites, and students and faculty at large universities. The general public of New York City and students and faculty at Columbia University and New York University (NYU) were considered to be suitable instances of city and campus because of their past history of comparatively frequent political protest. Our American data were collected by Response Analysis Corporation of Princeton, New Jersey, a survey research firm with expertise in designing and implementing surveys on sensitive topics (e.g., drug use, violence in the home). During the spring and summer of 1978 personal interviews were conducted with a probability sample of 778 adults residing in the five boroughs of New York City;[1] also, a random sample of 240 undergraduates, graduate students, and faculty in the College of Liberal Arts at Columbia and NYU completed a supervised, self-administered version of the same questionnaire in May and June of that year (for complete details of the sampling procedure see Muller, Jukam, and Seligson, 1982).

In the Federal Republic of Germany an

appropriate group to study is opponents of nuclear power. Especially since 1974, numerous legal and illegal protest actions have occurred against particular atomic power stations and against the utilization of nuclear energy in general.

We expected opponents of nuclear power to live mainly in large cities and in the vicinity of atomic power stations. The sampling sites selected were Eimsbüttel, a district of Hamburg where many counterculture people reside, and Geesthacht, a small town near Hamburg with an atomic power station in the neighborhood. A random sample was drawn from the populations of the two locations. If the respondent expressed a positive general attitude toward nuclear energy, only personal background data were collected. Full interviews were conducted with 187 opponents of nuclear energy, who were asked to give addresses of other opponents of nuclear power. The additional snowball sample consisted of 211 respondents. Differences between the random and snowball samples with respect to the demographic characteristics of the respondents were not sufficiently large to warrant separate analyses (for complete details of the sampling procedure and the analyses of the subsamples see Opp et al., 1984).

The Hamburg interviews ($N=398$) were conducted by students from the University of Hamburg who were carefully trained. To test for the existence of agreement bias, each variable used in the following analysis was correlated with a social desirability scale. Bivariate correlations were all within the range of ±.10. Also, no significant correlations were found between properties of the interviewers (e.g., gender, attitude toward nuclear energy) and responses of the interviewees.

Measurement of the Dependent Variable: Rebellious Collective Action

The concept of rebellious collective action entails acts of aggressive political participation (see Muller, 1979, pp. 4–7). Aggressive political participation in the New York City study is measured following a procedure developed by Muller (1979, pp. 37–68). Respondents were questioned about their past performance of and future intention to perform a series of behaviors, legal and illegal, described as actions that people may take to accomplish their political goals and objectives.[2] The set of aggressive behaviors includes (1) participating in an unofficial or "wildcat" strike, (2) participating in a group that refuses to pay taxes, (3) seizing factories, offices, or other buildings, (4) participating in fights with police or other demonstrators, (5) participating in a group that wants to overthrow the government by violent means. A composite Aggressive Participation Potential scale (R_p) was constructed by summing participation weighted by intention across the five behaviors.[3] A simple Aggressive Behavior index (R_b) is the sum of the number of aggressive behaviors performed in the past by the respondent.

The correlation between Aggressive Participation Potential and Aggressive Behavior is $r = .72$. Weighting participation by intention thus produces a somewhat different measure than the index of past participation. The principal difference is that some respondents who have not previously taken part in aggressive activity express intention to perform one or more of the behaviors in the future, and many of these respondents receive intermediate scores on Aggressive Participation Potential, despite their zero score on Aggressive Behavior.

The range of the Aggressive Participation Potential scale is 0–21,[4] with a mean of 2.2 and a standard deviation of 2.7. Thirty-three percent of the respondents score zero on Aggressive Participation Potential. In comparison, the range of the Aggressive Behavior index is only 0–4, and fully 87.6% of the respondents receive a score of zero on this variable.

Because of the restricted range and extreme skewness of the index of past behavior, explanatory variables can be expected, *ceteris paribus*, to correlate less strongly with it than with the measure of participation potential. However, the pattern of relationships should not be affected. Inclusion of both indicators of rebellious collective action thus affords a useful consistency check in the testing of hypotheses. In particular, a hypothesis that holds for the prospective measure of aggressive participation potential at the time of the interview, but not for the retrospective index of previous aggressive participation, will be suspect in regard to its validity as a causal explanation.

In the Hamburg survey the referents of aggressive participation are (1) participation in a demonstration which is forbidden, (2) engaging in resistance if the police attack demonstrators, (3) breaking through barricades and the like during demonstrations, (4) painting slogans against nuclear plants and the like on walls of houses, (5) participation in an occupation of a construction site for nuclear power plants, (6) attacks and sabotage against nuclear power plants, and (7) attacks on individuals responsible for the construction of nuclear power plants. Aggressive Participation Potential and Aggressive Behavior variables were constructed according to the same procedure as that used in the New York City study.[5] The correlation between Aggressive Participation Potential and Aggressive Behavior in the Hamburg study is $r = .88$.

Measurement of the Independent Variables

The Hamburg interview schedule, designed in 1981 and administered in 1982, contains a more complete set of measures of the independent variables than the New York City interview schedule. The New York City interview schedule is limited to an indirect indicator of p_i, the influence of the individual on the provision of public goods; and measures of p_g, the influence of the group on the provision of public goods, and V, the public goods value of rebellious collective action. The Hamburg interview schedule includes measures of p_i and V, as well as measures of $E(F)$, the entertainment value of rebellious collective action, $E(A)$, the social affiliation benefit of such behavior, $E(O)$, the benefit of conforming to behavioral norms of important others, and $E(C_r)$, the costs of performing rebellious collective action.

The public goods value of rebellious collective action. A person who is proud and respectful of the political institutions under which he or she is governed, and who believes that they operate to promote justice and protect the basic rights of citizens, would be unlikely to consider acts of rebellious behavior as being in the public interest—indeed, such a loyal citizen would be likely to regard change resulting from rebellious behavior as a public "bad." By contrast, a person who is fundamentally alienated from the existing government and political institutions would be likely to regard change resulting from rebellious behavior as a public good. Thus a very basic indicator of the public goods value of rebellious collective action is the extent to which an individual is hostile to or alienated from the political system in general. In addition, for opponents of nuclear power, the utilization of nuclear energy is a public bad and less or no utilization is a public good.

In the New York City and Hamburg surveys, an indicator of the public goods value of rebellion, denoted V_s, is measured by responses to a series of questions about the extent to which the individual supports the political system.[6] In the Hamburg survey, an indicator of the extent to which the existing utilization of nuclear energy is considered to be a public bad, denoted V_n, is measured by yes-no responses to statements such as "I personally feel threatened by atomic power stations" and "to be sure, I am against atomic power stations, but they really do not concern me that much."[7]

Perceived influence on the provision of public goods. Respondents in the Hamburg survey were presented with a battery of questions designed to measure the p_i term, perceived influence of the individual on the provision of public goods, that included items such as "After all, it is superfluous that I am active against the construction of atomic power stations because I have no influence," and "Everyone who is active against atomic power stations makes a small contribution."[8] The Personal Influence scale, with a range of 0–1, has a mean of .73; thus, the average respondent in the Hamburg study estimates that he or she has considerable personal influence on the provision of public goods.

The New York City interview schedule did not include a direct measure of the perceived influence of the individual on the provision of public goods. As an indirect indicator of p_i we used a question that measures perceived importance of participation in general, denoted p_i^*.[9] We assume that individually rational respondents will tend to believe that participation by people like themselves is unimportant because the participation of a single person makes little or no difference in the probability of the success of collective political behavior, except in the case of very small groups. By contrast, we assume that collectively rational respondents, who are cognizant of the dilemma arising from individually rational free riding, will tend to believe that participation by people like themselves is indeed important. The mean of the Importance of Participation variable is .65 on a scale of 0–1.

The influence of the group on the provision of public goods—the p_g term—is measured in the New York City survey by a question about the extent to which dissident groups are perceived to have helped or hurt their cause by engaging in rebellious collective action. Six rebellious actions were evaluated in regard to whether they (*a*) had definitely helped the cause of the groups involved, (*b*) had helped the cause somewhat, (*c*) had neither helped nor hurt the cause, (*d*) had hurt the cause somewhat, or (*e*) definitely had hurt the cause.[10] The Efficacy of Group Aggression scale constructed from these items, when transformed to a range of 0–1, has a mean of .25. Thus, the average New York City respondent estimates that aggressive tactics by dissident groups in the past have not enhanced the provision of public goods.

The entertainment motive. The F term is measured by three items with which a respondent could more or less agree: (1) "If I protest against the construction of atomic power stations, this activity is fun for me"; (2) "although I am an opponent of nuclear energy, I find it somehow unpleasant being active against atomic power stations"; and (3) "I feel inhibited to show that I am against atomic power stations." A factor analysis (principal components) reveals unidimensionality (the first component explains 60% of the variance). We did not seek to determine a subjective probability of receiving entertainment from rebellious behavior because we assumed that respondents already know with certainty what entertainment value such behavior has for them.

Behavioral norms of important others. Measurement of the $E(O)$ term entailed a complex procedure. Respondents first were asked to state what most people whose opinion is important to them (like friends and relatives) think about their participation in the anti-nuclear movement. The possible responses were that such people (1) consider participation in the movement to be rather good (positive reference persons); (2) consider participation in the movement to be rather bad (negative reference persons); (3) hold differing opinions (mixed reference persons); and (4) are indifferent. Respondents choosing the positive or negative options were asked how important the opinions of the reference persons are, using a five-point scale ranging from "does not matter at all" to "matters very much." They were then asked to state whether, among the persons whose opinions are important, there are also persons who hold the opposite opinion. If the response to this question was affirmative, the importance question was repeated in regard to reference persons with the opposite opinion. If respondents chose the option of mixed reference persons they were asked how much they care about conforming to the opinion of each of the two sets of reference persons (positive and negative).

From the answers to this battery of questions we constructed a scale measuring the utility of following the expectations of important others with regard to being active. For respondents indicating only reference persons who expect activity (positive others), the more these expectations mattered to them, the higher their scores were. For respondents indicating only reference persons who expect inactivity (negative others), the less these opinions mattered, the higher their scores were. If respondents indicated mixed expectations, we first assigned scores for following the expectations of positive reference persons, and then for following the expectations of negative reference persons; the more respondents cared about following expectations of being active, and the less they cared about following expectations of being inactive, the higher their scores were. The second score was then subtracted from the first score.

Finally, we weighted the utility of following the expectations of important others by the respondent's subjective probability that the reference persons hold the perceived expectations. This was determined by asking how certain respondents were (in regard to five categories of certainty scored 0, .25, .5, .75, and 1.0) that the reference persons in question are positive, negative, hold mixed opinions, or are indifferent.

Social affiliation rewards and costs of rebellious collective action. Respondents were presented with a list containing seven positive reactions and seven negative reactions of other persons or institutions that might be incentives or disincentives for participation in the antinuclear movement. The positive sanctions entailed social rewards such as receiving social approval from other opponents of nuclear power, feeling solidarity with other opponents of nuclear power, and getting to know interesting people. The negative sanctions entailed costs such as being labeled "leftist" or "crazy," being injured by the police, and *Berufsverbot* (prohibition from employment in the public sector). Respondents were asked, for each of the 14 sanctions, first to evaluate them on a five-point scale of very bad to very good, scored from –1 to +1; and second, to state the likelihood that they would occur (using the five-point certainty scale mentioned above). The utility of each sanction then was multiplied by the subjective probability of its occurrence.

A factor analysis (principal components) of the expected utilities of positive and negative sanctions yielded four factors with eigenvalues greater than 1. Most of the positive sanctions loaded highly on the first factor and most of the negative sanctions loaded highly on the second factor. Another factor analysis was performed, limiting the number of factors to two. Under this constraint all of the positive sanctions loaded on the first factor and all of the negative sanctions loaded on the second factor. An Expected Utility of Positive Sanctions scale, the indicator of the $E(A)$ term, was constructed from the factor scores of the first factor, and an Expected Utility of Negative Sanctions scale, the indicator of the $E(C_r)$ term, was constructed from the factor scores of the second factor. These variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Since most respondents assign a positive utility to positive sanctions (i.e., social rewards), scores in the high range of the Expected Utility of Positive Sanctions scale indicate a subjective probability that positive sanctions are likely to occur, whereas scores in the low range indicate a subjective probability that positive sanctions are unlikely to occur. By contrast, most respondents assign a negative utility to negative sanctions (i.e., costs), so high scores on the Expected Utility of Negative Sanctions scale (which are mostly around 0) indicate a subjective probability that negative sanctions are unlikely to occur, whereas low scores (which are negative) indicate a subjective probability that negative sanctions are likely to occur. Thus it should be kept in mind that if negative sanctions are a disincentive for performance of rebellious political behavior, there should be a *positive* correlation between the Expected Utility of Negative Sanctions scale and the Aggressive Participation Potential and Aggressive Behavior variables.

Results

The private interest model predicts a lack of association between rebellious collective action and its public goods value because of individually rational free riding. People who attach high public goods value to rebellious collective action are expected to realize that they will receive the public goods of successful rebellion regardless of whether they participate or not; therefore, they should be no more likely to score high on indicators of R than people who attach low public goods value to rebellious collective action.

The public goods model allows for the possibility that group rather than individual influence on the provision of public goods may be a relevant factor in a rational citizen's decision calculus, and that collectively rational individuals also may estimate individual influence to be non-negligible because they believe individually rationally free riding will reduce the likelihood of success. Empirically, the expectation of the public goods model is to observe nontrivial correlations between R and V as weighted by p_i and/or p_g; moreover, weighting V by p_i and/or p_g should improve the correlation in comparison to V alone.

The predictions of the private interest and public goods theories were tested across four subpopulations of the New York City survey: whites and nonwhites from the general public and from the universities. We controlled for these subpopulations in order to determine if results hold across individuals who (1) have differing objective social background characteristics (white versus nonwhite), and (2) reside in differing community contexts (general public versus university) that might be more or less conducive to rebellious collective action.

Correlations between the two indicators of rebellious collective action, the Aggressive Participation Potential scale, denoted R_p, and the Aggressive Behavior index, denoted R_b, and the public goods component variables and product terms are listed in Table 1.[11] Comparison of the fourth row with the first row shows that the correlations between $(p_g + p_i^*)V_s$ and R_p and R_b exceed those between V_s and R_p and R_b in every case except that of R_b among whites in the university context, where the correlation is unchanged. Since p_i^*, the Importance of Participation variable, is only an indirect indicator of

Table 1. Correlations between Rebellious Collective Action and (1) The Public Goods Value of Rebellion and (2) Influence on Provision of Public Goods: New York City Sample

	General Public				University			
	Whites		Nonwhites		Whites		Nonwhites	
Scales	Aggressive Participation Potential (R_p)	Aggressive Behavior Index (R_b)	Aggressive Participation Potential (R_p)	Aggressive Behavior Index (R_b)	Aggressive Participation Potential (R_p)	Aggressive Behavior Index (R_b)	Aggressive Participation Potential (R_p)	Aggressive Behavior Index (R_b)
Political Support/ Alienation V_s:	.36	.24	.40	.19	.40	.26	.72	.63
Importance of Participation p_i*:	.10	.02*	.13	.10	.08*	.05*	.46	.32
Efficacy of Group Aggression p_g:	.31	.21	.17	.06*	.46	.20	.18*	.08*
Product Terms								
$(p_g + p_i^*)V_s$:	.38	.26	.46	.24	.44	.26	.77	.66
p_gV_s:	.39	.30	.42	.26	.45	.26	.65	.52
Number of Cases	349	361	316	327	202	207	23	24

*Not significant at the .05 level (for table entries).

individual influence on the provision of public goods, the fifth row gives the product term for group influence only. Comparison of the fifth row with the first row shows that for the general public and for whites in the university context, the correlations between p_gV_s and R_p and R_b exceed those between V_s and R_p and R_b in every case except one, R_b among whites in the university context, where the correlation is unchanged. For the small subsample of nonwhites in the university context, weighting V_s by p_g reduces the correlation with R_p and R_b. In sum, in line with the specification of the public goods model, weighting the public goods value of rebellious collective action by individual and group influence on the provision of public goods results in nontrivial correlations with indicators of participation in rebellious behavior; and the magnitude of these correlations is usually greater than that observed for the unweighted public goods value, a finding consistent with general rational choice theory.

The results from the Hamburg survey are presented in Table 2, where we have two public goods variables, V_s and V_n,[12] and a direct measure of the p_i term. The correlations between the public goods variables and the indicators of rebellious collective action are nontrivial and, as the public goods model specifies, multiplying the public goods variables by perceived individual influence on provision of the public goods again raises the magnitude of the correlations.

The predictions of the public goods theory thus are supported cross-nationally as well as across subpopulations of New York City. Weighting the public goods value of rebellious collective action by perceived individual and/or group influence on the provision of public goods enhances (consistently but not dramatically) the correlations with current potential for performing rebellious collective action and past performance. This result is in accordance with an expected utility model of decision making, and lends empirical support to our

Table 2. Correlations between Rebellious Collective Action and (1) The Public Goods Value of Rebellion and (2) Influence on Provision of Public Goods: Hamburg Sample

Scales		Aggressive Participation Potential (R_p)	Aggressive Behavior Index (R_b)
Political Support/Alienation,	V_s:	.47	.43
Discontent with Nuclear Energy,	V_n:	.33	.29
Personal Influence,	p_i:	.27	.23
Product Terms,	p_iV_s:	.49	.45
	p_iV_n:	.39	.35
Number of Cases		398	398

contention that there is indeed a p in such participation.[13]

The data of Tables 1 and 2 indicate that public goods are an incentive for performing rebellious political behavior. Now we turn to the question of whether selective soft incentives and expected costs also are determinants of such behavior. In this regard we focused on the following selective incentives: F, intrinsic psychological gratification derived from rebellious collective action because it is "fun"; $E(O)$, the expected reward of performing rebellious behavior because it conforms to behavioral norms of important reference persons; and $E(A)$, expected social affiliation benefits of rebellious behavior (positively valued reactions of the social environment). We also take into account the disincentive of $E(C_r)$, the expected value of costs (negatively valued reactions of the social environment, especially the police). Since the New York City survey did not include measures of selective incentives and costs, we use only data from the Hamburg survey.

The first equation of Table 3 shows the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of current potential for performing rebellious political behavior against (1) the public goods variables, (2) the indicators of soft selective incentives, and (3) the expected utility of negative sanctions (costs). As anticipated from the bivariate correlations, the public goods variables, p_iV_n and p_iV_s, are estimated to have significant positive effects on R_p. With respect to selective incentives, the entertainment value of rebellious collective action, F, and expected positive sanctions in the form of social affiliation rewards, $E(A)$, are statistically nonsignificant; only the expected value of conforming to behavioral norms of important others, $E(O)$, shows a small (in terms of the standardized coefficient) but statistically significant effect. Surprisingly, the expected utility of negative sanctions, $E(C_r)$, is estimated to have a significant negative instead of positive effect. Since costs generally are negatively valued, this means that respondents who attach a relatively high probability to the occurrence of negative sanctions are somewhat more likely to have a high rebellious behavior potential than those who attach a low probability to the occurrence of negative sanctions.

When the explanatory variables are compared in regard to their relative importance, the dominant predictor of potential for performing rebellious political behavior is the public goods value of rebellion as indexed by generalized hostility toward the political system weighted by perceived personal influence on the provision of public goods. This also is the case in regard to the equations

Table 3. Rebellious Collective Action Regressed Against Rational Choice Variables: Hamburg Survey

Equations	Intercept	p_iV_n	p_iV_s	F	$E(O)$	$E(A)$	$E(C_r)$
(3.1) $R_p =$	5.24	0.70*	0.02**	1.02	2.90*	0.25	-1.22**
		(2.26)[a]	(5.00)	(0.80)	(2.15)	(0.57)	(-3.13)
$\hat{R}^2 = .28$		*0.12*[b]	*0.31*	*0.04*	*0.10*	*0.03*	*-0.14*
(3.2) $R_b =$	-0.45	0.07	0.003**	-0.01	0.29	0.08	-0.11
		(1.75)	(5.00)	(-0.05)	(1.47)	(1.33)	(-1.89)
$\hat{R}^2 = .22$		*0.09*	*0.32*	*0.00*	*0.07*	*0.07*	*-0.09*
(3.2a) $R_b =$	-0.54	0.09*	0.003**				-0.12*
		(2.09)	(6.25)				(-2.05)
$\hat{R}^2 = .21$		*0.12*	*0.35*				*-0.09*
Number of cases = 398							

Note: R_p: Aggressive Participation Potential
R_b: Aggressive Behavior
V_n: Discontent with Nuclear Energy
V_s: Political Support/Alienation
p_i: Personal Influence
F: Entertainment Value
$E(O)$: Expected Behavioral Norms of Important Others
$E(A)$: Expected Social Affiliation Rewards (positive sanctions)
$E(C_r)$: Expected Costs (negative sanctions)

[a] t-ratio in parentheses.

[b] Standardized regression coefficients in italics.

$^{*}p < .05$
$^{**}p < .01$

for past performance of rebellious political behavior, R_b, where the standardized regression coefficients of p_iV_s are .32 and .35, a magnitude similar to the estimate obtained for future performance in equation (3.1). Indeed, in equation (3.2), p_iV_s is the only statistically significant explanatory variable. The indicators of p_iV_n and $E(C_r)$ are of borderline significance in equation (3.2), however, and when the nonsignificant soft selective incentives variables are trimmed from the prediction equation, (3.2a) shows that p_iV_n and $E(C_r)$ achieve significance at the .05 level, although the standardized coefficient of $E(C_r)$ is of trivial magnitude (less than .1). Thus the multivariate analysis shows that, in contrast to conventional rational choice models of rebellion, the public goods variables, not selective incentives, appear to be the most important incentives for performing rebellious political behavior. Expected costs do not appear to be a disincentive, and they may even have some weak incentive value. This latter result is inconsistent with rational choice theory in general.

Conclusion

A fundamental problem for a rational choice theory of rebellious collective action is to explain why average citizens might choose to take part in such behavior. According to the private interest theory of collective action in general, formulated by Olson (1971) and applied specifically to the case of politically rebellious behavior by Tullock (1971), the public goods value of rebellion cannot be an incentive to participate because of free riding. Consequently, the private interest theory predicts that the rational average citizen will participate only if coerced to do so or if private material rewards are offered, such as direct payment or proceeds of looting. The coercion and material gain factors, however, can be incentives for average citizens only under special circumstances, such as when a dissident group already is sufficiently powerful to control territory or when rebellious collective action takes the form of land seizures.

The dilemma of the private interest theory in regard to behavior of average citizens is recognized explicitly by Salert (1976, p. 49), who concludes that "the problem with this theory stems from its relative neglect of psychological factors or from the conception of rationality on which it is based, or both." In this paper we pursue the two lines of investigation suggested by Salert as ways of developing a rational choice theory of rebellion: modification of core assumptions and more precise specification of the nature of psychological incentives.

In contrast to the private interest theory, we assume that average citizens may adopt a collectivist conception of rationality because they recognize that what is individually rational is collectively irrational—that if people like themselves were individually rational free riders, the likelihood of the success of rebellious collective action would be very small, and that, therefore, it is collectively rational for all to participate, even though the objective probability of a single individual influencing the outcome is negligible. Thus we reject one of the core assumptions of the private interest theory, namely, that the public goods value of rebellious collective action necessarily drops out of an average citizen's utility calculus.[14]

According to our model for a public goods theory, two perceived influence variables are stipulated as relevant: (1) the subjective probability of individual influence on the provision of public goods, and (2) the influence of the group as an undifferentiated whole. In regard specifically to the latter, we postulate that the perceived influence of the group as a whole will be a function of observation of the success or failure of dissident groups in the past: if dissident groups are perceived to have been generally successful, then perceived group influence on the provision of public goods will be high; if dissident groups are perceived to have been generally unsuccessful in the past, then perceived group influence on the provision of public goods will be low.

Postulation of relevant perceived influence variables allows us to introduce the multiplicative interaction of influence and public goods incentive into a model of an average citizen's decision calculus. With respect to operational definition of the public goods incentive, we expect that it will be a function in general terms of a citizen's overall evaluation of the political system—"diffuse support" in the terminology of Easton (1965); "legitimacy" in the terminology of Lipset (1963); "system affect" in the terminology of Almond and Verba (1963)—and a function in specific terms of a citizen's evaluation of particular governmental policies—an important aspect, in the respective terminology of these scholars, of "specific support," "effectiveness," and "incumbent affect." The weakness of previous theorizing about determinants of rebellious collective action on the basis of diffuse/specific support, legitimacy/effectiveness, or system/incumbent affect is that it is individually rational to free ride instead of rebel, regardless of the extent to which diffuse/specific support, legitimacy/effectiveness, or system/incumbent affect are low or negative. Our public goods theory provides a plausible causal rationale for linking such traditional political support variables, as indicators of preferences for public goods, to the decisions of average citizens about whether or not to take part in rebellious collective action.

Apart from public goods incentives, we also take into account the expected utility of a variety of nonmaterial selective incentives, as well as expected costs. Olson (1971) is skeptical about the role of nonmaterial rewards as a determinant of collective action in general. Tullock (1971) argues that although a particular kind of nonmaterial selective incentive, the entertainment value of rebellion, is an important motive of "pseudo-rebellious" behavior engaged in by students in advanced democracies, the entertainment motive is not an important incentive in "serious" rebellion. Silver (1974) expands upon the entertainment motive to include a long but vaguely defined list of "psychic income." We measure the entertainment value of rebellious political behavior, as well as two kinds of psychic income: expected benefits of conforming to behavioral expectations of important others, and expected social affiliation rewards.

The principal results of our tests of rational choice models of rebellious collective action are, first, that selective incentives appear for the most part to be irrelevant. This runs counter to the spirit of Olson's general theory, which, as Barry (1978, pp. 23-46) has argued, may have a somewhat narrow range of applicability; and it contradicts directly the arguments of Tullock and Silver in regard to private psychological gratification. Second, we find that public goods incentives—the variables assumed to be irrelevant in the private interest or "by-product" models of Olson, Tullock, and Silver—consistently are estimated to have significant impact on participation in rebellious collective action. These variables are components of a public goods model that is predicated on the assumption that, in regard to an average citizen's choice of whether or not to rebel, considerations of what is collectively rational can override the individually rational logic of the private interest theory.

A finding that goes against the grain of rational choice theory is the observation of a small but statistically significant negative relationship between the expected utility of negative sanctions and rebellious collective action. Respondents who believe that rebellious behavior is likely to be costly show a somewhat greater tendency to participate than those who believe that it is unlikely to be costly. The solution of this anomaly is an important priority of future research on the formulation and testing of rational choice theories of rebellion. One possibility is that the unexpected sign of the costs variable reflects the presence of a "martyr" syndrome, which would need to be measured independently and controlled for. Alternatively, high expected costs may be closely intertwined with a high public goods value of rebellion, stemming from perception of the existing regime as extremely repressive. If so, this raises the question of how to separate costs from public goods, theoretically and empirically.

Notes

This research was supported by the National Science Foundation, award SOC77-00187, and by a grant from the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk.* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1984 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C. We are grateful for helpful comments from members of the Rational Choice Seminar at the University of Arizona.

1. Of 2425 potentially eligible households, 928 refused to give the information necessary to determine eligibility. Of the remaining 1297 known eligible households, the completion rate was 60%. Of all potentially eligible households, the completion rate was 32%. Response Analysis developed a complex weighting procedure that can be used to compensate for the problem of low response rate. We do not use the weighting procedure, however, since our interest

is in testing general hypotheses rather than describing distributions.

2. Respondents were asked first whether they approved of each behavior, and second, to estimate how large a percentage of citizens in the United States would approve of each behavior. These were intended principally as "warm-up" questions. Respondents then were asked to report their intention to perform each behavior in the future ("would do; might do, depending on the circumstances; would not do") and whether they had performed the behavior in the past. Special precaution was taken to ensure anonymity. For the behavioral intention question a deck of preshuffled cards (each listing a particular behavior) was given to the respondent, who was instructed to circle the appropriate response option on each card and place it in an envelope, which then was sealed in his or her presence upon completion of the series. This procedure was repeated for the question about actual participation.

3. The participation potential variables are defined operationally as the product of behavior and intention, where behavior is scored 1 for lack of participation and 2 for participation, and intention is scored 1 for negative intention, 2 for conditionally positive intention, and 3 for unconditionally positive intention. Very little nonresponse was observed (only 3% of the respondents could not be scored on all five variables). When subjected to a factor analysis (principal components) the five participation potential variables load highly on a single factor, indicative of unidimensionality.

4. A constant equal to the number of items was subtracted from the total score in order to set the origin at zero.

5. As in the New York City survey, respondents in the Hamburg survey were presented with a list of legal and illegal behaviors (23 in all), described as actions people might take to protest against the construction of nuclear power plants. For each behavior respondents were asked to report whether they had engaged in it or not. Respondents also were asked about their intention to perform the action in the future, using five response categories ranging from "in no case" to "quite certain." The participation potential variables were constructed by multiplying past behavior (scored 1 for "have not done" and 2 for "have done") by future intention (scored from 1 to 5, where a high score means that the behavior will be performed with a high probability in the future). There were no missing values on the question about past behavior, but because of missing data on the intention question, only 85% of the respondents could be scored on the behavior times intention product variables. This can be explained in part by interviewer errors, as some of the interviewers wrongly assumed that they should ask the intention questions only for those actions previously performed by a respondent. For each intention variable the missing value was replaced by the mean. A factor analysis of the participation potential variables indicates unidimensionality.

6. Respondents in the New York City survey were asked to state the extent to which they (1) have respect for the political institutions in the United States, (2) think that the courts in the United States guarantee a fair trial, (3) feel that the basic rights of citizens are well protected by the political system, (4) are proud to live under the political system, (5) feel that the system of government is the best possible political system, and (6) feel that they should support the system of government. The response continuum was a seven-point scale. The average inter-item correlation was .57, and scale reliability (Alpha) was .89. Scores were reversed and summed to form a Political Support/Alienation scale (V_s). Respondents in the Hamburg survey were asked to respond on a five-point agree-disagree scale to the following statements: (1) "At present, I feel very critical of our political system"; (2) "In general, one can rely on the federal government to do the right thing"; (3) "The courts in the Federal Republic guarantee everyone a fair trial regardless of whether they are rich or poor, educated or uneducated"; (4) "I find it very alarming that the basic rights of citizens are so little respected in our political system"; (5) "Looking back, the leading politicians in the Federal Republic have always had good intentions"; (6) "I have great respect and affection for the political institutions in the Federal Republic." The average inter-item correlation was .40 and scale reliability was .80. Items were scored in the direction of negative evaluation and summed.

7. The series also included the following: "The existence of atomic power stations is a catastrophe for me"; "I am really afraid of atomic power stations"; "Sometimes I think about atomic power stations, but they do not play an important role in my life"; "It is sometimes difficult for me to fall asleep if I think about the problem of nuclear energy"; and "I am worried about the existence of nuclear power stations." A response was scored 1 if it indicated discontent with the existing utilization of nuclear energy; otherwise a score of 0 was assigned. The mean inter-item correlation was .26 and scale reliability was .71. Responses were summed across items to construct a Discontent with Nuclear Energy scale (V_n).

8. The series also included the following: "The anti-nuclear movement would lose influence if I were no longer active";* "The activity of a single person against the construction of atomic power stations cannot prevent the development of nuclear energy"; "The question of whether the anti-nuclear movement is successful or not because of my participation never occurs to me";* "I don't believe that my activity against atomic power stations has any weight." A five-point agree-disagree response format was used, scored to range from low to high per-

ceived personal influence. A factor analysis (principal components) yielded two factors with eigenvalues greater than 1. The starred items show low loadings on the first factor. A Personal Influence scale (p_i) was constructed from the factor scores of the first factor. Scale scores were transformed to a range of 0–1 according to the formula: $X_i' = (X_i - X_{min})/(X_{max} - X_{min})$, where X_i is the original scale value and X_i' is the transformed value.

9. Respondents were asked: "In your opinion, how important is it for people like yourself to be involved in politics today? Is it very important, somewhat important, somewhat unimportant, or very unimportant?" Responses were scored in reverse order, 0, .33, .67, and 1.

10. The six actions were (1) disrupting lectures and meetings, (2) staging illegal demonstrations or strikes, (3) obstructing traffic or preventing free access to schools, factories, or other buildings, (4) damaging or destroying rooms or furniture in universities, (5) taking over public buildings and fighting with the police, and (6) taking up guerrilla tactics such as bombing buildings, holding hostages, and hijacking airplanes. The mean inter-item correlation between responses (on a five-point scale scored from "hurt" to "helped") is .52, and scale reliability is .87. An Efficacy of Group Aggression scale (p_g) was constructed by summing scores across items and transforming them to range between 0 and 1.

11. Scores on the Political Support/Alienation scale are squared because the hypothesis of a positively accelerated function is more plausible theoretically than that of a linear function (see the discussion in Muller, 1979, pp. 83–88).

12. Scores on the Political Support/Alienation scale are squared; scores on the Discontent with Nuclear Energy scale are not squared because this transformation does not improve the correlation with R_p and R_b, perhaps because of the restricted range of the Discontent with Nuclear Energy scale, which is limited to eight values between 0 and 7.

13. Mixed evidence on the question of whether there is a p in conventional political participation (e.g., voting, campaign activity) is reported by Aldrich (1976); however, the indicators of p used by him are indirect.

14. Mason (1984) also rejects this assumption on the grounds that certain kinds of public goods—i.e., those that are inclusive and non-inferior—are not subject to free-riding. An implicit assumption of Mason's argument is that the influence of the individual or the group on the provision of public goods will not be negligible in the case of inclusive and non-inferior public goods.

References

Aldrich, John H. 1976. Some Problems in Testing Two Rational Models of Participation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 20:713–33.

Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bandura, Albert. 1973. *Aggression: A Social Learning Analysis.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Barry, Brian. 1978. *Sociologists, Economists and Democracy.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Easton, David. 1965. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life.* New York: Wiley.

Hardin, Russell. 1978. Groups in the Regulation of Collective Bads. Presented at the annual meeting of the Public Choice Society, New Orleans, La.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1963. *Political Man.* Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Anchor Books.

Mason, David. 1984. Individual Participation in Collective Racial Violence: A Rational Choice Perspective. *American Political Science Review*, 78:1040–56.

Mueller, Dennis. 1979. *Public Choice.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Muller, Edward N. 1979. *Aggressive Political Participation.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Muller, Edward N., Thomas O. Jukam, and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1982. Diffuse Political Support and Antisystem Political Behavior: A Comparative Analysis. *American Journal of Political Science*, 26:240–64.

Olson, Mancur. 1971. *The Logic of Collective Action.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Opp, Karl-Dieter. 1986. Soft Incentives and Collective Action. *British Journal of Political Science*, 16:87–112.

Opp, Karl-Dieter, Käte Buro-Auffarth, Peter Hartmann, Thomazine von Witzleben, Volker Pöhls, and Thomas Spitzley. 1984. *Soziale Problems und Protestverhalten* [Social problems and protest behavior]. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Salert, Barbara. 1976. *Revolutions and Revolutionaries: Four Theories.* New York: Elsevier.

Silver, Morris. 1974. Political Revolution and Repression: An Economic Approach. *Public Choice*, 17:63–71.

Tullock, Gordon. 1971. The Paradox of Revolution. *Public Choice*, 11:89–99.

Edward N. Muller is Professor of Political Science, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721.

Karl-Dieter Opp is Professor of Sociology, Institut für Soziologie, Universität Hamburg, Sedanstrasse 19, D 2000 Hamburg 13, FRG.

REFORMULATING THE CUBE LAW FOR PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS

REIN TAAGEPERA
University of California, Irvine

The cube law *was proposed around 1910 to express the conversion of a party's vote shares into its seat share in two-party plurality elections with single-seat districts. This article develops predictive seat-vote equations for a much wider range of elections, including those involving many parties, single- and multi-seat districts, and diverse seat allocation rules such as plurality and list proportional representation (PR). Without any statistical curve fitting based on the seat and vote shares themselves, the basic features of the conversion are predicted using exogenous parameters: magnitude and number of districts, number of parties, and total size of the electorate and of the assembly. The link between the proposed equations and the original cube law is explicated. Using an existing data base, the fit of the predictive model is examined. On balance, this model accounts well for the conversion of votes to seats, and for the deviation from proportionality in PR systems.*

A fundamental issue for democracies is the extent to which elections reflect the popular will. One important aspect of that concern is the degree to which voter preferences for different parties and candidates are reflected in electoral outcomes. The way in which this question is commonly studied is by looking at the relationship between the aggregate vote share for candidates of a given party (or other grouping) and the aggregate seat share received by candidates of that party (Rae, 1971).

Some electoral systems expressly aim at proportional representation (PR), that is, seat shares equal to vote shares. However, the so-called PR systems differ widely among themselves in the degree to which they deviate from ideal PR, largely because different district magnitudes (i.e., the number of seats per district) are used, and different numbers of parties have evolved. Discussion of electoral reform in such countries often revolves not around the principle of PR, but around whether and how to make the system somewhat more or less proportional. However, such discussion has not been guided by any general quantitative rule predicting the specific degree of deviation from PR in the systems existing or proposed.

For plurality elections, it is well known that proportionality between vote shares and seat shares cannot be expected. In this case, however, a votes-to-seats conversion rule has been proposed, the so-called cube law. Devising a comparable expression for the PR elections would have considerable practical importance in guiding the discussions of electoral reform. A

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 80 NO. 2 JUNE, 1986

more general expression accounting for votes-to-seats conversion in both plurality and PR elections would also be of theoretical significance in unifying the field of electoral systems, and in casting new light on the functioning of each particular system through quantitative comparison with others.

The purpose of this article is to develop and test a set of predictive equations that use no curve fitting based on the seat and vote shares themselves. Starting out as a reformulation and expansion of the cube law, these new seat-vote equations express the basic features of conversion of vote shares into seat shares for a number of electoral rules, including plurality, "list PR" elections, and the Japanese single nontransferable vote.

The Cube Law of Elections

For two-party contests in single-seat ("single-member") districts using plurality, the *cube law of elections,* first formulated around 1910 (see Kendall and Stuart, 1950) was proposed as a predictor of the expected seat-vote relationship. The cube law expresses the empirical observation that cubing the ratio of votes (v_K/v_L) received by any two parties K and L was seen to approximate the ratio of assembly seats (s_K/s_L) they win:

$$s_K/s_L = (v_K/v_L)^3. \tag{1}$$

What this means is that any advantage a party has in terms of votes is magnified at the seats level, and in a very specific way.

The general form taken by the cube law is unusual in political science (though quite usual in some other sciences), in that it consists of an equation connecting well-defined quantities, without any adjustable parameters subject to statistical curve fitting. Given its empirical nature, it might more properly be called the "cube rule," but the traditional designation will be kept in this article. The cube law is meant to apply only to electoral systems of the Anglo-Saxon type that use one-seat districts and the plurality ("first past the post") allocation rule. In particular, it is not expected to apply to PR systems in multi-seat districts. The latter try to achieve something close to $s_K/s_L = v_K/v_L$, thus replacing the power index 3 in equation (1) with 1.

Even some Anglo-Saxon elections deviate considerably from the cube law (Tufte, 1973). They involve partisan gerrymander, which biases the pattern in favor of one party, and bipartisan gerrymander, which profits incumbents in both major parties. Despite such occurrences the cube law might still be a useful simple base-line rule. It could supply a framework to which various correctives could gradually be added—e.g., some bias or gerrymander coefficients. (For a recent overview of measures of bias see Grofman, 1983.)

The predictive power of the cube law is more seriously threatened by observations that in many cases a power index other than 3 gives a better fit. Even though the cube law was initially formulated for Great Britain, some recent work suggests that a power index of 2.5 might fit British elections better (Laakso, 1979). Further analysis (Schrodt, 1980) underlines the difficulty of establishing the proper statistical format for testing such a nonlinear expression.

Previous Generalizations of the Cube Law

A number of ingenious theoretical explanations for the existence of the cube law have been offered. Most of them (see appendix 1) are so specific that they have not offered avenues for testable predictions beyond the Anglo-Saxon parliamentary elections. However, there is one previous line of approach which has yielded testable predictions for some other elections (such as the U.S. Electoral College), but always within the plurality framework. This approach will be reviewed here, because it will supply the starting point for further generalization to multi-seat districts, to be presented in the next section.

The properties of the following equation were studied by Theil (1969):

$$s_K = v_K{}^n/\Sigma v_i{}^n, \tag{2}$$

where s_K and v_K are one particular party's vote and seat shares, respectively, n is a constant, and the summation is over the vote shares of all parties. This equation expresses the seat share of one specific party, K, in terms of the vote shares of K and all other parties. When dividing equation (2) by the analogous equation for party L, the summation term cancels out, and one obtains

$$s_K/s_L = (v_K/v_L)^n. \tag{3}$$

This form would include, as special cases, the cube law (for $n=3$) and perfect PR (for $n=1$). Equation (2), in turn, can be derived from equation (3), which means that the two forms are mathematically equivalent. In the case of the cube law, the summational form was used by Qualter (1968) for Canadian elections.

Theil (1969) showed that if any equation connecting s_K/s_L to v_K/v_L exists at all, it has to be of the general form given above. The reason is that the sum of the seat shares of all parties must amount to unity, or 100%. Summing the seat shares s_i for all parties, using equation (2), does yield such a result. This could not be the case for any other functional relation between s_K/s_L and v_K/v_L, when the system has three or more parties, according to Theil's mathematical proof. What this means is that equation (3) is the only possible expression connecting seat and vote ratios that does not produce inconsistencies.

At this stage the index n could have any value, and the question remains why it should be equal to 3 in the case of national assembly elections. It has been proposed (Taagepera, 1973) that n depends on the logarithms of the total number of votes (V) and the total number of districts (D):

$$n = \log V/\log D, \tag{4}$$

provided that all seats in the same district are allocated to the party with plurality of votes.

The broad underlying reason is as follows. When one considers the ideal extreme cases $D=V$ and $D=1$, it becomes apparent that the numerical value of n should be affected by the relative number of votes and districts. If districts are made so numerous that every voter is a separate district ($D=V$), then perfect PR should prevail by definition, so that $n=1$. If, on the other hand, the number of districts is reduced to one (as in direct presidential elections), then only one party can win a seat, and the resulting seat ratio 0:1 emerges from equation (3) only if n tends to infinity. Assuming quasi continuity in the intervening range, one would expect that n gradually increases from 1 to infinity as D gradually decreases from V to 1.

Equation (4) expresses this general trend and also satisfies the boundary conditions at $D=1$ and $D=V$. The theoretical/mathematical justification for the logarithmic format is reviewed in appendix 2. The striking aspect of equation (4), however, is that it does agree with actual elections, and not only in the cases where the cube law might apply, but also in U.S. Electoral College elections and certain trade union elections data.

For most national assembly elections, the ratio log V/log S, where S is the number of assembly seats, happens to be close to 3, regardless of electoral rules used (see Table 1 for some examples, disregarding for the moment the last three columns, M, N, and n). In other words, a cube root relationship tends to exist worldwide between assembly size and the voting population, and a rational model for such a relation has been proposed by

Table 1. Characteristics of Electoral Systems Selected for Model Testing

Country, Period and Number of Elections	Votes (V, millions)	Seats ($S=DM$)	$\frac{\log V}{\log S}$	District Magnitude (M)	Effective Parties (N)	n
U.S. House 1950–70 (11)	54.9	436	2.93	1	2.0	2.93
Canada 1963–74 (5)	8.3	264	2.86	1	3.1	2.86
Japan 1963–76 (5)	47.5	486	2.86	4	3.3	1.30
Austria 1945–70 (8)	4.4	165	3.00	6	2.5	1.20
Switzerland 1947–75 (8)	1.0	200	2.61	8	5.4	1.13
Italy 1958–76 (5)	30.2	630	2.67	19	3.9	1.05
Finland 1962–75 (5)	2.5	200	2.78	15	5.8	1.07
Netherlands 1963–77 (5)	6.3	150	3.12	150	5.4	1.01

Sources: Median V, S, and N calculated from data in Nohlen (1978, pp. 384–415), except for the U.S. (Vick, 1979, based on Cox, 1972). Average M is calculated or estimated from information in various parts of Nohlen (1978). Equation (5) is used to calculate n. The number D of districts resulting from $S=DM$ may differ slightly from the actual number when M is not the same for all districts.

Taagepera (1972). In the case of single-seat districts (where $D=S$) this means that the value of n resulting from equation (4) is close to 3. The cube law now appears as the result of combining the "cube root law of assembly sizes" with the equations (3) and (4).

While the cube law is thus explained in terms of more basic rules and thus becomes more credible, it also is subject to a new unexpected modification: instead of being exactly 3 in all cases, the exponent is now expected to vary somewhat from country to country (and also over time within the same country). For New Zealand, equation (4) yields values around $n=3.2$, while for Britain it yields $n=2.6$, with intermediate values for Canada (2.8) and the U.S. (2.9).

Besides casting such new light on the cube law, equations (3) and (4) also lead to predictions regarding the U.S. electoral college, where $D=51$ (and less in earlier times), given that all delegate seats of a state go to the same party. Instead of a power index close to 3, equation (4) now yields an average of about 5, and this is indeed close to the observed average swing ratio, which is clearly higher than predicted by the cube law (Taagepera, 1973). Certain trade union elections studied by Coleman (1964, p. 347) also fit the pattern, but there the calculated (and observed) n is much less than 3: namely, around 1.5 (Taagepera, 1973). As observed earlier, equation (4) also applies to direct presidential elections, where the entire country becomes a single one-seat district.

In sum, the combination of equations (3) and (4) can express and predict the broad features of Anglo-Saxon assembly elections, of U.S. Electoral College elections, and of direct presidential elections. The fit to any particular election results may be far from the best statistical fit, but the latter lack any predictive ability regarding other countries.

Apart from direct testing or theoretical proof, a model's credibility increases if it leads to unanticipated consequences that can be observed. The application to U.S. Electoral College and direct presidential elections is of that type, since both fall clearly outside the scope of the original cube law. The usefulness of a model is also enhanced if it ties together several previously isolated phenomena. Combining the aforementioned "cube root rule of assembly sizes" (as proposed by Taagepera, 1972) and the seat-vote relationships in equations (3) and (4) to yield the cube law of elections is such an extension.

Like the cube law, the generalized seat-vote relationship thus developed is meant to apply only to systems using the plurality allocation rule. We will now proceed to previously uncharted ground, and extend the seat-vote equations to multi-seat districts with PR allocation rules. It is sometimes thought that such an extension is unnecessary, because "PR is PR." However, actual PR systems deviate from the ideal PR, and they do so to varying degrees. It will be seen that our extended model is able to account for the basic differences between them.

Seat-Vote Equations for Multi-Seat Districts with Multiple Parties

Further extension of the model of seat-vote relations to include PR elections in multi-seat districts first requires the introduction of district magnitude, M, i.e., the number of seats allocated in the same electoral district using some PR or other non-plurality formula. On grounds that will be discussed shortly, it is proposed that magnitude affects the power exponent n and requires the following modification of equation (4):

$$n = (\log V/\log DM)^{1/M}. \qquad (5)$$

In the case of single-seat districts ($M=1$) this equation reduces to the earlier one, as it should. In the case of very large districts (such as Netherlands, where the whole country is a single electoral district of $M=150$) n tends toward unity, reflecting near-perfect PR. For low-magnitude, multi-seat districts (such as Japan, where $M=4$), the small party penalty inherent in the cube law is reduced to a considerable extent, but the system still is a long way from perfect PR.

The way M is introduced is chosen so as to satisfy the boundary conditions for the extreme cases of $M=1$ (cube law) and M tending toward infinity (perfect PR), but beyond this it is purely empirical. It is justified to the extent that it correctly predicts the broad patterns of the seat-vote relationship for a wide range of district magnitudes. The equation would be expected to apply best to systems with a simple electoral setup: having all districts be the same magnitude and using a simple allocation rule such as d'Hondt or Quota. The complexities actual electoral systems can exhibit are almost limitless (for an overview, see e.g. Grofman, 1975, or Lijphart, 1984a). Thresholds, nationwide adjustment seats, use of second preferences (through ranking on the ballot or through a second round of voting), high variance in district magnitude, and other such features are not taken into account by equation (5). Since such features should be expected to reduce the predictive power of our model, if it is nonetheless able to account well for the basic features of votes-to-seats conversion, our confidence in the model's usefulness would be greatly enhanced.

Used in conjunction with equation (2), equation (5) would enable us to calculate the seat shares s_K for any given value of v_K, except for one remaining problem: the outcome does not depend only on the given party's share of votes, but also on how the remaining votes are distributed among the other parties, through the summation in the denominator of equation (2). In plurality elections, in particular, votes distribution among other parties matters greatly. A vote share of 40% can spell disaster if the party is facing a single opponent, or landslide victory if it is facing two opponents of equal size (as Thatcher did in 1983).

The main issue here is the number of serious opponents one faces. To operationalize "serious" we will use the "effective number of parties," as defined by Laakso and Taagepera (1979), and recently used by Lijphart (1984b) to establish major conclusions regarding the functioning of democracies:

$$N = 1/\Sigma v_i^2, \qquad (6)$$

where the summation is over all parties in the given elections.[1] While N changes from election to election, the changes are usually observed to be minor, so that the average N over a long period can be used (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979; Lijphart, 1984b). Using such an average value, we shall approximate the denominator in equation (2) by assuming that every party K faces $N-1$ other parties of equal size in terms of votes. This gives us, for the denominator of equation (2),

$$\Sigma v_i{}^n = v_K{}^n + (N-1)^{1-n}(1-v_K)^n. \qquad (7)$$

This seemingly complex expression actually represents a simplification, in the sense that instead of having to know the vote shares of all the parties, one only needs to know N and the vote share v_K of the single real or hypothetical party under consideration. In sum, the seat-vote equations for single-seat plurality and multiseat PR elections will be tested in the form

$$s_K = v_K{}^n/[v_K{}^n + (N-1)^{1-n}(1-v_K)^n], \qquad (8)$$

where n is given by

$$n = (\log V/\log DM)^{1/M}. \qquad (5)$$

We can now calculate the seat share for any given vote share, provided that N and n are known. The latter in turn depends on the average district magnitude, the number of districts, and the number of votes in the nation. Thus we are predicting the shape of the relationship between seats and votes in terms of one factor (V) independent of the electoral rules, two factors stipulated in the electoral rules (M and D), and a factor (N) which summarizes the long-term votes distribution. If those few factors exogenous to the election results of the given year enable us to account for the general pattern of votes-to-seats conversion in a wide range of multi-seat PR and single-seat plurality systems, we would be doing well, indeed.

Graphical Analysis of the Seats-Votes Model

The commonsense way to graph the seat-vote relation for various parties is simply to plot the seat share of party K (s_K) versus its share of votes (v_K), as shown in Figure 1 for Canada and the U.S. However, this way of graphing results in an overcrowding of points at the lower left and a lack of sensitivity regarding even major deviations from PR. Curves C and C′ express the theoretical outcomes calculated from equation (8) for the U.S. House ($N = 2.0$) and for Canada ($N = 3.1$), respectively. Given that n is close to 3 in both cases (see Table 1), these curves essentially express the outcome of the traditional cube law for parties facing a single opponent or two opponents of equal size, respectively. Although the cube law pattern is a standard example of a gross deviation from PR, the curves C and C′ do not visually seem to deviate that much from the line of perfect PR. Most actual data points for elections world-wide are squeezed in between the curves shown and the ideal PR line. Even stark deviations from PR would be deemphasized both in visual inspection and in statistical testing. Thus the commonsense way to display seats-votes data is not very good.

The crowding and loss of discrimination are avoided if, instead of s_K, one plots the "advantage ratio" $A_K = s_K/v_K$ versus v_K, a format used earlier by Taagepera and Laakso (1980). The outcomes for Canada and the U.S. are shown in Figure 2. The perfect PR and cube law curves now become very distinct, and considerable detail emerges for the small Canadian parties. In the first plot (s vs. v) they all seem to fall close to the PR line. In the second plot (A vs. v) some visibly fall

Figure 1. A Non-Optimal Way to Plot Electoral Data: Seat Shares vs. Vote Shares



very much short of PR, while in one case there is considerable overrepresentation. Note that such "proportionality profiles" have one point for every party in every election.

To demonstrate how widely disparate proportionality profiles can be engendered by equation (8), depending on district magnitude, a sampling of theoretical curves is shown in Figure 3.[2] These curves show that, in comparison with PR rules, the plurality rule ($M=1$) is expected to give a greater relative advantage to large parties, as has long been observed empirically. They further show that within the PR systems the large party bonus should decrease as M increases, a point previously noted by Sartori (1968) among others.

Graphical Testing of the Seat-Votes Model

While one might eventually want to test the fit of the proposed equations for all available electoral data, all that is really needed is to look at a data base that adequately covers the entire observed range of values of both district magnitude ($M=1$ to 150) and the number of parties ($N=2$ to 6). To reduce the possibility of picking only the cases which best agree with the model, the selection of countries and periods was based on two previously existing works: Lijphart's *Democracies* (1984b) and Nohlen's *Wahlsysteme der Welt* (1978).

Case Selection

All electoral systems among Lijphart's (1984b) list of 21 stable democracies were considered, discarding those which involve extensive nationwide or regional adjustment seats, rather high thresholds, a second round, use of second preferences, or mixing of several allocation rules. Among the remaining 14 cases, those with the lowest and the highest effective number of parties were chosen for different ranges of district magnitude.[3] For the 8 cases thus selected (see Table 1), the election data to be used were chosen on the basis of elections tabulated in the

Figure 2. Proportionality Profiles: Advantage Ratios vs. Vote Shares



Note: See Table 1 for data sources and parameter values of the predicted curves shown in Figures 1 and 2.

Figure 3. Predicted Proportionality Profiles at Various District Magnitudes (M)



Note: These profiles have been calculated using equation (8), with $n=3^{1/2M}$ and $N=1.25(2+\log m)$.

appendix of Nohlen (1978).[4] Average magnitudes were calculated or estimated from information in Nohlen, and rounded off to integers. The average n and N were calculated using equations (5) and (6). The expected seat shares at various vote shares were calculated using equation (8), and the resulting theoretical proportionality profiles were graphed. Figures 2 and 4 show the actual results for all parties in all the elections considered, plotted superimposed to the theoretical curves.[5]

In assessing the fit of the model to the data from the eight countries, it should be kept in mind that this is *not* a curve fitting with four coefficients, the values of which can be adjusted at will to achieve the best fit. The values of M, N, V, and D are all predetermined by the political system. There are no adjustable fudge factors. This also means that there is no need for an "after-the-fact test of the fitted model" with a different data set, because there was no fitted model to start with: all coefficients are exogenous to the data on seats and votes.

Country Results

United States. Among the single-seat systems, the U.S. House offers the lowest number of parties (N=2.0). The fit of the U.S. data to the calculated curve in Figure

Figure 4. Predicted and Actual Proportionality Profiles for Elections with Multi-Seat Districts



Note: See Table 1 for data sources and parameter values used.

2 (which closely agrees with the classical cube law) is visibly close to the best possible fit.

Canada. Among the single-seat systems, Canada has the largest effective number of parties ($N=3.1$). While in the less sensitive s vs. v plot in Figure 1 the Canadian data may look close to the calculated curve, the more sensitive proportionality profile (A vs. v plot) in Figure 2 reveals considerable deviation, especially for the smaller parties. Like the classical cube law, the present refined form correctly predicts very few or no seats for small nationwide parties, such as the British Liberals, but it cannot account for regionally based parties such as the Scottish Nationalists, for whose success the nationwide vote share is not relevant. In such cases A actually tends to decrease with increasing vote shares, up to about 15% of the votes, reflecting the unsuccessful attempts of some regionally based parties to go nationwide. Canada offers one of the most marked cases of such regional variety.

Japan. Figure 4 shows various patterns for multi-seat districts. Japan is the only case available with a low M and a simple allocation rule, and even there the rule is rather unusual: the single non-transferable vote. The calculated curve tends to fall below the actual points, but it correctly predicts the general pattern: (1) The penalty for nonregional small parties is less than in the case of single-seat districts, but is still considerable. (2) The bonus for the large parties is less than in the case of single-seat districts, but it is still higher than in any other multi-seat system (as we will see). (3) The shift from penalty to bonus occurs at lower vote share levels (less than 30%) than is the case for single-seat districts (32–45%). As in the case of nationwide Canadian parties, the general shape of the proportionality of profile is well predicted for Japan, too.

Austria and Switzerland. The next panel in Figure 4 shows the calculated curves and election data for two countries with medium district magnitudes in which the number of parties differs widely: Austria ($N=2.5$) and Switzerland ($N=5.4$).[6] At a given percentage of votes, the calculated curves predict higher values of A in the case of Switzerland. This is confirmed by electoral results. The imperfect detailed fit should not detract from this main fact: as N changes (at essentially constant M) the direction and the approximate amount of change in A are correctly predicted. Furthermore, the maximum advantage ratio for large parties is predicted to be less than that for Japan, because of larger district magnitude, and this is also borne out. The small-party penalty is correctly predicted to be about equal in Austria and Japan, but less heavy in Switzerland. The shift from small-party penalty to large-party bonus occurs in Switzerland at a lower percentage of votes (around 20%) than in Japan, as predicted by the curves; in Austria's case the lack of parties with vote shares between 20% and 35% leaves this question open.

Finland and Italy. These countries have very large district magnitudes (short of a single countrywide district).[7] Although these countries differ considerably in the number of their parties, the calculated curves predict that at such a large magnitude N makes hardly any difference. If anything, the Italian data points would be expected to lie slightly lower than the Finnish, and on the average this is the case. Compared with Switzerland, the calculated curves for Finland and Italy predict a slight further reduction in small-party penalty, but this small difference cannot be ascertained with the actual data, given their wide random scatter. The prediction of a slightly lower large-party bonus, compared to that of Austria and Switzerland, is neither confirmed nor disconfirmed, given the scatter in data points. The predicted curves are by now so close to the ideal PR line that distinctions cannot be made regarding the break-even point. Once again the predicted curves tend to lie slightly too low for the larger parties.

The Netherlands. For the huge magnitude ($M=150$) of the Netherlands' countrywide district, the calculated curve is practically indistinguishable from the ideal PR line. The actual data confirm this linearity, but the best-fitting horizontal line lies at $A = 1.03$ rather than $A = 1.00$. (This is compensated by heavy penalty on parties with less than 2.5% of the votes, which are not shown in the plot.) The prediction of an even lesser large-party bonus and small-party penalty than in the case of Finland and Italy is borne out, but the difference is small, as expected from the model, and could be swamped by random noise.

Statistical Considerations

The degree of agreement of the predicted curves with the actual data readily meets the coarse but hard-to-fool test called eye-balling. This is true, in particular, regarding predictions about what would happen when district magnitude is increased, or when, at the same M, the number of parties is increased. A more formal statistical analysis will be given next.

For each country, the data were grouped by vote share brackets of 10%—i.e., up to 9.9%, from 10.0% to 19.9%, etc. Within each bracket the median vote share and the median advantage ratio A were determined. The theoretical advantage ratio (designated in this section as A') was also calculated on the basis of the median vote share, using equation (8) and the appropriate country parameters (M, D, V, and N). If the model fitted, one would expect not only a high correlation between the calculated A' and the actual value of A, but also a best-fit line close to $A = 1.0\ A' + 0.0$. This is so, indeed, especially in the case of multi-seat districts. For the 24 number pairs (A and A') generated by the 6 multi-seat systems, the predicted A' ranges from 0.6 to 1.1; the best-fit line is very close to $A=A'$, namely $A = .92A'+.13$, and $r^2=.87$.

The goodness of this fit is highlighted when one considers the best empirical predictions based on Rae's (1971, p. 89) linear fit of the percentage of seats to the percentage of votes for a large number of PR elections ($s = 1.07v - .84\%$).[8] This equation yields advantage ratio predictions which are not only rather widely scattered ($r^2 = .54$), but also congregate along a best-fit line with a slope deviating from unity: $A = 1.65A'-.66$. Using the best linear fit of seats to votes in our actual testing sample for a kind of "post-diction" offers no improvement: $A = .55A'-.46$; $r^2=.44$. For the multi-seat districts, our model performs vastly better than the empirical approach.

When including the 6 number pairs generated by the two single-seat systems in our sample, the goodness of fit is reduced by the aforementioned small, regionally based Canadian parties. The range of predicted values A' widens (from 0.02 to 1.4), the best-fit line for our model becomes $A=.54A'+.48$, and r^2 is .75. Small but nationwide parties in single-seat districts (e.g., in the U.K. or New Zealand) would follow the model, but the U.S. has no third parties with more than 2.5% of votes. This leaves Canada as the only plurality system in our sample which has small parties, putting the model to the severest possible test. Nonetheless, our model still does appreciably better than empirical predictions based on Rae's (1971, p. 70) fit of a large number of elections with single- and multi-seat districts ($s = 1.13v - 2.38\%$). The latter yields a correlation between expected and actual values of A of ony $r^2=.32$. The best fit of the percentage of seats to the percentage of votes for our present sample ($s = 1.15v - 2.45\%$) is very close to Rae's, and its "postdicted" advantage ratio values have the same limited correlation ($r^2 = .32$) with the actual A.

The elections held after the compilation of the Nohlen (1978) data are too few to offer a sufficient data base for a separate testing of the model. If, however, 13 later elections in the same countries are included with the previous data base of 52 elections, the outcome remains essentially the same, with $r^2 = .70$ for predictions based on our model and applied to all countries, including Canada.[9]

Conclusions

The qualitative predictions of the seats-votes model expressed in equation (8) are confirmed in the cases where large differences in proportionality patterns were expected. The deviations from proportionality predicted by our model agree with the actual ones much better than is the case for predictions based on any other approach (short of country-by-country curve fitting): $r^2 = .87$ for our model vs. .54 for the best alternative approach in the case of PR in multi-seat districts, and $r^2 = .75$ for our model vs. .32 when including plurality elections. Of course, better empirical fits could easily be found for each country separately, but such post-fact curve fitting would be something quite different from the approach used here, since it would be of no use in predicting outcomes in countries apart from the one for which it was established. The major achievement of the present approach is to enable one to make baseline predictions for almost any electoral system for which the number and magnitude of districts and the number of voters and parties are well definable and known.

The problem of expressing the relationship between seats and votes has of course not been fully solved. There are electoral rules that defy any systematics, such as the stipulation that the opposition parties to the PRI are to receive 25% of the seats in the Mexican national assembly, regardless of their percentage of votes. Other phenomena, such as vote size thresholds and mixing of several allocation rules, could in principle be taken into account by developing appropriate correction terms to the model presented here. The same applies to the effect of PR allocation rules (such as d'Hondt and Largest Remainder) at the same district magnitude and number of parties, although their effect is small compared to that of M and N.

How does the model presented agree with countries and periods other than the ones tested in this article? Given our method for selecting the sample countries, other systems with simple allocation rules should fit equally well. Visual inspection of previously published West European proportionality profiles (Taagepera and Laakso, 1980) confirms this expectation. The partly theory-based and partly empirical equations presented here clearly offer sufficient potential to warrant further testing with all electoral data available. They have predictive power, and by the same token are clearly "falsifiable"— an indispensable feature of scientific models and laws. For systems with complex electoral rules they offer a way to tell to which simpler system (if any) such a system is equivalent, as far as the votes-to-seats conversion is concerned.

In sum, with four parameters (M, N, V, and D), which are themselves exogenous to the elections data, we can account very well for seats-votes relationships in a very wide range of electoral and party systems. The form of interaction between these parameters is derived from theoretical considerations about their functional relationships. Given the exogenous nature of these parameters, the proposed seat-vote equations offer considerable interest for "electoral engineering," since the model can make specific predictions about how the votes-to-seats conversion would change upon, say, a small alteration in average district magnitude. But the main interest is intellectual and conceptual. Regarding the multi-seat districts, the small but significant deviations from PR can now for the first time be "understood" in a sense that includes quantitative prediction. For plurality in single-seat districts the known seats-votes relationships have been clarified by making them part of a broader picture. To an appreciable extent, single-seat and multi-seat electoral systems have up to now been considered distinct species to be studied separately. Unifying the field of electoral systems through equations which apply to both species certainly has theoretical significance.

Appendix 1. Previous Explanations of the Cube Law

A normal distribution of voters for a party over all districts would yield the cube law, provided that the appropriate value is used for variance (Kendall and Stuart, 1950). The general shape of the relationship thus receives an explanation, but the particular exponent value, 3, does not. The suitable value of variance emerges from a contagious binomial model based on a Markov chain approach, provided that people form reciprocal influence clusters of a suitable size (Coleman, 1964, pp. 343–53). The establishment of a tie between cluster size and the outcome of an election is of considerable interest in its own right, but it does not explain why people aggregate in clusters of precisely the right size to yield a cube relationship in national elections.

A Poisson distribution can be used instead of the normal one, and it can be justified in terms of a model of interaction between interparty negotiations and intraconstituency pressures (March, 1957); however, the underlying factors have not been measured. A LOGIT approach (Theil, 1970) also leads to the desired curve shape; the cube relationship emerges if one arbitrarily assumes that the standard deviation of the vote proportions across districts is around 1/8. A stochastic model by Quandt (1974) chiefly adds the possibility of bias in favor of one of the parties in a two-party system. The large number of parameters enables the model to account, in retrospect, for a large variety of shapes of the seats-votes relationship, but at the cost of making prediction unfeasible. The Markov scheme has been further elaborated upon by Gudgin and Taylor (1979, pp. 31–53) who may have been unaware of Coleman's work. The cluster sizes that would give rise to the cube law are not independent input data, but again are calculated retroactively from the cube law.

A quite different game theory approach to campaign resource strategy is followed by Sankoff and Mellos (1972); it leads to an exponent of 2 rather than 3. Additional assumptions regarding an unswayable hard core of partisan voters can lead to an exponent of 3—or any other value. Once more we have an interesting connection, but a hard-core percentage calculated from the cube law cannot pass for an explanation of it.

Broadly speaking, the aforementioned approaches tend to show the plausibility rather than the inevitability of the cube law. Some of them enable us to use the exponent 3 to infer what the prevalent cluster size or hard-core percentage would have to be, but they do not explain why the whole magic package comes about. The very number of distribution-oriented models offered (which include all those mentioned, except Sankoff and Mellos) indicates some unease regarding the preexisting models.

What would constitute an adequate explanation of the cube law? First of all, one would ideally want a model plus some independently known quantitites such that one could plug those pre-given numbers into the model from the one end and have equation (1) pop out from the other end. The variance or standard deviation of the distribution of votes over districts can be independently known (though in practice this is often difficult), and thus models using this basis would satisfy this first condition. As a further desideratum, one would prefer a model which applies to all parties, all vote ranges, and to any number or size of districts. All the aforementioned explanations use a system with two parties only. If they can be expanded to include nationwide third parties such as the British Liberals, this aspect has not been formulated. Models which apply to pure two-party systems are not without merit, but multi-party models including the two-party systems as a special case offer a wider explanation. The approach taken by Theil (1969) leads in that direction.

Appendix 2. Derivation of $n = \log V/\log D$[10]

In the main text of this article, reasoning through extreme border cases led to the conclusion that n is a function of the total number of voters (V) and of districts (D): $n = n(V,D)$. For the sake of achieving as much generality as possible, we would want the model to apply also in the case of multi-stage elections, such as the voters/electoral college/president sequence, although such elections occur rarely. We are here again reasoning by extreme cases which may or may not occur in practice. But if they were ever to occur, a general model of elections should be able to fit them without running into inconsistencies. If V voters elect D subrepresentatives who in turn elect T final representatives, then one would expect equation (3) to apply to the stages V-D and D-T separately, and also to the entire process V-T. Consistency then requires that $n(V,T) = n(V,D)n(D,T)$. We can rewrite it, provided that $n(D,T)$ is not equal to zero, as

$$n(V,D) = n(V,T)/n(D,T).$$

Now take T to be a standard number of units, against which elections with any other number of units are compared. Then $n(V,T) = n(V,\text{constant}) = f(V)$ only, and similarly, $n(D,T) = f(D)$, so that

$$n(V,D) = f(V)/f(D).$$

The function f must be the same function for V and for D. Also, we must have $f(1)=0$, if we want to account for presidential elections.

In the absence of any information to the contrary, we have to assume that the degree of clustering of like-minded voters is the same on all levels (i.e., a magnified piece of a political adherence map would look like the original map). When V voters elect D representatives (with V/D voters per one-seat district) we should observe the same decrease in f on the entire country level, where the decrease is from $f(V)$ to $f(D)$, and on the level of a single district, where the decrease is from $f(V/D)$ to $f(1)$. Since $f(1)=0$, this yields

$$f(V/D) = f(V) - f(D),$$

an identity satisfied only if $f(V) = \log V$. This completes the derivation of

$$n(V,D) = f(V)/f(D) = \log V/\log D.$$

Notes

I would like to thank Philip Converse, Creel Froman, Bernard Grofman, Manfred Holler, Arend Lijphart, Howard Margolis, Frederick Reines, and Matthew Shugart for helpful comments.

1. For four parties of equal size (vote distribution of .25/.25/.25/.25), N is exactly 4, as one would want it to be. For a distribution of .45/.35/.19/.01 we obtain $N=2.77$, which tells us that there are only two major parties plus a third one of somewhat lesser importance. The Rae-Taylor fractionalization index F is connected to N through $N=1/(1-F)$.

2. For all curves shown in Figure 3 it was assumed that the aforementioned cube root relationship (Taagepera, 1972) between the number of assembly seats and the number of voters applies perfectly, so that equation (5) becomes $n=(3)^{1/M}$. Also, N was given the average value at the given district magnitude reported by Taagepera (1984) for worldwide data: $N=1.25(2+\log M)$. Despite these simplifications, the variety of curves obtained is considerable. Even more variety can be expected if one uses the actual values of N, D, and V for particular countries.

3. The following ranges were used: for single-seat districts, $M=1$; for low magnitude, multi-seat districts, $2<M<4$; for medium magnitude districts, $5<M<9$; for high magnitude districts, $10<M<20$; and for very high magnitude districts, $M>100$. There are no cases with M between 20 and 100. For the low M, Japan is the only case with simple allocation rules available. For the very high M, the number of parties no longer is expected to matter, and the case with the highest M available (the Netherlands) was chosen.

4. The only omission was post-1970 Austria, where the electoral system shifted from $M=6$ to $M=19$. The U.S. House data missing in Nohlen (1978) were added, using approximately the same time span.

5. Parties with less than 2.5% of votes were not plotted. For such very small parties, wide random fluctuations in advantage ratio can be expected for any electoral system, because seats come in integer numbers only. If a party with 1.5% of the votes obtains one seat in an assembly of 200 seats, its advantage ratio is a low 0.67. If it should reach two seats, its A immediately jumps to a very high 1.33.

6. In Austria's case the effective M could be somewhat higher than the value $M=6$ used here, because the seats not allocated by district-wide quota of $q=100\%/(M+1)$ were allocated (by d'Hondt procedure) in four wider regions (Nohlen, 1978, p. 270). This could involve up to 20% of the total 165 seats—i.e., up to 8 seats per region, which thus would represent another district with $M=8$.

7. Among the high magnitude systems, Sweden and Luxembourg have a slightly lower N than Italy, but Italy was chosen as the low-N case because it is at the upper edge of the range of magnitudes. Like Austria, Italy allocates most of the seats by quota in the districts (with the definition of quota varying over time), but the remainder of votes are pooled for nationwide distribution, with some restrictions on parties which do not get any seats in the districts. The remainder has involved from 20 to 80 seats (Nohlen, 1978, p. 275)—i.e., an average of 50 out of a total of about 630. This is roughy equivalent to having one district of $M=50$, in addition to the regular districts where M varies from 1 to 36. The average value $M=19$ used here may slightly underestimate the effective average magnitude. In Finland, too, individual district magnitudes vary widely, from 1 to 24. The wider scatter of the Finnish data might be caused by the use of local electoral alliances, which have an unpredictable effect on the fortunes of lesser parties. In Italy the scatter may be reduced by the nationwide distribution of remainder seats.

8. Rae's empirical equation based on worldwide PR data predicts, of course, the same proportionality curve for all countries. Among those predicted by our model, this curve is closest to Finland's. No previous model seems to exist that would predict the shifts in proportionality profile curves from country to country.

9. Predictions of $A=\%S/\%V$ have been tested here, rather than predictions of the percentage of seats, because the percentage of seats is so highly correlated with the percentage of votes ($r^2=.981$ for our sample) that our model's explanatory performance ($r^2=.985$) does not stand out, although it outperforms all other approaches. Using $A=\%S/\%V$ instead of $\%S$ eliminates the PR component, thus accentuating the deviation from PR and making for a more stringent test.

10. This derivation is condensed from Taagepera (1973).

References

Coleman, James S. 1964. *Introduction to Mathematical Sociology.* New York: Free Press of Glencoe.

Cox, Edward F. 1972. *State and National Voting: 1910-1970.* Hamden, CT: Archon Books.

Grofman, Bernard. 1975. A Review of Macro-Election Systems. In Rudolf Wildenmann, ed., *Sozialwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch für Politik,* vol. 4. Munich: Günter Olzog Verlag, pp. 303-52.

Grofman, Bernard. 1983. Measures of Bias and Proportionality in Seats-Votes Relationships. *Political Methodology,* 9:295-327.

Gudgin, Graham, and Peter Taylor. 1979. *Seats, Votes, and the Spatial Organisation of Elections.* London: Pion Limited.

Kendall, M. G., and A. Stuart. 1950. The Law of Cubic Proportion in Election Results. *British Journal of Sociology,* 1:183-97.

Laakso, Markku. 1979. Should a Two-and-a-Half Law Replace the Cube Law in British Elections? *British Journal of Political Science,* 9:355-84.

Laakso, Markku, and Rein Taagepera. 1979. Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe. *Comparative Political Studies,* 12:3-27.

Lijphart, Arend. 1984a. Advances in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. *World Politics,* 36:424-36.

Lijphart, Arend. 1984b. *Democracies: Patterns of*

Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

March, James G. 1957. Party Legislative Representation as a Function of Election Results. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 21:521-24.

Nohlen, Dieter. 1978. *Wahlsysteme der Welt* [Electoral Systems of the World]. München: Piper.

Qualter, Terence H. 1968. Seats and Votes: An Application of the Cube Law to the Canadian Electoral System. *Canadian Journal of Political Science,* 1:336-44.

Quandt, Richard E. 1974. A Stochastic Model of Elections in Two-Party Systems. *Journal of the American Statistical Association,* 69:315-24.

Rae, Douglas W. 1971. *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Sankoff, David, and Koula Mellos. 1972. The Swing Ratio and Game Theory. *American Political Science Review,* 66:551-54.

Sartori, Giovanni. 1968. Representational Systems. *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* vol. 13. New York: Macmillan & Free Press.

Schrodt, Philip A. 1981. A Statistical Study of the Cube Law in Five Electoral Systems. *Political Methodology,* 7:31-54.

Taagepera, Rein. 1972. The Size of National Assemblies. *Social Science Research,* 1:385-401.

Taagepera, Rein. 1973. Seats and Votes: A Generalization of the Cube Law of Elections. *Social Science Research,* 2:257-75.

Taagepera, Rein. 1984. Effect of District Magnitude and Properties of Two-Seat Districts. In Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman, eds., *Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives.* New York: Praeger, 91-101.

Taagepera, Rein, and Markku Laakso. 1980. Proportionality Profiles of West European Electoral Systems. *European Journal of Political Research,* 8:423-46.

Theil, Henri. 1969. The Desired Political Entropy. *American Political Science Review,* 63:521-25.

Theil, Henri. 1970. The Cube Law Revisited. *Journal of American Statistical Association,* 65:1213-19.

Tufte, Edward R. 1973. The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems. *American Political Science Review,* 67:540-47.

Vick, Alan J. 1979. Proportionality Profiles of the United States Congress: 1910-1970. Unpublished manuscript.

Rein Taagepera is Professor, School of Social Sciences, University of California-Irvine, Irvine, CA 92717.

A PARTISAN SCHEMA FOR POLITICAL INFORMATION PROCESSING

MILTON LODGE
State University of New York
Stony Brook

RUTH HAMILL
Frank N. Magid Associates
Marion, Iowa

Based on their interest in politics and knowledge of political leaders, individuals are classified into three levels of partisan sophistication: (1) those scoring high in interest and knowledge (partisan schematics), (2) a middle group, and (3) those scoring low (partisan aschematics). In this experimental study, and consistent with findings from cognitive and social psychology, partisan schematics prove better able than partisan aschematics to classify campaign statements as either Republican or Democratic and to recall the policy stands taken by a fictitious congressman. Aschematics, at the other extreme, perform at no better than chance levels in either the recognition or recall of the congressman's policy statements. There are, however, liabilities to sophistication as well: Schematics demonstrate a "consistency bias" in recalling significantly more policy statements that are consistent with the congressman's party identification than are inconsistent with it. This "restructuring" of memory is especially pronounced among sophisticates, and reflects a serious bias in the processing of political information.

Few topics in the literature on political behavior have generated as much research and subsequent controversy as the concept of political sophistication. Virtually every descriptive statement about the political behavior of citizens must be qualified by their "level" of information, and all attempts to model behavior introduce one or another measure of political interest, knowledge, or experience as a control or intervening variable. The reasons for this are well documented: one's prior knowledge about some particular domain influences what one sees and remembers, and how one interprets reality.

Confronted with a blizzard of facts, figures, and images from which political impressions are formed and judgments made, the individual must of necessity impose some perspective on the world to make it comprehensible. An effective cognitive framework allows the citizen selectively to attend to some stimuli and disregard others, to group together otherwise disparate bits and bytes of information, to store in memory a representation of this information, and then to retrieve it

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 80 NO. 2 JUNE, 1986

when making decisions. Such memory structures—whether called "pictures in our heads" (Lippmann, 1922), "conceptual maps" (Axelrod, 1973), "frames" (Minsky, 1975), "scripts" (Schank and Abelson, 1977), or "schemas" (Bartlett, 1932; Neisser, 1976)—provide a "judgmental yardstick" (Converse, 1964) for the organization of information in memory.

The cognitive sciences have made significant progress in recent years using the schema concept to develop and test models of human information processing (Rumelhart and Ortony, 1977; Simon, 1980; Taylor and Crocker, 1981). Rather than review the extensive literature on schema functioning (see Alba and Hasher, 1983; Hastie, 1980, 1985; Wyer and Srull, 1984), let us simply summarize those findings that relate most directly to social cognition (Fiske and Taylor, 1984) and, by implication, to political cognition (Lau and Sears, 1985). Schemas have been found to:

1. provide categories for labeling people, places, events, and processes;
2. facilitate the chunking or grouping of information into larger, more meaningful, and more easily retrievable categories;
3. influence what information will be attended to, encoded, and retrieved from memory;
4. facilitate the recognition, recall, and ease of retrieval of schema-relevant information;
5. enable the individual to make inferences from incomplete data by filling in missing information with schema-consistent best guesses;
6. provide a basis for making more confident decisions and predictions; and
7. influence the weighting of evidence brought to bear in making decisions and evaluating probabilities.

Just as schemas vary in scope and complexity, citizens differ in their ability to use them effectively (Fiske and Kinder, 1981; Graber, 1984; Kinder, 1983; Lau, Coulam, and Sears, 1983; Thorson and McKeever, 1983). The cognitive literature classifies those individuals who have established knowledge structures about a particular domain as *schematics,* while those who have not developed an elaborated knowledge structure—whether for lack of interest, ability, or experience—are said to be *aschematics* (Markus, 1977). The breadth and depth of one's factual and associational knowledge about a particular sphere of interest is the hallmark of schema theory, and what discriminates the concept *schema* from *belief system* (Abelson, 1979).

Theoretically, whatever the domain, differences between how schematics and aschematics process information should be profound. In political cognition, as in social cognition, knowledge matters—it affects how new information is interpreted and used to guide behavior (Conover and Feldman, 1984; Lodge and Hamill, 1983). In politics as in other human endeavors (Markus and Smith, 1981), expertise is acquired by exposure and practice. From this cognitive perspective, the principal indicators of sophistication are an individual's *domain-specific* interest, experience, and knowledge.

The application of schema theory to political information processing is, unfortunately, neither simple nor direct, as the cognitive sciences have focused almost exclusively on knowledge structures central to the individual and pertinent to daily life. Politics, however, encompasses a much wider domain of information and behavior than is commonly studied in psychology, and for many people—perhaps for all but a handful—the political world has a less perceptible impact on their lives than does, say, their occupation. Given these significant dissimilarities, we cannot be confident that schemas will have the same cognitive consequences on political thinking as do the social schemas traditionally studied in psychology. This being the case, the basic question to be asked is, Do the same patterns of facilitation effects and liabilities found in the cognitive literature for how "experts" process information in nonpolitical domains hold for the processing of political information by political sophisticates?

We start with the assumption that there is no single, overarching "schema about politics"—that in all likelihood there are many distinct ways to think about government and politics and oneself as a citizen (Campbell et al., 1960; Conover and Feldman, 1981; Hamill, Lodge, and Blake, 1985; Lau, 1985; Miller, 1985; Stimson, 1975). One could, for instance, see and interpret information about government and politics in terms of political parties and partisan conflicts, or, perhaps, organize one's thinking about politics along ideological lines. Other schemas are possible as well. One could—apparently some people do—think about politics as race against race, or, like Marx, see policy disputes as the expression of class conflicts. Each of these frameworks, as well as others, no doubt, is a potentially viable way of organizing information about government and politics, and would produce distinct patterns of evaluations and action.

By all counts, only a minority of citizens—probably no more than 25%—use the concepts *liberal* and *conservative* to organize their political beliefs along ideological lines (Bennett, 1977; Conover and Feldman, 1981; Kinder, 1983; Knight, 1983; Levitan and Miller, 1979; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, 1976), even when sophisticated methods are used to reduce measurement error and model issue preferences (Erikson, 1979; Marcus and Converse, 1979; Norpoth and Lodge, 1985).

As suggested in *The American Voter* (Campbell et al., 1960), a simpler and perhaps more readily accessible political schema available to the average citizen would be one based on the perception of partisan differences (Bastedo and Lodge, 1980; Conover and Feldman, 1985; Gant and Luttbeg, 1984; Lau, 1985; Sharp and Lodge, 1985). For citizens with the conceptual wherewithal to structure contemporary politics this way, there would be meaningful distinctions between the policies that Republican and Democratic leaders prototypically espouse. We begin then by discriminating partisan schematics from aschematics. Given that expertise is acquired through domain-specific interest and experience, our operational measurement of partisan sophistication is an index of the individual's interest in, experience with, and knowledge of the Republican and Democratic parties.

Predictably, *partisan schematics* will demonstrate the same kinds of facilitation and liability effects when processing political information as do schematics in other areas of social cognition when dealing with schema-relevant information. To test for this general effect on political thinking, we investigate two of the most critically important aspects of information processing: the recognition and recall of schema-relevant information. The starting point is categorization, thought to be the most basic act of human information processing and the organizing principle of semantic memory (Rosch, 1975). To deal effectively with the barrage of information impinging on individuals in their everyday lives, categorization provides a method for grouping discrete bits of information into a meaningful cognitive structure that in turn facilitates the retrieval of information from memory, which is then used to guide behavior. These memory processes require that the individual be able initially to categorize and organize incoming information. This leads to the first, most basic hypothesis:

> Partisan schematics will more accu- (i)

> rately categorize party-relevant information than will aschematics.

Next we examine the effects of a partisan schema on memory per se—here specifically, the recall of policy positions taken by a Republican or Democratic leader. While much of the social cognition research on schema functioning demonstrates facilitory effects on information processing, there are liabilities as well: Schemas generate expectations that have been shown to produce a variety of systematic errors in recognition, recall, and decision making (Taylor and Crocker, 1981). Based on such evidence for the processing of nonpolitical information, we hypothesize that

②

> Schematics will remember more information that is consistent with their partisan schema than will aschematics.

We then test for evidence of a systematic bias in recall such that

③

> Schematics will remember more schema-consistent than schema-inconsistent information.

In addition to exploring these basic effects culled from the cognitive literature, we systematically control for variables of particular importance in political behavior research—here specifically, the impact of party identification, educational level, cognitive ability, and self-identification as a liberal, moderate, or conservative on the processing of political information. While each of these factors is likely to influence the categorization and recall of political information, the individual's level of sophistication is expected to be the more powerful mechanism in guiding the processing of political information.

Method

A nonprobability sample of 603 residents of Long Island, New York, was interviewed in the fall of 1982.[1] As diagrammed in Table 1, this experimental study proceeded in four stages.

Stage 1: Questionnaire

Embedded in a conventional survey questionnaire were 12 questions drawn from the interview schedules of the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center which we used to measure partisan sophistication: 6 questions tapping interest in parties and elections, and 6 knowledge questions asking the subject to classify political leaders—Barry Goldwater, Tip O'Neill, Harry Truman, Howard Baker, Jack Kemp, and Claiborne Pell—as Republican or Democrat.[2] Correct answers were given a score of 1, incorrect and "don't know" responses a score of 0. Correlated at $r = .55$, the interest and partisan knowledge indices were combined into an additive index of partisan sophistication, which was then trichotomized to create three levels of expertise: the bottom third labelled *aschematics* ($n = 197$), the top third *schematics* ($n = 190$), and a middle group ($n = 197$).

Stage 2: Categorization of the Policy Statements and Experimental Manipulations

The policy statements used in this study were culled from the 1980 Republican and Democratic party platforms; from major campaign speeches by Reagan, Bush, Carter, and Mondale reprinted in *The New York Times*; and from preelection summaries of each candidate's policy positions published in *Time*, *Newsweek*, *U.S. News and World Report*, and the major Long Island newspaper, *Newsday*. In all, 160 policy positions on the economy, energy, the environment, military spending, and social issues were collected and then rated in a pretest by 80 college students on a seven-point category scale labeled *Republican* at one end and *Demo-*

Table 1. Experimental Design

	Condition				
Tasks and Procedures	Republican Group	Democrat Group	Importance Republican Group	Importance Democrat Group	Control Condition
Stage 1: Questionnaire					
Political Interest Political Activities Demographics Recognition of Leaders	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Stage 2: Categorization of Policies					
Partisan Mix of Policies	30 Rep; 10 Dem	30 Dem; 10 Rep	30 Rep; 10 Dem	30 Dem; 10 Rep	50 Rep; 50 Dem
Type of Judgment	Rep v. Dem	Rep v. Dem	Imp v. Unimp	Imp v. Unimp	Rep v. Dem
Stage 3: Distractor Task					
Civil Service Vocabulary Test	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Stage 4: Recognition of Policies					
Partisan Mix of Policies	10 "Old" Rep	10 "Old" Rep	10 "Old" Rep	10 "Old" Rep	None
	10 "Old" Dem	10 "Old" Dem	10 "Old" Dem	10 "Old" Dem	None
	10 "New" Rep	10 "New" Rep	10 "New" Rep	10 "New" Rep	None
	10 "New" Dem	10 "New" Dem	10 "New" Dem	10 "New" Dem	None
Type of Judgment:					
"Did Congressman Williams make this policy statement?"	Yes/No	Yes/No	Yes/No	Yes/No	None
Number of Cases	170	167	84	85	81

crat at the other. The 100 statements judged in the pretest as most characteristic of the Republican or Democratic parties were selected for use in the actual field study.

Experimental Session. Subjects were told they were taking part in a larger project whose aim was to design a campaign booklet giving voters information about the policy positions of their representatives in Congress. Approximately one-seventh of the sample was randomly assigned to the control group ($n = 81$), which characterized as Republican or Democratic the 100 statements used in all the subsequent experimental conditions and phases of the study. This task served as a reliability check to determine the extent to which the 100 policy statements were consensually defined by the sample as characteristic of the Republican or Democratic parties, and allowed us to determine if a schema effect is evident in the simple categorization of policies. Schematics should, predictably, be more accurate than aschematics in the categorization of the policy statements along the partisan dimension, *if* our measure of partisan sophistication is valid, and *if* the distinction between Republican and Democratic policy positions represents a meaningful category boundary.

As detailed in Table 1, the remaining 506 subjects were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions. Each subject read a short "biography" of a fictitious "Congressman Williams" from New York State, who was described as a life-long partisan and party leader; half the subjects were told he was a Republican, and the other half that he was a Democrat. All experimental subjects then read 40 policy statements attributed to the congressman. For the 254 subjects told that Congressman Williams was a Republican, 30 of the policies had been judged in the pretest as being characteristic of the Republican Party, and 10 were judged inconsistent—that is, selected from the set of policies associated with the Democratic Party. For the 252 subjects told that the congressman was a Democrat, the mix of policies was reversed—75% Democratic, 25% Republican.

An example of a policy consistent with the Republican party label is "Congressman Williams calls for major cuts in federal spending on social programs," whereas an inconsistent Republican policy stand is "Congressman Williams favors federal government programs to create more jobs." To assess possible differences in the perceived importance of the policies, which could well affect the recall of information, subjects in the two other experimental conditions rated each policy statement in terms of its national importance. Neither the Republican/Democratic statements nor the consistent/inconsistent items were found to differ in rated importance.

Stage 3: Vocabulary Test

After reading Congressman Williams' biographical sketch and categorizing his policy positions, subjects in the control group and in all four experimental groups completed a 38-item muliple-choice version of the 1975 Civil Service Commission Vocabulary Test. In addition to its value as a distractor task between the categorization (Stage 2) and the upcoming recall (Stage 4) phases of this experiment, the obtained test score provides a direct measure of each subject's verbal ability and, given a positive correlation between vocabulary and general I.Q. test scores, a surrogate measure of cognitive ability.

Stage 4: The Recognition of Policy Statements

Following the 10-minute vocabulary test, all experimental subjects participated in an unexpected recognition task. Forty policy statements were presented, half of them "old" statements—that is, policy statements actually made by Congressman Williams in the earlier categorization phase of the study. Of these "old" statements, 10 were selected from the set of policies consistent with the Congressman's party label, and 10 were inconsistent. The other 20 statements were all new items—policies not previously presented in the campaign booklet, 10 of which were consistent with the Congressman's party label, and 10 inconsistent. Experimental subjects were to decide for each statement whether Congressman Williams actually stated this policy position in the campaign booklet, indicating their decision on a seven-point scale ranging from 1, "Definitely Yes, he said that" to 7, "Definitely No, he did *not* say that."

The literature on human information processing predicts that schematics are more likely than aschematics to "remember" information consistent with their schema, whether it was actually present in the message or not. Those policies consistent with Congressman Williams's partisan affiliation and actually presented in the booklet ("old consistent") will, predictably, produce higher levels of accurate recall by schematics than aschematics. On the other hand, those schema-consistent policy statements never presented in the original message ("new consistent") should produce a relatively high rate of false recall in the memory task. Because schematics are attuned, for example, to the policy positions of the prototypical "Democrat," then even when a Democratic congressman does not actually make a campaign promise supporting, say, increased federal spending for education, schematics may erroneously attribute such schema-consistent statements to him. A consistency bias would be evidenced by subjects attributing "new consistent" policies to the congressman and recalling more of his "old consistent" than "old inconsistent" policy positions. According to the cognitive literature, schematics are especially prone to this type of consistency bias.

Relatedly, schematics should, in all likelihood, be able to reject "new inconsistent" policy statements, since such policy statements do not fit with their expectations of partisanship. The evidence concerning the recognition and recall of inconsistent information is, however, mixed, with some researchers concluding that because schema-inconsistent information is "out of character" it is more memorable, while others find that inconsistent information is processed less fully and therefore forgotten more easily (Hastie, 1980). In contrast to the differential effects expected for schematics, aschematics will, predictably, perform at about chance levels for all types of policy statements.

Results

Categorization

The first question raised concerns the ability of sophisticates and unsophisticates to categorize correctly the policy statements as representative of the Republican or Democratic parties. Recall that the 81 subjects randomly assigned to the control group were asked to rate all 100 policies on a seven-point scale along the Republican-Democrat dimension.[3] Eighty-eight of the 100 policy statements were judged by a majority of the control group as being characteristic of either the Republican or Democratic parties. These consensually defined policies are treated here as bona fide partisan policy statements. The 12 statements that did not meet this consensus criterion were eliminated from all further analyses.

First we analyzed the categorical judgments of the control group for evidence of a sophistication effect. Consensual responses—those matching the majority opinion—were coded as correct and assigned a score of 1, whereas incorrect and "not sure" answers were scored 0. For each subject the percentage of items correctly categorized was calculated and submitted to a one-way analysis of variance with level of sophistication as the independent factor. The results, presented in Table 2, show a strong schema effect ($F = 16.01$, $p < .001$), with scores increasing monotonically from a low of 54% for aschematics to 84% correct for schematics. Scheffe contrasts reliably differentiate each of the three levels of sophistication.

One alternative explanation for the differences in accurate categorization among the three groups is that partisan schematics, blessed with more verbal ability than aschematics, find the categorization of policy statements an easier task. The research design allowed us to examine this possibility using each subject's score on the vocabulary test. A median split on the vocabulary index produces six subject groups: high and low verbal ability crossed with the three schema groups. Table 3 reports the two-way ANOVA that includes both level of verbal ability and level of sophistication as factors. Although there is a main effect for verbal ability ($F = 6.5$, $p < .01$), the sophistica-

Table 2. Categorization of 88 Policy Items as Republican or Democrat by Schema Level for Control Group Subjects

Schema Level	Mean % Correct	Number of Cases
Aschematics	54.2	30
Middle	67.8	26
Schematics	83.8	25
$F = 16.01$; $p < .001$		

Note: Scheffe contrasts are significant for each of the paired comparisons at the .02 level or better.

tion effect is maintained ($F = 11.1$, $p < .001$). Within each level of verbal ability, partisan sophisticates score higher than the middle group, who in turn do better than unsophisticates. While verbal ability enhances performance, schematics consistently outperform aschematics, regardless of their vocabulary scores.

Several other analyses were performed to check for the impact of other factors that might mitigate the strength of schema effects. First, performance was compared for Democratic versus Republican policy statements. Although accuracy of categorization was slightly higher for the Republican items (68.4% vs. 66.1%, $p < .05$), the same monotonic pattern of schema effects as described above holds: Schematics outperform subjects in the middle group, who in turn are more accurate than aschematics in categorizing the policy statements as characteristic of the Republican or Democratic parties. Respondents were also classified according to their party identification, but no differences in categorization accuracy were found for Republicans, Independents, or Democrats. Similarly, whether an individual is a liberal, conservative, or moderate does not affect performance on this basic recognition task.

We now turn to test for schema and type-of-item context effects on the categorization of policies by the two experimental groups that evaluated the policy statements made by Congressman Williams along the Republican-Democrat dimension. Table 4 presents the percentage of consistent and inconsistent policies categorized correctly. Here again, level of sophistication exerts a significant impact on the categorization of both schema-consistent and schema-inconsistent information. As sophistica-

Table 3. Two-way ANOVA for Correct Categorization of 88 Policy Items as Republican or Democrat by Schema Level for Control Group Subjects

	Analysis of Variance		
Source	*df*	*F*	Significance
Schema	2	11.1	$p < .001$
Verbal ability	1	6.5	$p < .01$
Interaction	2	.77	n.s.[a]
Error	75		
Total	80		

[a] Not significant.

Table 4. Categorization of Consistent and Inconsistent Policy Statements as Republican or Democrat by Schema Level for Combined Experimental Groups

Schema Level	Mean % Correct: Consistent Items	Mean % Correct: Inconsistent Items	t-ratio	Significance	Number of Cases
Aschematics	43.4	37.6	2.88	$p < .005$	109
Middle	65.7	59.4	3.24	$p < .002$	110
Schematics	75.8	70.7	2.93	$p < .001$	118
Total	62.0	56.3	5.23	$p < .001$	
	$F = 62.9$; $p < .001$	$F = 45.1$; $p < .001$			

Note: All comparisons of group means for both consistent and inconsistent items differ at the .001 level or better.

tion increases from low to high, so does accuracy in categorization.

The results in Table 4 for experimental subjects provide strong support for the most basic hypothesis: Partisan sophistication facilitates the categorization of public policies. In the control group as well as in the Republican and Democratic experimental conditions, and for both consistent and inconsistent policy statements, the scores reliably order such that sophisticates outperform the middle group, which in turn outperforms the aschematics. Note too, for future reference, telltale evidence of a bias in information processing, as our sample of subjects proves better able to categorize the schema-consistent than schema-inconsistent policy positions of the congressman ($t = 5.23$, $p < .001$).

The two-way ANOVAs reported in Table 5 show the effect of both the schema

Table 5. Two-way ANOVAs for Correct Categorization of Consistent and Inconsistent Policy Statements as Republican and Democrat by Schema Level and Verbal Ability for Combined Experimental Groups

Source	Analysis of Variance: df	F	Significance
Consistent Items			
Schema	2	54.81	$p < .001$
Verbal ability	1	11.28	$p < .001$
Interaction	2	.04	n.s.[a]
Error	331		
Total	336		
Inconsistent Items			
Schema	2	38.92	$p < .001$
Verbal ability	1	9.31	$p < .002$
Interaction	2	.59	n.s.
Error	331		
Total	336		

[a] Not significant.

and verbal ability factors on the recognition of consistent and inconsistent policy items. For both kinds of policy statements, verbal ability produces a significant enhancing effect, but the impact of sophistication is greater than that of verbal ability. All in all, these results provide evidence that the pattern of schema effects routinely found in the social cognition literature for the categorization of nonpolitical information holds true for the processing of political information as well.

The Recall of Policy Positions

The second and most important concern of this study focuses on the citizen's ability to recall accurately the policy positions voiced by a political leader. Keep in mind that in the final phase of the experiment subjects were presented with 40 policy statements, half of which were policy stands actually taken by Congressman Williams in the booklet and half of which were new policy statements. Of the 20 old policy statements, 10 were consistent and 10 inconsistent with the congressman's partisan label, just as 10 of the new policy statements were consistent and 10 inconsistent. Responses were coded as correct if the subject answered "Yes, Congressman Williams said that" to an old item which was actually presented in the booklet, or answered "No, he did not make that policy statement" to a new item. All correct answers received a score of 1, all incorrect and "don't know" answers a 0.

Here we are interested in two types of effects known to influence decision making: a sophistication effect and a type-of-item context effect. Based on the social cognition literature, we fully expect that, overall, schematics will be more accurate than aschematics in determining whether a policy statement was or was not actually made by the congressman. However, this advantage should only hold for schema-consistent policies. Predictably, a well-developed schema will facilitate the recall of old policies that are consistent with their partisan schema, as well as help sophisticates reject—that is, say "no" to —new policies that are inconsistent with their schematic expectations. However—and this is the key point—the social cognition literature routinely finds that there are also serious liabilities to sophistication. To the extent that partisan sophisticates are like schematics in other domains, they will find it difficult to discriminate new from old consistent information, since schema-consistent policy statements are compatible with their expectations about what type of public policies Republicans and Democrats characteristically favor or oppose. Aschematics, on the other hand, lacking a well-developed partisan schema, should evidence neither facilitory effects nor strong biases, but poor performance throughout.

Table 6 reports the percentage of policy statements correctly recalled by each level of sophistication. Focusing first on the test for schema effects, we find differential rates of accurate recall by level of partisan sophistication: For all types of policy statements combined, schematics correctly recall significantly more policy statements overall than do aschematics. The schematic group averages 60.3% correct recall, the middle group 53.4%, followed by the aschematics, who do no better than chance (49.7% correct). A type-of-item effect on the recognition of policy information can be examined when the scores are broken down for each of the four distinct types of policies.

A schema effect is evident for three of the four types of policies. For the "old consistent," "new consistent" and "new inconsistent" policy statements, the levels of sophistication fall into the expected order: aschematics exhibit the poorest performance, the middle group performs better, and schematics demonstrate the most accurate recall. For the "old incon-

Table 6. Mean Percentage of Correct Recall of All Types of Policy Statements by Schema Level

	Policy Statement				
Schema Level	Old Consistent[a]	Old Inconsistent	New Consistent	New Inconsistent	Number of Cases
Aschematics	57.2	50.1	43.3	48.0	167
Middle	62.4	50.3	45.5	55.5	171
Schematics	69.0	49.9	54.1	68.3	165
Total	62.9	50.1	47.6	57.2	503
	$F=9.2$; $p < .001$	n.s.[b]	$F=5.09$; $p < .01$	$F=16.6$; $p < .001$	

[a]For Old Inconsistent items, group means differ at the .02 level or better.
[b]Not significant.

sistent" items, none of the schema groups do better than chance—a consequence, we believe, of different factors. The inability of sophisticates to recall "old inconsistent" items is a liability of their partisan schema. Given the avowed partisanship of Congressman Williams, schematics tend to forget 50% of his inconsistent statements, while remembering 69% of his consistent policies. Conversely, the failure of aschematics to recognize "old inconsistent" information is in keeping with their general inability to use partisanship as an organizing principle for processing political information. The low schema group produces recognition scores at chance levels for all types of items. They apparently see the Republican and Democratic parties as Tweedledee and Tweedledum.

Considering just the "old" items in Table 6—those policies the congressman actually took a stand on in the campaign booklet—we again find evidence of a "consistency" bias. Whereas all subjects are likely to recognize correctly more consistent than inconsistent policies, this tendency is especially pronounced for schematics. A similar pattern of bias also emerges from the analysis of new information, in which political sophisticates err significantly less often than do aschematics when processing inconsistent information about the policy stands of the congressman.

Facilitation effects of sophistication on political information processing are most clearly evident in the high rate of correct recall for "old consistent" and "new inconsistent" policies, while the liability of schematic processing shows up most strongly in the relatively low rates of recall for "old inconsistent" and "new consistent" policies.

Table 7 presents two-way ANOVAs for schema level and verbal ability for the percentage of old and new consistent and inconsistent policy statements recalled correctly. As is evident from these analyses, both schema level and verbal ability influence recall. For three of the four types of policies—"old consistent," "new consistent," and "new inconsistent"—verbal ability enhances recall, but once again the schema effect is maintained.

A summary measure of accurate recall can be computed by comparing the number of "hits" to "false alarms" in the recall of each type of policy. *Hits* refers to identifying correctly as "old," statements actually presented in the campaign booklet, whereas *false alarms* refer to responses of "Yes, he said that" to statements the congressman never made. False

Table 7. Two-way ANOVAs for Correct Recall of All Types of Policy Statements by Schema Level and Verbal Ability

	Analysis of Variance		
Source	*df*	*F*	Significance
Old Consistent Items			
Schema	2	6.27	$p < .002$
Verbal ability	1	11.50	$p < .001$
Interaction	2	.12	n.s.[a]
Error	497		
Total	502		
Old Inconsistent Items			
Schema	2	0.043	n.s.
Verbal ability	1	0.185	n.s.
Interaction	2	1.14	n.s.
Error	497		
Total	502		
New Consistent Items			
Schema	2	2.76	$p < .06$
Verbal ability	1	12.08	$p < .001$
Interaction	2	1.08	n.s.
Error	497		
Total	502		
New Inconsistent Items			
Schema	2	11.80	$p < .001$
Verbal ability	1	15.60	$p < .001$
Interaction	2	0.131	n.s.
Error	497		
Total	502		

[a]Not significant.

alarm scores are obtained by subtracting the percentage of policy statements correctly recalled from 100. Then, by subtracting the false alarm score from the hit score, a measure of accuracy corrected for guessing is obtained. Scores near zero indicate relatively equal numbers of correct responses and errors—presumably a consequence of random responding—while positive scores reflect the ability to differentiate between information that was presented and information that was not. Table 8 tallies the accuracy scores by schema level, separately for consistent and inconsistent items.

The low schema group produces mean scores indistinguishable from zero for both the consistent and inconsistent types of policies (.50 and -1.90), thereby confirming predictions of their chance performance, while the middle and high groups exhibit increasingly greater accuracy scores (7.90 and 5.50 for the middle group, and 23.10 and 18.23 for schematics), thus confirming the hypothesis that politically sophisticated individuals have a memory structure which facilitates the storage and retrieval of schema-relevant information.

A number of breakdowns of the recall scores were examined using both schema level and verbal ability as factors to com-

Table 8. Hits Minus False Alarms for the 40 Policy Statements by Item Type and Schema Level

Schema Level	Consistent	Inconsistent
Aschematics	0.50	-1.90
Middle	7.90	5.50
Schematics	23.10	18.20

pare the Republican versus Democratic conditions, one's ideological persuasion as a liberal, moderate, or conservative, and self-identification as a Republican, Democrat, or Independent. The pattern of results is consistent within each comparison: Schematics—whatever their party identification or ideological leaning—prove better able to recall the policy statements of a political leader more accurately than do aschematics, but, more interestingly, show clear evidence of consistency bias. Aschematics, on the other hand, whether Republicans or Democrats, liberals or conservatives, do poorly across the board.

Conclusion

Viewing the individual as an active information processor focuses attention on how citizens seek out, take in, organize, and act upon information given their prior knowledge structures. The pattern of results obtained in this study parallel those found in the cognitive literature for the processing of non-political information: Information processing is dynamic, at least for sophisticates, who are not passive collectors of information, but, rather, active "hypothesis testers" whose prior knowledge about political parties generates expectations that oftentimes help but at other times hinder their ability to deal with schema-relevant information.

In this experimental study, we find that partisan schematics outperform aschematics in the recognition and recall of policy statements. That schematics can accurately categorize policy positions as Republican or Democratic, even when the statement is inconsistent with the spokesman's partisan label, attests to the strength of their sophistication. The discriminatory power of schematics contrasts sharply with that of aschematics, who, if they are willing to hazard a guess, are likely to assume the congressman's policy position probably is consistent with his partisan label. Similarly, Fiske, Kinder, and Larter (1983) found that novices—like our aschematics—processed political information in a very simplistic way, relying on stereotypes, whereas experts—akin to our schematics—were more likely to recognize schema-inconsistent information.

The more interesting substantive findings of this experiment relate schema level to the recall of policy statements. Here again, the pattern of the facilitation and liability effects of sophistication on political information processing confirms predictions derived from the cognitive literature. Aschematics conform to Converse's (1975) description of the poorly informed voter who confronts a new political message "with next to no past information at all, . . . it is just more political blather: in five minutes he will not remember that he heard such a statement, much less be able to reconstruct what was said" (p. 97). In this experiment the time between the presentation of the policy statements and their recall was 10 minutes, by which time the congressman's policy positions were indeed a blur, even among those aschematics with higher levels of verbal ability.

Although partisan schematics prove to be rather effective processors of political information, they show clear evidence of stereotypy by remembering significantly more of the schematically consistent than inconsistent policy statements made by the congressman. Partisan schematics systematically distort the congressman's stance on the issues by imposing more schematic order on his policy positions than was actually present in the campaign message. This "restructuring" of memory, as distinct from veridical memory of the actual mix of consistent and inconsistent information in the campaign booklet, reflects a serious bias in the processing of political information. The "simple act" of labeling a congressman as a Republican or Democrat systematically affects what information about the candidate will be stored in memory and what information will later be available for informing one's evaluations.

Notes

This research was funded by the National Science Foundation, Grant No. SES8025069. We thank Kyu No and David Moskowitz for their assistance.

1. Relative to national averages our sample is overly representative of males (51%), whites (97%), the educated (67% above high school) and those with high income (70% reporting $20,000 a year), but more fairly approximates Long Islanders.

2. Several questions determining the level of participation in conventional electoral activities were included in the questionnaire. However, because subjects in this sample, like the national population, do little beyond voting, measures of participation did not correlate highly with either interest or knowledge. Therefore, activity scores were not included in our sophistication index.

3. A list of the 100 policy statements used in this study with the percentage of "Republican," "Democrat," and "Don't Know" responses is available from the Laboratory for Behavioral Research, SUNY at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY 11794.

References

Abelson, Robert. 1979. Differences between Belief and Knowledge Systems. *Cognitive Science*, 3:355–66.

Alba, J. W., and Lynn Hasher. 1983. Is Memory Schematic? *Psychological Bulletin*, 93:203–31.

Axelrod, Robert. 1973. Schema Theory: An Information Processing Model of Perception and Cognition. *American Political Science Review*, 67:1248–66.

Bartlett, Frederick. 1932. *Remembering*. London: Cambridge University Press.

Bastedo, Ralph, and Milton Lodge. 1980. The Meaning of Party Labels. *Political Behavior*, 2:287–308.

Bennett, W. Lance. 1977. The Growth of Knowledge in Mass Belief Systems: An Epistemological Critique. *American Journal of Political Science*, 21:363–400.

Campbell, Angus, Phillip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York: Wiley.

Conover, Pamela, and Stanley Feldman. 1981. The Origins and Meaning of Liberal/Conservative Self-Identification. *American Journal of Political Science*, 25:617–45.

Conover, Pamela, and Stanley Feldman. 1984. How People Organize the Political World: A Schematic Model. *American Journal of Political Science*, 28:95–126.

Conover, Pamela, and Stanley Feldman. 1985. The Role of Inference in the Perception of Political Candidates. In *Political Cognition*. *See* Lau and Sears, 1985.

Converse, Phillip E. 1964. The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. In David Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent*. New York: Free Press.

Converse, Phillip E. 1975. Public Opinion and Voting Behavior. In Frederick Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 4. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Erikson, Robert S. 1979. The SRC Panel Data and Mass Political Attitudes. *British Journal of Political Science*, 9:89–114.

Fiske, Susan, and Donald Kinder. 1981. Involvement, Expertise and Schema Use: Evidence from Political Cognition. In Nancy Cantor and John Kihlstrom, eds., *Personality, Cognition and Social Interaction*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Fiske, Susan, and Shelley Taylor. 1984. *Social Cognition*. New York: Addison-Wesley.

Fiske, Susan, Donald Kinder, and W. Michael Larter. 1983. The Novice and the Expert: Knowledge-Based Strategies in Political Cognition. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 19: 381–400.

Gant, Michael, and Norman Luttbeg. 1984. Mental Economy and Voter Rationality: The Informed

Citizen Problem in Voting Research. *Journal of Politics*, 46:132–53.

Graber, Doris. 1984. *Processing the News.* New York: Longman.

Hamill, Ruth, Milton Lodge, and Frederick Blake. 1985. The Breadth, Depth and Utility of Partisan, Class and Ideological Schemas. *American Journal of Political Science*, 29:850–70.

Hastie, Reid. 1980. Schematic Principles in Human Memory. In Nancy Cantor and John Kihlstrom, eds., *Personality, Cognition, and Social Interaction.* Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Hastie, Reid. 1985. A Primer of Information Theory for the Political Scientist. In *Political Cognition. See* Lau and Sears, 1985.

Kinder, Donald. 1983. Diversity and Complexity in American Politics. In Ada Finifter, ed., *The State of the Discipline.* Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association.

Knight, Kathleen. 1983. Ideology in the 1980 Election: Sophistication Matter. Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

Lau, Richard. 1985. Political Schemas, Candidate Evaluations, and Voting Behavior. In *Political Cognition. See* Lau and Sears, 1985.

Lau, Richard, and David Sears, eds. 1985. *Political Cognition.* Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Lau, Richard, Robert Coulam, and David Sears. 1983. Proposition 2½ in Massachusetts: Self-Interest, Anti-Government Attitudes and Political Schemas. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

Levitan, Teresa, and Warren Miller. 1979. Ideological Interpretations of Presidential Elections. *American Political Science Review*, 73:751–71.

Lippmann, Walter. 1922. *Public Opinion.* New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovitch.

Lodge, Milton, and Ruth Hamill. 1983. Some Experimental Effects of Ideological Sophistication on the Processing of political Information. Report No. 19, Laboratory for Behavioral Research, Department of Political Science, SUNY at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY 11794.

Marcus, Greg, and Phillip Converse. 1979. A Dynamic Simultaneous Equation Model of Electoral Choice. *American Political Science Review*, 73:1055–70.

Markus, Helen. 1977. Self-Schemata and Processing Information about the Self. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 35:63–78.

Markus, Helen, and Joseph Smith. 1981. The Influence of Self-Schemas on the Perception of Others. In Nancy Cantor and John Kihlstrom, eds., *Personality, Cognition, and Social Interaction.* Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Miller, Arthur. 1985. Information Processing and Political Candidates. In *Political Cognition. See* Lau and Sears, 1985.

Minsky, Marvin. 1975. A Framework for Representing Knowledge. In Patrick A. Winston, ed., *The Psychology of Computer Vision.* New York: McGraw-Hill.

Neisser, Ulric. 1976. *Cognition and Reality: Principles and Implications of Cognitive Psychology.* San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company.

Nie, Norman, Sidney Verba, and John Petrocik. 1976. *The Changing American Vote.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Norpoth, Helmut, and Milton Lodge. 1985. The Difference between Attitudes and Nonattitudes in the Mass Public: Just Measurement? *American Journal of Political Science*, 29:291–307.

Rosch, Eleanor. 1975. Cognitive Representations of Semantic Categories. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, 104:192–233.

Rumelhart, David, and Andrew Ortony. 1977. The Representation of Knowledge in Memory. In John Anderson, R. Spiro and W. E. Montague, eds., *Schooling and the Acquisition of Knowledge.* Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Schank, Roger, and Robert Abelson. 1977. *Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding: An Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures.* Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Sharp, Carol, and Milton Lodge. 1985. Partisan and Ideological Belief Systems: Do They Differ? *Political Behavior*, 7:147–66.

Simon, Herbert S. 1980. Behavioral and Social Sciences. *Science*, 209:72–78.

Stimson, James A. 1975. Belief Systems: Constraint, Complexity, and the 1972 Election. *American Journal of Political Science*, 19: 393–417.

Taylor, Shelley, and Jennifer Crocker. 1981. Schematic Bases of Social Information Processing. In E. T. Higgins, P. Hermann, and M. P. Zanna, eds., *The Ontario Symposium on Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 1. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Thorson, Stuart, and Mary Kay McKeever. 1983. Thematic Memory for Politics in Children. *Political Behavior*, 5:421–37.

Wyer, Robert, and Thomas Srull, eds. 1984. *Handbook of Social Cognition.* 3 vols. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Milton Lodge is Professor of Political Science, State University of New York-Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY 11794.

Ruth Hamill is a Research Analyst with Frank N. Magid Associates, Marion, IA 52302.

SCHEMATIC ASSESSMENTS OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

ARTHUR H. MILLER
University of Iowa

MARTIN P. WATTENBERG
University of California, Irvine

OKSANA MALANCHUK
Frank N. Magid Associates
Marion, Iowa

This article applies theories of social cognition in an investigation of the dimensions of the assessments of candidates employed by voters in the United States. An empirical description of the public's cognitive representations of presidential candidates, derived from responses to open-ended questions in the American National Election Studies from 1952 to 1984, reveals that perceptions of candidates are generally focused on "personality" characteristics rather than on issue concerns or partisan group connections. Contrary to the implications of past research, higher education is found to be correlated with a greater likelihood of using personality categories rather than with making issue statements. While previous models have interpreted voting on the basis of candidate personality as indicative of superficial and idiosyncratic assessments, the data examined here indicate that they predominately reflect performance-relevant criteria such as competence, integrity, and reliability. In addition, both panel and aggregate time series data suggest that the categories that voters have used in the past influence how they will perceive future candidates, implying the application of schematic judgments. The reinterpretation presented here argues that these judgments reflect a rich cognitive representation of the candidates from which instrumental inferences are made.

Candidate evaluations are one of the most important but least understood facets of American voting behavior. In a classic article, Stokes (1966) argued that "personality" characteristics, rather than issues or parties, provide the best explanation for shifts in the vote from one presidential election to the next. Moreover, subsequent research has shown that candidates have been more salient to voters than political parties since the late fifties (Kagay and Caldeira, 1975; Miller, Miller, and Schneider, 1980), and that since 1956 candidate affect has been more directly related to the vote than party attachment (Kelley and Mirer, 1974; Markus and Converse, 1979; Miller and Miller, 1976).

Yet despite the unquestioned importance of candidate evaluations, systematic theoretical and empirical research has

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 80 NO. 2 JUNE, 1986

lagged far behind that devoted to parties and issues. This may in part reflect a predominate concern among social scientists for examining rational choice theories of candidate selection. Voting on the basis of personality characteristics is often viewed in the literature as "irrational" (cf. Converse, 1964; Page, 1978). The popular cynical view of candidates is that they are attractively packaged commodities devised by image makers who manipulate the public's perceptions by emphasizing traits with special appeal to the voting audience. Voters' judgments about alternative candidates are in this view based on superficial criteria such as the candidate's style or looks.

Prior models of voting behavior have generally treated candidates as idiosyncratic, short-term forces. The model presented in *The American Voter* (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960), for example, portrayed candidate assessments as dominated by the more enduring forces of parties and issues. The attitude consistency theory underlying this model suggested that party identification acts as a perceptual screen, and that the human need for consistency results in attitudes toward less central political objects, such as candidates, being brought into harmony with party identification. Alternatively, rational choice models have argued that citizens deal with the information available for judging candidates in a piecemeal fashion, calculating overall utilities that are then employed to select the candidate optimally satisfying their self-interest (Downs, 1957; Fiorina, 1981).

perceptual screen

Doubts regarding the validity of these models of how individuals think about candidates have become increasingly frequent in recent years, however. With a decrease in the predictive power and stability of party identification, the model of *The American Voter* has been roundly criticized. In particular, many of the fundamental psychological underpinnings of the model have been questioned. The assumption, for example, that people have a need for consistency has been challenged (Kiesler, Collins, and Miller, 1969; Lau and Sears, 1985). Similarly, the notion of a perceptual screen is now seen as a rather static and limited view of cognitive processes. The metaphor of a screen focuses our attention on the acquisition of information, while ignoring its storage and retrieval from memory. In addition, while partisanship has always been a potent determinant of evaluative direction, it has never predicted the content (other than party) of people's thoughts about the candidates. Although later research (Rabinowitz, 1978; Rusk and Weisberg, 1972; Weisberg and Rusk, 1970) showed that substantive issue dimensions could predict the relative affective ratings of political leaders, it nonetheless left unanswered the question of what determines our actual cognitions about candidates.

Rational choice models also fail to describe or predict the content of the cognitions that citizens have about candidates. Furthermore, such models have been criticized as requiring an overly complex mental procedure for representing how people process candidate information (Fiske, 1985; Herstein, 1981). In short, rational choice models offer only a partial—and debatable—depiction of how citizens judge candidates.

Recently, a very different approach to candidate assessments has begun to appear in the literature. This emerging theory holds that candidate evaluations are not necessarily superficial, irrational, or purely short-term. Voters may focus on the personal qualities of a candidate to gain important information about characteristics relevant to assessing how the individual will perform in office (Kinder and Abelson, 1981; Popkin, Gorman, Phillips, and Smith, 1976; Shabad and Anderson, 1979). A similar perspective rooted in social psychological theory contends that criteria used in judging candidates reflects relatively general and enduring tendencies (Conover, 1981; Kinder, Peters, Abelson, and Fiske, 1980).

This new approach is largely based on the premise that individuals organize their thoughts about other people into broad preexisting categories. These category "prototypes" are then used in making judgments when only limited factual information is available (Cantor and Mischel, 1979). Kinder et al. (1980), for example, explore the features that may define an ideal president, to determine if people use this prototype to evaluate presidential candidates. They find that people can choose attributes they believe would make for an ideal president, but that these prototypic conceptions are related only to ratings of the incumbent president. In contrast, Foti, Fraser, and Lord (1982) demonstrate that preexisting cognitions about political roles are related to impressions of political leaders. Yet they only demonstrate the use of category labels such as "effective political leader" on two national figures, one of whom was president at the time of their study.

These results seem to support the traditional interpretation of candidate assessments as short-term indicators of electoral change. If the presidential prototype is primarily a reflection of characteristics associated with the incumbent, then the attributes describing an ideal president must be subject to considerable variation over time. However, given the timing of the Kinder et al. study (spring 1979), it is reasonable to assume that the situational context may not have provided sufficient cues to evoke prototypical cognitions about any potential candidate other than Carter, who was then the incumbent. In short, the evidence testing the question of whether voters judge actual candidates against some prototype remains inconclusive.

tesis It is our contention that a presidential prototype, or *schema*, as we shall label it, can and will be evoked during the actual campaign period when people receive the appropriate stimuli to trigger these preexisting cognitions. We will attempt to test this hypothesis with open-ended survey responses evaluating presidential candidates that have been gathered since 1952 by the National Election Studies (NES) conducted by the University of Michigan's Center for Political Studies. Our analysis of people's responses to the open-ended candidate questions reveals a great deal of information ① about what the electorate values in political leaders, and more generally, how ② voters organize their cognitions about them. Before proceeding to the analysis of these data, however, we need to summarize the processes involved in schematic judgments and the hypotheses they suggest.

Theoretical Predictions of Presidential Criteria

Current theories of social cognition posit that people deal with the flood of information in their environment by employing cognitive shortcuts (Nisbett and Ross, 1980). The basic assumption is that humans are active information processors and cognitive misers (Taylor and Crocker, 1981). This theory contends that people categorize objects and simplify information as a result of general limits to human cognitive capacity. The complexity of the real world becomes simplified in our minds through a dynamic process that combines experience with real-world occurrences (and co-occurrences of objects and events) and the results of active mental processes, including the inferences we make to fill in missing information or go beyond the information directly available to us (Fiske and Taylor, 1984). These mental representations of the world, frequently called *schemas*, function to direct our attention and aid in the storage and retrieval of information in a manner that influences both our memory of previous experience and the acquisition of new information (Fiske and Linville, 1980; Taylor and Crocker, 1981).

What this theory suggests for our purposes is that voters do not evaluate each political contender *de novo*, or simply with respect to readily apparent attributes, but rather in terms of their own embellished perceptions. As Lippman (1922) noted, "We do not so much see this man and that sunset; rather we notice the thing is man or sunset and then see chiefly what our mind is already full of on those subjects."

Person schemas are knowledge structures about people, and schemata about political candidates are organized cognitions about them in their political role. Candidate schemas thus reduce the complexity of our impressions by enabling us to categorize and label an individual politician according to certain abstract or representative features. These categories then serve as a set of cues from which we can draw further inferences about the candidate's future behavior (Schneider, Hastorf, and Ellsworth, 1979). For example, labeling Walter Mondale as a "big spender" may cue other unstated or inferred properties among conservatives, such as being a weak leader, being overly sympathetic toward those on welfare, and, of course, being a liberal.

This process of schematic thinking about candidates is similar to overt stereotyping, in which one assigns unobservable dispositional qualities (e.g., attitudes or intentions) to another. It is usually initiated by some social or physical feature of the perceived individual, a distinctive biographical fact or observable behavior pattern, or some commonly recognized label such as "Democrat" or "liberal." Once invoked, it acts to embellish what we know about the person and provides an implicit cognitive theory regarding what we expect of the person in the future (Cantor and Mischel, 1979). Schematic images are abstracted from prior experience. Political candidates, especially those running for the presidency, would therefore appear to be prime targets for schematic thinking. Besides all the daily information about the incumbent president, people generally have observed enough presidential candidates that it seems reasonable to hypothesize that they will employ categorical criteria when evaluating them.

Pres v. Senate ?

Another hypothesis suggested by this theoretical framework is that a few broad criteria, rather than specific information, will be used to judge candidates. Furthermore, these categories should be similar over time, despite the uniqueness of each candidate. We would also predict, for reasons spelled out below, that comments of a personal nature, rather than issues or partisan ties, should predominate in these evaluations. Contrary to the common assumption by those who view personality as irrational, schema theories suggest that more politically informed voters will be the most likely to make comments about the candidates' inner dispositions and behaviors. These types of assessment reflect inferences that go beyond the available information, and cognitive theories predict that people with "richer" schemas will make considerаby more inferences, based on their larger store of experience with the object. On the other hand, those with less well-formulated schemas can be expected to limit their inferences to observable features and to make fewer and less complex inferences. In sum, the frequency with which particular attributes will be used in appraising presidential candidates should reflect ① the availability of informational cues, ② the personal relevance of these cues, and ③ one's knowledge about politics.

Party, Issues, or Personality?

To examine the general framework people use in organizing their thinking about politics, it is important to ascertain how thoughts are structured. Because open-ended questions allow respondents to establish their own frame of reference, they are particularly well suited for this purpose. By examining the distributions and interrelationships among thousands of open-ended comments about the candidates obtained in the 1952–1984 NES studies, we can gain substantial clues about the cognitive representations people have of political leaders. The frequency of mentions will denote the relative importance of particular characteristics for the public; the way these comments are organized into larger domains (as determined via factor analysis) will reveal the basic structures underlying the multitude of responses. Fortunately, the relevant open-ended questions about candidates have been asked in exactly the same way since 1952, thus eliminating any methodological concerns about changes in the wording of questions.

Figure 1. The Distribution of Personal, Issue, and Partisan Comments About Presidential Candidates, 1952–1984



Source: SRC/CPS National Election Studies.

Note: Data are the percentage of all comments in all three dimensions. Comments associating candidates with particular groups were combined with those mentioning party connections. As party differences were frequently discussed in terms of the groups they usually benefit, the two sets of comments are theoretically similar.

Schema theories offer a framework for interpreting these open-ended statements by suggesting the primary criteria for evaluating candidates and by illuminating the cognitive processes most likely involved. As gaining attention is the initial step in the categorization process, salient factors in the environment provide the primary stimulus by which schemas are invoked (Taylor and Fiske, 1978). Candidates should be very salient features of this environment, perhaps even more so than issues or parties, because they are less abstract; thus, it is easier to store and retrieve information about them from memory. In addition, media coverage of campaigns augments this focus by placing greater emphasis on the personal characteristics and background of the candidates (see Figure 1). Except for 1972 and MacKuen, 1979).

Previous research does in fact suggest that over half of the comments made about candidates are on the personal level (see Sears, 1969, for a summary).[1] Since 1964, however, the proportion of issue-relevant comments in response to candidate like/dislike questions has increased (see Figure 1). Except for 1972 and 1984, the use of "person-related" characteristics has dominated cognitions about the candidates. Sears (1969) refers to this emphasis on personal characteristics as "the personalization of politics." We concur, and would further argue that it reflects the result of *performance* or *behavior* inferences made about the inner dispositions of the candidates.

If, on the other hand, these comments are nonsubstantive and idiosyncratic, then we would expect a good deal of instability on the individual level—that is, that people would not offer these responses consistently from year to year. Such is not the case, however. Examining the two long-term NES panel studies, one obtains the following continuity correlations for the number of comments made by respondents in each domain:

	1956-1960	*1972-1976*
personal	.41	.31
party/group	.07	.18
issues	.17	.23

Despite the greater similarity in the correlations for the three different components in the 1972-1976 panel, it is nevertheless still clear that the frequency of comments about candidates in terms of personal qualities is more stable across elections than is the case with either party or issue comments.[2] This greater stability at least hints at the possibility that some more enduring or schematic thinking underlies personal assessments.

A more traditional explanation for the prevalence and stability of so-called personality comments stems from Converse's (1964) cognitive capacity model. Converse suggested that better-educated people are more likely to focus on policy concerns rather than on nonsubstantive topics such as the candidates' personal features. This prediction is based on the assumption that well-educated people seek out more political information and that their formal training enables them to absorb better the complexities of issue politics. Figure 2, however, presents data directly at odds with the cognitive capacity model. In every presidential election survey since 1952, better-educated

Figure 2. Average Number of Personal, Issue, and Partisan Comments by Education



Source: SRC/CPS National Election Studies.

Note: The Figure entries are averages based on all nine presidential surveys for the period from 1952 to 1984. There was little variation in the year-to-year figures, thus justifying collapsing the years together. The yearly figures can be obtained from the authors upon request.

Table 1. Multivariate Analysis of the Use of Personal, Issue, and Partisan Comments in Candidate Evaluations

Predictors	Personal	Issue	Party/Group
Education	.18*	.08	.04
Media exposure	.11*	.08	.06
Political interest	.13*	.13*	.06
Strength of party identification	.04	.03	.14*
Articulateness	.28*	.23*	.21*
Multiple *R*	.50	.35	.29

Source: National Election Studies, University of Michigan Center for Political Studies.

Note: Table entries are standardized regression coefficients and multiple *R*. The dependent variable is the number of comments made in each of the three substantive areas, respectively. The figures presented are averages of the coefficients for the nine data sets from 1952 to 1984. The significance figures are also averaged across the years, and do not necessarily indicate the significance levels that would be obtained with a data set that combined all the years. A table with the coefficients for each individual year can be obtained from the authors.

$^*p < .01$.

respondents volunteered more personal comments about the candidates than did the less well educated, a finding that remains true even after controlling for articulateness.[3] Nor does the difference in the number of issue comments made across education levels fit with the prediction of the cognitive capacity model. Once articulateness was controlled for, level of education was not significantly correlated with the number of issue comments a respondent made in any of the years examined.

An alternative explanation is suggested by theories of schematic information processing. People generally use situational information as a basis for making inferences about another person's dispositions (Schneider, Hastorf, and Ellsworth, 1980). This implies that voters who regularly follow politics will have more available information about the candidates and be more likely to make dispositional inferences concerning them. Indeed, the regressions displayed in Table 1 demonstrate that political interest and media usage are significanty related to the number of personal attribute comments offered about the candidates. Yet even after controlling for these other factors, education remains a strong predictor of statements regarding the candidate as a person. Comments associating the candidates with issues, on the other hand, are predominately related to interest in politics (see Table 1).

In general, the regressions in Table 1 support the hypothesis that when asked to evaluate the candidates, people emphasize personally relevant factors. What is salient to the perceiver can also be a property of the perceiver, or as Markus (1977) argues, individual cognitive schemas about the self can direct our attention to particular aspects of the environment. For example, people who think of themselves as interested in politics seek out more political information and tend to make more issue comments, regardless of their educational background. Similarly, we find that strong partisans focus their comments on party connections, presumably because partisanship and the particular groups associated with each party are more personally meaningful to these individuals.

Surely the most important finding in Table 1 is the counter-intuitive notion that elections are more likely to be "personality contests" for college-educated voters. In order to develop a complete and meaningful interpretation of this important finding, it is clearly necessary to examine the content of the personal comments.

Cognitive Categories Underlying Personality Comments

Numerous statements have been made by survey respondents regarding the various candidates who have run for the presidency during the past quarter-century covered by the NES. The most crucial use of these data for our purposes is to determine if the comments cluster together into relatively few general categories, as schema theory would predict, and to ascertain from the content of the comments what judgmental criteria are employed. Previous researchers (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, 1954; Page, 1978; Shabad and Andersen, 1979) have organized people's responses in a number of different fashions according to their own particular interests. The variation in the resulting categorization schemes suggests the need for a systematic, empirically based approach to these open-ended responses. Rather than imposing ad hoc typologies on people's comments, we have chosen to investigate empirically how the respondents themselves structure their responses.

The approach employed was to apply factor analysis to the set of comments made by the respondents.[4] In each of the years examined, the factor analysis showed a five-dimensional solution as the best fit to the data. Although the components are not perfectly distinct for every year, they are clearly separate—the average correlation among the factors was only .10. These results confirm the prediction from schema theory that people think about presidential candidates in terms of a limited number of broad categories rather than in terms of a multitude of discrete traits. While the categories are similar in some respects to those used by previous researchers, they have the advantage of being identified through an analysis of the data themselves rather than by preconceived notions of the investigator.

The first generic category or dimension ① people use involves the candidate's past political experience, ability as a statesman, comprehension of political issues, and intelligence; we call this *competence*. ② Another dimension, *integrity*, deals with notions of trustworthiness and includes remarks such as "honest," "sincere," and "just another politician," and references to corruption in government. A third ③ dimension, *reliability*, is similar to integrity but contains important distinctions. Reliability refers to a candidate as dependable, strong, hardworking, decisive, aggressive, or the opposite of any of these. That the two dimensions are separate is most evident in the evaluations of Goldwater, who received the highest integrity rating of any candidate except Eisenhower and the lowest reliability rating of any candidate in the entire series. Reliability thus serves as a bridge between integrity and competence. Perhaps the best description of it would be trust in terms of capability rather than honesty.

④ A fourth factor, which we label *charisma*, encompasses a candidate's leadership, dignity, humbleness, patriotism, and ability to get along with, communicate with, and inspire people. Finally, a fifth major category can be seen as comprising the most purely personal comments. ⑤ Included here are references to a number of observable features about the candidates' appearance (e.g., age, health, smile, speech pattern) or background factors (e.g., military experience, religion, wealth, previous occupation). We refer to this as the *personal* dimension, but it should not be confused with the label *personal attributes* that has traditionally been used to designate all of the comments encompassed by the five different dimensions. (Please see the Appendix for a complete list of which codes fell onto which factors.)

In summary, the factor analysis demonstrates that people do in fact think about candidates in terms of a limited set of broad categories. These categories appear to incorporate both observable descriptive characteristics and inferred dispositions that citizens group in a coherent and consistent fashion when judging candidates. That most of the specific comments are incorporated by the five dimensions indicates rather widespread consensual cognitions of political candidates. Likewise, the similarity in the structure of the comments revealed by the factor analyses for the various years suggests that people share common expectations across time about what presidential candidates should be like. In general, the data imply schematic rather than piecemeal processing of information about presidential candidates.

The Prevalence of Specific Characteristics Over Time

Further evidence relevant to the question of whether people use relatively stable judgmental categories to evaluate candidates comes from an examination of the frequency with which the various categories have been employed over time. Despite the uniqueness of each specific candidate, we can expect that the inherent nature of schematic structures will limit

Table 2. The Relative Prevalence of Generic Categories of Candidate Characteristics, 1952–1984

Dimension	1952	1956	1960	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984
Competence	36	41	46	39	42	42	39	44	39
Integrity	14	15	9	18	16	25	27	16	16
Reliability	5	5	8	24	19	22	13	16	17
Charisma	10	9	6	8	9	5	5	5	10
Personal	35	30	31	11	14	6	16	19	18

Source: National Election Studies, University of Michigan Center for Political Studies.

Note: Table entries are percentages of all comments from the five dimensions.

their accommodation to new information. The novelty of each candidate and the historical situation may influence the prevalence of different criteria, but continuity in the general dimensions used in judging presidential contenders across time would further confirm that people process information about candidates schematically.

Over the years, respondents have consistently made more comments reflecting the internal dispositions and expected behaviors represented by the dimensions of competence, integrity, and reliability (see Table 2). Remarks concerning candidate competence have consistently been the most prevalent, thereby implying that voters are quite sensitive to cues concerning the candidate's past or potential performance in office. Such was particularly the case in 1960, when many people mentioned Nixon's experience as vice president. The fact that Kennedy deliberately tried to counter Nixon's advantage on this criteria by emphasizing his own knowledge and expertise no doubt also increased the frequency of these responses. Similarly, both candidates in 1980 emphasized their previous experience—Carter as president and Reagan as governor of California. The survey comments reflect these emphases, as well as a widespread questioning of Carter's competence to solve governmental problems.

The greatest variation in the frequency of responses occurs on the dimensions of charisma and personal characteristics. Presumably the frequency of these comments evidences greater variation across time because they reflect the uniqueness of particular candidates, rather than prototypical features. Eisenhower's military record, poor health, and advanced age in 1956, as well as Stevenson's divorce and Kennedy's religion were all vivid features that provoked comments in the early surveys. McGovern and Nixon, on the other hand, were not perceived as particularly unique in appearance or background, as evident from the relative lack of such remarks in 1972. Similarly, their lack of personal appeal can be seen by the equally low percentage of comments classified as charisma. In general, candidates running since 1964 have been less likely to evoke comments in terms of either charisma or personal characteristics.

The Continuity of Judgmental Criteria

The endurance of these prototypical judgmental criteria suggested by the aggregate figures is further supported by panel data. Those respondents who used the competence, integrity, or reliability dimensions for evaluating a candidate at one point in time were significantly more likely to employ the same dimension four years later, even though different candidates were now running for office (see

Table 3. Stability Across Time of Cognitive Dimensions Used in Evaluating Candidates, as Determined from Panel Data

	Percentage mentioning dimension in:			
	1960		1976	
Dimension	Who Used It in 1956	Who Did Not Use It in 1956	Who Used It in 1972	Who Did Not Use It in 1972
Competence	70	45	66	47
Integrity	49	23	59	38
Reliability	20	11	49	26
Charisma	38	20	21	16
Personal	52	41	35	33

Source: National Panel Studies, University of Michigan Center for Political Studies.

Table 3). For example, 70% of the 1956-60 panel respondents who mentioned competence in 1956 did so again in 1960, compared to only 45% for those who had not used competence in their evaluations in 1956. Similar differences were also generally found for the integrity and reliability categories in both the 1956-60 and 1972-76 panels.

The degree of continuity in the three main judgmental categories—competence, integrity, and reliability—when assessing candidates is significantly higher than might be expected given all the measurement problems involved in coding open-ended responses. This is not to imply, however, that the use of these criteria is unaffected by historical circumstances or the events of particular campaigns. On the contrary, the percentages for integrity and reliability in Table 3 reveal a general increase in these concerns during the 1970s, when citizens began to question whether politicians could and would do what they promised. Nevertheless, respondents who had employed one of the three major personal dimensions in the 1972 campaign were significantly more likely to use the very same criterion four years later when assessing two new candidates for the presidency. A much lower level of continuity was found for the dimensions of charisma and personal characteristics (see Table 3). Such instability further demonstrates the sensitivity of these two criteria to the unique features of specific candidates.[5]

If, as suggested earlier, people schematically draw dispositional and behavioral inferences from the candidate's appearance, then a variety of observable features will apparently cue the same inferred performance-related criteria when judging candidates. In other words, a candidate's unique personal attributes or campaign style might call attention to some characteristic from which the voters would infer that he lacked competence, while leaving unchanged the overall basic structure employed in candidate appraisals.

Explaining Candidate Assessment Dimensions

The consistent predominance of comments referring to competence, integrity, and reliability offers a considerably different interpretation regarding the meaning and political relevance of personality responses than is standard in the literature. The finding that better-educated people are more likely to offer personal comments now seems more understandable. As can be seen from Table 4, the competence, integrity, and reliability dimensions are those most frequently

Table 4. Average Number of Comments on Personal Attribute Dimensions, by Level of Education

Education	Competence	Integrity	Reliability	Charisma	Personal
Grade School	.58	.19	.19	.10	.37
High School	.76	.38	.29	.19	.47
College	1.15	.74	.66	.29	.48

Source: National Election Studies, University of Michigan Center for Political Studies.

Note: For the sake of parsimony the number of comments per dimension was averaged over the years 1952–1984 rather than presenting the figures for each year. Values for the individual years can be obtained by writing the authors.

mentioned by better-educated respondents. There is only a slight tendency for well-educated people to make more comments pertaining to the charisma and personal dimensions, and within education levels it is clear that these features are more salient to those voters with the least education. Therefore, a partial explanation for the decline noted earlier across time in comments referring to personal attributes may be the general rise in education that occurred during this period.

In sum, college-educated voters appear more likely to make inferences about the expected performance and internal dispositions of the candidates, whereas less-educated voters rely on more readily observable features. These observable features of the presidential contenders should cue inferences about the expected behavior of candidates according to the social cognition theory outlined above. Unique aspects of the candidates' looks, behavioral mannerisms, and background are often quite vivid and well known, thus providing relatively cost-free information used by many voters when evaluating candidates (Herstein, 1981). Therefore, we would expect that personal characteristics should carry more weight in schematic judgments made by the least-informed voters.

The evidence presented in Table 5 does, in fact, suggest that people—especially those with a low level of education—draw inferences about the competence, integrity, reliability, and charisma of a candidate from the candidate's personal characteristics. For example, the average correlation of the personal characteristics dimension with the other four was larger ($r = .14$) than the average correlation among the four substantive dimensions ($r = .08$). Although the multiple correlations in Table 5 are quite low for the college educated they are significant, thereby indicating that personal features play some role in their judgments about a candidate's prospective performance. These personal cues are clearly more important for the less well educated, though, as predicted by the theory. The only exception to this pattern occurs in 1980, due primarily to the tendency of better-educated voters to connect Carter's religious beliefs with his honesty. When these comments are removed, the multiple correlations return to the pattern found for the other years. However, this does suggest that what people personally value may determine which inferences get connected with particular characteristics.

Beyond education, it is also important to investigate other factors that influence the relative use of the varous prototypical candidate judgments. Previous research on schemas (Markus, 1977; Tesser, 1978) suggests that better-informed voters should have a greater store of previously gathered information upon which to base candidate inferences. By following the

Table 5. Multiple Correlation between Evaluations of Personal Candidate Characteristics and Competence, Integrity, Reliability, and Charisma, by Education

Education	1952	1956	1960	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984
Grade School	.30	.25	.24	.19	.25	.26	.35	.19	.21
High School	.18	.14	.19	.13	.18	.15	.16	.18	.19
College	.09	.13	.08	.11	.12	.14	.11	.20	.12

Source: National Election Studies, University of Michigan Center for Political Studies.

media they should have a clearer perception of the political environment, thereby fostering richer inferences. Similarly, more politically interested citizens will have spent more time thinking about the candidates, and therefore be more likely to report central attitudes and themes rather than easily observable characteristics.

A test of these hypotheses was accomplished with a multivariate analysis predicting the emphasis given to each dimension of candidate appraisal. Included among the independent variables, besides education, were (1) campaign interest and strength of party identification, to measure personal involvement in politics; (2) media exposure, to indicate familiarity with campaign information; and (3) a measure of articulateness, to guard against the possibility that the results simply reflect verbosity.

The results of the analysis demonstrate that interest in politics does significantly increase the likelihood of making performance-relevant inferences about the candidates—especially with regard to competence (see Table 6). However, political interest has no significant impact on references to charisma or to personal characteristics. It is also clear that information the media provides is relevant primarily to making competence inferences, and also focuses attention on the candidates' charisma—no doubt by informing voters of the candidates' previous experience and how they are performing in the campaign. Strength of party identifica-

Table 6. Multivariate Analysis Predicting the Origin of the Schematic Criteria People Use When Evaluating Candidates

Predictors	Competence	Integrity	Reliability	Charisma	Personal
Education	.12*	.14*	.17*	.09	.04
Political interest	.14*	.10*	.10*	.06	.08
Media exposure	.11*	.06	.05	.13*	.06
Strength of party identification	.03	.02	.04	.04	.03
Articulateness	.14*	.17*	.16*	.16*	.12*
Multiple *R*	.38	.33	.32	.29	.17

Source: National Election Studies, University of Michigan Center for Political Studies.

Note: Table entries are standardized regression coefficients and multiple *R*. The values are averages of the coefficients obtained for the nine presidential election surveys from 1952 to 1984, as are the significance figures. The individual figures for each study may be obtained by writing the authors. The dependent variable was the number of comments made in each of the five judgmental domains.

*$p < .01$.

tion, on the other hand, apparently plays no role in triggering either personal or performance-related judgments.

Of particular interest in Table 6 is the fact that education remains significantly related to one's attention to competence, integrity, and reliability, even after controlling for the effects of political interest, media usage, and articulateness. Therefore, this relationship is not simply the result of college-educated people being more politically interested and attentive to the media. A plausible alternative explanation is that these particular criteria are more relevant to the personal values of college-educated citizens. Perhaps better-educated people place greater emphasis on these characteristics in their own lives or in the schemata they apply to themselves, which they in turn use to evaluate candidates. In addition, formal education acts to socialize people into cultural norms regarding how a president ought to act. If the expectation that political leaders ought to be competent, honest, and reliable is largely determined culturally, then the relationship with education is quite understandable. Given the somewhat weak multiple correlations of Table 6, however, it is apparent that further research is needed in order to reach a definitive answer for why citizens apply particular prototypic criteria in their cognitions of political leaders.

In sum, empirical analysis reveals substantial variation in the inferential richness of candidate schemas from one individual to the next. College-educated people, for example, place more emphasis on performance criteria, which they infer from a broader information store, while the less well educated base their inferences more directly on the observable attributes of the candidates. There is also variation in the relative prevalence of particular judgmental criteria across time, thus revealing how unique features of the candidates or different campaign events influence cognitions of presidential contenders. Despite this variation, the general structure of the prototypic criteria remains in effect, guiding judgments about even relatively unknown persons who emerge as presidential candidates.

Extensions to Affective Evaluations and the Vote

As we have been reminded lately, politics—and human interactions more generally—usually have an emotional or affective undercurrent (Zajonc, 1980). The very act of assessing candidates implies the notion of preference or affect. Thus, a brief examination of how schematic judgments are associated with affective candidate evaluations and the vote is clearly in order. For the sake of brevity, we will consider only a limited set of expectations regarding the link between cognitive and affective candidate evaluations. For example, at a minimum, we would expect that criteria that are the most frequently used in candidate assessments should also weigh most heavily in overall affective evaluations (Tesser, 1978). If, as we argue, people evaluate candidates on the basis of inferences they draw from salient cues, then abstract inferences should be more strongly related to affective ratings and the vote than to the readily observable characteristics of the candidates. In addition, it follows that performance-relevant criteria should predict candidate affect better for college-educated respondents, whereas personal characteristics will be relatively more important for the less educated.

It is widely recognized that during the period from 1952 to 1980 presidential candidates in general became less personally popular with the public (cf. Miller and Wattenberg, 1981; Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, 1984, p. 225). This rise in negative evaluations did not, however, occur equally across the five categories we have identified. A separate analysis reveals that for the population as a whole,

Table 7. Average Regression Coefficients Predicting Affective Candidate Ratings and the Presidential Vote from Schematic Judgments, by Education

Dimensions	Grade School	High School	College
Predicting Democratic Candidate Feeling Thermometer Ratings from:			
Competence	.29	.25	.26
Integrity	.17	.25	.27
Reliability	.10	.13	.15
Charisma	.07	.08	.07
Personal	.16	.13	.07
Multiple *R*	.45	.47	.47
Predicting Republican Candidate Feeling Thermometer Ratings from:			
Competence	.28	.28	.33
Integrity	.16	.21	.22
Reliability	.12	.15	.17
Charisma	.07	.08	.06
Personal	.13	.12	.05
Multiple *R*	.44	.47	.51
Predicting Presidential Two-Party Vote from:			
Competence	.31	.30	.36
Integrity	.17	.21	.23
Reliability	.11	.12	.15
Charisma	.08	.09	.07
Personal	.16	.12	.07
Multiple *R*	.52	.54	.55

Source: National Election Studies, University of Michigan Center for Political Studies.

Note: All coefficients are averages for all the years available. The feeling thermometers range from 1968 to 1984, whereas the vote is available for all years. The independent variables employed in this analysis were computed by using the comments in each domain to derive the net balance between positive and negative responses for each candidate.

the increase in negative assessments is most evident in the areas of competence and reliability. As hypothesized, the rise in negative comments varied in terms of content across education levels. Among the better educated, negative comments on competence and reliability increased markedly, whereas comments regarding integrity, charisma, and personal characteristics revealed little systematic rise in negative judgments. The less well educated exhibited a relatively smaller increase in the percentage assessing candidate competence and reliability negatively, with the key difference being that respondents with a grade school education also became increasingly negative in their statements about the personal characteristics of the candidates (e.g., Reagan's age or Carter's southern roots in 1980).

These differences also appear to influence affect toward candidates and the vote choice in the manner suggested by Tesser (1978). As can be seen in Table 7, the regressions predicting candidate thermometer ratings and the vote reveal a substantially greater impact for the performance-relevant criteria than for the more superficial and apparent candidate characteristics. Moreover, competence, integrity, and reliability judgments generally increase in importance as education rises, while the impact of personal characteristics declines. The major exception to this pattern occurs for the impact of competence on the ratings of Democratic candidates. The somewhat higher average coefficient for competence among those with a grade school education occurs because their ratings of Carter were strongly associated with their belief in 1980 that he had gained valuable experience during his term in office. For the remaining three election studies, the competence coefficients fit the predicted pattern.

In general, the personal attributes of candidates play a more central role in the political cognitions of less well-educated citizens. Yet, even among these respondents, inferences about whether a candidate will perform competently, reliably, and honestly far outweigh considerations of the candidate's appearance. While voters might base their inferences about the candidate's future behavior on observable characteristics, actions, and other readily accessible political cues, it is the performance or instrumental inferences, rather than the observable features, that become linked with the vote decision. The variation in the magnitude of the coefficients across the different dimensions and education groups also fits with Tesser's (1978) suggestion that evaluations vary depending upon individual differences in cognitive schema.

Conclusion

The evidence presented above provides consistent support for the theory that Americans evaluate presidential candidates on the basis of a limited set of general and enduring criteria. In other words, people have a preexisting knowledge structure, or schema, concerning what a president should be like, and judge real candidates according to how well they match the elements of these schemas. While these criteria have remained quite stable over time, the relative importance of particular categories has varied with changes in historical circumstances. The primary dimension used by citizens throughout the 1952–1984 period has been competence, clearly a performance-related criteria. Integrity and reliability have become more prevalent in judgments of candidates since 1964. These broad expectations that citizens hold about presidential performance appear to reflect in part the actions of past presidents and in part the agenda as set by the media or by current candidates.

The cognitive process underlying the evaluation of candidates, which we have described above, is clearly a dynamic one involving an interaction between the individual and the political environment. Voters abstract from their experience of past presidents those features and behaviors they associate with political success, and then evaluate other candidates with respect to these same characteristics. During the campaign the candidates no doubt emphasize certain characteristics in ways that reflect on or cue judgments of their competence, integrity, and reliability, because they believe these are relevant to the conduct of the office. Voters in turn respond to these campaign messages not only because they are relevant to their schema for presidential candidates, but also because these are the terms in which the political dialogue is conducted. Particular events of the campaign and the unique strengths and weaknesses of the specific candidates, as well as cognitive and personal variation across individual voters, focus attention on certain of these criteria, giving more emphasis to some and less to others. Nevertheless, despite some variation in the specific content of political cognitions across time, the general structure of the abstracted inferences and judgments derived from the historical particulars remains fairly stable over the years.[6]

Unfortunately, the micro-level cognitive processes involved in evaluating candidates remain less clearly specified than the content and structure of candidate schemas. A number of alternative models describing the evaluation process could be examined. For example, voters might evaluate candidates by comparing each one individually with some abstract ideal or exemplary president. According to this model, a voter for Reagan would prefer him because he is as competent as their ideal president was or should be, independent of what they think about Mondale. An alternative model would have the voter explicitly comparing the two candidates with respect to the various prototypic categories (e.g., is Reagan more competent than Mondale?).

Differentiating between alternative cognitive process models at the individual level can be important to predicting overall candidate preferences. The open-ended questions from the National Election Studies are not, however, ideally designed for specifying these models. Further analysis with different forms of data in addition to the open-ended items is necessary before they can be fully tested.

Much work clearly remains to be done. Nevertheless, the relevance of the research presented here is that it offers a theoretical framework differing from previous approaches, and within which future work can be done. Earlier treatments of the candidate factor, especially the rational choice theories or those employed in *The American Voter*, deemphasized the cognitions and processes discussed here by treating them as idiosyncratic, irrational, and piecemeal rather than systematic and instrumental.

The enduring quality of the judgmental criteria over time challenges the conception of candidates as short-term forces presented in *The American Voter*. While the affective response to particular candidates has shown considerable volatility over the years, recent evidence reveals greater stability in the affective ratings of some political leaders than in feelings toward the Democrats or Republicans (see Wattenberg, 1984, ch. 2). Many politicians remain in office for so long and become salient enough to the general public to be considered long-term forces. Moreover, despite the fact that each candidate brings a unique set of personal characteristics to the public's attention, inferences based on these features do reflect more stable and enduring evaluative categories.

Evaluating candidates on the basis of personal qualities has for years been regarded as emotional, irrational, and lacking in political relevance. This interpretation arose in part because candidate evaluations were considered to be uninformed idiosyncratic responses based on superficial criteria. The evidence now suggests that a reinterpretation is clearly needed. Rather than represent a concern with appearance, candidate assessments actually concentrate on instrumental concerns about the manner in which a candidate would conduct governmental affairs. In general, they represent a schematic conception of the president as someone who can be relied upon to deal competently with the nation's problems in an honest and even-handed manner.

Appendix

The following is a list of the codes from the National Election Studies (NES) which form each of the five personal dimensions for our baseline year of 1972. In earlier years some of the codes on different dimensions were combined, necessitating the reading of the actual protocols for these cases to sort out the various codes and maintain consistency from year to year.

Integrity

313. A politician/political person; (too) much in politics; a good politician

1986 Schematic Assessment of Candidates

314. Not a politician; not in politics; above politics; a bad politician
401. Honest/sincere; keeps promises; man of integrity; means what he says; not tricky
402. Dishonest/insincere; breaks promises; no integrity; doesn't mean what he says; tricky
403. Man of high principles/ideals; high moral purpose; idealistic
404. Lacks principles/ideals; not idealistic
603. Honest government; not corrupt; no "mess in Washington"
604. Dishonest/corrupt government; "mess in Washington"

Reliability

213. Dependable/reliable; a man you can trust with the responsibilities of government ("trust" in the capability sense, rather than the honesty sense)
214. Undependable/unreliable; a man you can't trust with the responsibilities of government
319. (too) careful/cautious
320. (too) impulsive/careless
407. Public servant; man of duty; conscientious; hard-working; would be a full time President
408. Does not take public service seriously; lazy; would be a part-time President
431. Unsafe/unstable; dictatorial; craves power
432. Safe/stable
709. Good for country; has country's best interests at heart
710. Bad for country; doesn't have country's best interests at heart

Competence

201. General reference to him as "a good/bad man"; R has heard good/bad things about him; qualifications; general ability (low priority code)
211. Experienced
212. Inexperienced
217. His record in public service; how well he's performed in previous offices
218. Has government experience/political experience
219. Lacks government experience/political experience
220. A statesman; has diplomatic experience
221. Not a statesman; lacks diplomatic experience
315. Independent; no one runs him; his own boss
316. Not independent; run by others; not his own man/boss
413. Understands the nation's problems; well-informed
414. Doesn't understand the nation's problems; poorly informed
415. Idealistic/pragmatic/practical; down-to-earth; not too idealistic
416. Too idealistic
417. Uses common sense; makes a lot of sense
418. Not sensible; impractical
419 (too) well educated; scholarly
420. Poorly educated; unschooled
421. Intelligent/smart
422. Unintelligent/stupid/dumb
601. Good/efficient/businesslike administration
602. Bad/inefficient/unbusinesslike administration
609. General assessment of job he would do; he'd be a good/bad President, provide good/bad administration (low priority code)
707. Candidate as good protector; will know what to do
708. Candidate as bad protector; won't know what to do

Charisma

301. Dignified/has dignity
302. Undignified/lacks dignity
305. Inspiring; a man you can follow; "a leader"
306. Uninspiring; not a man you can follow; not a leader
307. People have confidence in him
308. People don't have confidence in him
309. Good at communicating with blacks, young people, other "problem" groups
310. Bad at communicating with blacks, young people, other "problem" groups
311. Knows how to handle people (at personal level)
312. Doesn't know how to handle people (at personal level)
317. Humble; knows his limitations; doesn't pretend to know all the answers
318. Not humble enough; too cocky/self-confident
411. Patriotic
412. Unpatriotic
433. Sense of humor; jokes a lot/(too much)
434. No sense of humor/humorless/(too) serious
435. Kind/warm/gentle
436. Cold/aloof
437. Likeable/gets along with people
438. Unlikeable/can't get along with people
439. Democratic (in nonpartisan sense)
440. Undemocratic (in nonpartisan sense)
441. High-fallutin/high-brow; talks in circles; can't talk to common man; can't communicate ideas well
442. Not high-fallutin/low-brow; talks straight; can talk to common man
703. Will save America; America needs him
704. Will ruin America; last thing America needs
705. Will unite Americans/bring people together
706. Will divide Americans/drive people apart

Personal

215. A military man; a good military/war record
216. Not a military man; bad military/war record; no military/war record
423. Religious; "moral" (in religious sense); God-fearing

424. Irreligious; "immoral" (in religious sense)
425. Self-made; not well off; started out as a poor boy
426. Wealthy; rich; born with silver spoon in his mouth
443. Well-known
444. Unknown/not well-known
445. Reference to his family
446. Reference to his wife
447. His speaking ability
448. His health
449. His appearance/looks/face/appearance on TV
450. His age
451. (too) old
452. (too) young
453. Mature
454. Immature

Notes

1. The actual open-ended questions from the NES were as follows: Is there anything in particular about [*Democratic candidate*] that might make you want to vote *for* him? Is there anything in particular about [*Democratic candidate*] that might make you want to vote *against* him? These questions were then repeated with regard to the Republican candidate. Thus, one possible reason for the prevalence of personal responses is that the items focus the respondent's attention on the candidate rather than on the issues or parties.

2. In a similar analysis, but using LISREL to correct for measurement error, Lau (1985) obtained across-time correlations of .80 for the personal comments, .32 for party, and .52 for issues in the 1972–1976 panel.

3. Articulateness was measured in terms of the number of comments made in response to another set of open-ended questions asking what people liked and disliked about the two parties.

4. The factor analysis proceeded by first forming a series of dummy variables for all the codes in the open-ended questions that deal with candidate attributes. The dummy variables were coded one if the respondent mentioned a particular candidate characteristic, and zero if no mention was made. A tetrachoric r correlation matrix was then computed for all the resulting dummy variables in the 1956, 1972, and 1976 surveys, and subjected to factor analysis using both orthogonal and oblique rotations. Selecting only those factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 produced a five-dimensional solution that accounted for 68%, 65%, and 71% of the total item variance in 1956, 1972, and 1976, respectively.

The final solutions for each of the factor analyses were then compared to determine their degree of similarity. Using the OSIRIS COMPARE program with 1972 as the target configuration, measures of fit (normalized symmetric error ranging from .028 to .031) indicated that the three different solutions were virtually identical (Schonemann and Carroll, 1970). In addition, an examination of the correlations among the measures created to indicate each of the five dimensions suggested that the structure underlying the comments was similar in all three years. Given these comparisons, it was decided that further application of these techniques to the survey data for other years was not necessary. Please see the Appendix for information on the specific code categories incorporated into the measure for each of the five dimensions.

5. A multivariate analysis with panel data confirms the results of Table 3. Mention of a dimension in 1972 was used to predict the use of the same dimension in 1976 after controlling for education, strength of party identification, and media usage. The results demonstrate that the prior use of the competence, integrity, and reliability dimensions significantly predicted (better than .001 level) the subsequent use of these dimensions, whereas no significant impact across time was found for the charisma or personal dimensions.

6. Recent research has suggested that a new "compassion" or "empathy" dimension of candidate evaluations may be emerging since 1980 (Kinder, 1985). A closer examination of the open-ended NES responses relevant to this theme, however, reveals little support for this contention. The percentage of comments that referred to codes encompassing compassion (codes 435, 436, 807, 808, 831, and 832) was only 3.3% in 1984, compared to 3% in 1980. Our analysis shows that closed-ended items that initially may be thought of as compassion, such as "in touch with ordinary people" or "really cares about people like me," are largely incorporated by the group benefits dimension in the open-ended responses.

References

Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter.* New York: Wiley.

Campbell, Angus, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller. 1954. *The Voter Decides.* Evanston, IL: Row and Peterson.

Cantor, Nancy, and Walter Mischel. 1979. Prototypes in Person Perception. In Leonard Berkowitz, ed., *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology,* vol. 12. New York: Academic Press.

Conover, Pamela J. 1981. Political Cues and the Perception of Candidates. *American Politics Quarterly,* 9:427–48.

Converse, Philip E. 1964. The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. In David Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent.* New York: Free Press.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy.* New York: Harper and Row.

Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

✓ Fiske, Susan T. 1985. Schema-Based Versus Piecemeal Politics. In *Political Cognition. See* Lau and Sears, 1985.

Fiske, Susan T., and Patricia W. Linville. 1980. What Does the Schema Concept Buy Us? *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,* 6: 543–57.

✓ Fiske, Susan T., and Shelley E. Taylor. 1984. *Social Cognition.* Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley.

Foti, Roseanne, Scott Fraser, and Robert Lord. 1982. Effects of Leadership Labels and Prototypes on Perceptions of Political Leaders. *Journal of Applied Psychology,* 67:326–33.

Graber, Doris A. 1976. Press and T.V. as Opinion Resources in Presidential Campaigns. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 40:285–303.

Graber, Doris A. 1980. *Mass Media and American Politics.* Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.

✓ Herstein, John A. 1981. Keeping the Voter's Limits in Mind: A Cognitive Process Analysis of Decision Making in Voting. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 40:843–61.

Kagay, Michael R., and Gregory A. Caldeira. 1975. I Like the Looks of His Face: Elements of Electoral Choice, 1952–1972. Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco.

Kelley, Stanley, and Thad Mirer. 1974. The Simple Act of Voting. *American Political Science Review,* 68:572–91.

Kiesler, Charles A., Barry E. Collins, and Norman Miller. 1969. *Attitude Change: A Critical Analysis of Theoretical Approaches.* New York: Wiley.

Kinder, Donald R. 1985. Presidential Character Revisited. In *Political Cognition. See* Lau and Sears, 1985.

Kinder, Donald R., and Robert P. Abelson. 1981. Appraising Presidential Candidates: Personality and Affect in the 1980 Campaign. Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York.

Kinder, Donald R., Mark D. Peters, Robert P. Abelson, and Susan T. Fiske. 1980. Presidential Prototypes. *Political Behavior,* 2:315–37.

Lau, Richard R. 1985. Political Schemas, Candidate Evaluations and Voting Behavior. In *Political Cognition. See* Lau and Sears, 1985.

Lau, Richard R., and David O. Sears, eds. 1985. *Political Cognition.* Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Lippman, Walter. 1922. *Public Opinion.* New York: Harcourt and Brace.

✓ Markus, Hazel. 1977. Self-Schemata and Processing Information About the Self. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 35:63–78.

Markus, Gregory B., and Philip E. Converse. 1979. A Dynamic Simultaneous Equation Model of Electoral Choice. *American Political Science Review,* 73:1055–70.

Miller, Arthur H., and Michael MacKuen. 1979. Informing the Electorate: A National Study. In Sidney Kraus, ed., *The Great Debates: Carter vs. Ford 1976.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Miller, Arthur H., and Warren E. Miller. 1976. Ideology in the 1972 Election: Myth or Reality? *American Political Science Review,* 70:832–49.

Miller, Arthur H., and Martin P. Wattenberg. 1981. Policy and Performance Voting in the 1980 Elections. Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York.

Miller, Warren E., Arthur H. Miller, and Edward J. Schneider. 1980. *American National Election Studies Data Sourcebook, 1952–1978.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Nisbett, Richard E., and Lee Ross. 1980. *Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings in Social Judgments.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Page, Benjamin I. 1978. *Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections.* Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Popkin, Samuel, John W. Gorman, Charles Phillips, and Jeffrey A. Smith. 1976. What Have You Done for Me Lately? Toward an Investment Theory of Voting. *American Political Science Review,* 70:779–805.

Rabinowitz, George. 1978. On the Nature of Political Issues: Insights from a Spatial Analysis. *American Journal of Political Science,* 22: 793–817.

Rosenstone, Steven J., Roy L. Behr, and Edward H. Lazarus. 1984. *Third Parties in America: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rusk, Jerrold G., and Herbert F. Weisberg. 1972. Perceptions of Presidential Candidates: Implications for Electoral Change. *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 16:388–410.

Sears, David O. 1969. Political Behavior. In Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, eds., *The Handbook of Social Psychology,* 2d ed., vol. 5. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Schonemann, Peter H., and Robert M. Carroll. 1970. Fitting One Matrix to Another Under Choice of a Similarity Transformation and a Rigid Motion. *Psychometrika,* 35:245–55.

Schneider, David J., Albert H. Hastorf, and Phoebe C. Ellsworth. 1979. *Person Perception,* 2d ed. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. ✓

Shabad, Goldie, and Kristi Andersen. 1979. Candidate Evaluations by Men and Women. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 43:19–35.

Stokes, Donald E. 1966. Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency. *American Political Science Review,* 60:19–28.

Taylor, Shelley E., and Jennifer Crocker. 1981. Schematic Bases of Social Information Processing. In E. Tory Higgins, Charles A. Herman, and Mark P. Zanna, eds., *Social Cognition.* Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Taylor, Shelley E., and Susan T. Fiske. 1978. Salience Attention and Attribution: Top of the Head Phenomena. In Leonard Berkowitz, ed., *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology,* vol. 11. New York: Academic Press.

✓Tesser, Abraham. 1978. Self-Generated Attitude Change. In Leonard Berkowitz, ed., *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology,* vol. 11. New York: Academic Press.

Wattenberg, Martin P. 1984. *The Decline of American Political Parties, 1952–1980.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Weisberg, Herbert F., and Jerrold G. Rusk. 1970. Dimensions of Candidate Evaluations. *American Political Science Review,* 64:1167–85.

✓Zajonc, Robert B. 1980. Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences. *American Psychologist,* 39:151–75.

Arthur H. Miller is Professor of Political Science, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52240.

Martin P. Wattenberg is Assistant Professor, School of Social Sciences, University of California-Irvine, Irvine, CA 92717.

Oksana Malanchuk is a Research Analyst with Frank N. Magid Associates, Marion, IA 52302.

THE PRESIDENT AND THE POLITICAL USE OF FORCE

CHARLES W. OSTROM, JR.
Michigan State University

BRIAN L. JOB
University of Minnesota

Throughout the post-World War II period the president has been called upon to make decisions concerning the use of force as a political instrument. The explanation that is offered is based upon a characterization of the president as a cybernetic human decision maker facing limitations. These limitations, in conjunction with the complexity of the environment, lead presidents to develop and use a relatively simple decision rule. The dependent variable, which is the probability of the use of force at any point in time, is explained in terms of enduring and essential concerns, which are operationalized as coming from the international, domestic, and personal environments. Data are taken from Blechman and Kaplan's Force Without War. *On the basis of our estimation and evaluation, presidential decisions to use force are based on factors in all three arenas.*

As the leader of one of the world's great powers, the president of the United States is charged with the responsibility of guiding and implementing policies to protect and advance U.S. interests abroad. This is an onerous responsibility; the fortunes of various presidents have risen or fallen on the basis of the American public's satisfaction with their performance in this capacity. However, this responsibility also represents an arena of decision making in which the president has a relatively free hand to operate according to his own dictates, and one in which he can command on his own a wide variety of instruments of policy in implementing his intentions.

One such option is obviously the use of the United States military. With extensive capabilities and global reach of the U.S. armed forces, components of it can be directed by the president to undertake a broad spectrum of foreign policy activities, ranging from the transporting of military equipment and advisors, to "showing the flag" with minor maneuvers, to engaging in military combat with an opponent. Certainly the most momentous and costly act of foreign policy is the fighting of a full-scale war. Our interest, however, is focused on the use of the U.S. military by the president in circumstances short of involvement, or intended involvement, in extended military combat. In these instances, the armed forces may be said to have been engaged not for the achievement of a military objective per se, but for "political" purposes, and their actions said to constitute "political uses of the armed forces"—that is, overt policy acts directed by the U.S. president that

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 80 NO. 2 JUNE, 1986

fall somewhere between acts of diplomacy and intentional uses of military power such as in Korea and Vietnam.

In a recent study, Blechman and Kaplan (1978) demonstrate convincingly that the use of force has proved, in the postwar era, to have been a frequently employed instrument of foreign policy. They show, for example, that between the years 1946 and 1976, the U.S. deployed military units abroad for political purposes 226 times. In light of this historical record, it is surprising to find that little has been written about these uses of force, as a set of events, or about the use of force as an instrument of U.S. policy, or about the decision-making process which precipitates these results.[1]

The Political Use of Major Force

Blechman and Kaplan (1978, p. 12) define the political use of armed forces as

> physical actions . . . taken by one or more components of the uniformed armed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence or be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence.

For these authors, decisions by the U.S. to use force in this manner are political in that actions are taken for nonmilitary objectives, and in that they take effect within the external environment of the U.S., involving the clash of the international political interests of many parties. Blechman and Kaplan go on, in their empirical work, to examine and classify the various types of international situations in which uses of force were undertaken, and to assess the effectiveness of different sequences and configurations of U.S. force deployments. Our interest in the political use of force by the U.S. differs from and extends the work of Blechman and Kaplan in three ways.

First, we wish to concentrate on the subset of Blechman and Kaplan's data in which *major* or *nuclear-capable* levels of force were used.[2] These uses, hereafter referred to as *major uses of force*, are presented in the appendix. We maintain that by restricting our focus to these incidents we have isolated the most important and consequential of U.S. political uses of force in this period.

Second, we posit that these incidents can be specifically characterized and studied as a set of presidential foreign policy decisions. This assumption rests on the facts that the president bears legal responsibility for the use of force, must sanction such uses, and will be given credit or blame for the success or failure of these ventures. Since the president is ultimately responsible, we assume either that he was directly consulted and gave his consent before any major force deployment was made, or that a choice was made according to his established guidelines. We are aware that the degree of direct involvement in these incidents was variable. However, a search of postwar presidential biographies and memoirs indicates that, with very few exceptions, all the major uses of force listed in the appendix were recognized as prominent presidential decisions.

Third, having identified the president as *the* relevant decision maker regarding political uses of major force, we wish to construct a model of his decision-making process. The president will be viewed as operating within three capacities—as chief executive, commander in chief, and political leader. He operates over time with the goal of effectively managing, or simultaneously balancing, his interests in the international, domestic, and political arenas. The president is faced with the need to monitor these various fronts, with a good deal of uncertainty about the effects of chosen forceful actions. In seizing certain opportunities to use force but rejecting others, the president clearly operates in a "political" fashion. He assesses a range of actors, not only in the international context, but also in the American domestic context and in the context of his political leadership. The president will, for instance, consider his domestic political standing, his relations with Congress, the public's attention or inattention to foreign policy matters, the public's dissatisfaction with the progress of the economy, etc. Also, whether an election is forthcoming and whether the president has a strong resource base of popular support may well be important in presidential calculations about acting in the international arena. In short, the set of variables monitored by the president, in the context of a decision on the major use of force is likely to come from international, domestic, and political sources.

Thus, as part of a larger research effort, this study attempts several steps toward a better understanding of the political uses of force by the United States and of presidential foreign policy decision making. By constructing a model that takes into account the trifold context in which decisions to use force are made, positing the effects of foreign, domestic, and political contextual factors, we provide a more complete understanding than has been previously available from studies which examine a less complete and/or exclusively domestic or international set of factors (e.g., Blechman and Kaplan, 1978; Mahoney, 1976; Stoll, 1984). Furthermore, our model of presidential decision making assumes that presidents throughout the postwar period have behaved as boundedly rational, cybernetic decision makers. We build upon and extend the work of Simon (1959, 1969, 1979), Steinbruner (1974) and others who established this tradition in the foreign policy decision-making literature.

The second major goal of this study is the operationalization of the decision-making model and its application to the Blechman and Kaplan (1978) data set of major uses of force in order to see how well the model, as specified, accounts for the occurrence and nonoccurrence of uses of force on a quarterly basis from 1948 to 1976—that is, the presidential terms of Truman through Ford.[3] Upon presenting our results we go on to assess the overall success of the model, looking at the relative impact of international, domestic, and political factors, and to examine how well it captures the record of individual presidents, testing our assumption that a common cybernetic mode of decision making effectively accounts for their actions.

A Cybernetic Model of Presidential Decision Making

There is widespread agreement in both the crisis and non-crisis literature as to the three competing characterizations of decision making—rational actor, cybernetic, and cognitive process (e.g., Gallhofer and Saris, 1979; Maoz, 1981; Ostrom, 1978; Steinbruner, 1974). In this regard, we assume that the president behaves not as a rational decision maker, but in a fashion similar to that suggested by the cybernetic approach to decision making. Operating in a context that has been described as "structural uncertainty" (Steinbruner, 1974, p. 18), the president is not able to determine the state of the environment, locate available alternatives, or assess the consequences of those alternatives—in short, the raw materials of rational choice are absent. In place of the rational choice perspective, we will argue that the cybernetic perspective is more appropriate, because it provides an understanding of how human decision makers reach decisions in highly complex and volatile environments by formulating simple and manageable decision algorithms. The mechanics of choice are simple: the president monitors a limited set of essential or critical factors, and considers a restricted set of decision options. Choice is tied to the essential variables by a relatively simple decision rule.

Underlying the cybernetic characterization of decision making is the following principle: "A man, viewed as a behaving system, is quite simple. The apparent complexity of his behavior over time is largely a reflection of the complexity of the environment in which he finds himself" (Simon, 1969, p. 25).[4] To model the environmental connection in a cybernetic fashion, Simon (1959) argues that it is necessary to take into account (*a*) the cognitive structure of the president-as-a-decision-maker, (*b*) the formulation and content of his decision premises, and (*c*) the logic of the inference process (or the decision rule) followed to reach a decision. We turn now to the task of delineating each of these specifically for a model designed to explain the series of U.S. presidential decisions to use major levels of military force in foreign affairs in a political fashion.

Cognitive Structure

A process of simplification will lead the president to develop a stable means for dealing with the complexity of the environment. First, as a decision maker, he will focus on a small and relatively *fixed number of environmental factors* that will be regularly monitored. The fact that the president operates at the nexus of numerous actors who are "pushing and pulling" him means that he will constantly be reminded of various factors that need to be taken into consideration. Second, the president, however, will perceive these multiple inputs in terms of quite gross distinctions. He will not attempt to catalog exhaustively the actual state of the environment and each and every one of the options or decision choices open to him; instead, only very general aspects of the environment will be monitored. In short, we assume that the president will have a stable cognitive structure that conditions the decision to use force.

We further assume that all presidents in the postwar era have adopted, to a large extent, a similar role in office, and thus may be characterized by a common model of decision making. As Simon (1959, p. 274) points out, "A role is a social prescription of some, but not all, of the premises that enter into an individual's choices of behavior." In these terms, the role of president brings with it certain premises that will be shared by all occupants of the Oval Office. Insofar as the political use of force is concerned, a similar role is manifested by presidents not because they all share all of the same individual beliefs or possess similar personalities, but rather because they are assumed to share three basic overarching goals: a preference for action, anticommunism, and "containment" of the U.S.S.R. Kegley and Wittkopf (1982, p. 36), in summarizing the literature, argue that these three tenets have remained uppermost in the minds of U.S. foreign policy makers:

1. The United States must reject isolationism permanently and substitute for it an active responsibility for the direction of international affairs.
2. Communism comprises the principal danger in the world, and the United States must use its power to combat the spread of this menace.
3. Because the Soviet Union is the spearhead of the communist challenge, American foreign policy must be dedicated to the containment of Soviet expansionism and influence.

These beliefs have led U.S. presidents to identify most unrest and turmoil as the result of the international communist movement, and to focus on the U.S.S.R. as the primary challenger to U.S. international interests. Furthermore, these beliefs have created a presumption that forceful actions are a necessary component of the containment strategy. In short, political uses of the military represent a very important component of U.S. foreign policy.

As a result, these shared assumptions will have led all presidents to react, evaluate, and behave in a similar fashion. The differences that one might ascribe to the different men that have occupied the Oval Office are, in part, a result of the differences in the contextual configurations (i.e., the environments) in which they were forced to operate. It shall be assumed that presidents have operated according to a common model of decision making by structuring and simplifying their need for information; by interpreting their role as entailing the monitoring and management of the domestic, international, and political environments; and by focusing generally upon the same essential concerns (termed *decision premises* below) in each of these environments.

In practice we will construct and apply a model to explain the use of force decisions throughout the 28-year span from 1949 to 1976. However, after assessing the capacity of this model in general terms, attention will focus on whether the decisions of some presidents are not accounted for as well as others—that is, is there an indication of idiosyncratic behavior or is there support for the validity of our assumption of commonality across individual office holders?

Decision Premises

The cybernetic decision maker structures his consideration of information and alternatives around a select number of *decision premises*, each premise specifying the "computational procedures for *assessing* the state of the environment and its implications for action" (Simon, 1959, p. 274). Following this logic, we maintain that the president selects or establishes his decision premises on the basis of his three major functional responsibilities: commander-in-chief, chief executive, and political leader. As commander of the U.S military, the president is bound to protect the interests of the United States and to maintain strength and credibility in the ability of the U.S. to realize and protect its interests. Critical indicators of his achievement in this capacity, not only for himself but also for the U.S. public and for our opponents and allies abroad, will be matters such as the state of relations with our superpower adversary and the status of the relative strategic balance. As chief executive, the president is expected to meet the expectations of the American people at large concerning peace, prosperity, domestic tranquility, and leadership. In order to do so, he must not only monitor and act to preserve and enhance his power and credibility in the national environment, but must also be alert to "transfer effects" of his actions in the external arena (and vice versa). From this perspective, the president will be sensitive to public attitudes towards international tensions and involvement, as well as to domestic considerations such as the state of the economy. Finally, as political leader of the government, the president will be concerned with maintaining and enhancing a "political resource base" in order to assure his political survival, freedom of action, and the electoral fortunes of his party. Doing so naturally focuses his attention on factors such as his current and relative popularity and the U.S. electoral calendar.

Thus, the president will be viewed as operating within a tripartite context. He will be seen to monitor salient dimensions in the domestic, international, and political arenas, and in his decision making will assess the relative importance of each of these dimensions before taking action. Based upon our earlier discussion and assumptions about the president as a cybernetic decision maker, we view the number of such dimensions as limited. To be specific, we posit that the decision premises of the president are structured according to the following list:

I. International environment

- A. Level of international tension
- B. Relative strategic balance
- C. Extent of U.S. involvement in ongoing war

II. Domestic environment
- A. Public attitude toward risks of international involvement—international tension
- B. Public attitude toward risks of international involvement—strategic balance
- C. Public aversion to war
- D. Condition of the domestic economy

III. Political environment
- A. Level of public support
- B. Overall political success
- C. Position on the electoral calendar

We proceed to provide a brief rationale for each of these separate decision criteria. Although this list is admittedly abbreviated, our model advances previous considerations of presidential foreign policy behavior by (*a*) positing a tripartite distinction among his decision criteria and (*b*) explicitly taking into account the potential impact of domestic conditions and public attitudes in determining external actions taken by the president.

Decision Premises: The International Environment

Any deployment of major force by the U.S. can be expected to have international ramifications—escalation, involvement of the U.S.S.R., further commitment of men and material. The president is seen as considering the following three international decision premises to determine the likely consequences of a use of force.

Level of international tension. The degree of tension in the international system is determined by the aggregation of the actions and statements of a wide variety of actors. However, while many nations play a role, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are the most active and direct contributors to the overall level of international tension. Furthermore, the basic goals of U.S. foreign policy have led presidents to view the U.S.S.R. as the primary adversary of the U.S. Indeed, if there are to be any ramifications emanating from a use of force, it is likely that they will involve the U.S.S.R. Hence, the president will be centrally cognizant of the level of tension existing between the two superpowers. Furthermore, we posit that, *ceteris paribus,* the higher the existing tensions between the superpowers, the more likely it will be for the president to consider acting in a forceful manner. Failure to act or backing away from confrontations means that the president runs the risk of diminished stature or resolve (see Wills, 1982, on Kennedy). A president will seek to maintain his international and domestic credibility by indicating his willingness to use force—particularly, perhaps, for "political" ends—so as to demonstrate simultaneously U.S. resolve to act tough and U.S. restraint at not engaging in direct conflict (Schell, 1976, pp. 366–67).

Relative strategic balance. In both symbolic and real terms, the U.S. is preoccupied with its relative strategic power (e.g., Prados, 1982). A key consideration is whether the perceived strategic nuclear balance has an impact on the exercise of force for political purposes. Despite the fact that the use of strategic capabilities may not, in any given situation, be directly or immediately contemplated, there will be a level of assurance and confidence provided the president by the perception that the U.S. is strategically dominant within the international environment as a whole. It is possible that an increased propensity to use force grows out of perceived strategic inferiority; the less secure the president is, the more likely he is to engage in bellicose actions to demonstrate to our opponents that the U.S. is not cowed. This suggests, in turn, that the greater the dominance, the less likely the president will feel the need to run either the risks that could arise from the escalation of local or regional violence, or the direct or indirect involvement of the U.S.S.R. We subscribe to this view and posit that the president has little to gain when the U.S. is strategically dominant. In such circumstances, if the use of force is not successful, the symbolic power attached to strategic dominance will be reduced. Since it seems that risks of use may, other things being equal, outweigh the gains, we argue that the greater the strategic dominance, the lower the propensity to use force.

Extent of U.S. involvement in war. During the post-World War II era, the U.S. has become involved in two wars: Korea and Vietnam. In each instance, the commitment in terms of lives and funds has been great, and involvement in war has brought the president under intense and close scrutiny (e.g., Mueller, 1973). The longer a conflict drags on, the more risky and costly it becomes for the president. For example, an enemy offensive may indicate the U.S. commitment is less than sufficient or poorly orchestrated; battle casualties and/or troop levels increase the importance of victory (Gelb and Betts, 1979). Citizen dissatisfaction with a war ultimately can undermine the president's overall ability to govern effectively (e.g., Lyndon Johnson in 1968). Thus, once involved in a major regional conflict, the president will concentrate most of his energies on the conduct of the war. Military manpower and reserves will be focused on the actual violence, and, as U.S. involvement in a fighting war intensifies, the president will be less likely to contemplate undertaking other actions that, even if noncombative to start, run the risk of engaging the military in further action, especially in other regional contexts.

Decision Premises: The Domestic Environment

There are significant ramifications in the domestic arena for the use of force abroad. If there is a general consensus on the part of the public that the risks associated with such actions are acceptable, the credibility and future effectiveness of the president may be enhanced. However, the converse will be true if the public does not feel that the risks are acceptable, or if the venture is unsuccessful (e.g., Jimmy Carter and the abortive hostage rescue mission, 1980). We assume that the following four decision premises represent the president's attention to the domestic environment in his consideration of the use of force.

Public attitude toward risk of international involvement—international tension. The president's stability and willingness to participate in international affairs will be affected not only by his assessment of international tension, but also by the public's perception of this tension level and the attendant risks of international involvement by the U.S. and its personnel. In fact, his estimate of this latter effect may be more important than his individual "objective" assessment. To take into account this "filtered" or interactive effect, the president will be alert to the issues that concern the public and the extent to which its feelings are optimistic or pessimistic regarding action in the international arena. Thus, there are times when the American public views foreign affairs with trepidation because of the perceived danger of major foreign involvement or an elevated possibility of nuclear war. When international tension is high *and* the general public expresses concern about international affairs, as was true throughout the 1945–62 Cold War era, the consequences, both foreign and domestic, of presidential failure will increase. Therefore, we posit that during those periods when the American public views foreign affairs with trepidation, higher levels of international tension will cause the president to lower his willingness or propensity to use force in a political fashion in foreign affairs.

Public attitude toward the risk of international involvement—strategic balance. To the extent, however, that the public views the U.S. as maintaining strategic dominance over its major rivals, the public's focus on foreign affairs may be interpreted, unlike instances of tension, as a call to action. In such circumstances, the political use of force will be seen as a less risky undertaking, perhaps even as a legitimate expectation of the U.S. in a role as world peacemaker or policeman or defender of democracy. The president, cognizant of these attitudes, will reverse his propensity to use force (as far as strategic balance is concerned). We argue, therefore, that whenever the American public views foreign policy matters as most important, the previously noted reluctance to use force in the face of a favorable strategic balance will be offset. In short, the risks will be worth taking.

Public aversion to war. If the U.S. is involved in a military confrontation resulting in the loss of life of U.S. service personnel, the public's attitude toward the risk of foreign involvement is effected during and after the period of fighting. (See for example, Holsti and Rosenau's [1984] analysis of the effects of Vietnam.) Furthermore, the greater the involvement in a "shooting" war, the longer will be the time period following the war in which the public will resist any further or additional involvement that might lead to U.S. casualties. It would be unwise for the president to consider undertakings with the risk of additional casualties, because of the lingering resistance to foreign involvement that follows such outbreaks of violence. Therefore, we expect that in periods following U.S. involvement in a shooting war, the president's propensity to use force will be markedly reduced.

Condition of the domestic economy. On the domestic front, the public's attention is often preoccupied with economic prosperity (i.e., general economic conditions). The state of the economy has a major impact on both popular support levels (e.g., Ostrom and Simon, 1985), and electoral outcomes (e.g., Tufte, 1978). It is an essential concern of the president, at times one which will preoccupy his attention at the possible expense of foreign relations. However, there may be an important indirect relationship between the use of force and the economy. The more prosperous the economy, the higher the president's prestige and anticipation of electoral successes. The absence of prosperity has the opposite effect, and, in times of economic misery, may lead the president to look for strategies to deflect attention from the lack of economic success and to bolster his sagging image. Publicized deployment of the U.S. military represents one possible lever at the president's disposal; another may be the engineering of visits with international leaders. Therefore, although it may be debatable, we will argue that as the state of the economy worsens, the overall propensity of the president to use force will increase.

Decision Premises: The Political Environment

Any major use of force draws great public attention to the president as an individual, and the anticipation of such visibility and attendant public scrutiny will have an impact on presidential decision making.

Level of public support. In making almost any decision, including a foreign policy decision, the president must consider his personal resource base. Given the critical importance of popular support as a resource, it can be expected that the president will manage it with care. There are two basic outcomes to a use of force. If the action fails or the U.S. gets drawn into a much bigger and/or costlier event, the president stands to see his credibility, his popularity, and the support for his party in Congress undermined. If the action is "successful" in the eyes of the public, not even necessarily in objective terms—e.g., Kennedy's involvement in the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco—the president's resource base stands to be enhanced. Hence, it can be expected that, all other things being equal, the president will act when he perceives he can afford to lose or when he possesses a "popularity buffer." We are led to argue that the higher a president's current approval rating, the greater will be his propensity to use force. Presidents with relatively low levels of popular support, and in turn congressional support, will tend to become immobilized.

Overall political success. When making a decision on the use of force the president will consider his long-term "track record" as well as his immediate domestic support base. Neustadt (1980) argues that the best indicator of track record in terms of success, power, and prestige is revealed in the comparison between the president's initial level of popular support and his current popularity. If, during the course of his tenure in office, the president has been successful, his popularity will have remained relatively constant (or have risen). If the president has been less successful, his popularity will have declined. The relative level is important because it represents an easily accessible summary measure of the degree to which the president's performance has matched his perceived promise. Large drops in approval during the course of a president's tenure in office are taken as reflecting fundamental and broad-based dissatisfaction with the president's stewardship. During times when the president is experiencing little overall success, it will be natural for him to pursue actions that will deflect attention away from failure. A "successful," highly visible use of force may be seen as a needed tonic. Consequently, we assume that a decline in presidential success will promote the acceptance of risk and a greater propensity to use force in the international arena.[5]

Position on the electoral calendar. Finally, it may be that the electoral calendar has an impact on presidential propensity to use force. During an election campaign period the president may well try to look "presidential." The anticipated favorable attention following a political use of force may be an incentive for the president to initiate such actions to boost his and/or his party's electoral chances. Also, in such circumstances a president is likely to downplay the risks of such involvement. This argument suggests that during quarters encompassing midterm and presidential elections, there may be more "strategic" behavior on the part of the president. Therefore, the propensity to use force will be greater during electorally important periods.[6]

In summary of our discussion of the decision premises considered by the president, we posit that the propensity of post-World War II presidents to use military force for political purposes is effected in the following ways.

By international contextual factors:

1. High levels of international tension between the superpowers increase the propensity to use force.
2. However, the greater the strategic dominance of the U.S., the less the likelihood that force would be used.
3. The deeper the involvement of the U.S. in a shooting war, the lower the propensity of the president to exercise force elsewhere in the international arena.

By domestic contextual factors:

4. During those times when the U.S. public is concerned about the level of international tension, the propensity to use force will be reduced.
5. During those times when the U.S. public is aware of the relative strategic dominance of the U.S., there will be a greater propensity for the president to use force.
6. In the period following involvement in a war, the propensity to use force will be affected negatively.
7. As the state of the domestic economy worsens, there will be an increased propensity to use force.

By personal and political contextual factors:

8. The higher the president's current approval rating, the more his propensity to use force will be expected to decrease.
9. However, as the overall success rating of the president declines, this propensity will be increased.
10. During national electoral campaigns, the propensity to use force will increase.

As can be seen, the effects of these decision premises considered separately are not mutually reinforcing. In virtually all instances, the president will experience crosspressures and internal conflicts in deciding whether or not to employ force. We are particularly interested, for example, in the possibility of discovering any differential effects on presidential decision making of international tension and of the relative strategic balance between the superpowers, depending on how the U.S. public views these factors and transfers its concerns to the president. For example, with high levels of international superpower tension the president's propensity to use force may be enhanced, but if the public expresses concern over the dangers of international involvement, this may well contribute to a lessening of the president's initial positive reaction, highlighting our general argument that foreign policy decisions can and will be affected by considerations other than international affairs.

A Presidential Decision Rule

Having discussed the president's cognitive structure and the substance of his decision premises, it is necessary to turn our attention to the form and structure of his use of the major force decision rule. Simon (1979, p. 3) observes that

> human powers are very modest when compared with the complexities of the environments in which human beings live. If computational powers were unlimited, a person would choose the course of action that would yield maximum utility under the given circumstances. . . . But real human beings . . . cannot follow this procedure. Faced with complexity and uncertainty, lacking the wits to optimize, they must be content to satisfice—to find "good enough" solutions to their problems and "good enough" courses of action.

The alternatives or possible responses have to be sought out and evaluated in order to make a decision. Search, furthermore, "takes place in a space that is essentially infinite" (Simon, 1979, p. 3). This, coupled with limited computational powers, compels human beings to limit their search by evaluating a small number of options and choosing the first one that is "good enough."

Thus, the first task in setting up a decision rule is to identify the choice set or set of alternatives that the decision maker seeks to evaluate. Following the logic of the cybernetic perspective, and thereby seeking to ease the burdens of calculation, we assume the president's choice set to be limited to two alternatives: (*a*) do not use major force and (*b*) use major force. Let Y_t represent the president's choice set, with $Y_t = 0$ for (*a*) and $Y_t = 1$ for (*b*).

In the current context we are evaluating the degree to which the president monitors, evaluates, and responds to "essential" aspects of the international, domestic, and political environments when deciding each quarter upon the political use of force. To accomplish these tasks the president simplifies his evaluation by developing a composite evaluation of the environment and determining the values of the composite index that are conducive insofar as the use of force is concerned.

In order to resolve the inherent conflicts among the 10 decision premises, we assume that the president, at each point in time, develops a composite index in which the evaluation of the decision premises is simplified in such a way that any set of environmental factors can be placed on a single scale of propensity to use force, Y^*_t.[7] The larger the value on the composite scale, the more conducive the environment is to major uses of force. To make such a placement, and thereby integrate the evaluation of the 10 premises, the president must complete two tasks. First, the salience of each of the decision premises must be determined so that each is weighted in a manner consistent with its importance to the president. Second, once weighted, the premises must be combined to yield a single position on the composite scale. One very plausible method is the accumulation or addition of the individual weighted components. This may be formally represented by

$$Y^*_t = \sum_i a_i I_{it} + \sum_j b_{jt} D_{jt} + \sum_k c_k P_{kt} + e_t, \qquad (1)$$

where I_{it}, D_{jt}, and P_{kt} are the essential variables identified by the international, domestic, and personal decision premises, respectively; a_i, b_j, and c_k are the weights for the international, domestic, and personal variables, respectively; and e_t recognizes the fact that other factors will impinge on the decision in an unsystematic fashion.

To identify environmental states that are conducive to and thereby complete the decision making process, it is our contention that there exists a threshold, *h*, which, from the standpoint of the president, represents the point at which the environmental evaluation moves from being unfavorable to favorable and vice versa. In other words, it is the *critical value on the propensity to use force scale.* A major use of force will be chosen ($Y_t = 1$) whenever

$$Y^*_t > h, \qquad (2)$$

where *h* is some point on the composite environmental evaluation. Therefore, the threshold identifies the range of Y^*_t for which the environmental context is conducive to major uses of force. Since any value of Y^*_t greater than *h* leads to the same decision—that is, to use force—decision making is greatly simplified.

It should be clear that the results of the composite environmental evaluation are not observable. When this is coupled with the fact that the evaluation is affected by random shocks (represented by e_t), it is clear that we must model the presidential decision rule in a probabilistic fashion. Taken together, equations (1) and (2) suggest the probability that the president will decide to use major levels of force during quarter *t* can be characterized in the following manner:

$$\begin{aligned} Pr(Y_t = 1) &= Pr(Y^*_t > h) \\ &= Pr[(\Sigma\, a_i I_{it} + \Sigma\, b_{jt} D_{jt} + \Sigma\, c_k P_{kt} \\ &\quad + e_t) > h]. \end{aligned} \qquad (3)$$

Several implications of this characterization of the cybernetic decision rule are noteworthy. First, the number of decision options each quarter is reduced to two alternatives. Second, presidents simplify their environmental evaluations by developing a single, composite index. Third, presidents use a threshold to determine whether major force is to be used; the environment is either conducive to a major use of force or it is not. Fourth, the presidential decision rule can best be represented as a step function. A change in the value of Y^*_t does not always lead to the same degree of change in Y_t. Only those changes that pass the threshold will lead to a change in behavior. All in all, equation (3) presents a probabilistic model of the president as a cybernetic decision maker.

An Operational Model of Presidential Decision Making

The Dependent Variable

The dependent variable, Y_t, is operationalized utilizing the data on the political uses of force presented by Blechman and Kaplan (1978). Note once more that we restrict our attention only to those occasions in which major force components or nuclear-capable U.S. forces were deployed (see Appendix).[8] These major political uses of force are aggregated on a quarterly basis over the time period 1949–1976. Y_t is given a value of one if one or more political uses of major force occurs in a given quarter; it takes on the value of zero otherwise.

It is important to understand that our's is a *time series* model in which we seek to predict, for each quarterly period, the probability of a major use of force given the particular configuration of environmental factors at that time. Thus, we are not trying to model decisions to use major force in specific instances as responses to "opportunities" and/or in specific regions. This is an important and interesting question that to be answered requires quite different model constructions and data that are not currently available.

Independent Variables

The next task in developing the model is to operationalize the essential concerns in the president's use of force decision calculus. A single variable is defined for each of the decision premises described earlier.

International Variables. The first international factor operationalized in the model is international tension, I_{1t}. This variable has been devised, utilizing the COPDAB monthly event data base, to reflect an overall level of tension in the bipolar international environment (Azar, 1982). The international tension measure is an index representing the difference between the total directed conflict and cooperation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. for each quarter divided by the total directed behavior of either a conflictual or a cooperative nature.[9] Consequently, I_{1t} ranges from -1 (pure cooperation) to $+1$ (pure tension). The greater the level of international tension, the more likely the president is to engage in a political use of force.

The second international factor is strategic balance, I_{2t}, a variable designed to represent the relative strategic power of the U.S. with reference to its major opponent in the international system, the U.S.S.R. I_{2t} is an index ranging from -1 (total U.S.S.R. dominance) to $+1$ (total U.S. dominance), calculated by taking the difference between U.S. and U.S.S.R. strategic capabilities and dividing by the total capabilities of both actors. Data on strategic forces is taken from Squires (1982).[10] It is posited that presidents are less likely to take risks when they have a strategic advantage—i.e., that the strategic balance (I_{2t}) and the propensity to use force will covary negatively.

The effects of the magnitude of any current U.S. involvement in major conflict are represented by the third measure, I_{3t}. The effects of war are viewed as cumulative, and thus the marginal impact of each additional death decreases as the number of deaths accumulates. For the years when the U.S. was participating in the Korean and Vietnam wars, the war variable, I_{3t}, takes on the value of the logarithm of the sum of battle deaths (Mueller, 1973). It is assumed that war (I_{3t}) will play an inhibitive role upon Y^*_t during the relevant time periods, because the president will be increasingly unwilling to risk further loss of life and/or material in other foreign policy actions.

Domestic Variables. The first and second domestic concerns operationalized in the model, D_{1t} and D_{2t}, are variables designed to reflect the degree to which the public is likely to sanction uses of force during those periods when it indicates attentiveness and concern over foreign policy issues facing the country. The overriding fact is that the American public has not frequently indicated in opinion surveys that it was concerned about high-risk foreign policy issues such as threat of war or nuclear war, relations with the Soviet Union, and resistance to communist expansion. However, when the public does identify high-risk foreign policy issues as most important, then the existing level of tension and the relative strategic balance are likely to be viewed as critical to the people and, in turn, to the president and his propensity to employ force. In operational terms, D_{1t} is equal to I_{1t}, and D_{2t} is equal to I_{2t} *in those quarters in which high-risk foreign policy issues are identified by the public as the most salient;* otherwise they are equal to zero.[11] Recall that we argued that during times in which high-risk foreign policy issues are dominant, international tensions will decrease the propensity to use force, but existing strategic balance will increase the propensity to use force.

The third domestic variable, aversion to war, D_{3t}, is designed to represent the lingering impact of war on the attitude of the public toward subsequent international involvement. It is our view that the lingering impact of war is a mirror image of the seriousness and longevity of the previous war. Therefore, we have operationalized the aversion to war as a mirror image of the war measure (i.e., $I_{3t-\Delta t} = D_{3t+\Delta t}$), to represent the aversion to risk on the part of the public with a presumed negative impact on the president's propensity to use force.

The measure of economic well-being, the misery index, D_{4t}, is operationalized as the sum of the unemployment and inflation rates multiplied by the percentage of the U.S. public identifying the economy as the most important problem (Ostrom and Simon, 1985, pp. 342–43). This combined measure reflects the overall level of "misery" imposed on the public by the state of the economy weighted by the salience of the economy to the public. The weighted misery index posits that the impact of economic performance is dependent jointly upon the seriousness of economic problems and the number of people paying attention to the problems. In discussing the connection between the economy and the use of force, presidential attempts at deflection of attention from domestic economic conditions was stressed. Thus, it is hypothesized that the higher the misery index, the higher will be the propensity to use force.

Political Variables. A quarterly presidential approval variable, P_{1t}, has been determined by applying a set of coding rules to the record of answers to the question asked of the public in Gallup surveys: "Do you approve or disapprove of the job (*name of president*) is doing as president?" The coding rules were as follows:

1. If only one opinion poll was conducted during a given quarter, P_{1t} is equal to the approval percentage for that quarter.
2. If the question was not asked during a given quarter, P_{1t} is interpolated by averaging the approval percentage on both sides of the gap.
3. If the question was asked more than once during a quarter, P_{1t} is the average of all approval percentages during that quarter.

4. When the question was asked over two successive quarters, that approval percentage is used for both quarters.

It argued that the president will be more likely to use force when his level of approval is high.

The president's current "power situation" (e.g., Barber, 1977) is assumed to play a prominent role in the determination of whether to use force. Defined as the difference between his initial level of public approval upon taking office and his current level of approval, the relative power variable (P_{2t}) is designed to measure in relative terms the "success" of the president during his tenure in office in satisfying the expectations of the public. It is hypothesized that P_{2t} is positively related to the propensity to use force, keeping in mind that positive values of P_{2t} are indicative of drops in public approval. Thus, the argument is that the president will move to counter these declines with an increased likelihood of foreign action.

The electoral variable, P_{3t}, designates those quarters that are electorally prominent. It takes on the value of one during the third quarter of even-numbered years —the periods in which the midterm and general election campaigns are winding to a close. In our view, the propensity to use force will increase in these periods, as presidents seek to enhance their credibility as action-oriented leaders.

Model Evaluation

The Estimation Procedure

To evaluate empirically the cybernetic model depicted in equation (3), it is necessary to obtain estimates of a_i, b_j, c_k, and h. This is accomplished using an ordered probit model (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984; McKelvey and Zavoina, 1975). In the dichotomous case (i.e., two-element choice set), the threshold (h) is set to zero and the parameters are estimated using maximum likelihood. Consequently, the estimated model predicts the president will use a major level of force during quarter t if Y^*_t is greater than zero; that is, when the environmental evaluation is "good enough." He will not use a major level of force during quarter t if Y^*_t is less than or equal to zero; that is, when the environmental evaluation is not "good enough." The probability $[Pr(Y_t=1)]$ resulting from the model is an estimate of the conditional probability that a president will use force given the status of the international, national, and political contextual factors.[12]

The Estimated Cybernetic Model

Table 1 presents a number of summary measures of the overall performance of our cybernetic model of presidential decision making. As can be seen, the model performs very well. All of the estimated coefficients for the essential variables have the hypothesized sign, and 8 of the 10 coefficients are significant, in terms of a one-tailed test, at the .05 level. On average, our model's use of force predictions are correct for three of every four quarters during the 1948–1976 period. This is noteworthy when one considers that there is a 45-55 split between use and non-use. As such, the model represents a substantial increase in predictive success over the naive alternative model that predicts the most frequent category continually. Note that the overall measure of fit (i.e., $-2 \times LLR$) is statistically significant at the .001 level. There is substantial empirical support, therefore, for our general assertion that a model of decision making based upon contextual factors can account for U.S. political uses of major force aggregated on a quarterly basis.

Closer examination of the model reveals interesting results regarding the differential impact of international, domestic, and political factors. To assess the relative impact of the three sets of variables, an instrumental variable was

Table 1. Parameter Estimates

Variable	Descriptor	Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE)	Standard Error (SE)	MLE/SE	Change in Decrease[b]	$Pr(Y_t=1)$[a] Increase[c]
I_{1t}	International tension	1.288	.590	2.184[d]	−.203	.223
I_{2t}	Strategic balance	−1.301	.940	−1.384	−.185	.203
I_{3t}	Cumulative war dead	−.198	.110	−1.797[d]	−.152	.159
D_{1t}	International tensions when foreign policy is primary public concern	−2.120	.863	−2.454[d]	−.260	.293
D_{2t}	Strategic balance when foreign policy is primary public concern	1.374	.769	1.788[d]	−.218	.241
D_{3t}	Aversion to war	−.202	.104	−1.940[d]	−.145	.151
D_{4t}	Weighted economic misery index	.180	.093	1.925[d]	−.206	.227
P_{1t}	Presidential approval	.087	.032	2.683[d]	−.352	.417
P_{2t}	Overall presidential success	.058	.029	2.000[d]	−.260	.290
P_{3t}	National elections	.491	.401	1.222	−.061	.064
Constant		−5.315	2.358	−2.254[d]		

$N=112$; 75% correct; 55% correct—null; -2×33.28, $p < .05$.

[a] Change in $Pr(Y_t=1)$ given a one standard deviation change (both probability enhancing and probability decreasing) while all variables take on their mean value. When all variables are held at their mean, $Pr(Y_t=1) = .44$.

[b] Decrease refers to change in probability brought on by a one standard deviation change in the variable in the direction that decreases the probability of using force.

[c] Increase refers to change in probability brought on by a one standard deviation change in the variable in the direction that increases the probability of using force.

[d] Significant at the .05 level.

created for each of the three types of variables, and the probability of use was predicted using the three instrumental variables.[13] The resulting beta weights of .605, .671, and .856 for international, domestic, and political instruments respectively, provide a rough indication of the relative importance of the three sets of environmental factors. Even though the use of force decision is grounded in the state of the international environment, the impact of the international variables is far from dominating in the model. In fact, $Pr(Y_t=1)$ is also quite responsive to changes in the domestic and political environments, with the political variables exerting the largest combined impact. This finding provides a foundation for greatly expanding the implications of the adjective *political* in the political use of force.

These general conclusions can be supplemented by a consideration of each of the individual coefficients. It is difficult to assess the impact of probit coefficients, since the estimation technique is nonlinear. To provide one means of assessment we offer an impact range. Table 1 presents the maximum likelihood coefficients (MLE) along with the impact that a decrease or increase of one standard deviation in each variable has on the $Pr(Y_t=1)$, assuming that all other variables are currently at their mean.[14] As such, the impact range provides an indication of the range of the effect of the variable in probability terms (i.e., how much change in $Pr(Y_t=1)$ results from changes in the environmental variables). For example, the impact range of P_{1t} is from −.352 to +.417, indicating that when all other variables are held at their mean, a one standard deviation drop in approval (13 approval points) from its mean (55) causes a drop in the predicted probability of major use from .44 to .09, while a one standard deviation rise in approval causes an increase in the predicted probability of major use from .44 to .85.

The index of U.S.-U.S.S.R. conflict and cooperation, I_{1t}, has a persistent impact on the predicted probability of the political use of force. Evaluating the coefficient in terms of a decrease or increase of one standard deviation, changes in I_{1t} can lead to a change of ±.20 in the probability of using force (the probability of use would be .24 or .64). Based on the estimated model, higher levels of I_{1t} in the international system increase the probability of the use of force.

However, the second international variable, I_{2t}, has a statistically insignificant impact on the predicted probability of the political use of force. Therefore, contrary to our initial argument, there is no indication that in periods in which the U.S. has been dominant in terms of strategic forces, the president is more likely to use force.

The predicted probability of the use of major force for political purposes is affected in a negative fashion by the extent of current U.S. involvement in war. The third international variable, war casualties, has a statistically significant impact. Thus, in our model, as U.S. battle deaths increase—that is, accumulate over the course of the hostility—the president is less and less likely to use the U.S. military elsewhere, even for so-called "political" purposes.

Our results contrast with Blechman and Kaplan (1978, p. 27), who suggest that international factors are most important in their analysis, and that current or recent involvement in war has a positive impact on the use of force. However, these authors were analyzing data including both minor and major uses of force—the former constituting about 150 incidents, many of them merely naval "sail bys." It is very plausible that while the U.S. is involved in extended conflict, it will be willing to engage in such relatively "costless" and risk-free political uses of force, but at the same time be increasingly reluctant to deploy major force components. Also, note should be made of the difference in operationalization. Blechman and Kaplan, as well as Stoll (1984), employ a dichotomous dummy variable to indicate U.S. war activity on an annual basis. Our measure is sensitive to the duration and the increased cost and commitment of U.S. combat action as the war progresses.

The effects of the domestic contextual factors are very prominent in our results. The first domestic variable, D_{1t}, reflects, on a quarterly basis, whether the public is concerned over the level of tension between the superpowers. Based upon the estimated coefficient of −2.12, during those quarters when the public is concerned about high-risk issues in foreign affairs, the probability of the political use of force is substantially dampened. Since the coefficient of D_{1t} represents the change in the coefficient of international tension, the impact of I_{1t} during times when the focus is on high-risk foreign policy issues is −.83 (i.e., 1.288 − 2.120). Thus, in those quarters in which high-risk foreign issues are dominant, the positive impact of international tension is offset by public concern with war; in fact, during such periods the net effect is that tension is negatively related to the probability of a political use of force.

The second domestic variable, D_{2t}, relates the public's concern over foreign affairs to the level of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic balance. Based upon an estimated coefficient of +1.374 for D_{1t}, I_{2t} has no impact (−1.301 + 1.374) during quarters when foreign policy issues represent an important American public concern. The relationship between strategic balance and the use of force disappears—that is, major political uses of force are not related to the strategic balance.

It is interesting to note the significance of the change in effects of the variables between I_{2t} and I_{1t} when the two variables are modified to reflect public attention and concern, yielding the variables D_{1t} and D_{2t}. The interactive effect of public concern completely changes the nature of the relationships found at the "international" level with regard to tension and the strategic balance. This provides one more piece of evidence to underscore the contention that the political use of force is a decision undertaken with reference to domestic as well as international contextual factors.

The third domestic variable, D_{3t}, indicates that immediate postwar periods are marked by substantially reduced propensities to use force. The similarity in the magnitude of the coefficients for I_{3t} and D_{3t} suggests that the termination of a war does not have an abrupt impact on the political use of force; instead, a significant inhibiting effect of the war experience lingers on for a considerable period of time. It also suggests that the inhibiting effects of past wars decline with the passage of time.

The final domestic variable, D_{4t}, economic misery, also proves important. The estimated coefficient of .18, which is statistically significant, indicates that the cumulative normal function increases by one standard deviation for every five-point increase in the weighted misery index. When evaluated in terms of the impact of a standard deviation change, it is clear that a one standard deviation change (3.23 on the weighted misery index) leads to substantial changes (±.20) in the probability of using force. The magnitude and importance of this coefficient imply that the president is more prone to use force in times of economic stress.

Finally, turning to the effects of political leadership factors upon presidential decisions, the coefficient for P_{1t} suggests that the higher the level of presidential approval, the more likely the president will be concerned with the possibility that the use of force, if unsuccessful, could reduce his personal resources. The value of .09 indicates that the cumulative normal function will increase nine-tenths of a standard deviation for every 10 rating points in the polls. Note that a president's approval rating is the most important variable in the model from a statistical point of view.[15] Holding all else equal, a one standard deviation change in approval (13 rating points) can lower or raise the probability of the use of force by .35 and .41 respectively. Since changes of 13 points or more in approval do occur frequently, a good deal of the impetus for the large swings in the propensity to use force can be traced to the presidential approval rating.

The estimated coefficient for overall presidential success, P_{2t}, indicates that each 10-point decline during a president's tenure in office increases the cumulative normal function by six-tenths of a standard deviation. It demonstrates, however, that the probability of use does not decline in the face of falling approval as rapidly as the coefficient of P_{1t} suggests. That is, the more negative the president's overall record in office (as represented by declining popular support), the more likely he is to act in the absence of a popularity buffer. For example, taking the constant term and coefficients of approval and overall success from Table 1, we find that, *ceteris paribus*, $Pr(Y_t = 1) < .50$ when $P_{1t} < 43$, assuming that 70 is the high point of P_{1t} for the term and all other variables equal zero. If we take approval and overall success together while holding all other variables at zero, three "zones" relating to use are suggested: (1) when $P_{1t} > 58$, the probability of the use of force is greater than .67—hence the president has a buffer of popular support that will enable him to act; (2) when $P_{1t} < 43$, the probability of the use of force is less than .50, indicating that in the absence of other factors the president is unlikely to use force at all; and (3) when $58 > P_{1t} > 43$, the president may use force in anticipation of being able subsequently to regain some of his lost approval. All in all, the president's absolute and relative level of approval has a startling, very interesting, and significant impact on probability that he will use force in a political fashion.

The final variable in the model, P_{3t}, was designed to detect an electoral rhythm in the political use of force. Although the coefficient for this variable fails to achieve statistical significance, it is of substantive interest. According to the estimated version of our model, the cumulative normal score increases by .49 during each quarter prior to a national election, indicating a positive electoral cycle impact upon decisions involving the political use of major force.

As indicated earlier, it is difficult to compare our enterprise with Stoll's (1984) study. He focuses solely upon presidential reelection campaigns, finding some support for his hypothesis that during those reelection campaign periods occurring while the U.S. is also fighting a major war abroad there would be an increase in the certain uses of force for political purposes. Our model, on the other hand, is broader in scope, not only in its inclusion of a wider range of international and domestic factors, but also in its inclusion of all congressional election periods, and has quite different operationalizations for many key variables. On the whole, however, we would tend to suggest that the impact of electoral concerns would be quite subsidiary to the president's other, more influential, pressures and considerations.

Overall Explanation

Recall that the specification of the president's decision rule was based on locating environmental configurations conducive to the use of force. By implication, we expect a cybernetic decision maker to reach the same decision whenever the composite environmental evaluation remains below (or above) the threshold. This, in turn, leads us to expect extended periods, or eras, in which similar decisions persist.

Figure 1 presents the predicted values of

Figure 1. Propensity to Use Major Force



$Pr(Y_t = 1)$ over the 1949–1976 period. Turning to a consideration of the ebb and flow of presidential decisions to use force, as reflected in the changing probabilities, we find there are apparently three distinct eras in U.S. decisions to use major force for political purposes. The first period runs from 1949 through mid-1953, and is marked by values of $Pr(Y_t = 1)$ far below .50. The dominance of the decision not to use force is due to low values of presidential approval, the Korean War, and the fact that the American public identified high-risk foreign policy issues as the most important problem facing the country during these years. The second period, which runs from mid-1953 through 1965, is dominated by values of $Pr(Y_t = 1)$ well above .50. Our explanation for the relative frequency with which force was predicted and used during this period is based on high presidential approval ratings and the absence of war, creating an environment in which the U.S. president could operate in a relatively unrestricted fashion in the foreign policy arena. The third period runs from 1966 to 1976 and is marked by very low values of $Pr(Y_t = 1)$. These predictions result from low values of approval, reduction in international tension, and the ongoing and residual effects of the Vietnam War. Thus, the cybernetic model provides a clear explanation for the extended periods over which presidential decisions with respect to the major use of force did not change.

The rather wide fluctuations in the predicted probability of using force in each quarter during the 1949–1976 period provide ample indication of the tremendous impact of the international, domestic, and political arenas on foreign policy decision making. In spite of the wide fluctuations, the observed behavior is predicted to remain quite stable. These results, when interpreted from a cybernetic perspective, provide support for the proposition that the president is predisposed to use force or not use force based upon the current state of the environment. While the present analysis sheds no light on decision making in specific instances, it does provide a clear indication of the importance of contextual environmental factors on the likelihood that a president will use force each quarter.

Conclusions

The model presented in this paper produces a general, comprehensive explanation in which the political use of force by the U.S. is viewed as a presidential decision determined by a limited number of international, domestic, and political/personal factors. The cybernetic decision-making perspective and the model developed on this basis have credibility and deserve further consideration. Certainly, there is support for the proposition that the use of force is a presidential decision that resides in a decidedly political context. First, the decision is influenced by all three of the environments within which the president is assumed to operate. Second, the international variables are not the single most important contextual determinant of decisions on the use of force. Third, the effect of the international variables, when modified to account for domestic public perceptions, was dramatically altered. Fourth, political leadership factors appear to play a very prominent role in establishing the propensity to use force. In fact, the absolute and relative levels of popular support turn out to be the most important influence on the political use of major force.

Therefore, our cybernetic model of presidential decision making provides a substantively-based explanation for decisions to use force during the entire 28-year period spanning six presidents. If the time series displayed in Figure 1 is divided according to presidential terms, one can calculate the mean predicted probability value for the quarterly political use of force by each president. Doing so yields

Table 2. Analysis of Model Predictions According to Presidential Term

Presidential Term	Predict=1 Actual=0	Predict=0 Actual=0	Predict=1 Actual=1	Predict=0 Actual=1	% Correct
Truman	0	14	0	2	88
Eisenhower	6	6	17	3	72
Kennedy	3	1	7	1	67
Johnson	3	7	8	2	75
Nixon	0	15	2	5	77
Ford	1	5	2	2	70
Total	13	48	36	15	75

Note: Percentage of nonuses predicted correctly = 79%; percentage of uses predicted correctly = 71%.

quarterly predicted propensities of .15 for Truman, .58 for Eisenhower, .73 for Kennedy, .54 for Johnson, .26 for Nixon, and .48 for Ford. There are thus substantial variations among presidents. Kennedy, for instance, was seen to be likely to use major force for political purposes in three of four quarters; that is, Kennedy was five times as likely to make such decisions as Truman.

Table 2 provides information on the number of correct and incorrect predictions on a term-by-term basis for the presidents. The percentage predicted correctly across all presidencies is remarkably stable: about 75%. Two patterns in these predictions are worth noting. On one hand, the model appears to err by predicting a use of force when there was none more often in those quarters prior to 1964 than in those after 1964. On the other hand, the error of predicting no use of force when there actually was one occurs most frequently for those quarters after 1964. It should be emphasized again, however, that our model assumes common decision-making behavior for all presidents.

There are a number of features of the prediction errors made by our cybernetic model that merit special attention. Table 3 divides these incorrect predictions into two groups based upon the type of prediction error made by the model. The left-hand column lists those quarters in which a use of force was predicted when there was no such use; this type of error occurred more frequently prior to 1964 and most often during the Eisenhower presidency. An in-depth analysis of presidential decision making during these quarters would provide some insight into the genesis of the decision against the use of force. There are at least two possible explanations for these mistakes. First, on the surface, it would appear that although tensions ran high and the U.S. maintained a superior strategic position throughout the Cold War of the 1950's, presidents were somewhat adverse to risk, and were not always willing to capitalize on these circumstances by using the military for political purposes. Second, it could be the case that there were no opportunities to use force in a political fashion.

The right hand column, in Table 3, lists the actual uses of force not predicted by the model. The events represented by these errors share three obvious characteristics. First, a majority were initiated by other international actors: The problems surrounding the assassination of Diem, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the Czechoslovakian invasion, the EC-121 being shot down, the Mayaguez incident, and the North Korean attack in 1976 were all unanticipated by the U.S. Second, a number of the missed predictions involve events surrounding the Korean and Vietnam wars. While in subsequent analyses

Table 3. Listing of the Model's Incorrect Predictions, 1949–1976

Use of force predicted when none occurred			Actual use of force not predicted		
Quarter	Year	President	Quarter	Year	Event Number
			3	1950	30
			1	1951	31
1	1953	Eisenhower			
			2	1954	41
1	1956	Eisenhower			
			3	1954	42
4	1958	Eisenhower			
			2	1956	51
			4	1963	133
1	1960	Eisenhower			
2	1960	Eisenhower			
3	1960	Eisenhower			
			2	1967	174
4	1961	Kennedy			
1	1962	Kennedy			
			3	1968	179
			2	1969	182
3	1962	Kennedy			
			1	1971	192
4	1965	Johnson			
			2	1972	198
2	1966	Johnson			
			4	1972	199
3	1966	Johnson			
			1	1973	200, 201
1	1976	Ford			
			2	1975	218
			2	1976	225

most of these uses may be eliminated as components of the larger U.S. South Asian war, for this initial venture we performed a straightforward secondary analysis of the Blechman and Kaplan data set of nuclear-capable or major-level force incidents. Third, several "missed" predictions were events that became extremely important and very visible because of wide publicity and public attention. Consequently, whether or not the president "wished" to use force, based on his assessment of contextual factors as set out in the model, immediate short-term pressures may have exerted overriding influences toward the use of force.

This raises two final points that must await examination in further research. One omission from the present analysis is a consideration of the "opportunity to use force." We chose to focus instead on the general context in which use of force decisions were made. However, having shown that the context is an important determinant of presidential decision making, in subsequent research we turn to the development of the concept of *opportunity* and an operational procedure for the identification of such incidents. In conceptual terms, an *opportunity* is a set of circumstances in which the president considered using force of some kind to achieve U.S. interests. While we cannot know actual presidential considerations, we can assemble a set of events about which we can reasonably assume that the use of force was a considered option. Previous research suggests that factors such as a threat to U.S. security, endangerment of U.S. personnel and civilians abroad, a threat to a state with U.S. security commitments, a threat to a state in which the U.S. has interests, a threat to a state that receives U.S. security and/or economic assistance, a threat to U.S. economic interests, a threat posed by "communist" elements, or any one of a set of moves by a major opponent could be representative features of the class of opportunities to use force. In this regard, it will also be important to focus on the region in which the opportunity takes place. Construction and collection of an opportunity set will necessitate extensive research in presidential writings, government documents, and in data archives. However, such efforts are necessary, because a decision-making model cannot be said to be applied satisfactorily if its only referents or applications are those incidents in which a positive decision was made to employ force. The research reported on in this paper provides a necessary first step towards this larger goal.

Second, the Blechman and Kaplan data set ends in 1976. Arguably the 1977-1984 period—which saw, among other incidents, the hostage rescue attempt in Iran, the Marines in Lebanon, and the invasion of Grenada—is a very interesting one. It is imperative that we obtain the data necessary to identify all of the major or nuclear-capable uses of force for this period. Once this data is available, it will be possible to test the predictive capacities of our model, as well as to determine whether the recent upsurge in uses of force in the Reagan administration is due to the peculiar nature of the president, or whether this propensity to use force is consistent with the ebb and flow of the post-World War II era.

Appendix: Nuclear-Capable or Major Uses of Force, 1949-1976

Event Number[a]	Force Level[b]	Quarter[c]	Year[c]	Description[d]
29	1	3	1950	Korean War: Security of Europe
30	3	3	1950	Political developments in Lebanon
31	3	1	1951	Security of Yugoslavia
38	2	3	1953	End of war in Korea
39	1	3	1953	Security of Japan/Korea
40	3	1	1954	France-Viet Minh War: Dienbienphu
41	1	2	1954	Guatemala accepts U.S.S.R. aid
42	3	3	1954	France-Viet Minh War: Dienbienphu
43	3	3	1954	British airliner shot down by China
44	1	3	1954	China-Taiwan: Tachen Islands
46	3	4	1954	Accord on Trieste
48	3	3	1955	Austrian State Treaty
51	3	2	1956	British General Glubb ousted in Jordan
52	3	3	1956	Egypt nationalizes Suez Canal
53	1	4	1956	Suez crisis
56	3	1	1957	Political-Military crisis: Indonesia
57	2	1	1957	Political-Military crisis: Jordan

Appendix (continued)

Event Number[a]	Force Level[b]	Quarter[c]	Year[c]	Description[d]
61	3	3	1957	China-Taiwan conflict
62	2	3	1957	Political developments: Syria
63	3	4	1957	Indonesia-Netherlands crisis
65	3	1	1958	Political-Military crisis: Indonesia
66	2	2	1958	Political crisis: Lebanon
69	1	3	1958	Political crisis: Lebanon
70	1	3	1958	Political crisis: Jordan
71	1	3	1958	China-Taiwan: Quemoy-Matsu
75	2	1	1959	Security of Berlin
78	1	2	1959	Security of Berlin
79	3	3	1959	China-Taiwan conflict
80	3	3	1959	Civil war: Laos
82	3	4	1959	Political developments: Cuba
91	3	4	1960	Cuba supports insurgents: Guatemala and Nicaragua
96	2	1	1961	Civil war: Laos
99	2	2	1961	Trujillo assassinated
102	1	2	1961	Security of Berlin
103	3	3	1961	Security of Kuwait
110	3	2	1962	Civil war: Laos
114	1	3	1962	Cuban Missile Crisis
119	3	2	1963	Civil war: Yemen
121	3	2	1963	Withdraw missiles: Turkey
122	3	2	1963	Political crisis: Jordan
123	3	2	1963	Civil war: Laos
125	3	2	1963	Buddhist crisis in South Vietnam
133	3	4	1963	Assassination of Diem
136	3	1	1964	Security of Panama Canal
138	2	1	1964	Cyprus-Greece-Turkey crisis
139	3	1	1964	Coup in South Vietnam
143	2	2	1964	Civil war: Laos
149	3	3	1964	Cyprus-Greece-Turkey crisis
151	2	3	1964	North Vietnam fires on U.S. ship in Tonkin Bay
155	3	4	1964	Viet Cong attack Bien Hoa barracks
157	3	1	1965	Viet Cong attack Pleiku
158	3	1	1965	Viet Cong attack Qui Nhon
159	2	2	1965	Civil war: Dominican Republic
163	3	3	1965	War in Vietnam: Withdraw troops from Europe
164	3	3	1965	Political developments: Cyprus
166	3	3	1967	Civil war: Dominican Republic
174	3	2	1967	Arab-Israeli War
178	1	1	1968	Pueblo seized by North Korea
179	2	3	1968	Invasion of Czechoslovakia
182	2	2	1969	EC-121 shot down by North Korea
189	2	2	1970	Civil war: Jordan
192	3	1	1971	Withdraw troops from South Korea
198	2	2	1972	North Vietnamese offensive in South Vietnam
199	3	4	1972	Break down of peace talks: North Vietnam
200	3	1	1973	Civil war: Laos
201	3	1	1973	Civil war: Cambodia
205	1	4	1973	Arab-Israeli War
210	3	3	1974	Cyprus-Greece-Turkey crisis
216	2	3	1975	Collapse of regime in South Vietnam

Appendix (continued)

Event Number[a]	Force Level[b]	Quarter[c]	Year[c]	Description[d]
218[e]	2	2	1975	Cambodia seizes Mayaguez
225[e]	1	2	1976	North Koreans attack demilitarized zone

[a]Taken from Blechman and Kaplan (1978).

[b]Taken from Blechman and Kaplan (1978).

[c]Refers to the quarter and year in which the U.S. became involved.

[d]Taken from Blechman and Kaplan (1978).

[e]These numbers are taken from the ICPSR code book and are different from those reported in Blechman and Kaplan (1978).

Notes

The authors wish to thank Kriss Ostrom, Brian Ostrom, Dennis Simon, and Marita Kaw for their many suggestions and critical evaluation of this paper. A previous version of this paper was presented at the 1982 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Denver, CO. The research was funded by the National Science Foundation, Grant No. SES-8309703. We acknowledge the support of the Graduate School of the University of Minnesota and the College of Social Science of Michigan State University in providing funds to facilitate early stages of the project.

1. The already noted Blechman and Kaplan (1978) study is the first to catalog, categorize and study U.S. uses of force in a systematic fashion. Several authors, while employing the phrase "use of force" and constructing theoretical explanations that could apply more broadly, have focused their empirical efforts exclusively upon U.S. postwar direct military interventions (e.g., Pearson, 1974; Tillema, 1973; Tillema and van Wingen, 1982; Weede, 1978). George, in his work on "coercive diplomacy" with Hall and Simons (1971), in his work on deterrence with Smoke (1974), and in his own extensive work on presidential decision making (1980a and 1980b), has illuminated various questions and cases of relevance to this subject. Much has been written on crises (e.g., Holsti, 1972; Lewis, 1981; Snyder and Diesing, 1977, and on "noncrisis" decision making (e.g., Allison, 1971; Halperin, 1974; Steinbruner, 1974, but decisions to use force "fall between the cracks" of these studies. Krasner (1978) briefly considers the use of force by the U.S. government to advance commercial interests, but finds no empirical examples.

2. Bleckman and Kaplan (1978, pp. 49-50) identify five levels of force. The three highest entail the use of a strategic nuclear unit and/or a major force component. A *major force component* consists of (*a*) two or more aircraft carrier task groups, (*b*) more than one ground batallion, or (*c*) one or more combat wings.

3. We have chosen to restrict our attention to post-1948 uses of force (*a*) to focus on complete presidential terms, and (*b*) to avoid any contamination caused by immediate post–World War II foreign policy activities. In spite of the fact that many interesting events have taken place since 1976, our reliance on the Blechman and Kaplan data limits our analysis to pre-1977 uses of force.

4. Most certainly, cognitive processes and individual personality will have an impact on presidential decision making. Rather than assert that these factors are unimportant, we simply have chosen to look to the environmental connection first.

5. Insofar as the absolute level of support is concerned, the higher the president's popularity, the more likely it is he will have a popularity buffer that might increase his propensity to accept the risk of failure. With respect to overall success, it is our contention that declining *relative* success may lead the president to take some type of military action. Consequently, the negative impact of declining political success.

6. Note should be made of a recent article by Stoll (1984, p. 234) hypothesizing that if the U.S. is involved in or "close to" a war at the time of a reelection campaign, there will be an increased likelihood of "visible uses of military force." Our argument, therefore, runs counter to Stoll's.

7. We assume that this scale is continuous and ranges from $-\infty$ to $+\infty$.

8. We realize that questions can be raised about the exclusion of "nonmajor" uses of force. For example, the use of the Sixth Fleet in Cyprus in July 1974 is included, whereas the August 1967 display has been omitted. Whereas the former was coded as a "three," the latter was coded a "four." Rather than raise questions about the restrictions, we have opted for a straightforward secondary analysis using the original Blechman and Kaplan codes.

9. The measure is constructed as follows. We sum U.S.→U.S.S.R. and U.S.S.R.→U.S. directed conflict. From that we subtract U.S.→U.S.S.R. and U.S.S.R.→U.S. directed cooperation. The difference is divided by the sum of directed conflict and cooperation, creating an index which ranges from −1 to +1.

10. For the years prior to 1955, it is assumed that the U.S.S.R., with its limited airforce capabilities, posed no direct strategic threat to the U.S. (e.g., Kilmarx, 1962; Lee, 1961).

11. In statistical terms, the coefficients for D_{1t} and D_{2t} represent the change of the impact of tension and balance when the public is concerned about high-risk foreign policy issues. By including these interactive variables, the relationship between international tension and strategic balance on one hand and the probability of using force on the other is subject to change. The impetus for the change is public opinion.

12. There is a theoretical and methodological issue that deserves special attention before we proceed: the possibility of a simultaneous relationship between the $Pr(Y_t=1)$ and P_{1t}. There are three reasons that lead us to reject this possibility and hence to estimate equation (3) separately, without reference to an approval equation. First, it is our contention that the relationship between $Pr(Y_t=1)$ and P_{1t} is recursive; that is,

$$P_{1t} \rightarrow Pr(Y_t=1) \rightarrow P_{1t+1}.$$

Second, the impact of the relationship $Pr(Y_t=1) \rightarrow P_{1t+1}$ is mediated by other considerations. Previous research (Ostrom and Simon, 1985) suggests that the impact of dramatic international events is proportional to the extent of the media coverage given to the event. Thus, on an a priori basis, it seems clear that there will be no direct relationship between $Pr(Y_t=1)$ and P_{1t+1}. Finally, the time gradient is too coarse to allow us to discern a simultaneous relationship. It is not possible to tell empirically whether force leads approval or vice versa. At this juncture it seems safe to proceed with the estimation of the single equation.

13. To create the instruments required the following computation:

$$I_{iv} = 1.228{*}I_{1t} - 1.301{*}I_{2t} - .198{*}I_{3t}$$

$$D_{iv} = -2.120{*}D_{1t} + 1.374{*}D_{2t} - .202{*}D_{3t} + .180{*}D_{4t}$$

$$P_{iv} = .087{*}P_{1t} + .058{*}P_{2t} + .491{*}P_{3t}.$$

When the $Pr(Y_t=1)$ is estimated using the three instruments, the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) for each instrument is equal to 1.000. The standard deviation of the underlying scale (Y^*_t) and of each instrument were used to compute the estimated beta weights (McKelvey and Zavoina, 1975, p. 115).

14. Using the estimated coefficients and the mean values for each of the independent variables, we determined that the probability of using major force is .44. While holding all variables at their mean value, we calculated the change in the probability of use that results from each variable evidencing both a plus and minus one standard deviation change from its mean. The two columns in Table 1 represent the probability enhancement and decrement brought on by these changes.

15. This finding is confirmed by Blechman and Kaplan's (1978, p. 27) result that, in bivariate terms, approval was most highly correlated with the use of force.

References

Aldrich, John, and Forrest Nelson. 1984. *Linear Probability, Logit, and Probit Models.* Beverly Hills: Sage.

Allison, Graham. 1971. *Essence of Decision.* Boston: Little, Brown.

Azar, Edward W. 1982. *Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), 1948–1978: Daily Events Record.* Ann Arbor: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.

Barber, James. 1977. *The Presidential Character.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Blechman, Barry, and Stephen Kaplan, with David Hall and others. 1978. *Force Without War.* Washington, D.C.: Brookings.

Gallhofer, I., and W. Saris. 1979. Strategy Choices and Foreign Policy Decision Makers. *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 23:425–45.

Gelb, Leslie, and Richard Betts. 1979. *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked.* Washington, D.C.: Brookings.

George, Alexander. 1980a. Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in US Foreign Policy. In Ole Holsti, Randolph Siverson, and Alexander George, eds., *Changes in the International System.* Denver: Westview Press.

George, Alexander. 1980b. *Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy.* Denver: Westview Press.

George, Alexander, and Richard Smoke. 1974. *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy.* New, York: Columbia University Press.

George, Alexander, David Hall, and William Simons. 1971. *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy.* Boston: Little, Brown.

Halperin, Morton. 1974. *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy.* Washington, D.C.: Brookings.

Holsti, Ole. 1972. *Crisis, Escalation, and War.* Montreal: McGill University Press.

Holsti, Ole, and James Rosenau. 1984. *American Leadership in World Affairs.* Boston: Allen & Unwin.

Kegley, Charles W., Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf.

1982. *American Foreign Policy: Patterns and Process*, 2d ed. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Kilmarx, Robert. 1962. *A History of Soviet Air Power.* New York: Praeger Publishers.

Krasner, Stephen. 1978. *Defending the National Interest.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lebow, Richard. 1981. *Between Peace and War.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lee, Asher. 1961. *The Soviet Air Force.* London: G. Duckworth.

McKelvey, Richard, and William Zavoina. 1975. A Statistical Model for the Analysis of Ordinal Level Dependent Variables. *Journal of Mathematical Sociology*, 4:103–20.

Mahoney, Robert. 1976. American Political-Military Operations and the Structure of the International System. Presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association.

Maoz, Zeev. 1981. The Decision to Raid Entebbe. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 25:677–708.

Mueller, John. 1973. *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion.* New York: Wiley.

Neustadt, Richard. 1980. *Presidential Power.* New York: Wiley.

Ostrom, Charles. 1978. A Reactive Linkage Model of the US Defense Expenditure Policy-Making Process. *American Political Science Review*, 72: 941–57.

Ostrom, Charles, and Dennis Simon. 1985. Promise and Performance: A Dynamic Model of Presidential Popularity. *American Political Science Review*, 79:334–58.

Pearson, Frederic. 1974. Geographic Proximity and Foreign Military Intervention. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 18:432–60.

Prados, John. 1982. *The Soviet Estimate.* New York: Dial Press.

Schell, Jonathan. 1976. *Time of Illusion.* New York: Vintage Books.

Simon, Herbert. 1959. Theories of Decision Making in Economics. *American Economic Review*, 49: 253–83.

Simon, Herbert. 1969. *Sciences of the Artificial.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

Simon, Herbert. 1979. *Models of Thought.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Snyder, Glenn, and Paul Diesing. 1977. *Conflict Among Nations.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Squires, Michael L. 1982. Modeling the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Arms Race. Ph.D. diss., Indiana University.

Steinbruner, John. 1974. *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Stoll, Richard. 1984. The Guns of November. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 28:231–46.

Tillema, Herbert. 1973. *Appeal to Force.* New York: Crowell.

Tillema, Herbert, and John Van Wingen. 1982. Law and Power in Military Intervention. *International Studies Quarterly*, 26:220–50.

Tufte, Edward. 1978. *Political Control of the Economy.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Weede, Erich. 1978. US Support for Foreign Governments on Domestic Disorder and Imperial Intervention 1958–1965. *Comparative Political Studies*, 10:497–527.

Wills, Garry. 1982. *The Kennedy Imprisonment.* Boston: Little, Brown.

Charles W. Ostrom, Jr. is Associate Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824.

Brian L. Job is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455.

CANDIDATES AND POLICY IN UNITED STATES SENATE ELECTIONS

GERALD C. WRIGHT, JR.
MICHAEL B. BERKMAN
Indiana University

*This analysis demonstrates that policy issues play an important role in the selection of members of Congress. We differ with the conclusion of much of the existing research on congressional elections, which indicates that policy considerations are of minor importance. We have conducted an analysis of the 1982 U.S. Senate elections, drawing on data from the CBS News/*New York Times *1982 congressional poll and from 23 statewide exit polls. We demonstrate that (1) candidates behave as though they believe issues are important to voters; (2) candidates' policy positions systematically influence voters' decisions; and (3) candidates' issue positions and voters' evaluations of the president and the economy interact to provide clear patterns of policy effects on Senate election outcomes. Policy effects are substantial and systematic in Senate elections, and cannot be omitted if we are to appreciate the importance of congressional elections in the national policy-making process.*

Research on congressional elections has grown substantially, although unevenly, in the last decade. The several strands of research on congressional elections do not currently add up to a full picture of the interactions among candidates, voters, and national issues in House and Senate contests. We have learned a great deal about incumbency and the impact of economics in congressional elections, especially House elections, but little about the impact of policy generally, and even less about Senate elections in particular.

We approach legislative elections with the assumption that their major function is the selection of alternative sets of policy makers. This perspective implies the need to consider and explain the issue stances of candidates as well as voters' choices, and to consider more broadly the role of policy in congressional elections. Previous work that takes this view suggests policy plays a part in congressional elections. We know, for example, that opposing candidates for House and Senate seats usually represent substantial policy alternatives (Backstrom, 1977; Erikson and Wright, 1985; Sullivan and O'Connor, 1972), and that who wins makes a difference in the types of policies enacted (Brady and Lynn, 1973; Brady and Sinclair, 1984; Wright, 1986). We also know from aggregate-level cross-sectional studies that there is considerable correspondence between the general liberalism or conservatism of House incumbent issue positions and various measures of district ideology (Erikson, 1971; Erikson and Wright, 1980, 1985; Schwarz and Fenmore, 1977). In aggregate time-series studies, researchers find that economic conditions and evaluations of the president explain changes in the two-party House and Senate vote from one election to the next (Hibbing and Alford, 1982; Kramer, 1971; Tufte, 1978). The evidence for policy congruence between represen-

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 80 NO. 2 JUNE, 1986

tatives and constituents, and the pattern of voters "punishing" the presidential party for poor economic or presidential performance argue that elections do provide a policy linkage between voters and Congress.

In spite of these studies, the predominant message in the recent burst of congressional elections research is that policy factors are not important to voters. One reason for this conclusion is a matter of emphasis. Most of the recent attention to candidates has been on their service, contacting, and advertising activities rather than on issues (Abramowitz, 1980; Hinckley, 1980a; Mann and Wolfinger, 1980; Parker, 1980; and many others). This is consistent with the research agenda set by the mystery of the "vanishing marginals" and the apparent increased advantages of incumbency in House contests (Mayhew, 1974; cf. Jacobson, 1985). However, this collective concern with incumbency has been a major factor shaping the common wisdom that policy considerations are rather unimportant in congressional elections.

This conclusion is reinforced by analyses of the information voters have about candidates. Issues and ideology do not loom large in the electorate's images of Senate and House candidates. Most of what voters have to say about candidates concerns service, integrity, experience, and other nonpolicy attributes (Abramowitz, 1980; Hinckley, 1980a; Mann, 1978; Mann and Wolfinger, 1980). Policy thus plays a distinctly secondary role in explaining individual candidate choice. In competing against other aspects of candidate image or even party identification, policy issues are not high on the list of predictors of individual votes. But does this mean that policy plays an insignificant role in the overall electoral process? We argue it does not. The purpose of this paper is to develop and test a model of the interactions of candidate issue strategies and voter decision making. We assess the model at the level of candidates and at the level of voters. We then show how candidate strategies combine with economic and presidential evaluations to shape the pattern of election outcomes.

We look, in this paper, at Senate elections. Abramowitz (1980) and Hinckley (1980b) both argue that voters know more about Senate than House candidates. Since the challenger is better known, more experienced, and national issues are more important in Senate than in House elections, senatorial contests are a logical first place to look for the policy linkages between candidate issue strategies and presidential performance and voter decisions. We discuss later how House elections might compare to the findings reported here.

Theoretical Perspective: The Strategic Problems of Candidates and Voters

To consider the linkage between members' behavior and the process by which they are selected, we develop an approach that focuses on the policy strategies of candidates and voters. We begin by thinking about the goals and constraints working on candidates and on voters in senatorial elections. Our approach is narrower than others, in that we purposely ignore some important factors: we are not concerned here with candidate personalities, with voter psychology, with service to the state or lack thereof, with media usage and coverage, or with campaign spending. Our approach is broader, however, because we try to see policy as part of the larger electoral process—encompassing the perspectives of candidates and voters—and to see how these combine to shape the outcomes of U.S. Senate elections.

Candidate Strategic Problems

In the context of the general election, we assume that the overriding short-term goal of all senatorial candidates is to get elected (or reelected). Here we do not need to assume that reelection is a candidate's only goal, only that it be seen clearly as a necessary condition to accomplishing other policy or power goals (Dodd, 1977; Wittman, 1983). Convergence toward the median voter appears to be the rational vote-maximizing issue strategy under a broad array of conditions (Downs, 1957; Hinich and Ordeshook, 1970; Hinich, Ledyard, and Ordeshook, 1973). Certainly this is the case for one-dimensional issue spaces, and the recent congresses do appear to be described adequately by a single underlying liberal-conservative dimension (Poole, 1981; Poole and Daniels, 1985; Schneider, 1979; Shaffer, 1980). While convergence is a rational strategy for the general election, candidates do not in fact converge, but usually offer distinct choices to the electorate (Erikson and Wright, 1985; Poole and Rosenthal, 1984; Sullivan and O'Connor, 1972; Wright, 1978a).

One reason for the "failure" of the Downsian model is that the expectation of convergence ignores the impact of primary elections on candidate issue strategies (Wright, 1978b). The first hurdle for any candidate is to win the primary, and it is the winners of the primaries who face the larger citizenry in the general election. If voters behave sincerely rather than strategically, in the sense of voting for their most preferred candidate in the primaries, then the two parties are frequently going to offer candidates that diverge, not converge, on the ideological spectrum. The reason for divergence is the clear ideological distinctiveness of the activists and primary voters in the two parties, and perhaps the candidates' own policy preferences (Wittman, 1983). The likely winner of most Democratic primaries is going to be more liberal than is optimal for the general election, and the likely winner of most Republican primaries will be more conservative than is optimal for victory in the general election.

Aranson and Ordeshook (1972) and Coleman (1972) arrive at this conclusion on the effects of primaries from a formal perspective. On the empirical side, we have used both national surveys and state-level exit poll data to compare the ideological profiles of primary and general election voters (Wright, 1978b; Wright and Berkman, 1985). The results are as one would expect: voters in Democratic primaries are more liberal and voters in Republican primaries are much more conservative than are general election voters. We can add to this primary election factor the polarizing effects of party activists and financial supporters. Few activists or "amateurs" are moderate. Those who are well-informed and active in politics tend to have coherent belief systems (Converse, 1964), and thus cluster at the liberal and conservative poles of the ideological continuum. This is important for candidates initiating a campaign, who must begin by contending with sets of potential contributors and supporters who have little taste for the lackluster politics of moderation. Candidates thus face strong forces for ideological divergence at the same time that they would like (if only for purposes of getting votes) to appear moderate to the general electorate. The significance of the primary election and core ideological supporters is that candidates cannot easily shift positions toward the median state voter in the short-run without risking both alienation of those core supporters and charges from the opposition of being two-faced and inconsistent.

For incumbents the available evidence indicates that the adjustment in issue stances occurs two or three years before the election (Elling, 1982; Fenno, 1982);

Hibbing, 1984; Thomas, 1985). The general pattern is one of moderation in roll call voting as the general election approaches. The incumbent has an interesting strategic problem; too much movement to the middle early on could invite stronger challenges in the primary, whereas unmoderated ideological purity would offer a more tempting target for potential general election opponents. And the incumbent has to commit to an overall issue stance—by a record of roll call if nothing else—before knowing much about the actual level and intensity of the primary or general election competition that he or she will face.

The situation of the challenger is somewhat different. He or she is likely to be fresh from a contested primary and not to have the visibility and the resources for raising money that come with incumbency. While challengers would, we expect, profit from policy moderation, they may be less able to wean themselves, ideologically and financially, from their primary electorates.

Voter Strategic Problems

Elections are often seen as a means to "send them a message." The voter has the problem of how to send a precise message with just a simple X on a piece of paper or just the pull of a lever in the voting booth. In the end, the vote simply sends one candidate or the other to an office. However, there are several things voters can reasonably wish to accomplish with their ballots, and dealing with these sometimes conflicting goals gives rise to the nature of the voter's strategic problem.

We assume that most of what voters want to accomplish in senatorial voting can be summarized by three objectives. ① First, voters would like to elect the "best" representative, in the sense of one who is an effective policy maker, who shows the capacity for leadership, accomplishes things for the state, and generally has the personal characteristics and qualifications the voter associates with being a good ② senator. Second, citizens are assumed to want policy representation, in the sense of having a senator who votes and works on issues in ways that are generally consistent with the voter's own preferences on ③ the issues of the day. Third, congressional elections provide the opportunity to register sentiment about the president, his performance in office, and his handling of the economy.

Voters may frequently find that they are unable to satisfy all these goals with the same vote. A conservative who is unhappy with Reagan's economic policy may find herself confronted with a liberal incumbent with good committee assignments who is an effective advocate for her state's interests. How to vote? Obviously putting primary weight on the first and third goals would push toward a Democratic ballot, while attention to the second goal pushes her in the direction of a GOP ballot. Voters may often face such problems in deciding what "message" to send.

Our analysis of senatorial voting takes advantage of the voters' plight to explore the way in which they respond to candidates' strategic behavior. The logic we impute to voters is straightforward: they should use the information that is relevant and easily available to achieve the three goals. For example, if nothing is known about the leadership abilities of the candidates, this goal gets less weight; if it is known that a candidate shares one's issue positions and the other candidate generally embraces the flip side on the issues, one votes for the favored candidate; and, if the candidates are seen to disagree on the president's program and his performance, then this race may be an appropriate forum for a referendum vote.

The approach here focuses on the interaction of candidates and voters. Because of the differences in the distribution of issue preferences between primary and general election voters, candidates face one set of strategic problems, while voters must decide how to weight various factors that might be relevant to their decisions in meeting competing goals. We use this interaction to explore the role of policy in Senate elections.

Data Sources and Measures

Our approach has data requirements that differ from most studies of voting in congressional elections. We need objective measures of candidate issue stances in Senate contests, as well as statewide samples of voters in these races. Both sources of data used here are from the CBS News/*New York Times* (*NYT*) data collections from the 1982 U.S. Senate elections. Candidate issue information comes from their 1982 congressional poll. In that data set, all candidates and members of Congress were sent a questionnaire tapping a variety of issue- and campaign-related items. Here we deal only with the Senate data, and in particular with scale scores derived from responses to 10 issues. The 10 items scale nicely into a single liberal-conservative dimension. Responses are summed to form a measure of policy conservatism running from −5 to +5.[1] Thus, we have for all 1982 U.S. Senators and candidates an overall measure of policy conservatism. Since responses were made during the campaign and to a major news organization, we take these responses to represent the candidates' and senators' public stands on the issues at the time of the election.

For the voters' side of the analysis, we draw on the CBS/*NYT* statewide election day exit polls. These data are different from the familiar National Election Studies (NES) surveys. Whereas the NES are personal interviews, getting in-depth information about a smaller number of voters sometime after the election, the CBS/*NYT* exit polls obtain much less information, but immediately after the election and from many more voters. Each type of data set is appropriate for different sets of questions. For our purposes, it is crucial to have large numbers of cases that are representative of the electorates of individual states. Since our theory of voter responsiveness focuses on candidate strategy as much as on voter characteristics, we require less information on voter backgrounds, perceptions, and attitudes. We trade off in-depth analysis of individual voters for the breadth afforded by the statewide *CBS/NYT* exit polls. This offers a better opportunity to assess the interactions of candidates and their electorates.

The full data set includes statewide samples for 23 of the 33 Senate races in 1982. The overall sample of these respondents is 34,516, with state samples ranging from 652 in West Virginia to over 3,000 in California. Table 1 lists all the states with 1982 Senate elections. It shows the candidates running, the *N*s for the states for which we have poll data, and the percentage of the two-party vote received by the Republican candidate.

Mark Westlye (1983) has argued that the NES-based samples of voters in Senate contests are biased toward overrepresentation of "hard fought" elections that occur in the larger states. The argument that the larger states have more competitive Senate contests is born out by Hibbing and Brandes (1983). As a quick check against unwittingly reporting similar biases, we see that the mean winners' vote for the 23 states in our sample is 57.4%, while that for the full 33 states with Senate elections in 1982 was 59.2%. The omitted states are somewhat less competitive than those in the CBS/*NYT* data collection, but this is not so severe as to distort the findings offered here.

Candidate Issue Strategy

We have argued that candidates are torn between their primary and general election constituencies, but would like to

Table 1. 1982 Senate Elections and the CBS News-*New York Times* Exit Poll Surveys

State	Democratic Candidate	Republican Candidate	Number of Respondents	Republican Share of Two-Party Vote (%)
Arizona	DeConcini	Dunn	No Poll	41
California	Brown	Wilson	3,057	53
Connecticut	Moffett	Weicker	2,038	52
Delaware	Levinson	Roth	No Poll	56
Florida	Chiles	Poole	No Poll	38
Hawaii	Matsunaga	Brown	No Poll	18
Indiana	Fithian	Lugar	No Poll	54
Maine	Mitchell	Emery	1,532	39
Maryland	Sarbanes	Hogan	No Poll	37
Massachusetts	Kennedy	Shamie	2,938	39
Michigan	Riegle	Ruppe	864	42
Minnesota	Dayton	Durneburger	1,201	53
Mississippi	Stennis	Barbour	975	36
Missouri	Woods	Danforth	2,063	51
Montana	Melcher	Williams	1,391	43
Nebraska	Zorinsky	Keck	1,194	30
Nevada	Cannon	Hecht	1,158	51
New Jersey	Lautenberger	Fenwick	2,073	48
New Mexico	Bingaman	Schmitt	1,161	46
New York	Moynihan	Sullivan	2,411	35
North Dakota	Burdick	Knorr	No Poll	35
Ohio	Metzenbaum	Pfeifer	985	42
Pennsylvania	Wecht	Heinz	No Poll	60
Rhode Island	Michaelson	Chafee	1,286	51
Tennessee	Sasser	Beard	850	38
Texas	Bentsen	Collins	2,044	41
Utah	Wilson	Hatch	1,547	59
Vermont	Guest	Stafford	1,092	52
Virginia	Davis	Trible	954	51
Washington	Jackson	Jewett	No Poll	26
West Virginia	Byrd	Benedict	652	31
Wisconsin	Proxmire	McCullum	No Poll	35
Wyoming	McDaniel	Wallop	893	57

appear moderate in the general election. Let us now examine the policy choices offered by the 1982 senatorial candidates. Table 2 shows the mean policy conservatism scores for six groups of senators and candidates. Mean scores are shown by party for incumbents not running, for incumbents running in 1982, and for open-seat candidates and challengers. Comparisons either between parties or among types of candidates within a party indicate that incumbents running are more moderate than both their counterparts who are not under electoral pressure and their nonincumbent partisan colleagues. This difference is apparent for candidates in both parties, but more the case for Republicans.

Evidently, only incumbents seem to be playing the strategy of moderation. Challengers and open-seat contestants run much more as good ideological representatives of their parties than as seekers of middle-of-the-road votes. For example,

Table 2. Mean Policy Conservatism for Senatorial Incumbents and Candidates in 1982

Party	Incumbents Not Running	Incumbents Running	Challengers and Open-Seat Candidates
Republicans	3.5 (26)	1.0 (19)	3.6 (14)
Democrats	-1.4 (41)	-0.4 (11)	-2.4 (22)
Difference	4.9	1.4	6.0

Source: Computed from the 1982 CBS News/*New York Times* Congressional Poll.

Note: Scale runs from -5 to +5, with higher scores indicating policy conservatism. The number of candidates or senators in each category is shown in parentheses.

the ideological difference between the GOP and Democratic incumbents running for reelection is just 1.4, compared with the ideological distance between nonelection senators of 4.9, or the even greater distance between nonincumbents of 6.0.

These data suggest elections with relatively extreme challengers contesting more moderate incumbents. However, no consideration has been given to the ideologies of the districts, so any inferences remain tenuous. Candidates are not running from random states, but from states with distinct political cultures and traditions. We need to control for the effects of state preferences before concluding that senators moderate their issue stances in response to electoral pressures. That is, Table 2 shows that election year incumbents are more moderate than nonelection year incumbents, but are they more moderate relative to their districts?

To check this, we estimate a more complete model of senator/candidate issue positions. We assume here the workings of party activists and the primary system, so there is an overall party effect. While allowing for an overall party effect, we also acknowledge heterogeneity within the parties, and at least some of this is likely to reflect state voter preferences. Thus, within parties, there should be some relationship between senator/candidate ideology and state ideology and, perhaps, partisanship. Here we use the measures of state ideology and partisanship developed from aggregating at the state level 53 national polls taken from 1974 through 1982 (Wright, Erikson, and McIver, 1985).

If there is strategic moderation by senators, their expressed election year issue positions ought to be more moderate than those of nonelection year incumbents of the same party once state political preferences are controlled. To summarize our model of candidate issue strategy: We posit a party effect (Republicans are more conservative than Democrats), a state ideology effect (more liberal states should run more liberal candidates within both parties), and then we look for the election year pressure effects (incumbents and perhaps challengers of both parties should be more moderate than the senators of their respective parties who are not up for reelection). We also include a region effect for southern Democrats.

To assess this set of expectations we estimate the following model:

$$\begin{aligned} C = {} & a + b_1(1-P)YI + b_2(1-P)(1-I) \\ & + b_3P + b_4PYI + b_5P(1-I) \\ & + b_6(1-P)S_{11} + b_7S_I + b_8S_P \\ & + e, \end{aligned} \qquad (1)$$

where

C = senator/candidate issue conservatism (−5 to +5);

Table 3. Regression of Senator or Candidate Conservatism on State Partisanship and Ideology, by Election Year and Incumbency

Variable	Coefficient	*t*-ratio
Democratic incumbent, not running (*a*)	-5.16	-9.5
Democratic incumbent, running vs. Democratic incumbent, not running (b_1)	1.45	2.4
Democratic challenger vs. Democratic incumbent, not running (b_2)	-.25	-.4
Republican incumbent, not running vs. Democratic incumbent, not running (b_3)	4.89	8.3
Republican incumbent, running vs. Republican incumbent, not running (b_4)	-1.78	-2.9
Republican challenger vs. Republican incumbent, not running (b_5)	.94	1.8
Southern democratic challenger vs. non-southern Democratic incumbent, not running (b_6)	1.77	2.4
State ideology (b_7)	14.31	5.8
State partisanship (b_8)	-1.85	-1.1

$R^2 = .66$ $\bar{R}^2 = .64$ $N = 128^a$

Source: For senator or candidate policy conservatism, see the CBS News/*New York Times* 1982 Congressional Poll. For state ideology and partisanship, see Wright, Erikson, and McIver (1985).

Note: The first six coefficients represent differences in policy conservatism among types of candidates. Read the value of b_1, for example, as Democratic incumbents running for reelection were 1.45 points more conservative than Democratic incumbents not running, with the effects of state ideology and partisanship controlled.

[a] The *N* here is five less than in Table 2, because we do not have ideology and partisanship measures for Alaska and Hawaii.

P = party: 1 for Republican, 0 for Democrat;
Y = election year: 1 for seat up in 1982, 0 otherwise;
I = incumbency: 1 for incumbent, 0 for nonincumbent;
S_{11} = region: 1 for the 11 states of the Confederacy, 0 otherwise;
S_I = mean state ideology;
S_P = mean state partisanship; and
e = random error term.

The equation is set up this way to highlight the relationships of primary interest: strategic moderation and party differences. Specifically, if there is electoral pressure toward moderation in the general election, we expect Democrats running for reelection to be more moderate (i.e., conservative) than nonelection year Democratic incumbents (b_1 will be positive), while incumbent Republicans running will be more moderate (i.e., liberal) than nonelection year Republican senators (b_4 will be negative). Similarly, if challengers can moderate, b_2 will be positive (Democrats) and b_5 will be negative (Republicans). However, Table 2 suggests that nonincumbents are not moderate, so these coefficients could be about zero, or even have signs opposite those suggested. The overall effects of the party system, including primaries and ideologically distinct partisan supporters, can be seen in the magnitude of the party variable (b_3 should be positive). The results are shown in Table 3.

The general message from Table 3 is roughly the same as that from Table 2, where state partisanship and ideology are not controlled, but with some interesting additional information provided. Both Democratic and Republican incumbents running for reelection express more moderate issue positions than their counterparts not under election pressure. This is just a tendency, a shift toward the middle, not a case of leopards changing their spots. Interestingly, their challengers show no moderation relative to their districts at all. The signs for Democratic and Republican challengers indicate that, if anything, nonincumbents are more ideologically polarized than either set of incumbents. This, of course, is consistent with the simple mean scores in Table 2.

In addition, we see an interesting combination of party and district influences on candidate policy conservatism. The effects of party membership are positive and large. Controlling for the other factors, Republican senators who are not running are 4.9 points more conservative than their Democratic counterparts. Our model adds district ideology here, and it shows a substantial influence on candidate ideology: liberals of both parties tend to come from more liberal states. While state ideology is important, its effects here are less than the overall effects of candidate party affiliation: the standardized regression coefficient for state ideology is .34, while that for candidate party affiliation is .59. (Standardized coefficients for interaction terms do not have their usual straightforward interpretation, and hence are not presented.)

The dummy variable for southern Democratic candidates and incumbents is significant; they are more conservative than predicted on the basis of state partisanship and ideology. When this variable is omitted, the coefficient for state partisanship is significant and negative, which makes no sense. Thus, there is a regional effect not completely captured by our measures of state ideology and partisanship. The southern states produce by far the most conservative candidates (Wright, 1986).

The major message from our analysis of candidate policy strategies can now be summarized. First, there is generally a policy choice between candidates for the Senate, although this is muted by candidates' apparent efforts to moderate their issue positions for the campaign. The tendency toward moderation relative to the district holds only for incumbents; their challengers are purer ideologues. The reason is likely to be that challengers are generally fresh from primary victories, and hence still tightly tied to their primary electorates and core ideological supporters. Incumbents, in contrast, have had six years to position themselves. One interpretation is that senators use the first years of their terms to build credit with their attentive party activists and core ideological supporters, and then they moderate later in their terms to increase their general election appeal. The resources that come with incumbency seem to enable some moderation by senators while they hold off significant primary challenges. This should put them at an advantage to the extent that general election voters rely on general policy liberalism-conservatism in their decision.

Voter Responsiveness to Candidates

Do individual candidates and the policy directions they represent matter to voters, or is policy information about candidates so irrelevant, ambiguous, or even nonexistent in senatorial contests that what candidates stand for does not count in voting? Do candidate stances matter more under some circumstances than others? The CBS/*NYT* data allow us to examine some, but certainly not all, of the relationships of interest under the broad topic of policy voting. In particular, the large *N* of these polls and the questions asked permit us to assess how the policy positions of candidates influence voters. Our interest here is not in the relative effects of variables on voting (e.g., party versus issues); it is in the ways candidates influence levels of policy voting. While we believe it is reasonable, our definition of policy voting here is constrained by the items available in the CBS/*NYT* exit polls. It is the propensity of voters to use general policy liberalism-conservatism and evaluations of the president and his handling of the economy in their senatorial voting decisions.

Voter Ideology

The role of ideology—that is, liberalism or conservatism—is said to have increased over time in presidential elections, and in several pseudo-elections issues have been found to vary in importance depending on the candidates voters are asked to choose between (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, 1976, ch. 17). In House elections voters' issue liberalism was more closely related to the vote as the ideological distance between House members increased (Wright, 1978b), and the same is true for the Senate (Abramowitz, 1981). Based on these studies, and on the general knowledge gleaned from recent research on Senate contests, we expect that voters do have enough information about candidates to employ decision-making aids like partisan and ideological identifications selectively.

The basic idea here is simple, but the consequences are important. The idea is that voters will use their ideological identifications more when there is a clear ideological choice between candidates, and not use it when the candidates do not offer such a choice. This idea implies that the electorate has the ability to make reasonably fine distinctions. Whereas issues are said not to count to a significant degree in many subpresidential election studies, this hypothesis indicates that not only do they count, but that the degree to which they count is a function of the political system; here they matter to the extent that candidates take clear ideological positions. The logic here is similar to that of Hibbing and Alford (1981), who found economic conditions to have clearer effects in House elections in which an incumbent of the president's party was running. However, our formulation requires voters to respond to candidate issue positions rather than just to the party of the incumbent.

The model to test this proposition is estimated using simple product terms between the respondents' ideological identification and the candidates' policy conservatism, while including the obvious variables of party identification and incumbency to avoid major misspecification:

$$V = a + b_1P + b_2R_I + b_3D_I + b_4C_R + b_5C_D + b_6I + b_7IC_R + b_8IC_D + e \qquad (2)$$

where

V = senatorial vote: 1 if for a Republican, 0 if for a Democrat;
P = party identification: −1 for Democrats, 0 for independents, 1 for Republicans;
R_I = Republican incumbency: 1 for voters in elections with Republican incumbents, 0 otherwise;
D_I = Democratic incumbency: 1 for Democratic incumbent elections, 0 otherwise;
C_R = Republican candidate policy conservatism;
C_D = Democratic candidate policy conservatism;
I = ideology: −1 for liberals, 0 for moderates, 1 for conservatives; and
e = random error term.

Our hypothesis is that the slope for voter ideology increases as the candidates polarize—that is, the Democrat gets more liberal and the Republican gets more conservative. Our attention, therefore, focuses on the last three terms of the equation. The multiplicative variables are made interpretable by rearranging terms to determine the slope for ideology (I) (Friedrich, 1982). That is,

$$b_6I + b_7IC_R + b_8IC_D = (b_6 + b_7C_R + b_8C_D)I. \qquad (3)$$

The effect of voter ideology varies with the issue positions of candidates. For example, if both candidates are moderate,

Table 4. Probit Estimates of the Senatorial Vote on Selected Variables and the Interaction of Respondents' and Candidates' Policy Conservatism

	Probit Estimates	
Senate Vote with:	Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE)	MLE/ Standard error
Intercept (a)	0.064	2.77
Party identification (b_1)	0.805	80.33
Incumbency: Republican (b_2)	0.007	0.30
Incumbency: Democratic (b_3)	-0.387	-16.10
Republican candidate ideology (b_4)	-0.005	-1.29
Democratic candidate ideology (b_5)	-0.003	-0.71
Respondent ideology (b_6)	0.162	7.16
Respondent's ideology × Republican candidate's ideology (b_7)	0.054	11.38
Respondent's ideology × Democratic candidate's ideology (b_8)	-0.038	-6.94

$N = 33{,}200$ Estimated $R^2 = .394$

C_D and C_R would be scored zero, the last two terms would drop out, and the slope for voter ideology would equal b_6. Now let the Democrat stay put and the Republican run as an extreme conservative. C_R would now have a value of $+5$, so the slope for voter ideology would equal $b_6 + b_7(5)$.

We expect the impact of ideology to increase with the conservatism of the Republican candidate ($b_7 > 0$) and with the liberalism of the Democratic candidate ($b_8 < 0$). Table 4 shows the model estimated using probit analysis. The dichotomous dependent variable makes significance tests from OLS regression invalid (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984; Hanushek and Jackson, 1977, ch. 7). Probit is clearly more appropriate, but the probit estimates are less straightforward in their interpretation; they are the expected change in the cumulative normal probability distribution that results from unit changes in the independent variables. The last column of Table 4 shows the probit maximum likelihood estimates (MLEs) divided by their standard errors. These may be interpreted as the *t*-test in regression.

Our hypothesis is supported nicely. The signs of the "main effects" for ideology, as well as the interactions of voter ideology with candidate ideology, are in the correct direction and clearly significant. As the candidates become more polarized, the effects of voter ideology increase. This can be seen more clearly if the probit estimates are translated into probabilities. The effects of an independent variable in probit analysis changes with the values of the other independent variables. Thus, we show the effects of candidate polarization and voter ideology for each of the categories of our other independent variables, party identification and incumbency. Interestingly, incumbency did not help Republicans in 1982 (see Table 4), so no separate estimates are shown for those races.

Table 5 shows two sets of probabilities. Those on the left are estimated effects of voter ideology when both incumbents are centrists. Those on the right are our estimates for races with completely polarized candidates—a liberal Democrat versus a conservative Republican. Comparing the two columns of numbers shows the effect of candidate polarization on voters' use of

Table 5. Probabilities of a Republican Senatorial Vote, by Candidate Polarization

		Effect of Voter Ideology in Races with:	
		Moderate Democrat vs. Moderate Republican	Liberal Democrat vs. Conservative Republican
Incumbent's Party[a]	Voters' Party Identification	Difference Between Conservatives and Liberals[b]	Difference Between Conservatives and Liberals[b]
Democratic	Democratic	.068	.264
Open	Democratic	.098	.364
Democratic	Independent	.122	.444
Open	Independent	.128	.465
Democratic	Republican	.114	.423
Open	Republican	.089	.337

[a] Republican incumbents had no net advantage in the 1982 Senate elections; estimated probabilities by party identification are virtually the same as those for open-seat contests.

[b] The effect of voter ideology here is the difference between self-identified liberals and conservatives in their estimated probabilities of voting Republican. In the first row, for example, in a contest with a Democratic incumbent running for reelection where both candidates are moderates, the probabilities of a GOP vote for conservative and liberal Democrats were .167 and .099, respectively. The difference, .068, is the estimated effect of ideology.

ideology in Senate elections. The impact is marked: in the most competitive situation of independent voters casting ballots in open seat races, there is only a 13% difference between liberals and conservatives in support for the Republican. In fully polarized contests this difference increases to over 46%. Candidate polarization in effect would more than triple the weight voters give to ideological cues. The effect is less in other types of races, but in each case voter ideology is much more important when the candidates differ on the issues.

The CBS/*NYT* data permit us to look at candidate polarization and ideological voting at the state as well as the individual level. We begin with 23 separate state regressions of candidate choice on voter ideology. In these we control for party identification, for whether anyone in the respondent's household had been unemployed in the last year, and for the respondent's assessment of his or her finances compared with the last year. Figure 1 shows the relationship between the ideology slopes (which are monotonically related to the corresponding probit estimates) and candidate polarization. The pattern of state outcomes is unmistakable. As candidates differ on the issues, voters give greater weight to ideological cues in voting. This also demonstrates that the individual results shown presented above are not due to any artifactual hocus-pocus involved with our interpretation of the interaction terms. Rather, ideological choice produces ideological voters and ideological outcomes.

Before accepting the causal linkage between candidate strategy and voting, we should consider an alternative explanation. If some states have political cultures more disposed to ideological politics than others, then we might observe a correlation between candidate polarization and ideological voting even if voters were not responding to specific candidates. From this perspective, candidate polarization measures an aspect of political culture rather than the specific stimuli affecting voters. This implies that states with larger candidate distances would respond more ideologically to any reasonable political stimulus, because an ideological culture is causing both can-

Figure 1. The Importance of Voter Ideology in the 1982 U.S. Senate Elections, by Candidate Polarization



didate positioning and voting decisions. To assess this we substitute approval of Reagan for Senate vote in the equations above. Approval of Reagan is an ideologically relevant stimulus, and we find that it is strongly related to voter ideology. However, this relationship between approval of the president and ideology does not vary systematically with senatorial candidate polarization. In several tests, the weight given to voter ideology in assessments of Reagan does not vary with issue differences between Senate candidates. This gives us considerable confidence in the causal linkage between candidate strategy and voter calculus.

Evaluations of the Economy and the President

In the literature on congressional elections there is a sharp difference between findings obtained from analysts looking at aggregate time-series data and those looking at cross-sectional survey data (Kramer, 1983). The former consistently find large effects for the economy and presidential popularity. From the aggregate level, midterm elections appear policy-oriented with a distinctly national and presidential cast to the policies that are relevant (Hibbing and Alford, 1982; Kramer, 1971; Tufte, 1978). However, in individual-level studies voters seem to give little weight to their personal economic circumstances, but they do vote according to how they feel the presidential administration is doing with the economy overall (Kiewiet, 1981; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979; Kuklinski and West, 1981; Weatherford, 1983).

A question that remains largely unaddressed concerns the ways voters decide whether to "punish" candidates for an unfavorable economy or unpopular president. Most of the national level time-series studies seem to imply that candidates of the president's party are stand-ins for the administration. They get blamed —or, less often, rewarded—based on sharing party affiliation with the president, regardless of their behavior. There is a nice responsible-parties-doctrine feel to this perspective, but it does not fit well with our images of congressmen that are increasingly independent of party and presidential administrations.

A dyadic perspective of policy representation, which sees senators serving as delegates representing state rather than party interests, would argue that candidates act—and should be judged by voters —independently of the administration. If voters see their senators as *their* senators, rather than primarily as members of a party that supports or opposes the president, then citizen attitudes toward the economy and the president may not have much influence in senatorial elections. The ability of voters to differentiate among candidates' characteristics in weighting decision factors is suggested by interoffice differences in economic effects. National economic issues seem to be less important as we move toward more localized elections, where incumbency and contact effects are well known. The economy seems to have a larger impact on presidential than on congressional elections (Kiewiet, 1981), and within congressional elections economic effects are larger for incumbents of the president's party (Hibbing and Alford, 1981) and in senatorial races (Hibbing and Alford, 1982).

From these considerations, we hypothesize that the referendum model of midterm elections applies to the extent that the candidates running disagree on the president's macroeconomic policy and general performance in office. If voters are even modestly sophisticated, they are more likely to use their evaluations of the president in senatorial decisions when they have a liberal Democrat criticizing a president like Reagan and a conservative Republican telling them to "stay the course." The president is less relevant to the senatorial voting decision if the candidates take similar positions on the major issues and vis-a-vis the presidential program.

To assess the differential impact of the economy and presidential evaluations across senatorial elections, we examine three measures included in the CBS/*NYT* 1982 exit polls. Respondents were asked (1) about the effects Reaganomics had on their state, (2) whether they thought Reagan's program would eventually help or hurt the economy, and (3) about their approval of Reagan's handling of his job as president.[2] Each of these questions is explicit in mentioning the president. The first is retrospective and uses the voter's state as a focus. Evaluations of Reagan on this question were the lowest of the three measures: over 60% of those answering thought the president's economic program had hurt their state. The second item is prospective and pertains to the national economy. It was clearly not a simple projection from past behavior; over 55% thought that the president's economic program would eventually help the economy. Voters were evenly split on the third item, their approval or disapproval of the job Reagan was doing as president.

Reagan's clear conservative stance during his first two years as president means that conservative candidates are most likely to be identified with him and his program, and moderates and liberals less so. We expect, therefore, that the weight voters place on presidential evaluations in their Senate voting will vary directly with the differences between candidates.

Here the methodology is the same as that used in the previous section, but now we anticipate presidential evaluation effects to be a function of candidate ideological differences. Below are the equations we estimate. The variables and coefficients for b_1 through b_6 are the same as in the ideology analysis. We add the measures of attitude toward Reagan and his handling of the economy and we use these in the cross-product terms with candidate ideology:

$$\begin{aligned} V = a &+ b_1P + b_2R_I + b_3D_I \\ &+ b_4C_R + b_5C_D + b_6I + b_7X_i \\ &+ b_8X_iC_R + b_9X_iC_D + e, \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

where V and the first six right-hand side variables and their coefficients are the same as in the previous equation; and X_i equals one of three presidential/economic evaluation items discussed above. Each is scored -1 for an unfavorable evaluation of the president, 0 for a neutral or "don't know" evaluation, and 1 for a favorable evaluation.

In analyzing these economic/presidential evaluation items, we largely sidestep the self-interest versus sociotropic and the retrospective versus prospective voting debates (Fiorina, 1981; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979; Kramer, 1983; Kuklinski and West, 1981; Sears, Lau, Tyler, and Allen, 1980). These controversies are not directly relevant to our purposes.[3] We are interested in the selectivity with which voters reward and punish senatorial candidates for presidential management of

Table 6. Probit Estimates of Senate Vote on Selected Variables with Economic and Presidential Evaluations, by Candidate Ideology

Senate Vote with:	Reagan Effect on State	Reagan Program Help or Hurt	Job Approval
Intercept (a)	0.102	-0.041[a]	0.010[a]
Party identification (b_1)	0.631	0.584	0.560
Incumbency: Republican (b_2)	0.033[a]	-0.008[a]	-0.007[a]
Incumbency: Democrat (b_3)	-0.371	-0.381	-0.382
Republican candidate ideology (b_4)	-0.020	-0.017	-0.013
Democratic candidate ideology (b_5)	-0.022	-0.008	-0.011
Respondent ideology (b_6)	0.230	0.224	0.204
Economic and presidential evaluations (b_7)	0.406	0.434	0.410
Evaluations × Republican candidate's ideology (b_8)	0.033	0.032	0.037
Evaluations × Democratic candidate's ideology (b_9)	-0.039	-0.031	-0.036
N^b =	27,354	33,200	33,200
Estimated R^2	.480	.493	.488

[a] Coefficient is less than twice its standard error.

[b] Respondents in Massachusetts, Texas, and Vermont were not asked whether the Reagan economic program had helped or hurt their state.

the economy and the country. Thus, from the equation above, we anticipate that evaluations of Reagan will count for more as the Republican candidate becomes more conservative and as the Democratic candidate becomes more liberal. Support for this is found if $b_8 > 0$ and $b_9 < 0$.

The results for the three Reagan and Reaganomics items are shown in Table 6. The effects of evaluations of the president and his handling of the economy are substantial. Each of the Reaganomics items has a probit coefficient (b_7) of between .40 and .43, where both candidates are moderates. The signs are in the right direction for the effects of both Republican and Democratic candidate ideologies, and the interaction terms' coefficients are in the right direction and significant. The responsiveness of voters in using Reaganomics can be seen if we translate the predicted z-scores into probabilities. Let us consider how attitudes toward Reagan would influence an otherwise undecided voter—which, under probit, is where all variables will have their maximum impact. For such a voter, in an election with two moderates the difference between Reagan supporters and detractors varies between 31 and 34 percentage points in voting for the Republican candidate, depending on which item is used. And this effect increases with candidate polarization. The effects of the presidential and economic performance items are estimated to increase to between 55% and 56% for the undecided voters in elections in which a completely liberal Democrat would face an equally conservative Republican. Clearly, in the 1982 elections reactions to Reagan and the economy were important, and this importance increased among voters confronting a larger policy choice between candidates.

In this section we have found convincing evidence that voters are responsive to the issue strategies candidates pursue. As the candidates offer a clearer ideological choice, voters put more weight on their own ideological identifications and on their evaluations of the economy and presidential performance. Next we look at how these dynamics combine at the aggregate level to influence the outcomes of Senate elections.

Candidate and Economic Effects on the Outcome

The political significance of elections, for candidates, is not in whether voters base their choices on ideology and the president, but in how the candidate's own behavior affects the election outcome. We thus shift our focus and ask about the influence of candidate issue strategy on Senate election outcomes. In the process we see a significant difference in the importance of variables at the individual versus the aggregate level.

We begin by referring to Table 6 and the coefficients for the issue liberalism-conservatism of candidates. Evaluated at an expected probability of .5 (and assuming neutral attitudes toward Reagan), the largest probit coefficient is −.022. Translated into probabilities, this means a one-unit change in candidate liberalism-conservatism would change the probability of voting for the Republican by just .008—less than a 1% effect. Values of this magnitude would appear to yield the effects of candidate ideology as trivial. Indeed, were it not for the unusually large sample provided by the CBS/*NYT* exit polls, this effect would probably be lost. It would certainly not be statistically significant with the typical sample size of 1,500 or so. Such a conclusion of insignificance, however, would be a serious mistake.

To see this, let us compare voters in two hypothetical elections. We will hold all variables constant except candidate ideology. The first election has a liberal Democrat running against a moderate Republican with policy conservatism scores of −5 and 0, respectively. We can compare this to an election where a moderate Democrat opposes a conservative Republican, with policy conservatism scores of 0 and 5, respectively. Using the probit estimates in the first column of Table 6, we find a voter that otherwise had a .5 probability of voting Republican would have this rise to .544 in the contest with a liberal Democrat, and drop to .460 in the contest with a conservative Republican.[4] Thus, we get a difference due to candidate strategy of .084 (i.e., .544−.460) between the two elections. Using the coefficients from the second and third columns of figures in Table 6 yields smaller, but still important, estimates of .050 and .048. Aggregated, this means the candidate strategy differences in our two elections would produce a shift of between 5% and 8% in the vote among those most undecided, who, of course, are the crucial voters in a close election.

Given the general competitiveness of Senate contexts, this is not a small effect. We can compare this to the effects of a familiar variable such as party identification to appreciate more fully the electoral impact of candidate issue positions. At the individual level, there is no doubt that party is a more important determinant of the vote. But at the state election level, this is less obvious. To see this, we need only consider how many voters' partisan identifications we would need to change in our example to achieve a 5% shift in the vote. A 5% shift in the vote at 50% is represented by a probit change of .125. How much partisanship change is needed to bring this about? The answer is the change in the partisanship mean multiplied by the probit MLE coefficient for party identification. We use the coefficient for party identification from Table 4, (.805).[5] We would need a change in mean partisanship of .155 ($.125 = .805 \times .155$) to achieve an expected increase or decrease of 5% of the vote. Given the way party identification is scored, (−1, 0, +1), this means that over 15% of the electorate would have to change their partisanship in a uniform direction, say from Democrat to Independent and from

Independent to Republican. The entire literature on the decline of party identification that has occurred over the last 30 years rests on changes that are no larger than this 15%. We can see that the electoral significance of candidate ideology is much larger than is implied by its small individual-level coefficients.

The reason for this is an important distinction for electoral analysts. Some variables, such as party identification, are good at explaining individual voter behavior, but do not change much over time, and are not responsive to individual candidates. Thus, while they can predict individual behavior, they do not help in explaining variation from one election to the next in the same constituency. Aspects of the campaign, like candidate issue positions, may have only slight effects on most voters, and because of this can easily be overlooked altogether with our traditional design and research objectives of accounting for individual voting decisions. However, a small effect, working in the same direction across a state or district, can sum to a substantial collective weight. Our point is that candidate issue positions may be much more significant when the votes are counted than when we are trying to predict individual decisions.

Having made the point that candidate strategy can have significant effects on election outcomes, let us now assess how Reaganomics played out in the 1982 elections. In doing so we see how the strategies of candidates and voters combine with the effects of macroeconomic policy to establish a clear pattern of outcomes.

There are two aspects involved in determining the effects of presidential and economic evaluations on senatorial voting. The first is the level of mean evaluation among any group of voters, here state electorates. The second is the weight given to that evaluation in voting. These can be combined to obtain an overall estimate of the net effects on voting of any set of appropriately scored attitudinal elements (Achen, 1982; Stokes, 1966). We measure the net Reaganomics effects on a state's vote for Senator by summing the effects for the three Reagan variables considered above.[6]

The attitude and its weight are likely in this instance to be influenced by different factors. The weight is, we have argued, a function of candidate strategy. The more the candidates differ the greater should be the weight given to evaluations of Reagan and his handling of the economy. Attitudes toward Reagan, however, are likely to be a function of the voter's experience. Across states the clearest factor that would lead to different evaluations was the differential impact of the Reagan economic program. The major national issue in the 1982 elections was the economy, particularly unemployment (Clymer, 1982), and the costs of the Reagan recession were not borne equally among the states. Parts of Reagan's 1980 Sunbelt coalitions suffered less than the industrial central and northeast states of the Rustbelt. Thus, we expect the state unemployment rate to influence attitudes toward Reagan (it does but we do not show the data here), and candidate polarization to affect how much voters rely on these evaluations in casting ballots for senator.

To simplify the presentation we divide the candidate polarization variable in half (above or below a candidate issue difference of 4.5) and present the data for these "high" and "low" polarized races. The data are shown in Figure 2. The relationship between state unemployment and the impact of Reaganomics is clear in the polarized races (Figure 2-A). Attitudes toward the president had an effect when the candidates differed more on the issues, and the direction of this effect varied with state unemployment. Republican candidates lost votes where the employment rate was higher, and gained votes from evaluations of Reagan and the economy where unemployment was lower. But

Figure 2. Net Effects of Attitudes Toward Reagan and the Economy on the Senatorial Vote, by Candidate Polarization



Figure 2-B. Contests with Low Candidate Polarization

Figure 2-A. Contests with High Candidate Polarization

where the candidates were similar in their policy stances, attitudes toward the president had little effect on the election outcome (Figure 2-B). This can be seen in the nature of the scatterplots and in the steepness of the fitted regression lines: there is clearly a stronger relationship between Reagan's effect on the vote and unemployment in the polarized states.

There is an interesting lesson in these results. The effect of major national issues, such as the president's handling of the economy, may contribute to the outcome of a Senate election, but this is not just an across-the-board national judgment. For evaluations of the president to help the Democrat, the candidate needed higher unemployment and a Republican opponent who was clearly to the right. Republicans profiting from the Reagan phenomena needed lower rates of unemployment and Democrats considerate enough to stand out as a liberal alternative. The results here should caution us in generalizing about Senate elections as national referenda on the one hand or personality run-offs on the other; they can be both or a combination, and which depends to a great degree on the policy choice candidates present to their electorates.

Discussion and Conclusion

The voters in Senate elections are sensitive to the choices they are presented. Our findings suggest a calculating and somewhat sophisticated electorate that differs from the portrait presented in numerous studies of House voters. Concerning policy, it may be that there are tremendously large office effects relevant in Senate but not in House contests. However, it may also be that we have simply missed the effects of policy voting in House elections, because its predictive power is a good deal less than that of incumbency, candidate visibility, advertising, and the like. We believe this is the case (Erikson and Wright, 1980, 1985). However, direct comparisons seem to indicate that because candidates are more visible in Senate elections, policy plays a larger role there than in the House (Abramowitz, 1980; Kuklinski and West, 1981; Weatherford, 1983). Unfortunately, most of the Senate-House comparisons use NES data, which in recent years have samples that undermine such analyses (Eubank, 1985; Jacobson, 1980; Westlye, 1983).

For some time, scholars have recognized the need to go beyond generalizations about the "voter in presidential elections" or the "voter in congressional elections." Through the National Election Studies, major strides have been made in seeing and accounting for the importance of incumbency in House contests. It is probably not an overstatement to say that there cannot be any serious analysis of House elections without consideration of incumbency, any more than studies of individual voting can omit party identification. These are among the basic elements needed to describe the electoral process.

Our hope is that this paper will enhance congressional studies in a similar way by reintroducing the importance of policy. The availability of the CBS/*NYT* congressional poll and state voter exit polls has permitted us to explore a different set of questions than is the norm in congressional elections studies. In developing these, our point of departure is that although Congress is foremost a policymaking institution, most of our research has little to say about any policy linkage between elections and Congress. Our goal in this paper has been to identify and explore the policy dimension in Senate contests. Having access to the congressional poll data allows us to consider systematically candidates' issue positions. Analysis of these data demonstrated something careful congressional observers frequently report: candidates believe and act as though their issue stances matter to voters (Dodd, 1986; Fenno, 1982; Kingdon, 1981).

Accounting for candidates' issue stances, and hence the nature of the choices elections provide, requires appreciation of the crucial role of the primary system and activist supporters. Together these help to produce choices rather than echoes in congressional elections. We also find, contrary to the prevailing view, that voters act as though they are policy oriented. We see this at the individual level in the differences in the salience of ideology and presidential evaluations according to the nature of the electoral choices offered, and we find it at the aggregate level, where candidates' issue positions influence the outcomes of Senate races. We find a pattern of reward and punishment of candidates of the president's party according to how the state fared economically, but this pattern emerges only when there are clear differences between the candidates' stands on issues. There is, then, a strong connection between senators as policy makers and the electoral process by which they attain and keep that office. Policy is important for candidates, for voters, and for Senate election outcomes. It should also become important for those of us who study them.

Notes

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1985 annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Las Vegas, NV. This research was supported in part by a grant from the National Science Foundation, grant SES 83-10443. The candidate and exit poll data used in this analysis were collected by CBS News and *The New York Times*. The exit poll data were obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. We are grateful to Kathleen Frankovic and Warren Mitofsky for making the 1982 congressional poll data available, and to D. Christine Barbour for her assistance. We appreciate also the comments and suggestions offered by David Brady, Vincent Buck, Richard Fenno, Robert Huckfeldt, Richard Stoll, Rick Wilson, and Leroy Rieselbach. The authors are solely responsible for the interpretations and analysis.

1. Candidates and incumbents were asked if they favor or oppose constitutional amendments to (1)

allow individual states to prohibit abortions, (2) permit organized prayer in the public schools, and (3) require a balanced budget. In addition, they were asked about positions on (4) the Equal Rights Amendment, (5) a mutual nuclear freeze with the Soviets, (6) domestic content legislation for foreign cars sold in the U.S., (7) cancelling the July 1983 tax cut, (8) cutting back increases in military spending, (9) additional reductions in domestic social programs, and (10) regulation of air pollution. Using regular factor analysis with varimax rotation we see two factors emerge, although the second is very weak, with an eigenvalue of just 1.008. Basing the factor analysis on the preferable tetrachoric correlations yields a single factor with loadings ranging from .6 to .95. Items included in the CBS/*NYT* congressional poll that do not scale on the liberalism-conservatism dimension are positions on solving the social security funding problem and on whether arms sales ought to be used to pressure Israel to negotiate with the Palestinians.

2. The wording of the questions was (1) "Has the Reagan economic program: helped [*state name*], hurt [*state name*] or had no effect?"; (2) "Will Reagan's economic program eventually: help the economy, or, hurt the economy?"; (3) "Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as President?"

3. It strikes us that no one but a microeconomist would believe that citizens act in politics primarily in terms of narrowly defined economic self-interest. In any case, the self-interest/sociotropic distinction breaks down at the group level. What is a person called who is doing well personally, thinks Reagan's program will eventually help the nation, but votes against the Republican candidate because Reagan's program has unfairly hurt the voter's state?

4. The effect of candidate ideology in the first election is simply $-.022(-5) + .020(0) = .11$. From a table with the values for the standard normal distribution we find the probability of .0438, which is added to the initial .5 for .544. Where the Democrat is moderate and the Republican conservative we get $-.022(0) - .020(5) = -.1$, and subtract the area under the normal curve at that value (.0398) from .5 to get our probability of .460.

5. The equations that produce the coefficients in Table 6 control for the presidential evaluation items, and these could not reasonably be expected to remain constant if party identification changed. Using the larger coefficient lowers our estimate of the amount of change needed in partisanship to obtain any given shift in the vote.

6. These are calculated from individual state regressions of the vote on party ideology, unemployment, personal finances, and the three Reaganomics variables. The net effect of Reaganomics in each election is then the sum of the products of the individual state slopes and the state means of these variables.

References

Abramowitz, Alan. 1980. A Comparison of Voting for U.S. Senator and Representative in 1978. *American Political Science Review*, 74:633–40.

Abramowitz, Alan. 1981. Choices and Echoes in the 1980 U.S. Senate Elections: A Research Note. *American Journal of Political Science*, 25:112–18.

Achen, Christopher H. 1982. *Interpreting and Using Regression*. Beverly Hills and London: Sage.

Aldrich, John N., and Forrest D. Nelson. 1984. *Linear Probability, Logit, and Probit Models*. Beverly Hills and London: Sage.

Aranson, Peter H., and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1972. Spatial Strategies for Sequential Elections. In Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, eds., *Probability Models of Collective Decision Making*. Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Co.

Backstrom, Charles H. 1977. Congress and the Public: How Representative is the One of the Other? *American Politics Quarterly*, 5:411–35.

Brady, David, and Naomi Lynn. 1973. Switched-Seat Congressional Districts: Their Effect on Party Voting and Public Policy. *American Journal of Political Science*, 17:528–43.

Brady, David, and Barbara Sinclair. 1984. Building Majorities for Policy Changes in the House of Representatives. *Journal of Politics*, 46:1033–60.

Clymer, Adam. November 4, 1982. Lesson of '82 Elections: Ideology Overshadowed by Fears on the Economy. *New York Times*.

Coleman, James S. 1972. The Positions of Political Parties in Elections. In Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, eds., *Probability Models of Collective Decision Making*. Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Co.

Converse, Philip E. 1964. The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. In David E. Apter, ed. *Ideology and Discontent*. New York: Free Press.

Dodd, Lawrence C. 1977. Congress and the Quest for Power. In Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered*. New York: Praeger.

Dodd, Lawrence C. 1986. A Theory of Congressional Cycles: Solving the Puzzle of Change. In Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Leroy Rieselbach, and Lawrence C. Dodd, eds., *Congress and Policy Change*. New York: Agathon Press.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper & Row.

Elling, Richard C. 1982. Ideological Change in the U.S. Senate: Time and Electoral Responsiveness. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 7:75–92.

Erikson, Robert S. 1971. The Electoral Impact of Congressional Roll-Call Voting. *American Political Science Review*, 65:1018–32.

Erikson, Robert S., and Gerald C. Wright, Jr. 1980. Policy Representation of Constituency Interests. *Political Behavior*, 2:91–106.

Erikson, Robert S., and Gerald C. Wright, Jr. 1985. Voters, Candidates and Issues in Congressional Elections. In Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered*, 3d ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.

Eubank, Robert B. 1985. Incumbent Effects on Individual-Level Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections: A Decade of Exaggeration, *Journal of Politics*, 47:959–67.

Fenno, Richard F. 1982. *The United States Senate: A Bicameral Perspective.* Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute.

Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Friedrich, Robert J. 1982. In Defense of Multiplicative Terms in Multiple Regression Equations. *American Journal of Political Science,* 26: 797–833.

Hanushek, Eric A., and John E. Jackson. 1977. *Statistical Methods for Social Scientists.* New York: Academic Press.

Hibbing, John R. 1984. The Liberal Hour: Electoral Pressures and Transfer Payment Voting in the United States Congress. *Journal of Politics,* 46: 846–63.

Hibbing, John R., and John R. Alford. 1981. The Electoral Impact of Economic Conditions: Who is Held Responsible? *American Journal of Political Science,* 25:423–39.

Hibbing, John R., and John R. Alford. 1982. Economic Conditions and the Forgotten Side of Congress: A Foray into U.S. Senate Elections. *British Journal of Political Science,* 12:505–13.

Hibbing, John R., and Sara L. Brandes. 1983. State Population and the Electoral Success of U.S. Senators. *American Journal of Political Science,* 27:808–19.

Hinckley, Barbara. 1980a. The American Voter in Congressional Elections. *American Political Science Review,* 74:641–50.

Hinckley, Barbara. 1980b. House Reelection and Senate Defeats: The Role of the Challenger. *British Journal of Political Science,* 10:441–60.

Hinich, Melvin J., and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1970. Plurality Maximization vs. Vote Maximization: A Spatial Analysis with Variable Participation. *American Political Science Review,* 64:772–91.

Hinich, Melvin J., John O. Ledyard, and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1973. A Theory of Electoral Equilibrium: A Spatial Analysis Based on a Theory of Games. *Journal of Politics,* 35:154–93.

Jacobson, Gary C. 1980. Congressional Elections, 1978: The Case of the Vanishing Challengers. Presented at the Conference on Congressional Elections, Houston, TX, January 10–12.

Jacobson, Gary C. 1985. The Marginals Never Vanished: Incumbency and Competition in Elections to the U.S. House of Representatives, 1952–1982. Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

Kiewiet, D. Roderick. 1981. Policy-oriented Voting in Response to Economic Issues. *American Political Science Review,* 75:448–59.

Kinder, Donald R., and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1979. Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgements in Congressional Voting. *American Journal of Political Science,* 22: 495–527.

Kingdon, John W. 1981. *Congressmen's Voting Decisions,* 2d ed. Cambridge, MA: Harper and Row.

Kramer, Gerald H. 1971. Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964. *American Political Science Review,* 65:131–43.

Kramer, Gerald H. 1983. The Ecological Fallacy Revisited: Aggregate- versus Individual-Level Findings on Economics and Elections and Sociotropic Voting. *American Journal of Political Science,* 77:92–111.

Kuklinski, James H., and Darrell West. 1981. Economic Expectations and Mass Voting in United States House and Senate Elections. *American Political Science Review,* 75:436–47.

Mann, Thomas E. 1978. *Unsafe at Any Margin: Interpreting Congressional Elections.* Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute.

Mann, Thomas E., and Raymond E. Wolfinger. 1980. Candidates and Parties in Congressional Elections. *American Political Science Review,* 74:617–32.

Mayhew, David. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Nie, Norman H., Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik. 1976. *The Changing American Voter.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Parker, Glenn R. 1980. The Advantage of Incumbency in House Elections. *American Politics Quarterly,* 8:449–64.

Poole, Keith T. 1981. Dimensions of Interest Group Evaluation of the U.S. Senate 1969–1978. *American Journal of Political Science,* 25:49–67.

Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1984. The Polarization of American Politics. *Journal of Politics,* 46:1061–79.

Poole, Keith T., and R. Steven Daniels. 1985. Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S. Congress. *American Political Science Review,* 79:373–99.

Schneider, Jerrold E. 1979. *Ideological Coalitions in Congress.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Schwarz, John E., and Barton Fenmore. 1977. Congressional Election Results and Congressional Roll Call Behavior: The Case of 1964, 1968 and 1972. *Legislative Studies Quarterly,* 2:409–22.

Sears, David O., Richard R. Lau, Tom R. Tyler, and Harris M. Allen, Jr. 1980. Self-Interest vs.

Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting. *American Political Science Review*, 74:670–84.

Shaffer, William R. 1980. *Party and Ideology in the United States Congress*. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America.

Stokes, Donald E. 1966. Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency. *American Political Science Review*, 60:19–28.

Sullivan, John L., and Robert E. O'Connor. 1972. Electoral Choice and Popular Control of Public Policy. *American Political Science Review*, 66: 1256–68.

Thomas, Martin. 1984. Election Proximity and Senatorial Roll Call Voting. *American Journal of Political Science*, 29:96–111.

Tufte, Edward R. 1978. *Political Control of the Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Weatherford, R. Stephen. 1983. Economic Voting and the "Symbolic Politics" Argument: A Reinterpretation and Synthesis. *American Political Science Review*, 77:158–74.

Westlye, Mark C. 1983. Competitiveness of Senate Seats and Voting Behavior in Senate Elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, 27:253–83.

Wittman, Donald. 1983. Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories. *American Political Science Review*, 77:142–57.

Wright, Gerald C., Jr. 1978a. Issue Strategy in Congressional Elections: The Impact of the Primary Electorate. Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

Wright, Gerald C., Jr. 1978b. Candidate Policy Positions and Voting in Congressional Elections. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 3:445–64.

Wright, Gerald C., Jr. 1986. Elections and the Potential for Policy Change in Congress. In Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Leroy Rieselbach, and Lawrence C. Dodd, eds., *Congress and Policy Change*. New York: Agathon Press.

Wright, Gerald C., Jr., and Michael B. Berkman. 1985. Candidates and Policy in the 1982 U.S. Senate Elections: A Comparative State Analysis. Presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Las Vegas, NV.

Wright, Gerald C., Jr., Robert S. Erikson, and John P. McIver. 1985. Measuring State Partisanship and Ideology with Survey Data. *Journal of Politics*, 47:469–89.

Gerald C. Wright, Jr. is Associate Professor of Political Science and Michael Berkman is a graduate student at Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405.

Forthcoming in September

The following articles and research note have been scheduled tentatively to appear in the September 1986 issue:

Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson. "On the Structure and Sequence of Issue Evolution"

James Cassing, Timothy J. McKeown, and Jack Ochs. "The Political Economy of the Tariff Cycle"

Henry W. Chappell, Jr. and William R. Keech. "Political Motivation and Party Differences: A Dynamic Spatial Model of Party Competition"

Mary Dietz. "Trapping the Prince: Machiavelli and the Politics of Deception"

Bernard Grofman. "The Possibility of Faithfully Representative Committees"

Rhoda E. Howard and Jack Donnelly. "Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Political Regimes"

Peter McDonough, Samuel H. Barnes, and Antonio López Pina. "The Growth of Democratic Legitimacy in Spain"

Anthony Mughan. "Toward a Political Explanation of Government Vote Losses in Midterm By-Elections"

Charles W. Ostrom and Robin F. Marra. "United States Defense Spending and the Soviet Estimate"

Karen Rasler. "War, Accommodation, and the Process of Violence"

Harold W. Stanley, William T. Bianco, and Richard Niemi. "Partisanship and Group Support over Time: A Multivariate Analysis"

Ulmer, S. Sidney. "Are Social Background Models Time-Bound?"

CONTROVERSY

INTERPRETING THE 1974 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION

What factors best account for the 1974 congressional election results? Were the Democratic party gains in House seats due mainly to the behavior of "strategic politicians" who sought or accepted candidacies and raised effective campaign war chests? Or were the Democratic gains due more to the impact of Watergate and the economy on voters' choices? In this Controversy, *Gary C. Jacobson and Samuel Kernell defend the "strategic politicians" thesis, while Eric Uslaner and Margaret Conway stand by their more conventional accounting of the 1974 election outcome.*

In their report on "The Responsible Congressional Electorate: Watergate, the Economy, and Vote Choice in 1974," Uslaner and Conway (1985) contend that the conventional interpretation of the 1974 election—that voters treated it as a referendum on Watergate and the economy—is adequate after all. Their case rests on two lines of argument. One is that vote switches between 1972 and 1974 were associated in the expected direction with voters' reactions to Watergate and the economy. The evidence, taken from probit analyses of data from the 1972–74 panels of the National Election Study (NES), is consistent with this argument, although the effects are by no means overwhelming. Apparently they had to construct a single variable from two distinct questions—about approval or disapproval of Ford's pardon of Nixon and changes in personal finances—in order to produce a statistically significant connection between the vote and reactions to Watergate or the economy (p. 793). Contrary to their hypothesis, changes in ratings of Nixon on the "feeling thermometer" were not significantly related to either votes or vote shifts. Still, in contrast to most previous survey studies of 1974, they show that some voters apparently did react directly to national conditions in the expected manner.

Uslaner and Conway's second line of argument is an attack on our contention that the strategic decisions of candidates and contributors, guided by expectations about how Watergate and the economy would affect electoral odds, had an important effect on 1974 election results quite independent of voters' direct reactions to national issues (Jacobson and Kernell, 1983). Their claim here, however, rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of how campaign spending affects congressional elections.

The heart of their analysis is a discussion of spending ratios between types of candidates (p. 791). But ratios are meaningful comparative measures of financial strength only if the marginal effects of campaign spending are identical for incumbents, challengers, and candidates for open seats. The evidence is overwhelming that this is not the case; specifically, challengers gain far more from a given amount of campaign spending than do incumbents (Jacobson, 1985a). The Uslaner-Conway approach would, for example, equate a situation in which the average challenger and incumbent both spent $1,000 with one in which both spent $300,000. On the evidence of the last seven House elections, in the former case no challenger would ever win, while in the latter more than 20% would defeat the incumbent (Jacobson, 1985b).

The crucial figures for 1974 are not the ratios of spending by incumbent Democrats and Republicans to spending by their respective challengers, but the extraordinarily high average of $59,331 spent by Democratic challengers and the extraordinarily low average of $20,744 spent by Republican challengers. Using the expenditure coefficients estimated for our book (p. 46), which Uslaner and Conway offer as a justification for their approach (p. 790), we can project that, *with incumbent-challenger spending ratios unchanged,* had Democratic challengers spent as little as Republican challengers in 1974, their average share of the vote would have been 5.4 percentage points lower. Similarly, had Republican challengers spent as much as Democratic challengers, their average share of the vote would have been 3.4 percentage points higher. And finally, had Republicans and Democrats both matched the combined averages for both parties in 1974 ($40,157 for challengers, $63,993 for incumbents), the Democratic vote would have been 3.2 percentage points lower. This final figure is a reasonable estimate of the aggregate impact of campaign spending differences between Democratic and Republican challengers and incumbents in 1974 races for seats held by incumbents. It represents half of the 6.4 percentage point increase in the Democratic share of the two-party House vote between 1972 and 1974 in contests for these seats.

Uslaner and Conway's other test of the Jacobson-Kernell thesis produced mixed results. They find that Republican challengers' spending had a negative effect on the probability of voting for a Democratic incumbent, which is consistent with the thesis, but they find no effect for spending by Democratic challengers. They argue that this undermines the thesis, claiming, in addition—and inaccurately—that spending should have had greater effects for Democratic than for Republican challengers (p. 795). Nothing in our argument implies such asymmetry.

However, later on (pp. 799-800) they point out that the panel sample underrepresents districts with Republican incumbents and, to an even greater extent, districts with Republican incumbents who had close contests: "just four people interviewed who switched votes from 1972 to 1974 . . . resided in districts that tossed out Republican incumbents!" (p. 800). They conclude that "the bias in the sample undoubtedly attenuates the coefficients for Watergate and economic grievances" (p. 800). If so, estimates of the effects of spending by Democratic challengers in these contests will also be "attenuated." Uslaner and Conway cannot have it both ways, faulting the Jacobson-Kernell thesis when it does not fit the data, and faulting the same data when they do not support their argument.

There is, of course, an easy way to test whether Democratic challengers' expenditures affected vote shifts in Republican-held districts in 1974. By regressing the district-level vote shift on spending by the Democratic challenger and Republican incumbent, we find that Democratic challengers enjoyed an increase of about one percentage point over their party's 1972 vote share for every $11,900 they spent ($t=4.79$). The proportion of votes shifting from Republican to Democratic candidates in these districts is strongly and positively related to how much the Democratic challenger spent on the campaign.

Potential campaign contributors clearly had very different expectations about the prospects of Democratic and Republican challengers in 1974, and they distributed their money accordingly. Republican challengers that year were the most poorly financed group of challengers in any election since accurate campaign finance data have become available. Democratic challengers were, in real terms, better funded than any group of challengers prior to the 1980 Republican cohort. Recognizing the effects of campaign spending in House elections, it follows that their strategic choices contributed substantially to overall Democratic vote gains. Uslaner and Conway present evidence that elite expectations were grounded in reality: some voters evidently did cast votes based on Watergate and the economy. This is an important point, for strategic behavior not rooted in reality would be irrational and unstable. But their approach leads them to underestimate the extent to which elite strategies magnified the effects of Watergate and the economy in 1974, and so to overstate the case for the conventional interpretation.

GARY C. JACOBSON
University of California, San Diego

SAMUEL KERNELL
*The Brookings Institution,
Washington, D.C.*

Why did the Democrats gain 49 House seats (and 4 Senate seats) in 1974? Most academic accounts failed to find support for the "conventional wisdom" explanation that voters were motivated by Watergate and high inflation. Jacobson and Kernell (1983) suggest that because national political trends appeared to favor the Democrats, they were able to attract well-qualified and well-funded challengers to Republican incumbents. We have challenged this thesis and argued that there was retrospective voting in 1974, particularly among those voters who switched party preference from 1972 to 1974 (Uslaner and Conway, 1985).

Jacobson and Kernell criticize our formulation on several grounds. We shall address their specific complaints first, before moving on to the larger issue that separates us. They object to our construction of a variable combining the effects of Watergate and the economy, without specifically challenging our theoretical basis for doing so (cf. Brody, 1977). Moreover, they note that changes in people's thermometer ratings of Nixon failed to achieve statistical significance, although they did not point out that this variable had a marginal impact on the switchers' vote choice of more than 20% (Uslaner and Conway, 1985, p. 797). We claimed that the underrepresentation of districts with vulnerable Republican incumbents probably led to attenuated coefficients for our four retrospective voting predictors. Jacobson and Kernell correctly argue that this sampling problem also would affect Democratic challenger spending. Yet there is no reason to believe that the effects of spending will be more attenuated than those of the behavioral variables, and in the equations estimated, Democratic challenger expenditures always failed to reach significance.

Jacobson and Kernell also argue that our reconstruction of Table 4.1 in their book (1983) is based upon "a fundamental misunderstanding of how campaign spending affects congressional elections." We reanalyzed their data to see if there was support for their thesis that 1974 was marked by greater financial gains for Democratic challengers than for incumbents. In making these comparisons, we assumed that both incumbent and challenger spending matter in congressional elections. According to Jacobson and Kernell (1983), it is challenger spending that is most important. However, research by Ragsdale and Cook (1984) and even Jacobson (1985a) himself indicates that incumbent spending does matter, especially when sitting members are strongly challenged. If both incumbents' and challengers' expenditures matter, then the appropriate question is not whether we can make comparisons, but how we do so. Jacobson and Kernell (1983) compare spending levels between Democratic and Republican challengers and incumbents, respectively. But Democratic incumbents do not run against Democratic challengers; they run against Republican challengers. Comparisons between candidates in the same party assume there is a fixed pie of contributions for each party. Data from campaign expenditures, including those reported by Jacobson and Kernell (1983), belie this conclusion. What made 1980 such an interesting election is how much money went to Republican challengers rather than to Democratic incumbents, so it certainly seems that this is the appropriate comparison. In our Table 1 (p. 791) we analyzed these expenditures by means of ratios. We did not assert that these ratios constituted a measure of the marginal effects of campaign spending. When we performed probit analyses of the effects of spending on voter choices, the actual levels of expenditures by Republican and Democratic candidates in 1974 were used.

The final issue raised by our critics points to the heart of our disagreement, as reflected in the regression they report on the effects of Democratic challenger expenditures in 1974. We are not at all surprised that an aggregate-level analysis shows a significant *t*-ratio for such expenditures. Rather than dismissing the "strategic politicians" thesis, we argued that the effects of the quality of candidates and of expenditures are decidedly secondary to national macropolitical forces (see esp. Uslaner and Conway, 1985, pp. 800–801). Without any controls for behavioral variables, it is only commonsensical that Democratic challenger expenditures would be strongly related to the aggregate party vote in a year such as 1974, when the party was able to attract the best and the brightest among potential candidates, and when the level of funding for Democratic candidates compared to that of their Republican opponents rose dramatically across the board (including, of course, for challengers) from two years earlier. But does this imply that the "strategic politicians" thesis tells us all we need to know about the 1974 congressional elections? The aggregate analysis that provides the best support for our argument is that of Jacobson and Kernell (1983), which indicates that the partisan status of the challenger has a higher *t*-ratio than challenger expenditures for 1974, and that the lowest *t*-ratio is obtained for the quality of the challenger.

We shall never be able to resolve statistically the major outstanding issue of which came first, macropolitics or strategic politicians, because the two theses are complementary. We have no doubt that 1974 was marked by relatively well-funded and high-quality Democratic challengers, although we seemingly differ with Jacobson and Kernell as to whether Democratic incumbents also were so advantaged in that contest. But this is precisely the problem for the strategic politicians thesis: Democrats were blessed with a bumper crop of strong challengers precisely when they didn't need them. The major blessing a Democratic challenger had in that year was the simple fact of his or her party. In contrast, the Democrats needed a group of well-qualified candidates in 1980. With national trends running against them, they could not convince strong candidates, who would have the best chance of raising lots of money, to seek election to the Congress, while Republicans were bursting at the seams with such challengers. In more politically neutral years, such as 1976 or 1978, the impact of strong challengers might have been greater for either party. Yet, precisely because there were no macropolitical factors that would lead such candidates to see real chances for breakthroughs, neither party could attract the best set of challengers potentially available, thus limiting the gains either party could make. The strategic politicians thesis thus appears almost perfectly collinear with the macropolitics argument.

The strategic politicians thesis was offered by Jacobson and Kernell to account for what was perceived to be a failed conventional wisdom. Now that we have shown that the politicians and journalists did not get the story of 1974 wrong after all, there is no need to resort to a subsidiary, albeit complementary, explanation of what happened in that election. Second, the Jacobson-Kernell thesis is based upon an indirect model of political accountability, whereas ours is based upon a more direct linkage. Third, the macropolitical argument would make sense even if the strategic politicians thesis did not (or was not supported empirically). On the other hand, the strategic politicians thesis, taken by itself—that is, divorced from any macropolitical forces—makes no sense whatsoever. Finally, the macropolitics thesis explains both the breadth and depth of the Democratic sweep in 1974. The strategic politicians argument offers us no help whatsoever in understanding why so many Democrats with no previous electoral experience—and often with little or no funding—ousted Republican incumbents in state and local contests. Even though the two theses are complementary, it is clear, to us at least, which came first—and therefore which is the more convincing.

ERIC M. USLANER
M. MARGARET CONWAY

University of Maryland, College Park

References

Brody, Richard A. 1977. Stability and Change in Party Identification. Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.

Jacobson, Gary C. 1985a. Money and Votes Reconsidered: Congressional Elections, 1972–1982. *Public Choice*, 47:7–62.

Jacobson, Gary C. 1985b. Enough is Too Much: Money and Competition in House Elections, 1972–1984. Presented at the Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. Symposium on Elections in America, Boston, MA.

Jacobson, Gary C., and Samuel Kernell. 1983. *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections*, 2d ed. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Ragsdale, Lyn, and Timothy Cook. 1984. Representatives' Actions and Challengers' Reactions: Limits to Candidate Connections in the House. Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.

Uslaner, Eric M., and M. Margaret Conway. 1985. The Responsible Congressional Electorate: Watergate, the Economy, and Vote Choice in 1974. *American Political Science Review*, 79: 788–803.

RESEARCH NOTES

STRATEGIC POLITICIANS AND UNRESPONSIVE VOTERS

RICHARD BORN
Vassar College

To resolve the paradoxical finding that economic conditions and presidential popularity powerfully relate to quadrennial movement in the House vote, but explain little individual voting variation, Jacobson and Kernell have advanced their "strategic politicians" model of midterm elections. Purportedly, the early-year political environment helps determine how many of a party's strong potential contenders risk challenging incumbents; voters in turn respond to the quality of candidates before them in November, and thus indirectly reward the party favored by this early-year environment. Despite its current prominence, however, the theory does not stand up to empirical investigation. A time-series equation of midterm outcomes regressed on early-year national conditions does not fare particularly well when contrasted with comparable equations assuming direct-effects voting. Furthermore, challenger quality has only a weak influence on individual voters—subordinate, in fact, to the effects of economic attitudes and presidential evaluations.

Jacobson and Kernell's (1981, pp. 60–71) model of House midterm electoral behavior has come to enjoy widespread acceptance among political scientists. Adjectives such as "persuasive" (Bond, Covington, and Fleisher, 1985, p. 511), "compelling" (Brace, 1985, p. 107), and "ingenious" (Abramowitz, 1984, p. 710) are now virtually commonplace in references to it. Favorable notice has extended beyond the boundaries of academic political science as well; for example, in five 1982–83 articles, *National Journal* correspondents Richard Cohen (1982a, p. 60; 1982b, p. 1519; 1983a, p. 712; 1983b, p. 2018) and Dom Bonafede (1982, p. 1833) incorporate tenets of the model into their own electoral analysis.

The springboard for Jacobson and Kernell's work is the oft-noted finding that national issues and presidential approval ratings relate powerfully to midterm outcomes in aggregate, time-series analyses, while explaining little individual voting variation in cross-sectional, survey-based studies. To resolve this paradox, they argue that issue and presidential evaluations largely register on voting decisions indirectly, mediated through "self-reinforcing" strategic choices of political elites who believe—regardless of the reality—in substantial November voting based on national concerns. Hence, fewer able candidates of the administration party and more of the out-party risk opposing House incumbents in years with unfavorable economic tidings and an unpopular president, and financial contributions from other elites are

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 80 NO. 2 JUNE, 1986

similarly affected. The net result, then, is reinforcement of the more modest direct impact that national concerns alone have on voting.

Extensive supporting data on challenger quality and campaign expenditures are presented, but the former (coded according to whether he or she ever held elected office) are utilized more, in that reliable spending figures do not exist for the first seven post-World War II midterms considered. The novel contribution of Jacobson and Kernell here, as well as the key evidence exhibited to validate their model, is an effort to demonstrate that a party's numerical advantage in experienced challengers is not merely a response to a promising political outlook, but a major cause of favorable election results themselves. In a chapter of their book entitled "Midterm Congressional Elections Revisited: A Test of the Theory," they show that a 1946-78 equation regressing the administration party midterm vote on presidential popularity and annual change in real per capita income has a greater R^2 when the independent variables are measured early in midterm years rather than later, as in their modification of the equation previously developed by Tufte (1978, pp. 106-15), substituting annual third quarter-to-third quarter income change for his original midyear-to-midyear measure. That such early-year data from the time when serious potential contenders are said to be debating whether to run should offer a better explanation than data more contemporaneous with the voting act itself seems to suggest the obvious: direct election-day effects of national concerns are less important than prior strategic choices of politicians.

As subsidiary substantiation, less systematic but more straightforward evidence that candidate quality affects midterm results has been presented in a related paper by Jacobson (1981, p. 12). Brief mention is made that in 1946, 1954, 1958, and 1974, quality challengers brought about an average party vote shift about 2% better than that in districts where the party lacked such challengers.

The underlying theory of the "strategic politicians" model appears so plausible and the accompanying evidence—while limited in the sense just described—so consistent that it is not difficult to understand its current appeal. Undoubtedly, however, these same virtues have discouraged some needed reexamination. Such reevaluation, we shall argue, makes the authors' case far less compelling.

The "Strategic Politicians" Model Revisited

While the explanatory edge of early-year variables in Jacobson and Kernell's analysis is noteworthy, what is unconvincing is the conclusion that this advantage consequently vindicates their model. The assumption that the first part of an election year is the crucial period for making candidacy decisions is itself questionable. No systematic evidence is supplied. Although few studies bear on this matter, the existing information suggests a different decision time for large numbers of those who do end up running. Huckshorn and Spencer (1971, pp. 57-59) report that of all losing nonincumbents in November 1962, almost 30% publicly declared for office by the end of 1961. Given the obvious lag between personally committing oneself to the race and the announcement itself, an even greater share of candidacies actually must have been decided before January. More recently, all 1978 nonincumbent primary contenders surveyed by Maisel (1982, p. 20) claimed to have resolved to run no later than the preceding fall. Fowler (1976, p. 150), on the other hand, finds that owing to the lateness of the 1974 New York primary (September 10), only 18.6% of general election nonincumbents made commitments as early as 1973. Yet even here, relatively few decisions occurred early in the election year—48.8% were after May.

A more fundamental question concerns the presumption that a successful candidate-centered model can be built upon data covering all midterms since 1946. Most analysts regard the 1960s—especially the middle part of the decade—as the watershed wherein individual candidate and campaign characteristics came to play a major role in voting decisions. Nelson (1978–1979, pp. 666–74), for example, documents a partisan defection surge at this time brought on by incumbents' increased attractiveness to opposition partisans. Concurrent growth in the heterogeneity of swings within districts likewise has been read as a sign of more candidate-directed voting (Mann, 1977, pp. 83-87). More speculatively, Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde (1983, pp. 200–201) have argued that campaign spending took on added significance in the mid-1960s when electioneering became more dependent on costly new technology. Thus, for about half of the postwar period considered, it is unclear why early strategic decisions of prospective candidates should strongly affect midterm outcomes.

We shall further demonstrate, however, that even at the level of explanatory power alone, it is difficult to make a strong circumstantial case for the model. Elaborate alternative models that assume direct-effects voting are not required to attain superior performance in many respects. All our analyses below will be extended through 1982.

Examination will first center simply on Tufte's (1978) original, formative model,[1] which regresses the administration party's standardized vote (its percentage of the national two-party House vote minus its average over the past 16 years) on percentage change in real disposable personal income per capita between the midpoints of the pre-election and election years, and on the presidential approval rating in the election-year Gallup Poll administered closest to September 1.[2] As mentioned above, Jacobson and Kernell choose to examine their own revised version of this model, substituting third quarter-based annual income change. Even though we agree with their rationale—that July-September conditions, being nearer to election day, should more strongly relate to electoral choices if such choices indeed directly hinge on economic evaluations—it still seems unwise to exclude Tufte's original model altogether, owing to uncertainty in the literature over the time lag necessary before concrete economic events register on assessments of government (Norpoth and Yantek, 1983, pp. 786–89, 798–803).

The second model tested is a simple alternative to the revised Tufte model, but we believe it better accounts for direct-effects voting than does either version of his. Here, the economic variable is change in the same income index from the first three months of the pre-election year to the last full quarter before the midterm. A third quarter end point leaves just over a month remaining before election day, of course, but October–December data pose a worse problem, in that conditions during almost two-thirds of this latter interval would not yet be experienced by the time of balloting. Our assumption that voters are more likely to consider economic performance across 18 rather than 12 months strikes us as reasonable, since it permits the initial quarter under each new administration to serve as a natural comparative baseline. In selecting a presidential popularity indicator, we are not constrained by the need to work only with quarterly measures organized as above, which are imposed by the form of existing income data. Hence, while a three-month interval will be used to calculate average Gallup Poll approval, it will instead run from August to October, so that the campaign period itself can more fully be covered.

Table 1. A Test of the Explanatory Power of the Three Midterm Models, Based on National Election Results, 1946–1982

Coefficient	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
Income change	.692* .741	(.201)	.659** .777	(.180)	.596** .776	(.153)
Presidential approval	.086 .366	(.051)	.051 .271	(.040)	.078 .310	(.050)
Constant	-7.959		-6.588		-7.971	
R^2	.675		.684		.722	
$\bar{R}^2$	.582		.594		.643	

Note: Entries on first line are unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors (in parentheses); those on second line are standardized regression coefficients. Models 1–3, respectively, are Tufte's (based on 12-month, midyear-to-midyear income change and presidential approval in poll nearest to September 1), Jacobson and Kernell's (based on 12-month, first quarter–to–first quarter income change and average January–March presidential approval), and our own (based on 18-month, first quarter–to–third quarter income change and average August–October presidential approval).

*Significant at .05 level (two-tail t-test).

**Significant at .01 level (two-tail t-test).

Finally, we replicate Jacobson and Kernell's model by including first quarter–to–first quarter income change[3] and the president's average January to March popularity.[4] Income change values vary somewhat from theirs, in that the latest Bureau of Economic Analysis revisions are employed here.[5] Additionally, we rely on the longitudinal Gallup Poll approval data reported in the October-November 1980 *Gallup Opinion Index* and the December 1983 *Gallup Report.* (Jacobson and Kernell apparently took most of the 1946–78 data used in their test from another Gallup compilation that was less comprehensive for a number of years.)

The results of regressing the standardized administration party vote on the independent variables are in Table 1. Contrary to Jacobson and Kernell's claim, their model does not perform very impressively compared with those postulating direct effects of national concerns. The R^2 of their equation (.684) just barely exceeds Tufte's R^2 of .675, while falling short of our own value of .722.

A second major criterion for evaluating time-series models, of course, is predictive ability. In this regard, we contrast the models using an *ex post facto* forecasting scheme, where each election in the 1966–82 period is predicted according to the regression equation based on all preceding midterms. Two indices gauge each model's aggregate success: (1) the mean absolute prediction error and (2) Theil's inequality coefficient (U), which has the advantage of being restricted to a range of zero to one, with lower values signifying greater accuracy.

As seen in Table 2, the "strategic politicians" model has a mean absolute error of 2.35%, by far the worst. Our own 1.21% error is the smallest, below Tufte's 1.41%. The U values tell the same story, with the first model again demonstrating the weakest correspondence between predictions and actualities.[6]

Also important in Table 2 are the R^2 trends as more midterms are added. If we consider as well the Table 1 equations based on all the 1946–82 data, and regress the R^2 values on time (t = 1 for 1946–62, and 6 for 1946–82), the resulting slopes (b)

Table 2. The Forecasting Accuracy of the Three Midterm Models Based on National Election Results, 1966–1982

Midterm Election being Forecast	Midterms Used in Prediction Equation	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
		Prediction Error Percentage	R^2 ($\bar{R}^2$) of Prediction Equation	Prediction Error Percentage	R^2 ($\bar{R}^2$) of Prediction Equation	Prediction Error Percentage	R^2 ($\bar{R}^2$) of Prediction Equation
1966	1946–62	–.45	.812 (.624)	1.73	.930 (.860)	1.63	.818 (.637)
1970	1946–66	–1.11	.817 (.695)	–2.03	.893 (.822)	–.00	.797 (.662)
1974	1946–70	.14	.815 (.722)	–4.46	.835 (.753)	.15	.817 (.725)
1978	1946–74	–2.76	.826 (.757)	–1.32	.735 (.629)	–1.28	.828 (.759)
1982	1946–78	–2.58	.760 (.680)	–2.21	.748 (.665)	–2.97	.833 (.777)
Mean Absolute Error		1.41		2.35		1.21	
Theil's Inequality Coefficient (*U*)		.291		.351		.280	

Note: Models 1–3, respectively, are Tufte's (based on 12-month, midyear-to-midyear income change and presidential approval in poll nearest to September 1), Jacobson and Kernell's (based on 12-month, first quarter-to-first quarter income change and average January–March presidential approval), and our own (based on 18-month, first quarter-to-third quarter income change and average August–October presidential approval).

show a slight and moderate reduction in effectiveness for our model ($b = -.009$) and Tufte's ($b = -.024$), but a precipitous decline for Jacobson and Kernell's ($b = -.05$). This last, large negative slope is very troublesome, since, as argued above, a truly candidate-centered model should manifest precisely the opposite pattern—that is, relatively weak explanation before the mid-sixties, followed by improved performance as more midterms are included from the period when the personal dimension of electoral standing grew in importance.[7]

Finally, the predictive abilities of the models in 1982 deserve special attention. Before this latest midterm Jacobson and Kernell (1982, pp. 425-27) accurately prophesied that Republican losses would be much lower than Tufte's original 1946-78 equation predicted. They also were correct, however, in warning that their own model was unlikely to do better, owing to unusually aggressive Republican recruiting and fundraising efforts designed to offset the deflationary impact of early-year recession and Reagan's unpopularity. Although a specific alternative prediction derived from this argument is not presented, it still is possible to do so by employing a variant of their model, which should be able to account, at least in part, for such party activism arising independently of first-quarter national conditions. Here, in a 1946-78 equation using only nonsouthern election returns, Jacobson (1983a, pp. 142-50) adds a third independent variable equaling the northern state difference between the percentages of administration and opposition party challengers with elected office experience. Ironically, though, this fuller equation yields a less precise forecast of the 1982 northern vote, 2.48% below the actual Republican value, compared with a 2.2% underestimate for his corresponding two-variable equation.[8] Thus, neither the original "strategic politicians" model nor the effort to render it even more explicitly candidate-centered seems able to account for this rather enigmatic outcome.

While the performance of Jacobson and Kernell's model is comparatively unimposing, their focus on first quarter-based analysis admittedly is only an indirect test of the theorized electoral role of early strategic decision making. We now take the less circuitous route of determining what influence quality challengers have on individual votes. Such analysis, of course, cannot shed light on whether prospective challengers' candidacy decisions are substantially rooted in their evaluations of national conditions, but failure to uncover a causal link between quality challengers and voting behavior would alone be sufficient to undermine their theory.

Individual Electoral Choice: The Impact of Challenger Quality Versus Economic and Presidential Evaluations

As noted above, the cross-sectional data presented by Jacobson and Kernell to demonstrate an immediate electoral effect of challenger quality are very sketchy. The only other evidence bearing on this matter turns up in an analysis of the 1974 midterm, in which they assess the combined influence of officeholding experience and campaign spending on challengers' margins. While the coefficient of the former falls a bit short of significance (Jacobson and Kernell, 1981, p. 46), they go on to argue that the full impact failed to register because challenger spending is itself related to having held office. A fairer test of the force of challenger quality thus would exclude spending information, but another problem would remain. Signs of pending incumbent vulnerability in the election ahead likely will improve the odds of a stronger challenger emerging, thereby posing a reciprocity danger which could inflate the values of the challenger quality coefficient. The customary two-stage corrective technique adopted here is to construct first an instrumental variable for quality and then substitute it in the final estimation.

Jacobson and Kernell's supposition about the electoral appeal of officeholding is tested with data from the National Election Studies (of the University of Michigan's Center for Political Studies) for all midterms since 1966. At the same time, this effect is contrasted with that arising from perceptions of the economy and the president. Here, variables derived from all economically relevant survey items repeated across the five midterms are included, as well as the presidential thermometer question asked in all years but 1966. The equation estimated for each election for voters in districts with an opposed incumbent is

$$CVOTE = a_1 + b_1 QUAL + b_2 PID + b_4 CPMARG + b_5 UN + b_6 INF + b_7 PASTYR + b_8 NEXTYR + b_9 PRES + u, \qquad (1)$$

where

$CVOTE$ is 1 if a pro-challenger vote is cast, and 0 otherwise;

$QUAL$ is 1 if the challenger has held elected office, and 0 otherwise;

P is 1 if the challenger is Democratic, and 0 if Republican;

PID is 1 for voters sharing the challenger's party affiliation, 0 for independents, and −1 for incumbent party identifiers (independent leaners are grouped with weak and strong partisans);

$CPMARG$ is the two-party House vote proportion for the challenger's party in the last election (voters in districts with uncontested races in this election are not analyzed);

UN is 1 for voters living in districts with a nonadministration party challenger and citing unemployment as the most important problem, −1 for those having an administration party challenger and citing this problem, and 0 for those not citing it;

INF is coded like UN, except that the problem is inflation;[9]

$PASTYR$ is 1 for voters living in districts with a nonadministration (administration) party challenger and experiencing a worsened (improved) personal financial situation over the past year, −1 for those having an administration (nonadministration) party challenger and experiencing a worsened (improved) situation, and 0 for those seeing no change;

$NEXTYR$ is coded like $PASTYR$, except that the evaluations concern the expected financial situation over the next year;

$PRES$ is the president's thermometer rating for voters in districts with an administration party challenger, and 100° minus the rating for those with a nonadministration party challenger; and

u is the error term.

The case for including the controls P and PID is obvious; $CPMARG$ accounts for the likelihood that a weak prior showing by the incumbent will in itself be related to backing the opposition in the forthcoming election, while also encouraging a quality challenger to emerge.

Dependable instrumental variables for $QUAL$ could be created only in 1966 and 1982. Predicted probabilities of having an experienced challenger in one's district ($\widehat{QUAL}$) are calculated by performing a probit analysis of $QUAL$ on the remaining independent variables, plus the natural log of the incumbent's number of terms and eight dummy variables delineating U.S. census regions.[10] The resulting predictions are transformed into probabilities by means of the cumulative standard normal distribution. Seniority had a positive effect ($p < .001$) on the odds of a quality challenger in the former election, but its maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) in 1982 was in the opposite direction ($p <$ .01). Conceivably, it took time before politicians recognized that a junior member, if spared defeat, could turn his or her district into a formidable election fortress. Back in 1966, when incumbency was just beginning to take on substantial electoral importance, there might still have been greater tolerance for delaying challenges until more senior members showed signs of flagging vigor and constituency concern. Experienced challengers also varied considerably by region; overall, the Mountain state reference group differed significantly (at $p <$ .05 or better) from two-thirds of the other regions. In general, regions with less heavily populated states tended to have greater percentages of experienced challengers, probably because of higher ratios of state legislators and local government officials to the number of House seats.[11] Predictions of actual *QUAL* values based on the 1966 and 1982 instrumental equations were 14.1% and 16.6% more accurate, respectively, than those where all cases were predicted to be the more common zero value of *QUAL*.

The same instrumental equations estimated for the other three midterms, however, were much less powerful. Even including additional exogenous variables failed to produce a sufficiently strong instrument.[12] Consequently, estimation of the *CVOTE* equation here must rely only on the original *QUAL* values.

Table 3 contains the one-stage probit MLEs for all elections, plus the two-stage estimates for 1966 and 1982. The results clearly are not encouraging for the "strategic politicians" theory. In the one-stage analyses, no *QUAL* MLE is significant at the .05 level, and only three even have the hypothesized positive sign. Furthermore, in conformity with our speculation about reciprocity bias in one-stage relationships between challenger experience and incumbent vulnerability, the 1966 and 1982 impacts of quality are sizably reduced in the two-stage reestimations.

The case for voters responding to national issues and presidential standing is, to be sure, also less than overpowering. Slightly over half of all economic MLEs, whether the one- or two-stage results are considered, are negative. Still, there are positive signs each of the four times when an economic coefficient is at least twice the size of its standard error. Moreover, all four presidential MLEs are positive, and three are significant.[13] It seems, then, that Jacobson and Kernell's theory inverts the true relative importance of challenger quality and national-level forces as direct causes of voting behavior.[14]

A final question concerns the extent to which each kind of individual voting accounts for the movements in the off-year vote analyzed in time-series studies. A variable's impact on an election, of course, depends on the distribution of its values as well as its MLE. Our strategy, which has been applied before by researchers (Abramowitz, 1984, pp. 715–19; Kiewiet, 1983, pp. 118–24), first generates a respondent's predicted probability of supporting the challenger using the relevant Table 3 equation and actual values of the right-hand variables. Next, individual probabilities are recalculated by assigning "neutral" positions to each case on all economic and presidential evaluation variables; that is, actual values are replaced by zeros on *UN*, *INF*, *PASTYR*, and *NEXTYR*, and by 50° on *PRES*. A third series of probabilities similarly is produced employing the actual values of all variables save *QUAL* (or $\widehat{QUAL}$), which instead is assigned zeros. By then separately subtracting the latter two probability sets from the first, we are left with the individual-level impacts of national concerns and challenger quality, respectively, on challenger support. Final-

Table 3. A Probit Analysis of the Effects of Challenger Quality and Economic and Presidential Evaluations on Individual Voting in Five Midterms

		Midterm Election Maximum Likelihood Estimates									
		1966		1970		1974		1978		1982	
Quality challenger	One-stage	.242	(.187)	-.168	(.267)	-.068	(.194)	.052	(.198)	.289	(.180)
	Two-stage	.067	(.279)	—		—		—		-.162	(.382)
Party	One-stage	-.484*	(.193)	-.134	(.269)	.214	(.256)	-.347	(.260)	.069	(.241)
	Two-stage	-.522**	(.200)	—		—		—		.242	(.271)
Party identity	One-stage	.949***	(.083)	1.333***	(.138)	.813***	(.088)	.721***	(.090)	.827***	(.112)
	Two-stage	.943***	(.083)	—		—		—		.805***	(.111)
Past challenger party vote	One-stage	-.048	(.991)	2.583	(1.691)	3.264**	(1.162)	2.808**	(.860)	2.018*	(.933)
	Two-stage	.390	(1.118)	—		—		—		2.273*	(.977)
Unemployment citation	One-stage	1.476*	(.738)	-.500	(.454)	.942*	(.364)	-.091	(.466)	.095	(.176)
	Two-stage	1.511*	(.739)	—		—		—		.096	(.176)
Inflation citation	One-stage	-.087	(.283)	1.040*	(.408)	.129	(.157)	-.039	(.150)	-.222	(.421)
	Two-stage	-.085	(.283)	—		—		—		-.128	(.429)
Finances over last year	One-stage	-.138	(.104)	.131	(.135)	.227*	(.097)	.029	(.094)	-.075	(.108)
	Two-stage	-.145	(.104)	—		—		—		-.081	(.107)
Finances over next year	One-stage	.137	(.123)	-.218	(.171)	-.224	(.118)	-.066	(.114)	-.063	(.145)
	Two-stage	.139	(.123)	—		—		—		-.048	(.145)
Presidential thermometer	One-stage	—		.012*	(.005)	.008*	(.004)	.006	(.004)	.016***	(.004)
	Two-stage	—		—		—		—		.016***	(.004)
Constant	One-stage	4.709		2.897		2.868		2.951		2.673	
	Two-stage	4.604		—		—		—		2.652	
$\hat{R}^2$	One-stage	.463		.637		.497		.413		.583	
	Two-stage	.459		—		—		—		.577	
Percent correctly predicted by equation	One-stage	79.3		83.3		79.9		81.0		83.0	
	Two-stage	79.3		—		—		—		82.7	

Table 3 (continued)

		Midterm Election Maximum Likelihood Estimates				
		1966	1970	1974	1978	1982
Percent correctly predicted by "null" model	One-stage	64.5	64.4	62.3	78.9	68.9
	Two-stage	64.5	—	—	—	68.9
N		420	289	398	506	411

Note: Entries are maximum likelihood estimates of probit equations and their standard errors (in parentheses). *N*s in 1970 and 1974 are weighted numbers of respondents. The 1970 analysis excludes Form 2 whites, who were not asked either question concerning personal finances.

*Significant at .05 level (two-tail *t*-test).
**Significant at .01 level (two-tail *t*-test).
***Significant at .001 level (two-tail *t*-test).

Table 4. The Net Impacts of Challenger Quality and Economic and Presidential Evaluations on the National Administration Party Midterm Vote

Midterm Election	Standardized Administration Party Percentage of National Two-Party Vote Predicted from Probit Equations	Net Percentage Impact Owing to Economic and Presidential Evaluations	Net Percentage Impact Owing to Challenger Quality
1966 One-stage	-1.21	.12	-.87
Two-stage	-1.21	.09	-.25
1970 One-stage	3.27	1.56	-.26
1974 One-stage	-3.70	.04	.21
1978 One-stage	-.76	2.49	.18
1982 One-stage	.44	2.50	-1.40
Two-stage	.45	2.56	.80

Note: Standardized vote percentages and net impacts are calculated from Table 3 probit equations.

ly, each impact's net contribution to the national administration party vote is estimated by averaging across respondents (before averaging, impact values are reversed in sign for those in districts with nonadministration party challengers).

Besides the two net impacts, we include in Table 4 as the analogue of the dependent variable used in time-series analyses the standardized national vote of the administration party predicted according to the true values of all independent variables (as before, the standardization subtracts from the predicted percentage the actual mean received during the past eight elections). Across the period considered, it is evident that the more the administration party is favored by economic and presidential evaluation impacts, the stronger is its showing; the equation for the vote regressed on net impact (*NI*) incorporating the two-stage 1966 and 1982 results is $Y = -1.875 + 1.102NI$, $R^2 = .287$ (if only one-stage results are included, $Y = -1.905 + 1.127NI$, $R^2 = .29$). Net impacts of challenger quality, however, have virtually no effect, and the little that exists is in the wrong direction: $Y = -.239 - 1.109NI$, $R^2 = .036$ (with only one-stage results, $Y = -.869 - 1.114\,NI$, $R^2 = .093$).

While a direct causal link thus exists between aggregate election results and individual voting based on economic and presidential assessments, one should not overdo the substantive importance of this linkage. Net impacts owing to these assessments, after all, explain under one-third the variance in our standardized vote estimates. Many individual-level factors responsible for quadrennial electoral movement consequently remain to be identified, but at least we can say that support for experienced challengers is not one of them.

Summary and Conclusions

Jacobson and Kernell's midterm theory has not fared well in our study. This holds true when their time-series model incorporating early-year economic conditions and presidential approval is contrasted with direct-effects models using later measurements of these variables, as well as when the immediate effect of challengers' elected office experience on individual voting is analyzed.

Perhaps, though, the focus in appraising the quality of a challenge to an incumbent should be shifted from characteristics of contenders per se (i.e., experience) to those of campaigns (i.e., spending levels). Expenditures are of equal intrinsic importance to their theory, playing a lesser role in their actual analysis simply because the relevant data exist only since 1972. Within this restricted period, challenger spending certainly has been shown to Affect the House vote significantly. (As noted above, however, Abramson et al. [1983] argue that spending meant less before the mid-1960s.) Could challenger spending, rather than experience, thus be the pivotal intermediary force responsible for much of the aggregate relationship between national conditions and election outcomes left unexplained by direct-effects voting?

We can attempt a very tentative stab at an answer by regressing the administration party's standardized vote on the ratio of its average challenger spending to that of the opposition. If all six 1972–82 elections are used in order to circumvent the problem of just three applicable midterms, the R^2 is only .365; moreover, without 1974—decidedly the worst year for the administration party on both variables—it drops to a scant .069. This is small compared with relationships involving other aggregate-level indicators used to predict election outcomes. The corresponding R^2 of the standardized vote regressed on the difference between administration and opposition party percentages of experienced challengers is .455 (.215 with 1974 excluded), and that for the regression on annual midyear-to-midyear change in real disposable personal income per capita is an even heftier .649 (.47 without 1974).

Thus, we doubt whether officeholding credentials or expenditures really hold the key to explicating the underlying dynamics of midterm vote fluctuations. Political elites may well predicate personal strategy on their reading of the prevailing partisan winds, but there is little reason to think that the collective consequence of such discrete actions makes much difference on where these winds carry the parties as of election day.

Notes

The survey data analyzed here were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).

1. While Tufte states that various causal mechanisms may be responsible for his findings, Jacobson and Kernell (1981, p. 8) argue that the assumption of individual "referendum" voting at least implicitly underlies his model. They thus treat it as a direct-effects model, as shall we.

2. For the latter variable, however, Tufte (1978, p. 111) makes an exception in 1974 by entering Ford's 55% mid-October rating, presumably to sidestep the inflated 66% figure in the pre-pardon "honeymoon" period of early September. We shall follow the same course.

3. Quarterly data on real disposable personal income per capita begin only with the first quarter of 1947; hence, like Jacobson and Kernell, we estimate all models with the 1945–46 income change based on midyear-to-midyear data.

4. In their book, the authors actually calculate average presidential support from March to May, rather than over the January to March interval corresponding to their first-quarter income variable. No explanation for this oddity is provided; certainly, Gallup Poll frequencies during these periods have been similar since 1946. At any rate, Jacobson's later analysis based only on northern election results (see n. 6) uses first-quarter data for both variables.

5. In particular, 1945–74 data are from *The National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 1929–76, Statistical Tables* (1981), while those for 1977–78 and 1981–82 come, respectively, from the July 1982 and July 1984 issues of *Survey of Current Business.*

6. To account for the South's greater insulation from the national forces affecting strategic decisions, Jacobson (1981; 1983a, pp. 142–50), in a more recent reworking of his model, transforms the dependent variable to equal the northern standardized vote only. The same right-hand variables as before are used, however, since complementary regional data do not exist across the full period studied; thus, it is questionable whether any gains from analyzing more competitive elections really outweigh the asymmetry of explaining solely northern outcomes with data partly reflecting southern conditions. In any event, when we make this change in testing the three models above, the "strategic politicians" equation definitely emerges with the largest 1946–82 R^2, but still has by far the worst 1966–82 prediction

error. Furthermore, the "strategic politicians" R^2s continue to diminish much more rapidly over time than those of the other two models.

7. In the "strategic politicians" model and our own, the presidential approval variable excludes surveys continuing across two months, only one of which is within the stipulated three-month interval. This is necessary, because for a number of earlier elections, it is impossible to tell what percentage of such interviews was done in each adjacent month. The one case where this procedure works against the former model is 1946, when Truman's 63% approval in January was well above the 50% recorded in the succeeding March-April poll. If the average of these two polls is substituted in the "strategic politicians" analyses above, there is some improvement in performance; however, the model's R^2 in the analysis of Table 1 remains below our own, and its prediction error is still the worst of the three models in Table 2. Likewise, its R^2 values over time decline at about the same pace as before.

8. Adding challenger quality yields a lower Republican vote estimate, simply because the party's northern state disadvantage (14.6%) is unusually large; i.e., it may well have had more such candidates than could be expected given national conditions, but then so did the Democrats. (All challenger quality data used here and below come from *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report.*)

9. Responses involving national problems were classified under the headings of unemployment or inflation using Kiewiet's coding scheme (1983, p. 83).

10. Owing to small numbers of respondents, West South Central voters were combined with those from West North Central states in 1966 (furthermore, no useable East South Central cases existed), while in 1982, East South Central and South Atlantic states were merged, as were New England and Middle Atlantic states.

11. For evidence of substantial variation by state in the appeal of House nominations to state legislators, as well as an inverse relationship between such appeal and state population, see Robeck (1982, pp. 508–509).

12. Following Bianco (1984, pp. 352–61), we tried the annual change in state per capita income and the prior district margin of the presidential candidate of the challenger's party. We may differ in not finding them to be helpful predictors, in that he employs district-level data pooled across all four 1974–80 elections.

13. Removing *CPMARG* from the Table 3 equations does not result in a significant MLE for either quality variable. The poor performance of challenger experience thus is not a function of any collinearity here.

14. Kramer (1983), however, has warned that cross-sectional estimates of economic voting effects, such as those calculated here, might well be biased, owing to measurement error in the relevant variables (e.g., perceptions of personal financial gains may poorly tap the underlying theoretical phenomenon—that part of such improvement actually induced by government policy).

References

Abramowitz, Alan I. 1984. National Issues, Strategic Politicians, and Voting Behavior in the 1980 and 1982 Congressional Elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, 28:710–21.

Abramson, Paul R., John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde. 1983. *Change and Continuity in the 1980 Elections*. rev. ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.

Bianco, William T. 1984. Strategic Decisions on Candidacy in U.S. Congressional Districts. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 9:351–64.

Bonafede, Dom. October 30, 1982. Some Things Don't Change—Cost of 1982 Congressional Races Higher than Ever. *National Journal*, pp. 1832–36.

Bond, Jon R., Cary Covington, and Richard Fleisher. 1985. Explaining Challenger Quality in Congressional Elections. *Journal of Politics*, 47: 510–29.

Brace, Paul. 1985. A Probabilistic Approach to Retirement from the U.S. Congress. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 10:107–23.

Cohen, Richard E. January 9, 1982a. Congress: Control at Stake. *National Journal*, pp. 59–69.

Cohen, Richard E. September 4, 1982b. Keep the Bums In. *National Journal*, p. 1519.

Cohen, Richard E. April 2, 1983a. 1982 Post Mortem. *National Journal*, p. 712.

Cohen, Richard E. October 1, 1983b. Covering Congress. *National Journal*, p. 2018.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 1966. Eastern States Roundup. 30 September, 2264–93.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 1966. Southern States Roundup. 7 October, 2348–85.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 1966. Western States Roundup. 14 October, 2432–61.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 1966. Midwestern States Roundup. 21 October, 2508–41.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 1970. Election 1970: The East. 2 October, 2359–87.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 1970. Election 1970: The Midwest. 9 October, 2507–35.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 1970. Election 1970: The South. 16 October, 2587–607.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 1970. Election 1970: The West. 23 October, 2435–55.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 1974. The 1974 Election Report. 12 October, 2715–815.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 1978. The 1978 Elections. 14 October, 2797–914.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 1982.

The 1982 Elections. 9 October, 2481–610.

Fowler, Linda L. 1976. The Cycle of Defeat: Recruitment of Congressional Candidates. Ph.D. diss., University of Rochester.

The Gallup Opinion Index. 1980. The Presidency. October–November, 3–39.

The Gallup Report. 1983. President Reagan Ends 1983 with Highest Approval Rating in Two Years. December, 14–29.

Huckshorn, Robert J., and Robert C. Spencer. 1971. *The Politics of Defeat: Campaigning for Congress.* Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.

Jacobson, Gary C. 1981. Strategic Politicians and Congressional Elections, 1946–1980. Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York.

Jacobson, Gary C. 1983a. *The Politics of Congressional Elections.* Boston: Little, Brown.

Jacobson, Gary C. 1983b. Reagan, Reaganomics, and Strategic Politics in 1982: A Test of Alternative Theories of Midterm Congressional Elections. Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago.

Jacobson, Gary C., and Samuel Kernell. 1981. *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections.* 2d ed. 1983. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Jacobson, Gary C., and Samuel Kernell. 1982. Strategy and Choice in the 1982 Congressional Elections. *PS,* 15:423–30.

Kiewiet, D. Roderick. 1983. *Macroeconomics and Micropolitics: The Electoral Effects of Economic Issues.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kramer, Gerald H. 1983. The Electoral Fallacy Revisited: Aggregate Versus Individual-Level Findings on Economics and Elections, and Sociotropic Voting. *American Political Science Review,* 77:94–111.

Maisel, Louis S. 1982. *From Obscurity to Oblivion: Running in the Congressional Primary.* Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press.

Mann, Thomas E. 1977. *Unsafe at Any Margin: Interpreting Congressional Elections.* Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute.

Nelson, Candice. 1978–1979. The Effects of Incumbency on Voting in Congressional Elections. *Political Science Quarterly,* 93:665–78.

Norpoth, Helmut, and Thom Yantek. 1983. Macroeconomic Conditions and Fluctuations of Presidential Popularity: The Question of Lagged Effects. *American Journal of Political Science,* 27:785–807.

Robeck, Bruce W. 1982. State Legislator Candidacies for the U.S. House: Prospects for Success. *Legislative Studies Quarterly,* 7:507–14.

Tufte, Edward R. 1978. *Political Control of the Economy.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 1981. *The National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 1929–76, Statistical Tables.* Washington, D.C., September.

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 1982. *Survey of Current Business.* vol. 62, no. 7.

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 1984. *Survey of Current Business.* vol. 64, no. 7.

Richard Born is Associate Professor of Political Science, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, NY 12601.

WHO OVERREPORTS VOTING?

BRIAN D. SILVER
Michigan State University

BARBARA A. ANDERSON
University of Michigan

PAUL R. ABRAMSON
Michigan State University

The effects of respondent characteristics with regard to the propensity of nonvoters to report that they voted are examined by analyzing the vote validation studies conducted by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center in 1964, 1976, and 1980. Previous research has suggested that vote overreporting derives from the respondent's wish to appear to engage in socially desirable behavior. This earlier research suggests that the only respondent characteristic that is strongly related to overreporting is race; measures of socioeconomic status and of general political attitudes are said to be at most weakly related to the tendency to exaggerate voting. These earlier conclusions are incorrect. We measure the extent of overreporting for the population "at risk" of overreporting voting: those who did not actually vote. Respondents most inclined to overreport their voting are those who are highly educated, those most supportive of the regime norm of voting, and those to whom the norm of voting is most salient—the same characteristics that are related to the probability that a person actually votes. Blacks are only slightly more likely to overreport voting than whites. The pattern of relations between education and vote overreporting is opposite what would be found if those who falsely reported voting fit the typical image of the uneducated, uninvolved, "acquiescent" respondent who is concerned primarily with pleasing the interviewer.

Many American nonvoters report to survey organizations that they voted. In the four vote validation studies conducted by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center (SRC) and Center for Political Studies, a large proportion of respondents who did not vote, according to checks of local registration and voting records, claimed that they voted: 27.4% in 1964, 31.4% in 1976, 22.6% in 1978, and 27.4% in 1980.

The generally accepted explanation for vote overreporting is that it is an artifact of the interview. Overreporting is seen to result from the respondent's desire to please the interviewer and to appear to engage in socially desirable behavior. According to Sudman and Bradburn (1974; see also Bradburn and Sudman, 1979), altering the "characteristics of the interview task" by using telephone or mail surveys or random response techniques does not markedly reduce the tendency to give socially desirable responses. Eliminating third parties from the interview also has no consistent effect on vote overreporting (Silver, Abramson, and Anderson, 1986).

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 80 NO. 2 JUNE, 1986

Earlier research also claims that the propensity to overreport voting is not related to respondent characteristics such as socioeconomic status, age, and sex, or to political attitudes such as feelings of political efficacy or political trust, strength of partisanship, or sense of citizen duty. Only race, it is argued, is related to the propensity to overreport voting; blacks are more likely to overstate voting than whites (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, 1983; Abramson and Claggett, 1984; Katosh and Traugott, 1981; Sigelman, 1982; Traugott and Katosh, 1979).

Voting is positively associated with respondent characteristics such as education, income, interest in politics, feelings of political efficacy, sense of citizen duty, concern with the election outcome, and strength of partisan identification. In short, Americans who feel more strongly attached to the established political order are more likely to vote. Some popular texts on American political behavior have accepted the conclusion that Americans whose stake in society ought to make them want to appear to be in conformity with social norms are not more likely to overreport voting than those who are less motivated to appear to conform (Flanigan and Zingale, 1983, p. 185; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980, p. 118).

Our research challenges this conclusion. We find that Americans who are more highly educated and more politically efficacious, who have a stronger sense of citizen duty and stronger partisan attachments, and who are more concerned about the outcome of the election, are also more likely to overreport voting.

Data and Measures

We use election and vote validation data from the National Election Studies (NES) of the University of Michigan Center for Political Studies for 1964, 1976, and 1980.[1] A small proportion of validated nonvoters are actual voters (Abramson and Claggett, 1984). Errors arise primarily when the field staff does not find an actual voter's name on a list of registered voters. To the extent that such errors result from poor maintenance of local registration records, errors in validation will tend to underestimate the participation of voters who live in poor communities, such as blacks and whites with low levels of education and income. This possible bias in the validated vote measure runs against our main thesis—that higher-status respondents are more likely to overreport voting.

Dependent Variable

Previous research has concluded that it makes little difference in the pattern of relations whether the reported or the validated vote is used as the dependent variable. This is not surprising in light of the high correlation between the self-reported and the actual, validated vote.[2] However, most of this earlier research does not address the question of what the relation is between respondent characteristics and the tendency to overreport voting.

Most researchers have not used an indicator of vote overreporting that is appropriate for understanding what causes an individual to overreport. Only about 1% of respondents who actually voted (according to official records) mistakenly reported that they did not vote. Between 90% and 96% of all vote misreports are by people who did not actually vote. Even so, some researchers analyzing the vote validation data have used as their main measure of vote misreporting the proportion of all respondents whose self-report does not correspond with the official voting records (e.g., Katosh and Traugott, 1981; Traugott and Katosh, 1979; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980, p. 118). Others have looked at the proportion of those who claimed to have voted but did not actually vote (Abramson and

Claggett, 1984, p. 721; Cahalan, 1968–69; Sigelman, 1982, p. 49).[3]

At issue in the choice of a measure of overreporting is not the actual distribution of voters and nonvoters, but rather the choice of the appropriate denominator for calculating the proportion misreporting: (1) all respondents, (2) respondents who claimed they voted, or (3) respondents who did not actually vote. Since virtually all misreporting is by actual nonvoters who claim they voted, the third denominator is the most appropriate for representing the population that is "at risk" of misreporting: those who did not actually vote.[4]

The other two approaches reflect the aggregate amount of misreporting of voting, but are not good indicators of the individual behavioral propensity to misreport, since they do not use the appropriate population at risk. Also, they are sensitive to the marginal distribution of actual voters and nonvoters. The larger the proportion of nonvoters among the respondents or in any subset of respondents, the greater the proportion of respondents who are available to misreport that they voted. Other things being equal, the larger the proportion of nonvoters, the higher the total proportion of misreporters will be. This elementary fact was pointed out by Parry and Crossley (1950, p. 75) 35 years ago. If one analyzes misreporting among actual nonvoters, no such sensitivity to the marginal distribution of voters and nonvoters exists. Accordingly, in crosstabulations we use as the dependent variable the *percentage of those who did not actually vote who reported that they voted.*

Independent Variables

We focus on factors related to the normative commitment to voting. We use respondent's education as an indicator of socioeconomic status. We also examine the relation between the tendency to overreport voting and other measures of the respondent's "motivation to vote": external political efficacy, sense of citizen duty, strength of partisanship, concern about the outcome of the election, and political interest.[5] Earlier research based on the 1980 NES (Silver, Abramson, and Anderson, 1986) showed that whether nonvoters stated in the pre-election survey that they expected to vote was an extremely strong predictor of whether they claimed that they voted. Thus, we also examine pre-election expectation to vote.

Results

Education and Vote Overreporting

In contrast to previous research, we find that education is positively related to vote overreporting (see Table 1). The relation is weak in 1964, a high-stimulus election which mobilized low-status Americans. Nonetheless, in all three surveys respondents who were college graduates were the most likely to overreport voting, and those who had not finished high school were the least likely to overreport voting. Over time, the relation between vote overreporting and education has become stronger.

Thus, nonvoters who are most likely to overreport voting come from the same educational groups as those who are most likely to vote. Low-status respondents, who are said to be especially inclined to give socially desirable responses to interviewers, particularly when the issue addressed is not very salient (Schuman and Presser, 1981, ch. 8), are not more inclined to overreport voting.

Support for Civic Norms and Vote Overreporting

Since education is related to political attitudes that have been linked with political participation, such as political

Table 1. Validated Nonvoters Who Said They Voted, by Level of Education, 1964, 1976, and 1980

	Level of Education				
Year	Some High School or Less[a] (%)	Completed High School (%)	Some College (%)	Completed College (%)	tau_c
1964	22.3 (184)	34.3 (102)	28.6 (28)	34.8 (23)	.106*
1976	23.5 (356)	28.3 (329)	45.5 (132)	53.1 (89)	.200**
1980	16.7 (174)	27.2 (191)	34.8 (89)	56.1 (41)	.220**

Note: Figures in parentheses are base *N*s for the percentages immediately above.

[a] "Some High School or Less" includes respondents with up to 12 years of schooling but no high school diploma.

*Statistically significant at or below $p = .05$.

**Statistically significant at or below $p = .01$.

efficacy and level of political interest, these attitudes are likely to be positively related to vote overreporting. Also, if vote overreporters come disproportionately from people who have a strong motivation to vote, then attitudes such as strength of party identification, which are related to the motivation to vote but are not strongly related to education, should also be related to overreporting.

An important indicator of the saliency of voting is whether the respondent stated in the pre-election survey that he or she expected to vote in the forthcoming election. The responses should be closely related to whether the respondent actually voted. In fact, this is so. For the three elections, the Kendall's tau_b coefficients between stated expectation and actual, validated voting range from .55 to .60. However, pre-election expectation is even more strongly related to the self-reported vote; the tau_b coefficients range from .70 to .73. In 1964, 49.1% of validated nonvoters who had stated that they expected to vote falsely reported that they had voted; the corresponding figures in 1976 and 1980 were 57.0% and 51.2%. In contrast, only between 1.5% and 3.5% of nonvoters who had stated that they did not expect to vote claimed later that they voted.

The consistency between pre- and post-election reports about voting (pre-election declaration of intention; post-election self-report of actual behavior) does not seem to be an artifact of the interview-reinterview survey method, for two reasons. First, substantial vote overreporting has been found in numerous other studies in which only a single interview was conducted (e.g., Bradburn and Sudman, 1980; Katosh and Traugott, 1981; Parry and Crossley, 1950; Weiss, 1968-69). Second, in the 1964, 1976, and 1980 SRC election studies there is no relation between whether the respondents gave consistent responses and whether the same interviewer administered both the pre- and post-election surveys (see Silver, Anderson, and Abramson, 1985).

Table 2 shows that in all three elections, the tendency to overreport voting is positively and significantly related to the

Table 2. Validated Nonvoters Who Said They Voted, by Measures of Respondents' Political Attitudes, 1964, 1976 and 1980

	1964			1976			1980		
	Low	Medium (in percentages)	High	Low	Medium (in percentages)	High	Low	Medium (in percentages)	High
External Efficacy	24.3 (107)	24.7 (150)	36.6 (82)	24.9 (408)	31.4 (234)	43.0 (253)	19.0 (205)	26.4 (148)	41.7 (132)
Tau$_c$		.091*			.158**			.193**	
Partisan Strength	11.8 (51)	28.0 (182)	34.3 (102)	21.2 (194)	30.8 (557)	49.8 (146)	11.9 (109)	26.2 (294)	50.5 (91)
Tau$_c$		.137**			.169**			.245**	
Citizen Duty[a]	—	—	—	14.2 (247)	29.9 (349)	48.4 (299)	15.6 (109)	24.1 (191)	39.1 (179)
Tau$_c$					.290**			.200*	
Concern for Outcome	18.6 (140)		33.5 (182)	23.8 (454)		41.0 (419)	22.4 (241)		34.9 (218)
Kendall's tau$_b$		.158**			.170**			.132**	
Interest in Campaign	18.2 (121)	30.2 (126)	35.2 (91)	15.6 (266)	31.4 (392)	48.1 (249)	11.1 (190)	32.9 (207)	51.8 (83)
Tau$_c$		.150**			.264**			.317**	

Note: Cell entries are the percentages of validated nonvoters who falsely reported after the election that they had voted. Figures in parentheses are base *N*s for the percentages immediately above. The wording of the items and definitions of the categories used for each measure are given in Silver, Anderson, Abramson (1985).

[a] The citizen duty items were not included in the 1964 SRC National Election Study.

*Statistically significant at or below $p = .05$.

**Statistically significant at or below $p = .01$.

respondent's sense of political efficacy, strength of partisan attachment, concern with the electoral outcome, and interest in the campaign; it is also positively and significantly related to the respondent's sense of citizen duty in both years (1976 and 1980) in which this attitude can be measured. The relation between overreporting and these political attitudes is not as strong as the relation between overreporting and the respondent's expectation of voting, but the evidence refutes the argument that overreporting of voting is unrelated to the respondent's support for civic norms. Further evidence that respondents who are strongly motivated to vote are even more strongly motivated to *say* they voted is that the relation between the attitude measures and the respondent's self-reported vote is stronger than the relation between these attitudes and the respondent's actual vote.[6]

Table 3 tests whether the relation between these political attitudes and vote overreporting is completely filtered through the "expectation of voting" variable. Panel A shows the relations between vote overreporting and the measures of political attitudes among respondents who stated in the pre-election survey that they expected to vote in the November election. Panel B shows the relations among respondents who stated that they did not expect to vote.

Vote expectation is a powerful filter for the effects of general political attitudes on vote overreporting. The relations in Panel B are all very weak, and only two of the 14 tau$_c$ coefficients are statistically significant at the .05 level. Equally striking are

Table 3. Validated Nonvoters Who Said They Voted, by Measures of Respondents' Motivation to Vote and Whether Respondents Said They Expected to Vote, 1964, 1976, and 1980

Voting Expectations and Attitude Measures	1964			1976			1980		
	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High
		(in percentages)			(in percentages)			(in percentages)	
A. Nonvoters Who Said That They Expected to Vote									
External Efficacy	43.5	47.4	56.9	49.7	57.8	65.3	41.6	48.6	65.0
	(46)	(78)	(51)	(165)	(116)	(185)	(89)	(72)	(80)
Tau_c		.109			.146**			.211**	
Partisan Strength	33.3	51.7	49.3	52.9	54.4	68.0	30.6	50.0	66.7
	(15)	(87)	(71)	(70)	(298)	(102)	(36)	(148)	(63)
Tau_c		.035			.100*			.224**	
Citizen Duty	—	—	—	39.6	52.8	66.6	40.0	47.3	58.3
				(75)	(188)	(208)	(40)	(93)	(115)
Tau_c					.206**			.148*	
Concern for Outcome	42.6		51.8	54.2		59.8	51.5		51.4
	(54)		(112)	(183)		(274)	(97)		(144)
Kendall's tau_b		.072			.061**			−.002	
Interest in Campaign	46.3	47.3	53.4	42.3	57.5	63.9	29.0	51.6	72.9
	(41)	(74)	(58)	(91)	(204)	(175)	(62)	(126)	(59)
Tau_c		.062			.155**			.324**	
B. Nonvoters Who Said That They Did Not Expect to Vote									
External Efficacy	7.8	0.0	3.4	3.5	3.9	1.3	1.1	1.7	2.3
	(51)	(63)	(29)	(200)	(103)	(78)	(94)	(58)	(44)
Tau_c		−.050			−.013			.010	
Partisan Strength	0.0	6.0	0.0	0.9	3.7	6.4	1.6	0.8	5.9
	(32)	(83)	(26)	(110)	(232)	(39)	(62)	(119)	(17)
Tau_c		.006			.033*			.009	
Citizen Duty	—	—	—	2.6	2.1	6.0	0.0	1.2	3.6
				(155)	(141)	(84)	(55)	(85)	(55)
Tau_c					.022			.029	
Concern for Outcome	2.7		3.2	3.4		3.1	1.6		1.7
	(74)		(63)	(239)		(131)	(127)		(59)
Kendall's tau_b		.013			−.012			.001	
Interest in Campaign	2.9	4.4	3.4	1.0	3.4	7.6	0.9	3.1	0.0
	(70)	(45)	(29)	(155)	(174)	(60)	(114)	(64)	(19)
Tau_c		.009			.045**			.011	

Note: Figures in parentheses are base *N*s for the percentages immediately above.

*Statistically significant at or below $p = .05$.

**Statistically significant at or below $p = .01$.

the extraordinarily low levels of vote overreporting among those who did not expect to vote. In contrast, in Panel A, not only are the levels of vote overreporting much higher than those in Panel B, but most of the political attitude measures have moderate and statistically significant relations with vote overreporting. Prior attitudes appear to be partially filtered through the vote expectation measure: 11

of the 14 tau coefficients in Panel A are weaker than the bivariate relations between attitudes and overreporting (Table 2). Analogous results obtain when we examine the relation between vote overreporting and education while controlling for vote expectation.

Race, Sex, Age and Vote Overreporting

Given the conclusions of previous research, it is important to examine whether our measure of vote overreporting shows large differences in race. Although a higher proportion of black nonvoters than white reported that they voted, only in 1976 is the racial difference in overreporting statistically significant. Even for 1976, these differences should not be overinterpreted. Differences in overreporting related to race may be partly an artifact of error in the vote validation process (Abramson and Claggett, 1984), of differences in the quality of interviewing, or of sampling error or differential response rates of blacks and whites.[7] Earlier conclusions that blacks are much more inclined than whites to report falsely that they voted (see especially Hill and Hurley, 1984; Sigelman, 1982) are not supported when the appropriate population at risk is analyzed.

In 1964, men were more likely to overreport voting than women, but this difference was eliminated by 1980, probably because of the virtual elimination of sex differences in reported voter turnout. The pattern of vote overreporting by age follows the trajectory of actual voting by age. The youngest and oldest nonvoters are the least likely to overreport voting.

Multivariate Logit Regression

We use logit regression analysis to summarize the effects of education and support for civic norms on the probability that nonvoters will falsely claim that they voted, and to determine whether these effects remain after the respondent's age, sex, and race are taken into account. To define the dependent variable (false reporting), actual nonvoters who say they voted are coded 1, and those who say they did not vote are coded 0. The analysis estimates the probability that an actual nonvoter will claim to have voted.

Interpreting the effect of differences in individual logit regression coefficients is not straightforward. However, as in ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression, larger logit regression coefficients imply larger effects on the dependent variable than smaller logit regression coefficients. Also, the test of significance of individual logit regression coefficients is analogous to that used in OLS regression (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984, pp. 54-55).

The test for the goodness of fit of the model as a whole is a test of the significance of the difference between the chi-square for the specified model and the chi-square for the model that includes only the grand mean. Since there is no direct analogue to the R^2 statistic of OLS regression, we report a pseudo-R^2 approximation proposed by Aldrich and Nelson (1984, p. 57).

Model Specification

For each National Election Study, we first specify a "base model" in which the dependent variable, false reporting (*FR*), is a function of whether the respondent declared that he or she *expected* to vote (*EXPECT*, coded 1 or 0) and of the respondent's *education*, expressed by the following dummy variables: "Completed High School" (*HSED*), "Some College" (*SCED*), and "Completed College" (*CCED*).[8] Since education only affects the propensity to overreport voting among respondents who declared before the election that they expected to vote, we specify the joint effects of education and expectation as interaction terms. The base model is:

$$\text{logit}(FR) = b_0 + b_1 EXPECT$$

$$+ b_2(EXPECT \times HSED)$$
$$+ b_3(EXPECT \times SCED)$$
$$+ b_4(EXPECT \times CCED) + e. \qquad (1)$$

All variables in the base model are included in each regression equation. As with education, all other independent variables are expressed as interactions with vote expectation. Recall that we interpret the expectation variable as an indicator of the saliency of voting to the respondent.

The results of the logit regression are shown in Table 4. Three models are specified for each election year. In each year, the base model as a whole is statistically significant at $p < .001$. In each year also, the main effect of the *EXPECT* variable is significant, as is the interaction between *EXPECT* and at least one of the education categories.

The second model for each year adds to the base model terms reflecting race, sex, and age, labelled collectively as "covariates." Based on preliminary analysis, the effect of age is expressed as an interaction term between *EXPECT* and a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent was between age 18 and age 30, and the value of 0 if the respondent was older. The 18–30 year-olds stand out because of their low propensity to overreport voting, despite their high level of education.

Three measures of political attitudes are included in the third equation for each year: (1) high political interest (*EXPECT × HIGH INTEREST*), (2) high external political efficacy (*EXPECT × HIGH EFFICACY*), (3) high citizen duty (*EXPECT × HIGH DUTY*). When all of the political attitude variables examined in the cross-tabulations are entered simultaneously in the regression equation, none of them is statistically significant in the logit regression. This is because of multicollinearity, and because there is a large penalty in degrees of freedom from including nonsignificant variables in logit regression. Although some alternative combinations of variables might have worked nearly as well, the three variables that were included were the ones that showed the strongest effects of the political attitude variables in combination with the base model and covariates.

Discussion

In 1964, neither the three covariates nor the additional political attitude variables improves the goodness of fit of the model. In 1976 and in 1980, however, both the covariates and the political attitude variables add significantly to the goodness of fit. Judging from the pseudo-R^2, the base model variables and the base model plus covariates do better in accounting for overreporting in 1976 and 1980 than in 1964. Even more importantly, additional motivating factors come into play in later elections. Although the best individual predictor differs between 1976 and 1980, in each succeeding election the effects of the political attitude variables become stronger. This is consistent with the increasing importance of political efficacy and strength of partisanship in accounting for voter turnout in recent presidential elections (Abramson and Aldrich, 1982).

Conclusion

We have shown that the tendency to overreport voting is related to respondent characteristics. Thus, measures of the relation between respondent characteristics and self-reported voting will overestimate the strength of the relation between the dependent and independent variables.[9] Therefore, Sigelman's (1982) and Katosh and Traugott's (1981) conclusions about the comparability of analyses of the social and political correlates of voting using the validated and self-reported voting data are not sound for all types of analyses. Wolfinger and Rosen-

Table 4. Logit Regression for Base Model, Base Model with Covariates, and Model with Political Attitude Variables, 1964, 1976, and 1980

Variables	1964			1976			1980		
	Base Model[a]	Base Plus Covariates	Base Plus Covariates and Political Motiv.	Base Model	Base Plus Covariates	Base Plus Covariates and Political Motiv.	Base Model	Base Plus Covariates	Base Plus Covariates and Political Motiv.
Constant	-3.273* (7.30)	-3.273* (7.30)	-3.273* (7.30)	-3.403* (11.60)	-3.401* (11.88)	-3.401* (11.88)	-4.179* (7.31)	-4.179* (7.31)	-4.179* (7.31)
Base Model Variables									
Expected to Vote	2.810* (5.16)	2.689* (4.50)	2.695* (4.23)	3.494* (9.82)	3.125* (8.03)	2.380* (5.37)	3.594* (5.51)	4.015* (5.72)	3.158* (4.06)
Expected to Vote × Completed College	1.715* (2.00)	1.838* (2.10)	1.845 (1.93)	.678 (1.54)	.962* (1.98)	.414 (.77)	2.541* (2.28)	3.649* (2.93)	2.857* (2.09)
Expected to Vote × Some College Education	.057 (.09)	.188 (.30)	.192 (.28)	.508 (1.31)	.975* (2.26)	.547 (1.19)	1.231* (2.38)	2.271* (3.31)	1.977* (2.65)
Expected to Vote × High School Education	.955 (1.94)	.996 (1.96)	.997 (1.90)	.114 (.38)	.541 (1.59)	.390 (1.09)	.652 (1.42)	1.075* (2.04)	1.034 (1.82)
Covariates									
Expected to Vote × Black	—	1.038 (1.67)	1.044 (1.61)	—	.995* (2.56)	.974* (2.38)	—	-.351 (.64)	-.462 (.73)
Expected to Vote × Male	—	-.125 (.29)	-.126 (.29)	—	.495 (1.77)	.506 (1.72)	—	-.195 (.45)	-.558 (1.14)
Expected to Vote × Age 18–30	—	-.106 (.21)	-.107 (.20)	—	-.721* (2.39)	-.556 (1.76)	—	-2.034* (3.57)	-1.958* (3.16)
Political Attitude Variables									
Expected to Vote × High Interest in Politics	—	—	-.016 (.03)	—	—	.547 (1.84)	—	—	1.393* (2.87)
Expected to Vote × High External Political Efficacy	—	—	.003 (.01)	—	—	.434 (1.34)	—	—	1.126* (1.98)
Expected to Vote × High Citizen Duty[b]	—	—	—	—	—	.942* (3.25)	—	—	.414 (.87)

Table 4 (continued)

Variables	1964			1976			1980		
	Base Model[a]	Base Plus Covariates	Base Plus Covariates and Political Motiv.	Base Model	Base Plus Covariates	Base Plus Covariates and Political Motiv.	Base Model	Base Plus Covariates	Base Plus Covariates and Political Motiv.
Statistical Significance of Specified Models									
Comparison with Constant (grand mean)									
Chi-square	80.6	83.7	83.7	252.4	267.6	285.0	131.0	148.2	165.2
d.f.	4	7	9	4	7	10	4	7	10
p-value	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001
Comparison with Base Model									
Chi-square	—	3.1	3.1	—	15.2	32.6	—	17.2	34.2
d.f.	—	3	5	—	3	6	—	3	6
p-value	—	.39	.69	—	< .001	< .001	—	< .001	< .001
Comparison with Base Model Plus Covariates									
Chi-square	—	—	0	—	—	17.4	—	—	17.0
d.f.	—	—	2	—	—	3	—	—	3
p-value	—	—	1.00	—	—	< .001	—	—	< .001
Total *N*[c]	234	234	234	470	470	470	313	313	313
Residual *N*	229	226	224	465	462	459	308	305	302
Aldrich-Nelson[d] Pseudo-R^2	.256	.263	.263	.349	.363	.377	.295	.321	.345

[a] The *t*-ratios are given in parentheses. The tests are based on a two-tailed test of the *t*-ratio (ratio between the regression coefficient and its standard error).

[b] The citizen duty items were not included in the 1964 National Election Study of the University of Michigan Survey Research Center.

[c] Like the crosstabular analysis, the LOGIT regression analysis for 1976 is based on weighted data. For the sake of comparability, the logit regression is performed only on cases for which there are no missing data on any of the variables in the three equations shown for the given year.

[d] The pseudo-R^2 statistic used here is defined by Aldrich and Nelson (1984, p. 57).

*Significant at the .05 level.

stone's (1980, p. 118) declaration that "misreporting is not strongly related to demographic characteristics, although it is a bit more common among the very young and the very poor" is incorrect.

Our results have theoretical implications for the study of American political attitudes. By measuring overreporting of voting as individual rather than aggregate political behavior, the pattern of overreporting is shown to be consistent with our understanding of the individual motivational bases of political participation. This approach also gives a more accurate picture of the social bases of support for regime norms.

There is an analogy between our results and studies of such values as support for civil liberties and tolerance of minorities, nonconformists, and political extremists. Several scholars have pointed out that since respondents who are more highly educated are more likely to be aware of the "correct" or socially approved responses, their responses may stem from the desire to provide socially approved answers. Jackman and Muha (1984) argue, however, that higher-status respondents are not giving superficial answers that do not reflect a behavioral commitment; instead, higher-status respondents give answers to questions dealing with social issues that are consistent with their class interests and that express their satisfaction with the status quo. Both interpretations fit our results, which show that more highly-educated respondents are more likely than less-educated respondents to try to appear to be in conformity with the regime norm of voting, even when their actual behavior is inconsistent with this norm.

Notes

The data for this research were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, which bears no responsibility for our analyses or interpretations. We are grateful to John H. Aldrich, Mary R. Jackman, Robert W. Jackman, Howard Schuman, and Arland D. Thornton for helpful comments; to Michael Coble, Harriet Dhanak, and Amy Hsu for programming assistance; and to Maria Elena Sanchez for providing information concerning the vote validation procedures in the National Election Studies conducted by the University of Michigan Center for Political Studies. Work on this topic was motivated by research on interview quality for the Soviet Interview Project. A more detailed version appeared as Research Report No. 85-76 of the Population Studies Center of the University of Michigan, 1225 South University Ave., Ann Arbor, MI 48104.

1. We recode the vote validation data in the SRC studies following the procedures reported in Abramson and Claggett (1984). We do not include the 1978 SRC post-election survey, since it provides no measure of vote expectation.

2. The Kendall's τ_b coefficients between whether or not respondents said they voted and whether or not they actually voted is .784 in the 1964 SRC election study, .725 in the 1976 study, and .778 in the 1980 study.

3. Abramson and Claggett (1984) refer to racial differences in the percentage of nonvoters who acknowledged they did not vote, but this is not the main dependent variable in their analysis.

4. For further discussion of the importance of defining the population at risk of misreporting voting, see Anderson and Silver (1986) and Silver, Anderson, and Abramson (1985).

5. The recoding and construction of these measures from the SRC survey results follow standard procedures in previous research, and are described in detail elsewhere (Silver, Anderson, and Abramson, 1985).

6. We compared all pairs of tau coefficients between the two measures of whether the respondent voted and each of the political attitude measures. In 13 of the 14 paired comparisons the coefficient between the attitude and self-reported vote is larger than the coefficient between the attitude and the validated vote.

7. This argument is consistent with Weiss's (1968–69) study of welfare mothers, which showed that those who were more involved in the community were more likely to overreport voting. There is also evidence that response rates in SRC surveys have declined in recent years, particularly in large cities (Steeh, 1981). For further discussion of differences regarding race, see Silver, Anderson, and Abramson (1985).

8. "Some High School or Less" is the omitted category.

9. This point was made by Weiss (1968–69, pp. 627–28), but seems to have been overlooked by later researchers.

References

Abramson, Paul R., and John H. Aldrich. 1982. The Decline of Electoral Participation in America. *American Political Science Review*, 76:502–21.

Abramson, Paul R., and William Claggett. 1984. Race-Related Differences in Self-Reported and Validated Turnout. *Journal of Politics*, 46: 719–38.

Abramson, Paul R., John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde. 1983. *Change and Continuity in the 1980 Elections*, rev. ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.

Aldrich, John H., and Forrest D. Nelson. 1984. *Linear Probability, Logit, and Probit Models.* Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

Anderson, Barbara A., and Brian D. Silver. 1986. Measurement and Mismeasurement of the Validity of Self-Reported Vote. *American Journal of Political Science.* Forthcoming.

Bradburn, Norman M., Seymour Sudman, and Associates. 1979. *Improving Interview Method and Questionnaire Design: Response Effects to Threatening Questions in Survey Research.* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Cahalan, Don. 1968–69. Correlates of Respondent Accuracy in the Denver Validity Survey. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 32:607–21.

Flanigan, William H., and Nancy H. Zingale. 1983. *Political Behavior of the American Electorate*, 5th ed. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Hill, Kim Q., and Patricia A. Hurley. 1984. Nonvoters in Voters' Clothing: The Impact of Voting Behavior Misreporting on Voting Behavior Research. *Social Science Quarterly*, 65:199–206.

Jackman, Mary R., and Michael J. Muha. 1984. Education and Intergroup Attitudes: Moral Enlightenment, Superficial Democratic Commitment, or Ideological Refinement? *American Sociological Review*, 49:751–69.

Katosh, John P., and Michael W. Traugott. 1981. The Consequences of Validated and Self-Reported Voting Measures. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 45:519–35.

Parry, Hugh J., and Helen M. Crossley. 1950. Validity of Responses to Survey Questions. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 14:61–80.

Schuman, Howard, and Stanley Presser. 1981. *Questions and Answers in Attitude Surveys: Experiments on Question Form, Wording, and Context.* New York: Academic Press.

Sigelman, Lee. 1982. The Nonvoting Voter in Voting Research. *American Journal of Political Science*, 26:47–56.

Silver, Brian D., Paul R. Abramson, and Barbara A. Anderson. 1986. The Presence of Others, Pre-Election Vote Expectations, and Overreporting of Voting in American National Elections. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Forthcoming.

Silver, Brian D., Barbara A. Anderson, and Paul R. Abramson. 1985. Who Overreports Voting in American Elections? A Reconsideration of the Effects of Respondent Characteristics. *University of Michigan Population Studies Center Research Reports*, No. 85-76. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.

Steeh, Charlotte G. 1981. Trends in nonresponse Rates, 1952–1979. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 45: 40–57.

Sudman, Seymour, and Norman M. Bradburn. 1974. *Response Effects in Surveys: A Review and Synthesis.* Chicago: Aldine.

Traugott, Michael W., and John P. Katosh. 1979. Response Validity in Surveys of Voting Behavior. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 43:359–77.

Weiss, Carol H. 1968–69. Validity of Welfare Mothers' Interview Responses. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 32:622–33.

Wolfinger, Raymond E., and Steven J. Rosenstone. 1980. *Who Votes?* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Brian D. Silver and Paul R. Abramson are Professors of Political Science, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824.

Barbara A. Anderson is Professor of Sociology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109.

BOOK REVIEWS

BOOK REVIEW CONTENTS

Review Essay

Boucher, David. *Texts in Context: Revisionist Methods for Studying the History of Political Theory.*
Condren, Conal. *The Status and Appraisal of Classic Texts: An Essay on Political Theory, Its Inheritance, and the History of Ideas.* . . . . John Gunnell 631

Political Theory

Benjamin, Roger and Stephen L. Elkin, eds. *The Democratic State.* . . . . Norman J. Vig 640
Bluhm, William T. *Force or Freedom? The Paradox in Modern Political Thought.* . . . . Arthur L. Kalleberg 641
Brown, Robert. *The Nature of Social Laws: Machiavelli to Mill.* . . . . Jonathan Riley 643
De Jasay, Anthony. *The State.* . . . . Gordon Tullock 644
Elster, Jon. *Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality.* . . . . Charles Larmore 645
Dworkin, Ronald. *A Matter of Principle.* . . . . Richard E. Flathman 647
Fisher, David. *Morality and the Bomb: An Ethical Assessment of Nuclear Deterrence.* . . . . James A. Stegenga 648
Holmes, Stephen. *Benjamin Constant and the Making of Modern Liberalism.* . . . . Isaac Kramnick 649
Kaplan, Morton A. *Science, Language and the Human Condition.* . . . . John W. Danford 650
Koerner, Kirk F. *Liberalism and its Critics.* . . . . Steven Michael Dworetz 652
Kuklick, Bruce. *Churchmen and Philosophers: From Jonathan Edwards to John Dewey.* . . . . Robert A. Heineman 653
Liebowitz, Nathan. *Daniel Bell and the Agony of Modern Liberalism.* . . . . Leonard Williams 654
Macpherson, C. B. *The Rise and Fall of Economic Justice, and Other Essays.* . . . . Philip Green 656
Meyers, Diana T. *Inalienable Rights: A Defense.* . . . . James S. Fishkin 657
Rosen, Michael. *Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticism.* . . . . Bernard Yack 658
Schott, Kerry. *Policy, Power and Order: The Persistence of Economic Problems in Capitalist States.* . . . . Margaret Levi 659

American Politics

Aaron, Henry J., and Harvey Galper. *Assessing Tax Reform.* . . . . James L. Curtis 660
Benson, Peter L., and Dorothy L. Williams. *Religion on Capitol Hill: Myths and Realities.* . . . . David C. Leege 662

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 80 NO. 2 JUNE, 1986

Carnoy, Martin and Henry M. Levin. *Schooling and Work in the Democratic State.* . . . . . Harmon Zeigler 663
Carroll, Susan. *Women as Candidates in American Politics.* . . . . . Virginia Sapiro 665
Chubb, John E., and Paul E. Peterson, eds. *The New Directions in American Politics.* . . . . . Charles O. Jones 666
Derthick, Martha, and Paul J. Quirk. *The Politics of Deregulation.* . . . . . Kenneth J. Meier 667
Greenberg, Edward S. *Capitalism and the American Political Ideal.* . . . . . David Vogel 668
Jenkins, J. Craig. *The Politics of Insurgency: The Farm Worker Movement in the 1960s.* . . . . . Kenneth Finegold 669
Kayden, Xandra and Eddie Mahe, Jr. *The Party Goes On: The Persistence of the Two-Party System in the United States.* . . . . . Cornelius P. Cotter 671
Light, Paul. *Artful Work: The Politics of Social Security Reform.* . . . . . David Vogler 673
Long, Elizabeth. *The American Dream and the Popular Novel.* . . . . . Henry S. Kariel 674
Majka, Linda C. and Theo J. Majka. *Farm Workers, Agribusiness and the State.* . . . . . Kenneth Finegold 669
Mosley, Hugh G. *The Arms Race: Economic and Social Consequences.* . . . . . John R. Gist 675
Natchez, Peter B. *Images of Voting/Visions of Democracy.* . . . . . Richard Sobel 676
Pedraza-Bailey, Silvia. *Political and Economic Migrants in America: Cubans and Mexicans.* . . . . . George C. Kiser 677
Rabin, Jack and Don Dodd, eds. *State and Local Government Administration.* . . . . . Robert T. Perry 678
Rosenbaum, Walter A. *Environmental Politics and Policy.* . . . . . Geoffrey Wandesforde-Smith 679
Rubin, Barry. *Secrets of State: The State Department and the Struggle Over U.S. Foreign Policy.* . . . . . Joseph M. Scolnick, Jr. 681
Smith, Rogers M. *Liberalism and American Constitutional Law.* . . . . . Michael W. McCann 682
Steiner, Giblert Y. *Constitutional Inequality: The Political Fortunes of the Equal Rights Amendment.* . . . . . Joyce Gelb 683
Treadway, Jack. *Public Policymaking in the American States.* . . . . . Edward T. Jennings, Jr. 684
Waltman, Jerold L. *Political Origins of the U.S. Income Tax.* . . . . . James L. Curtis 660
Ware, Alan. *The Breakdown of Democratic Party Organization, 1940–1980.* . . . . . John C. Green 685
West, William F. *Administrative Rulemaking: Politics and Processes.* . . . . . John E. Rouse, Jr. 686
Witte, John F. *The Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax.* . . . . . Allen Schick 687

Comparative Politics

Arter, David. *The Nordic Parliaments: A Comparative Analysis.* . . . . . Kenneth E. Miller 689
Barkan, Joel D. *Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania.* . . . . . Dean E. McHenry, Jr. 690

1986 Book Reviews

Barnett, A. Doak. *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process.* . . . Steve Chan 691
Beer, William R. and James E. Jacob, eds. *Language Policy and National Unity.* . . . Brian Weinstein 692
Benner, Jeffrey. *The Indian Foreign Policy Bureaucracy.* . . . Mary Fainsod Katzenstein 693
Beyme, Klaus von. *Political Parties in Western Democracies.* . . . Russell J. Dalton 694
Danielson, Michael N. and Rusen Keles. *The Politics of Rapid Urbanization: Government and Growth in Modern Turkey.* . . . Frank Tachau 695
Dearlove, John and Peter Saunders. *Introduction to British Politics: Analysing a Capitalist Democracy.* . . . Jorgen Rasmussen 697
Dekmejian, R. Hrair. *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World.* . . . John O. Voll 698
Eisenstadt, S. N. and Ora Ahimer, eds. *The Welfare State and Its Aftermath.* . . . B. Guy Peters 701
Fleet, Michael. *The Rise and Fall of Chilean Democracy.* . . . Hannah W. Stewart 700
Groth, Alexander J. and Larry L. Wade, eds. *Comparative Resource Allocation: Politics, Performance and Policy Priorities.* . . . B. Guy Peters 701
Hardgrave, Robert L., Jr. *India Under Pressure: Prospects for Political Stability.* . . . Mary Fainsod Katzenstein 693
Horowitz, Donald L. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict.* . . . Fred von der Mehden 702
Ismael, Tareq and Jacqueline S. Ismael. *Government and Politics in Islam.* . . . Marvin G. Weinbaum 703
McLennan, Gregor, David Held, and Stuart Hall, eds. *State and Society in Contemporary Britain: A Critical Introduction.* . . . Jorgen Rasmussen 697
Opello, Walter C., Jr. *Portugal's Political Development: A Comparative Approach.* . . . Howard J. Wiarda 704
Pridham, Geoffrey, ed. *The New Mediterranean Democracies: Regime Transition in Spain, Greece and Portugal.* . . . Thomas D. Lancaster 705
Smith, Brian C. *Decentralization: The Territorial Dimension of the State.* . . . Carolyn Teich Adams 706
Tolliday, Steven and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds. *Shop Floor Bargaining and the State: Historical and Comparative Perspectives.* . . . Peggy Kahn 708
Worsley, Peter. *The Three Worlds: Culture and World Development.* . . . John A. Armstrong 709

International Relations

Aggarwal, Vinod K. *Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade.* . . . Stefanie Ann Lenway 711
Boyle, Francis A. *World Politics and International Law.* . . . Michael M. Gunter 712
Brams, Steven J. *Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict.* . . . Stephen J. Majeski 713
Byers, R. B., ed. *Deterrence in the 1980s: Crisis and Dilemma.* . . . Louis Rene Beres 715
Catudal, Honore (Marc). *Nuclear Deterrence—Does It Deter?* . . . Louis Rene Beres 715

Dallin, Alexander. *Black Box: KAL 007 and the Superpowers.* . . . . Charles F. Hermann 716
Duncan, W. Raymond. *The Soviet Union and Cuba: Interests and Influence.* . . . . H. Michael Erisman 717
Eayrs, James. *In Defense of Canada: Growing Up Allied.* . . . . David Taras 718
Foltz, William J. and Henry S. Bienen, eds. *Arms and the African: Military Influences on Africa's International Relations.* . . . . Victor T. Levine 720
Holloway, David and Jane M. O. Sharp, eds. *The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition?* . . . . Daniel Nelson 721
Hsiung, James C., ed. *Beyond China's Independent Foreign Policy: Challenge for the U.S. and Its Asian Allies.* . . . . Robert Bedeski 722
Ives, Jane H., ed. *The Export of Hazard: Transnational Corporations and Environmental Control Issues.* . . . . Philippe G. LePrestre 723
Jackson, Robert J., ed. *Continuity of Discord: Crises and Responses in the Atlantic Community.* . . . . Glenda G. Rosenthal 730
Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.* . . . . George Modelski 724
Light, Margot and A. J. R. Groom, eds. *International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory.* . . . . Edwin Fedder 726
Paarlberg, Robert L. *Food Trade and Foreign Policy: India, the Soviet Union, and the United States.* . . . . Don F. Hadwiger 726
Papp, Daniel S. *Soviet Perceptions of the Developing World in the 1980s: The Ideological Basis.* . . . . Mark N. Katz 728
Smith, Steve, ed. *International Relations: British and American Perspectives.* . . . . Edwin Fedder 726
Spiegel, Steven L. *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy from Truman to Reagan.* . . . . James Lee Ray 728
Treverton, Gregory F. *Making the Alliance Work: The United States and Western Europe.* . . . . Glenda G. Rosenthal 730

REVIEW ESSAY

Texts in Context: Revisionist Methods for Studying the History of Political Theory. By David Boucher. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985. Pp. vii + 280. $39.90.)

The Status and Appraisal of Classic Texts: An Essay on Political Theory, Its Inheritance, and the History of Ideas. by Conal Condren. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. Pp. xiii + 303. $27.50.)

The study of the history of political theory largely defined the subfield of political theory in American political science for well over half a century, and it was an integral aspect of the discipline's vision of the scientific study of politics. During the behavioral revolution, and evolution, the discipline and its subfield engaged in a bitter quarrel. The post-behavioral era has been marked by a detente. While the history of political theory remains a sub-subfield of political science, it has little to say to the mainstream of the discipline, which, in turn, has afforded it limited cognizance and concern. Some have argued that such a divorce, or at least a state of permanent separation, is the preferred condition, and one that is of mutual benefit—most have at least been comfortable with the estrangement. It might also be argued, however, that each has been impoverished both by the loss of a dimension of critical exposure and by a narrowing of their field of action.

These are complicated issues, but even to broach them requires a more detailed grasp of what has happened to the study of the history of political theory since it cut loose from issues defined by political science and by the conflict with behavioralism. During the past 15 years, the study of the history of political theory has been steadily transformed. The principal development that contributed to changing the contours and internal constitution of the field was the appearance of a critique that alleged a failure on the part of past research to be adequately historical, and which has been accompanied by the emergence of a body of research that in various ways and degrees has been associated with this critique. This has been conventionally dubbed the "new history of political theory" or, more ambiguously, the "new historicism."

Boucher's and Condren's books represent and address the transformation in question, and text and context in this case are inseparable. To situate this work properly would require a definitive account of the study of the history of political theory during the past three decades, and this, in turn, would require nothing less than writing a history of academic political theory; but it is important to sharpen our sense of the character and location of this literature.

The appearance of the new history has been associated prominently with the criticisms advanced by Quentin Skinner and J. G. A. Pocock, beginning in the late 1960s, and with the historical research which they and individuals of a similar persuasion, have accomplished. Accounts of that persuasion have been related in many places, including the works reviewed here, and an extensive—and maybe excessive—critical literature has evolved around this work. But the very fact that the issues have occasioned an amount of methodological discussion that sometimes seems out of proportion to the research programs involved signals some underlying concerns about the current status of political theory in general. A number of factors are relevant in explaining the strong reactions that this work has evoked. Most obvious is its trenchant critique of past scholarship, but the crux of the controversy lies deeper and involves a more subtle issue. It is not simply that the critics attacked past work as failing to achieve historicity, but that much of this work did not understand itself as mere history, taking its relationship to politics as generic and fundamental to the field.

The story of the new history has been told in different ways, depending on the critical or apologetic note being sounded. There has been

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 80 NO. 2 JUNE, 1986

a tendency, however, both among critics and defenders, to picture an old and a new genre, and to consider the virtues or deficiencies of each. In some respects this approach is reasonable, but it also fails to touch many of the broader and deeper issues involved. Political theory as a whole, and even the history of political theory, was not—despite its scholarly and educational paradigms (or totems)—a highly integrated field. Furthermore, no authoritative disciplinary matrix has arisen from the disintegration of past practices and the appearance of new modes of research. Although some of the regulative assumptions of earlier forms of study have been theoretically devastated, they, and their literary residue, persist alongside methodological and substantive works that reject the old aims and premises and articulate and represent new ones.

Since the "history of political theory" (philosophy, ideas, and thought) refers to both a subject matter and its investigation, there is an inherent ambiguity in the designation. There is another dimension of ambiguity, however, that stems from the fact that in its latter mode it is characteristically used both to talk about a certain analytically distinguishable kind of research and to refer to the practice of a particular discipline or subdiscipline. It is not uncommon for works from a variety of fields to be subsumed as contributions to the history of political theory, and for the latter in turn to be understood as part of the history of ideas or an aspect of intellectual history. This is quite innocuous, unless these categorical terms are reified and it is assumed that there is, in fact, a distinct conventional practice such as the history of ideas, of which the history of political ideas, as a specific field, is a tributary. This problem has appeared from time to time in the methodological arguments of the new historians, who seek to legislate what they claim to be a truly historical form of inquiry. However, the distinction is also important for understanding the general outlines of the evolution of the history of political theory as a field of study.

If we speak generically about the study of the history of political theory or the history of political ideas, we can reasonably claim to discern instances in the early to mid-nineteenth century in various fields of scholarship and forms of political commentary. Although the actual historical relationship between such analytically specified forebears and later, more disciplined forms of inquiry is complex, the connections are significant. No matter where we locate its ancestors and relatives, either categorically or historically, there is an important sense in which the history of political theory did not emerge as a distinct genre and field of study until it found a home in American political science. Beginning in the late 1800s, but most significantly taking form in the work of William Dunning at the turn of the century, and extending through the period of George Sabine's extraordinary influence, it had a special relationship with this discipline. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that the history of political theory as we know it, both as a subject matter and a field, has been an invention of American political science.

From the late nineteenth century through the 1940s, the subfield of political theory in political science was essentially the study of the history of political theory. Despite some instances of conflict, there was, for the most part—and in the view of such major proponents of a scientific study of politics as Charles Merriam—a fundamental complementarity between this form of historical inquiry and the pursuit of a theoretical and practical science of politics. However, a fundamental transformation in this relationship began during the rise of the behavioral movement.

The behavioral revolution largely defined itself in terms of a rejection of the study of history of political theory, and posed a fundamental antagonism between historical and scientific theory. This conflict was more complex than is often assumed. Although, in retrospect, this shift has often been viewed as natural and incremental, it was in fact sudden and anomalous. There were many reasons—both internal and contextual, pragmatic and principled—for the behavioral critique of historical political theory. It was, in an important respect, an intellectual and (in a lexical sense) conservative reaction to new influences in the literature of political theory that challenged the dominant values of both American political culture and the American science of politics.

Beginning in the late 1930s and early 1940s, the philosophical histories of émigré scholars such as Leo Strauss, Hannah Arendt, Eric Voegelin, and Herbert Marcuse—as well as certain sympathizers such as John Hallowell—represented, at least implicitly, a fundamental break with the assumptions that had governed the field and assured the unity of historical and scientific approaches to theory. The point is not that earlier histories of political theory "from Plato to NATO" (Condren, p. 253) were not philosophically inspired and shaped, but rather that the new literature, whatever its ideological bent (which ranged from Christian to Marxist), implicitly, and often explicitly, confronted and contradicted some of the basic beliefs and commitments that had traditionally informed the discipline.

Through the 1940s, the textbooks and scholarship in the history of political theory had been devoted largely to telling the story of the evolution of the idea and institution of liberal democracy and suggesting—even avowing—that it was underwritten by scientific understanding. This was the meaning conferred on the great tradition that was both constitutive of and constituted by the classic texts that had become the basic subject matter of historical interpretation and evaluation. By the early 1950s a different perspective, forged in the context of European philosophy and the experience of totalitarianism, had, through the work of the refugees, begun to gain a voice within the discipline. Although still not highly visible in the literature, its claims presented a different version of the tradition of political theory—one that contrasted sharply with dominant assumptions and particularly with the increasing commitment of the discipline to pure science and a distinction between empirical and normative inquiry.

The account of the tradition was transformed into one of decline culminating in a crisis of modernity rooted in the pathology of modern political thought, particularly those ideas that gave rise to scientism and liberalism. This alleged intellectual and political crisis of the West was reflected, it was claimed, not only in the rise of totalitarianism, but in the antihumanistic positivism of contemporary social science and the practical and theoretical deficiencies of liberalism to which it contributed. The basic givens of the liberal/pragmatic consensus were challenged by transcendental claims and world-historical visions that both in style and substance contradicted the images of political science and political theory that had prevailed for more than half a century.

Before behavioralism had selected the history of political theory as a contrast model, the foundations of the critique of behavioralism had already been laid down. It was not that political scientists and earlier historians of political theory had not acknowledged a modern crisis reflected in the war and other aspects of social upheaval, but rather that they believed it was an aberration that would be dissipated through historical progress assured by and manifest in science and liberalism. Behavioralism was not, at least in principle, as revolutionary as its proponents claimed. There was no element of the behavioral credo that had not been articulated by earlier representatives of the discipline such as Merriam. Nor was it the doctrine of complacency that some of its opponents suggested. It was aggressive in maintaining and defending the liberal/scientific faith.

The behavioral claim that the study of the history of political theory had failed to contribute either to the scientific understanding of politics or to relevant value theory (e.g., David Easton) served more to segment than initiate the polarities. Indigenous historians, long attached to the traditional liberal/pragmatic goals of political science, became tarred with the same brush as those who espoused the still somewhat elusive arguments of the new wave of European thought. For the next two decades, the critique of behavioralism was a principal commitment of the literature associated with the history of political theory, and mainstream political science increasingly defined itself in terms of its distance from historical and normative theorizing. This conflict was marked by ultimately untenable claims about both science and the great tradition, but it largely came to define the discourse of political theory in political science.

There were many factors that contributed, by the early 1970s, to the emergence of political theory as an autonomous interdisciplinary field including elements of political science, philosophy, and history. One cause was the increasingly uncomfortable position of the history of political theory and allied concerns in the discipline of political science as constituted by the behavioral hegemony. Despite tensions within the camp of the history of political theory, Sheldon Wolin (1969) spoke for a generation when he defended "political theory as a vocation" against what he charged was the antihistorical and apolitical scientism of behavioral political science. Although it has been tempting to suggest that political theory was ostracised by political science, it is necessary to note the degree to which separatism had been rooted in the basic sentiments of the literature that had come to dominate this subfield.

By the late 1970s, the critique of behavioralism had essentially passed into other hands, and the emerging post-behavioral climate was ecumenical and tolerant of diverse modes of theorizing. The history of political theory continued to find a home in political science, but many of those once most actively involved in criticizing behavioralism increasingly became distanced from issues in the discipline and reflected concerns defined by the wider and burgeoning field of political theory.

It would be a mistake to suggest that the appearance of the internal methodological critique of the study of the history of political theory that began to emerge in the late 1960s can be explained simply as a result of the disengagement of the field from political science. Many of the principal sources, such as the work of Skinner, had never been closely tied to American political science, while some criticisms of past work were in fact rooted in the discursive context of American political science. Apart from the intrinsic significance of the issues that were raised and the power of the arguments advanced, much of the impact of this literature must be attributed to this disengagement.

As long as the study of the history of political theory was shaped by its relationship to political science, there was little self-reflection and impetus for critical examination. Some of the most extravagant and vulnerable claims about the meaning and significance of the classic literature and the activity of studying it were generated under these conditions. Autonomy occasioned self-consciousness about historicity and about the assumptions that had informed past endeavors. The claims fell upon a field that had been absorbed with "political" and disciplinary rhetoric. Now, separated from the context of the debate about behavioralism, the study of the history of political theory was—maybe almost inevitably—forced to address issues regarding the nature of its own activity and its subject matter.

One of the characteristics of the study of the history of political theory—including many of the earliest examples of the genre, and certainly beginning with its more overtly ideological forms in the 1930s—was that often neither the concern nor the approach was essentially historical. This is not to suggest that the criteria of "historical" are uncontested, or that the new history had any special authority to specify them or success in meeting them, but simply to indicate that much of the literature in the field, despite its historical form, belonged to a distinct scholarly/rhetorical genre of political/philosophical analysis and commentary. Often neither the behavioralists who criticized it as historical antiquarianism nor the new historians who deemed it inadequate intellectual history gave sufficient attention to its practical intention and purpose, and to its actual form and context.

Although there is opportunity and ground for a critique of the ideological premises and implications of the new history, it represents a decisive chapter in the academization and professionalization of political theory. This is really what much of the controversy has been all about, even though disguised in terms of arguments about method and proper subject matter. Although the study of the history of political theory has long been basically an academic activity, its understanding of itself, both before and after the transformation effected by the émigrés, reflected its mid-nineteenth century origins and contemporary aspirations as a contribution to, and even a form of, political discourse.

The new history, despite more continuities with the past than it might wish to acknowledge, represents a distinct break in terms of its institutional separation from political science; its attachment to the interdisciplinary field of political theory; its methodological commitment to a "truly" historical account of political ideas, traditions, and texts; and its substantive research programs. In its claims there are intimations of significance beyond the sphere of accurately recounting the past, but its self-defined goal is to separate understanding and critique and give priority to the former. This is often accompanied by the argument that relevant critique must be preceded by an accurate understanding of what is being criticized, but for the most part the emphasis has been on the theory and practice of making political theory historical, as opposed to practical and philosophical.

This, as well as the methodological emphasis, is not an uncommon pattern in the development of academic disciplines, and it offers some interesting parallels with the evolution of political science as a whole. The study of the history of political theory, despite its Europeanization, in some respects sustained the sentiments of the pre-behavioral political science that favored practical political engagement and sought an image of world-historical significance. There are hints (and even explicit claims) that the new history, like the policy turn in post-behavioralism, having pursued the distinction between explanation and application, may be toying with the issue of how once again to join what has been deemed separate and equal. As with the case of political theory in general, questions about the relationship of the new history to both politics and political science must be a matter of concern, particularly in view of the break with past commitments and assumptions. In this respect, the two books under consideration do not offer much explicit direction, but they do provide a basis for talking about the issues.

One perspective for relating these works is to view Boucher's book as a descriptive, explanatory, and critical account of the methodological claims of the new historians, and to approach Condren's book as an attempt to refine and extend some of the critical themes associated with this literature. This is a somewhat limiting approach, but it largely reflects what the authors see themselves as about, taking account of the fact that the treatments are basically complementary and markedly different in style and scholarship.

Boucher has provided a useful and relatively exhaustive account of the work of some of the principal individuals associated with the new history. Greenleaf, Pocock, and Skinner are discussed in three consecutive chapters. The arguments of John Dunn, which Boucher believes are substantially the same as those of Skinner, are also given considerable attention. Although Boucher has embellished and extended some of the criticisms and analyses that have been directed toward this literature, little in the book can be designated as original or of great value to those already familiar with the literature or involved in the dialogue. Its principal virtue is that it presents a consolidated account that should be very helpful to individuals who wish to gain a comprehensive sense of the theory and practice of the new history, its intellectual patrimony, and its general relationship to the field of the history of political theory. Although the basic posture of the book is critical and takes account of the considerable body of critical literature that has developed around the arguments of the new history during the past 15 years or so, Boucher does not deal either particularly well or fully with this material and its relationship to his claims.

The principal scholarly contributions of Boucher's book include sorting out the differences and similarities between the arguments of individuals such as Pocock and Skinner, who are too often lumped together; extending the discussion of Greenleaf's work, which has received less attention; emphasizing prominently Michael Oakeshott and his relationship to this literature; extending the analysis of the concept of tradition, which has been so central to the issues; and providing a valuable account of British Idealism and the philosophy of history and its relationship to the new history. The discussion of idealism is a little disappointing. While this philosophical tradition is obviously important, since, as the author suggests, "it informs and inspires much of the recent methodological literature" (p. 39), the discussion of Collingwood, Oakeshott, and others is juxtaposed rather than related in an explanatory way to the arguments in question. There are similar difficulties with somewhat more truncated treatments of philosophical hermeneutics and other issues.

Boucher argues that the appearance of the new history and its "preoccupation with method" was both a reaction to "orthodoxy" in the field regarding the how and why of studying past texts, and a response to those who, during the 1950s and 1960s, either deprecated the study of the history of political theory or lamented, from various perspectives, the "decline" of the field. Despite some theoretical differences, the arguments of Greenleaf, Skinner, and Pocock—all practicing but theoretically inclined historians—converged in the thesis that it was necessary to become methodologically self-conscious and to seek an understanding of past texts in their historical—intellectual, linguistic, and social—context. Although this general characterization is defensible and accurate in many respects, Boucher devotes a less than satisfying chapter to attempting to relate this work to the development of the Anglo-American study of the history of political theory.

The arguments of the new historians are, as Boucher emphasizes, not only closely related to the Idealist school, but even more immediately and obviously to the work of Wittgenstein, Austin, Kuhn, and post-positivist work in philosophy and social science. Such influence is apparent in claims regarding issues such as the need to situate texts in the world of ideas to which they originally belonged; the emphasis on the identity or parallel between ideas and language; the defense of the autonomy of historical understanding (vis à vis science); and the priority of objectivity achieved through avoiding anachronism and eschewing, at least initially, philosophical and ideological suppositions and concerns in favor of recovering an author's intention and the original meaning of the work. Boucher is not at his best in dealing with the character of such intellectual connections, but one reasonable summary conclusion that his discussion might imply is that the new historians have drawn upon more recent philosophy in an attempt to rehabilitate or reconstitute some of the more characteristically vulnerable and contested claims about historical understanding associated with the Idealist tradition.

To the extent that the book has a central theme, it is the claim that while the arguments of Greenleaf, Pocock, and Skinner represent successive moves away from the concerns and philosophical attachments of previous historians of political thought, in the end the authors "fail to maintain what they assert" (p. 5), or to achieve the standard of historicity to which they aspire. While Greenleaf emphasizes the importance of traditions as an object of study and the appropriate context for interpreting a text, Pocock stresses the constitution and evolution of paradigmatic languages, to the extent that particular texts are important only insofar as they represent or transform such languages. Skinner's intentionalist approach, in turn, focuses less on the linguistic context than on what a particular author says and does with language.

This kind of distinction may have some heuristic value as an organizing perspective, but has limited use as a basis for comparing these authors and understanding the differences between their claims. Boucher does well when he describes the individual positions, but falls into difficulties when he attempts to join the arguments. The charge that the new history has failed to practice what it preaches is a common one, and Boucher's discussion neither adds to nor adequately conveys the existing literature on the matter. When he engages some of the more complex philosophical and theoretical issues regarding such matters as relativism and objectivity, linguistic conventions and intentionality, and the relevance of hermeneutical arguments such as those of H-G. Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur to the issues at hand, he seems less than completely at home.

Boucher concludes that the principal contribution of these historical revisionists is that they have created a new self-consciousness among students of political thought about the methods and assumptions to which they have hitherto subscribed. Yet, he suggests, this work has not had the impact its proponents had hoped. In some sense, there is no doubt that both these claims are correct, but Boucher does not explore either assertion very fully. He points to some of the work that professes to have been inspired by the revisionists, but fails to discuss much of the most significant research that has been generated within what could be construed as the intellectual climate that the new history has helped create.

Boucher correctly points out that it is difficult to ascertain what kind of historical practice can be accommodated under the methodological principles advanced by the revisionists, just as it is difficult to determine when the practitioners actually, if ever, live up to the principles adduced. However, he does not explore the general problem of the relationship between philosophical methodology and research involved here, and what parts such metatheory plays, and has played, in the study of the history of political thought. He concludes tht the impact of the revisionists has not been as radical as often claimed, and that "the relationship between the new and the old histories of political thought is not one of rejection and replacement, but one of continuation and refinement" (p. 258). In the end, "in making a commitment to understand texts historically, we find that we have committed to very little" (p. 271). These are relatively safe conclusions, but they do not carry us very far in assessing the work of the revisionists and its relationship to past and future scholarship.

Ironically, what the revisionists have often failed to take into account when castigating past research was its intellectual context and the intentions of authors. They have treated it as bad history according to their criteria, and even assumed that earlier authors had simply failed to live up to universally specifiable standards of historical knowledge. To some extent this has probably been more a rhetorical strategy than an oversight, and Boucher probably overemphasizes their claim to historical purism by suggesting that they view criticism and philosophical purposes as illegitimate. It would be more accurate to say that they insist on the separation of historical understanding and explanation from normative claims about subject matter. There is no doubt that they have fostered what might reasonably be construed as a more historical (academic) attitude. This suggests definite questions about the relationship between historical and political discourse and about the role of political theory in the university, which, today as well as in the past, has characteristically understood itself as more than merely a professional scholarly activity.

Condren provides little help in addressing this problem, since, like the new historians' criticism of earlier work, he pays scant attention to its actual purpose and self-image. Yet the myths and rhetorical moves that characterized much of this work and its "historical" claims cannot be absolved simply because its authors understood themselves as engaged in such relatively cosmic endeavors as seeking political truth and the reformation of modern social science. Herein lies one of the fundamental dilemmas of academic political theory: to attempt, either consciously or unconsciously, to speak politically in the language of scholarship, or to conduct scholarship according to the form of political argument. The outcome is usually failure at both.

Condren understands himself as engaging in "a study of academic mythologies—in part, a professional act of deconstruction" (p. ix) aimed at an examination of the "institutionalized study of a handful of classic texts and the rhetoric of their promotion" (p. x). He is eminently successful in exorcizing the vestiges of the dubious claims that for so long have governed the history of political theory, but that require exposure if there is to be any serious consideration of the reconstitution of this field so that it can deal seriously with its relationship to politics on the one hand, and political science and philosophy on the other.

One of the difficulties with the methodological critiques advanced by individuals such as Skinner was that they were intricately bound up with, although not limited to, the defense and propagation of a certain kind of research program. This methodology was not in fact the articulation of a method as much as the strategic deployment of philosophy in the service of certain modes of research. This is one reason why so many have noted a disjunction between the principles advanced and the history practiced. It would be fair to say that, despite the fact that he sees this work as a "clearing operation" to be succeeded by better history, Condren—at least here and I suspect by inclination—is much more the pure methodologist. This is far from an unproblematic position to occupy, but he is sensitive both to the fact that *homo methodologicus* operates in a "dubious region" (p. 7), and to the many paradoxes and ironies involved in a vocation that tends "to hover (Socratically in a basket?) at the nexus of extrinsic and intrinsic inquiry" (p. 20), lacking unequivocal membership in any community.

Condren has written an uncommonly literate, erudite, and even entertaining book that manifests a thorough knowledge both of the history of political theory as a field of study and of its subject matter. The discussions are also firmly grounded in philosophy and literary criticism. It is a significant demonstration that tough-minded analysis is alive in the field and can be executed with grace and wit. There are times when the book seems excessively annotated and cluttered with asides, but the breadth and depth of scholarship is impressive. The author is in complete command of his subject. In the course of illustrating some points about textual exegesis, he also offers some compelling interpretations of portions of the work of such classic authors as Plato, Marsilius, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke. In the end, Condren is not able to conjure up much in the way of cures for the disabilities in the field he diagnoses, but he is aware that metatheory is neither the basic repository of answers to substantive problems nor a source of automatic authority regarding the activities it brings under its gaze. There is a dimmer but persistent sense that what is often posed here as a historiographical problem really has no historiographical answer.

This is the problem of what are, and have been, the criteria by which a text achieves the status of a classic. This turns out to be somewhat more fundamental than it might appear, since, in the case of the history of political theory, the whole enterprise has almost uniquely revolved around studying a set of texts it has designated as classics, and has identified itself in terms of its special relationship to these works. Condren's conclusion, in short, is that "beyond the level of evocative rhetoric, common standards of textual appraisal specific to political theory are chimerical" (p. 7), and that the field has rested on very shaky foundations indeed.

The problem is in part a consequence of the particularly complex and fluid structure of this community of scholarship, which has often been rife with disputation. But the two "articles of faith" that have been most peculiar to the community and most universally accepted within it have failed to yield a basis for an appraisal of the classic texts. The "issue-orthodoxy," or the idea that politics consists of a set of universal and perennial issues, that constitutes the subject matter of political theory, and the "myth of the tradition," or the belief that the classic texts are elements of a genuine historical "tradition," have come under severe attack in recent years, and Condren demonstrates that these dogmas have little power to explain why a classic is a classic.

Condren argues that it is necessary, then, to look at the more general "appraisive field" of textual analysis as a whole, to which the concept of "classic" belongs and on which the political theory community ultimately relies. This he takes to be a cluster of notions which include originality, coherence, contribution and influence, and ambiguity. Despite the somewhat unstable character of the political theory community, it does have internal elements of identity and cohesion, no matter how shaky they may appear when subject to scrutiny. However, the community (and here he plays with the political/religious analogue) also participates in a wider appraisive (ethical) structure constituted by these concepts. He treats these categories consecutively on an ascending scale of what he claims to be their rhetorical/explanatory power.

His discussion of this conceptual field often strays—but very fruitfully—beyond the literature of political theory. Although the implication is that the argument is moving in a more positive direction, the analysis of political theory in terms of its understanding and application of terms such as *originality, contribution, influence,* and *coherence* is, in fact, as destructive as the critique of the issues/tradition nexus. He concludes that "they provide little more than a superficial rhetoric of rationalizations" (p. 167). In the last third of the book, Condren turns to an excellent extended discussion of ambiguity that has more to offer as a piece of independent analysis than it does as an answer to the basic problem posed. He claims that it suggests the basis for a "reformed appraisive field" that would "provide a more viable framework for understanding the actual history of given texts in political theory than any reliance upon the established field can provide" (p. 10). Here Condren inevitably, but nobly, fails in his search for why a classic is a classic in political theory.

He claims that his typology of ambiguity provides a way of looking at the texts comprising the classic canon that—as a matter of historical fact, and contrary to the dogma of the field—"do not conform to any single conventional pattern of discourse" (p. 189). Condren argues that classic status is essentially a function of the degree to which a text offers sufficient ambiguities for exploitation as an authority, and that this, in turn, is often a consequence of the polemical context (of religious and political controversy) in which they were rooted and of their "rhetorical and ideological resonance." He stresses that his claim is not simply that these books became classics because they were "pathologically ambiguous" (p. 261), but rather that the notions of authority, exploitation, and ambiguity provide a conceptual framework for explaining why certain texts have emerged as a classical tradition from what an early historian of political thought referred to as the "promiscuous heap" of available works.

Although Condren has indicated an important characteristic of the classic texts, and possibly even a necessary condition of classic status, it is not a sufficient explanation of why they became classics. However, he has also, by this point, shifted the problem from why the political theory community considers them classics to why they became classics before being bequeathed to or appropriated by this community. The problems overlap, as he makes clear in his allusions to the similarities between political and academic discourse, but they are not the same. The discussion of ambiguity simply cannot carry the burden assigned to it, and Condren, in fact, seems to sense the limits of his attempt to rationalize classicalness. He notes that such an analysis cannot substitute for looking in detail at the actual history of particular texts and of the intellectual community conferring the classic status. There is no analytical answer to what is really a particular historical and, at least academically, ideological problem. His final, short answer is the best, and actually is implicit throughout: "What then gives texts classic status? At its simplest, the intellectual communities that need them: they have been fashioned as man's gods and ancestors have been in his image and likeness" (p. 284).

Condren's work is eminently successful as a deconstructive effort that extends and deepens the critique of the less than tenable basis on which much of the work in the history of political theory has been conducted. Parallelling that critique has been the appearance during the past 15 years of significant research that has attempted to disengage itself from the difficulties of those who propagated, and were mesmerized by, the spell of the great tradition and other mythologies. This work, in both theory and practice, has hardly been free from intrinsic problems, but most of the dissatisfaction has been of a different nature. It has been rooted in the fact that this work does not replace in kind what has been cast aside, and does not fulfill the expectations and purposes that in part defined the old endeavor. More specifically, it fails, for example, to absorb itself sufficiently within the traditional classic canon and to accept the premises attaching to that definition of the subject matter, and it steps aside from political commentary that ascribes to itself world-historical significance. In fine, much of the criticism has simply been rooted in nostalgia for an obsolescent genre, and in the residue of old commitments and beliefs.

The study of the history of political theory, organized around the notion of a tradition containing and constituted by the classic canon and explaining the present, was once understood as the theoretical core of political science. During the behavioral era it was gradually displaced from that matrix, but that alienation exposed its fragility. The accompanying internal transformation, initiated by the émigrés and their increased philosophization of the subject matter, eventually, and ironically, made it alien to the very structure it contributed largely to creating: autonomous academic historical political theory. The study of the history of political theory will remain part of the scholarly and educational structure of political science, not only because of its relevance to and historical roots in that field, but simply because many of its most significant practitioners are professional political scientists. However, its intellectual evolution will continue primarily to depend, at least in the near future, on its place in the interdisciplinary field of political theory and on the kind of discussions initiated by the new history.

With regard to its relationship to politics, there is little to suggest that the study of the history of political theory is any kind of special case, despite vestigial hopes and claims. Its future in this respect is tied to more general questions about the relationship of the fields of political science and political theory to politics —that is, the general relationship between academic and public discourse. The new history has had little to say about this, but at least it has avoided some of the dubious answers emanating from various other quarters as diverse as public policy analysis and critical theory.

JOHN G. GUNNELL

State University of New York Albany

POLITICAL THEORY

The Democratic State. Edited by Roger Benjamin and Stephen L. Elkin. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1985. Pp. vii + 275. $30.00 cloth; $12.95 paper.)

The notion of the state has always been difficult to reconcile with liberal democratic thought, especially its Anglo-American pluralist variants. Until recently, most discussion of the state had been rooted either in the Weberian model of permanent bureaucratic administration or in the Marxian concept of the state as an instrument of class repression. Most democratic theorists have rejected the idea of an autonomous state on principle (usually contract theory) or empirically: representative governments are bound by electoral preferences and group interests in the underlying civil society.

Liberal pluralist doctrine of this kind has come under increasing attack from both the Left and Right in recent years. Neo-Marxist theorists of advanced capitalism have revived the Gramscian idea of a relatively autonomous state apparatus that promotes the interests of capital apart from the organized expression of class interests by the ruling class itself. On the other side, the new political economists of the public choice school have deduced increasingly elaborate logical hypotheses from microeconomics and game theory which purport to demonstrate that democratic political processes cannot fairly and efficiently aggregate public preferences.

The Democratic State is a welcome effort to capture the main currents in this debate and, at the same time, to rescue the concept of the state from the extremes and incorporate it into a new, more catholic theory of liberal democratic governance. Although the book does not fully succeed in the latter regard, it does provide a stimulating set of essays on the political economy of capitalism and a biting critique of mainstream political science that ignores "the theoretical challenge posed by the increasing centrality of the state in the life of liberal democratic societies" (p. 12).

An early chapter by Roger Benjamin and Raymond Duvall does an excellent job of dissecting various definitions of "the state" and in showing that its role and degree of autonomy cannot be divorced from its structural context. Specifically, they argue that the state plays a completely different role in advanced-capitalist or postindustrial society than in the dependent-industrializing capitalism of the third world. While the resulting typology is interesting, one wonders whether both postindustrial and Marxist structural concepts can be so conveniently accommodated as suggested here. Surely the range of structural alternatives is far richer than the ideal types presented.

The next two chapters present Marxist and public choice perspectives on capitalist democracy. David Braybrooke discusses classical and contemporary Marxist conceptions of the state and the possibilities for its transformation under predicted capitalist crises. After reviewing and questioning the views of Mandel, O'Connor, Poulantzas, and Habermas, he suggests that the late capitalist state—with its relatively autonomous bureaucracy and capacity for crisis management—could undergo gradual "self-transformation" into a benign, decentralized form of socialism. In contrast, the lengthy (91-page) chapter by Peter Aranson and Peter Ordeshook decries the "welfare-degrading tendencies of representative democracies" (p. 142), i.e., their tendency to produce an excessive public sector. The public choice argument is essentially that much of what passes for public good is in fact collective provision of concentrated private benefits to special interests. There is rarely any genuine welfare justification for state action in this view. The formal logic supporting this position is set out in considerable detail, with reference to electoral and interest group incentives and the consequent functioning of legislatures, bureaucracies, and even courts. Although the chapter fits awkwardly into the book and will be heavy going for readers unschooled in economics, it represents a good introduction to public choice analysis.

But the most valuable contribution is

Stephen Elkin's eloquent essay entitled "Pluralism in Its Place: State and Regime in Liberal Democracy." Beginning with the Lindblomian observation that "the distinguishing feature of liberal democracies is the division of labor between market and state" (p. 179), Elkin argues that both state and economy are parts of (and thus shaped by) the more fundamental social and philosophical "regime" in which they are imbedded. Rejecting both pluralist and elitist conceptions of democracy, he holds that the liberal state is neither a neutral power arena nor a tool of class domination, but rather a "mixed" state in which the needs of business and popular control are both accommodated. In essence, he carries Lindblom's analysis of politics and markets a step further by showing how the dependence of democratic governments on private business performance can be legitimated by the acts of the state itself in balancing competing concepts of justice.

The final chapter on "Political Futures" by Norman Furniss rounds out the book with some empirical observations and philosophical reflections on the challenges posed by the international economic "regime crisis" for the further development of the social democratic state. Although retrenchment of the welfare state is occurring in the 1980s, Furniss discusses the alternatives of supply-side "socialization of production," as in France, and "autogestionnaire democracy" built around citizen and worker movements in other countries.

This volume obviously does not produce a coherent liberal democratic theory of state but does confirm that the concept of the state is a rich vein to be mined in political science. *The Democratic State* belongs in all academic libraries and will provide essential supplementary reading for many political science and political economy courses.

NORMAN J. VIG

Carleton College

Force or Freedom? The Paradox in Modern Political Thought. By William T. Bluhm. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984. Pp. xvii + 322. $25.00, cloth.)

This work is an articulation and criticism of the confusions in political life deriving from the Cartesian subjectivism that lies at the foundation of all major representatives of modern political thought. In Bluhm's view, Cartesianism provides the metaphysical source of the problematic or contradictory political ideas of the modern era. He indicts Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche with internal contradictions that have their origins in the worldview of Descartes. One example is his view that Locke brought Hobbes's Leviathan within a constitutional order, but merely substituted an absolute social majority for an absolute crown. The irony of what is intended compared to what is produced in the case of each of these thinkers is what Bluhm refers to in the book's subtitle, "The Paradox in Modern Political Thought."

Bluhm introduces his theme in chapter one in terms of the dichotomy between various interpretations of force and freedom in recent controversies about the modern classics. According Bluhm, commentators have tried over a period of 200 years to resolve this paradox in modern theories of politics in favor of either "libertarian" or "authoritarian" interpretations of the classics. Before going into his own analysis of each of the classic moderns, Bluhm, in chapter two, analyzes the nature of Cartesian dualism (subject/object, mind/body, reality/knowledge). In short, the whole of subsequent modern political thought was constructed upon a philosophical fault that still underlies major contemporary ideologies. Bluhm's treatment of Descartes is necessarily brief, but I have no quarrel with his sketch of Descartes' metaphysics and epistemology. Indeed, Bluhm performs a useful function in succinctly articulating the significance of a thinker usually considered non-political for the core ideas or basic categories of otherwise highly diverse political thinkers from Hobbes to Nietzsche.

The central chapters, three through five, document the contradictions and ambiguities between what I will briefly term the libertarian and authoritarian strains inherent in the ideas of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Mill, and Nietzsche, and argue their grounding in a common metaphysics rooted in Descartes. The analysis here is succinct, persuasive, and clearly informed with a coherent, interpretational perspective derived from years of reflection.

In chapter six Bluhm reviews several different twentieth-century attempts to replace

Descartes' dualism with holistic philosophies that might eliminate the contradictions of modern political thought. "With Nietzsche's death," writes Bluhm, "all the possibilities implicit in the Cartesian world-view had been stated" (p. 237). But Bluhm assumes here that no worldview has taken the place of Cartesian dualism, and that we are still living under the stresses of political cultures dominated by these Cartesian possibilities. Contemporary thought seems to be looking for a "new way," according to Bluhm, but the tensions between force and freedom still dominate the recent efforts of even those who have tried to develop a "holistic understanding of social reality."

Bluhm touches briefly on existentialist thought, but concentrates his analysis on the works of Wittgenstein and Winch as representatives of ordinary language philosophy, and on reinterpretations of Marxism by Sartre and Kolakowski. Included is a section sketching very briefly some contemporary criticisms of ordinary language philosophy and phenomenology, especially in respect to their attempts to develop new philosophies of social and political science. Neither of them, in Bluhm's eyes, succeed in providing a cognitive ground for human personality without abandoning the contributions of science. That is, they fail to contribute to the development of a humanistic social science.

The last effort at finding a new way begins from the categories of Marxism. From Bluhm's viewpoint, Sartre's work ends in a contradiction between his analysis of human freedom (in "the project") and his understanding of historical process as necessary. Similarly, Kolakowski never moves beyond the contradiction inherent in his views of freedom and determinism.

All contemporary movements of thought for Bluhm have thus failed to solve the force/freedom problem, have failed "to place force, even in idea, at the service of human freedom. . ." (p. 273). In his final chapter Bluhm attempts to suggest a way beyond the dualist categories of Descartes' definition of reality. He suggests that it is not just flawed argument, but "existential incoherence" that pushes us towards this new outlook. Bluhm aligns himself with Alasdair MacIntyre's rejection of the common, total *ethos* of both liberal individualism and Marxism, and with his thesis that "our world of values is in disorder today" to the point where we have no way of testing various modes of moral argument or ways of life. As part of an overall "working hypothesis," Bluhm rejects two notions: (1) that history can be represented in terms of necessary laws (which is consistent with the abandonment by natural science of necessity for probability), and (2), that the terms mind and body are useful categories as starting points for theorizing (which also have been destroyed by science). In place of the Cartesian dichotomy of sense experience and private minds, Bluhm asks the reader to consider whether we do not have access to a "public mind," a mind embodied in human experience or common-sense reality. Such a public mind might tell us what mankind has historically and universally defined as good and evil. Following MacIntyre, he rejects the concept of abstract principle in favor of a neo-Aristotelian concept of the virtues, some of which apparently are universally accepted. These virtues—such as truthfulness, justice, and courage—are embodied in concrete social practices and in particular communities. Bluhm is not saying there are any shared ideals of humanity that might replace the "problematical ontologies" criticized in this book. What he does suggest is that there are "common themes" that cut across the "plurality of ideas."

One commonality is the obvious historical dialogue "between hedonistic self-interest and inherent or absolute right as fundamental motives" (p. 288). In every time and place, he suggests, these have "had to come to terms with each other." He then proceeds to sketch very briefly the various modes in which this dialogue of right and interest has been expressed in Western biblical, ancient Greek, Oriental, Indian, and Islamic writings. He seems at times to suggest that inherent right and enlightened (not radical, or short-term) self-interest converge or become identical in these historical worldviews. While hinting at only a few political implications from this fusion of morality and self-interest (p. 304), Bluhm concludes with the suggestion that "the moral experience of mankind, sketched here," while requiring more extensive empirical comparative inquiry, does suggest certain universal norms as "parameters to the freedom of individuals," while allowing "leaway for variety in life style and in the structures of political order" (p. 308). Thus, the gaps between mind and body, and between fact and value, dissolve as we recognize that we live in a world defined by both hedonic and moral values that shape and restrain us, but also that we create ourselves because we are "symbolic entities." The force/freedom paradox disappears in the symbolic, normative practice of mankind, which negatively sets only parameters to the freedom of individuals while allowing positive freedom for concrete, substantive decisions regarding lifestyles and political structures. Undoubtedly, many political theorists will find unsatisfactory Bluhm's new way out of the contradiction created by the Cartesian dualism that underlies modern political thought, but it is very tentatively suggested at the end of what I consider a very perceptive and persuasive diagnosis of the problems of modernity. His analysis of modern thought leading to that diagnosis makes this book well worth reading and very useful, I should think, as challenging ancillary reading in graduate courses in modern political theory.

ARTHUR L. KALLEBERG

University of Missouri
Columbia

The Nature of Social Laws: Machiavelli to Mill. By Robert Brown. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Pp. ix + 270. $39.50, cloth.)

In this ambitious book, Robert Brown aims "to trace, and to some extent criticize, the intellectual sources and development of the . . . view, first made explicit during the Enlightenment, that social life can, and should, be studied by the same methods as those of the natural sciences" (p. 251). Brown begins by pointing out that only isolated empirical generalizations were stated by pre-seventeenth century thinkers (introduction and chap. 1). He goes on to suggest that the first connected system of empirical generalizations was the notion of a self-regulating "circle of commerce" pioneered by seventeenth century political economists such as Mun, Misselden, North and Locke, and subsequently elaborated by later economists including Quesnay, Turgot, Hume, Smith, Condorcet, Say, Malthus, Ricardo, Senior, and Mill (all of whom are briefly discussed in chapters 2–5) Brown then argues that the development of political economy gave rise to a secondary literature devoted to methodological issues in the study of social life, engaging not only the economists themselves, but also historians and philosophers such as Vico, Turnbull, Comte, and Whewell (each of whom is also discussed in chapters 3–8). The secondary literature was "stimulated by the prospect of finding in social processes the analogues of Newton's laws of physical processes" (p. 71). In this regard, Mill's *System of Logic* (1843) is taken by Brown to represent the zenith of the Enlightenment conception of social science, "subsequent elaboration [having added] nothing essential" (p. 5).

Brown concludes his critical survey by strongly affirming that "we cannot realistically hope to find precise social laws concerning the sequence of phases of group life" (p. 261). "In this respect, there are not, and cannot be, scientific laws of society as there are scientific laws of nature. Hence there will never be trustworthy, accurate and wide-ranging social theories comparable to that of Newtonian mechanics" (p. 262). This conclusion, it should be noted, might possibly be interpreted to be compatible with, say, Mill's conception of social science, since Mill certainly does not claim that social science can achieve the predictive accuracy of the Newtonian model. Rather, he emphasizes that social phenomena are extremely diverse and constantly changing, not least because human volition is itself a causal antecedent, so that unforeseen changes of circumstances will in practice often violate the *ceteris paribus* clause implicit in the statement of any social science theorem. In other words, the influence of any one social law will often be counteracted in unpredictable ways by the influence of some other social law as circumstances change (*Logic*, book 6, esp. chap. 6). But Brown apparently seeks to present a much stronger conclusion than this familiar caveat about the level of guidance to be expected from social science. He suggests that we should confine our attention to finding "laws that connect social factors which are contemporaneous—Mill's laws of coexistence" (p. 262). However, as Mill makes clear in the *Logic* (bk. 3, chap. 22), such laws (whether considered ultimate or derivative from unknown causal laws) are merely empirical generalizations rather than scientific theorems (except when confirmed by an extremely wide induction by simple enumeration, akin to that underlying the universal law of causation). In effect, then, Brown defends some form of casual empiricism (tied to our "common-sense vocabulary") against a properly scientific approach to social phenomena. Indeed, his view is that "the social studies will not suffer much if there are no laws of social life" (p. 263).

Space limitations confine me to four brief comments. First, Brown's technique of sketching the ideas of a wide variety of classical thinkers, while impressive in scope, seems inadequate for his critical purposes. Given his view that Mill brought the Enlightenment conception "to a point sufficient for us to fully understand and appraise it" (p. 5), a more careful study of Mill's work on methodology (including the essays on Comte and Hamilton, as well as the *Logic*) should perhaps have been the focus.

Second, and related to the first point, serious doubts can be raised about Brown's interpretations of several thinkers. He seems to misinterpret various aspects of Mill's thought, for example, including the role of *ceteris paribus* clauses in the statement of causal laws (pp. 150, 230-32); the justification for regarding "laws of large numbers" to be causal laws rather than mere empirical generalizations (pp. 232-33); and the ways of determining whether known causal laws are ultimate or derived from more general causal laws (pp. 226-30).

Third, while Brown focuses rightly on "psychological reductionism" as a central tenet of the Enlightenment approach, his arguments certainly do not destroy the idea that scientific explanations of social life must ultimately be based on laws of individual psychology (pp. 49-96, 187-93, 255-57). In this regard, his failure to consider the writings of Mill and Bain on "association psychology," vitiates his criticisms (pp. 241-44) of Mill's distinction between the abstract laws of psychology (invariant across all societies) and the concrete laws of ethology (specific to the material circumstances of the given society). Moreover, his familiar suggestion (pp. 60-61) that the self-regulating behavior of free markets cannot be reduced to the intentions of individual buyers and sellers is not persuasive, as Amartya Sen has recently argued in another context (1983. The Profit Motive, *Lloyds Bank Review*, 147: 1-20). Perhaps justification rather than explanation of the market might rest in part on "unintended consequences," but even this is contestable since the efficiency of market equilibria rests entirely on the harmony which the price system brings about among the selfish intentions of different individuals.

Finally, Brown makes no attempt to distinguish scientific determinism from fatalism, and sometimes writes as if he believes there is no distinction: "Social laws. . . , if they exist, can be obeyed for only one reason, namely that the question of choice does not arise" (p. 254). But Mill took great pains in the *Hamilton* (chap. 28) to clarify the scientific "doctrine of causation," arguing (pace Berlin) that the doctrine is quite compatible with our feelings of moral freedom and responsibility. In this regard, Brown's rather curt dismissal (pp. 5-6) of Marx's views seems unfortunate. A comparison of Marx and Mill might well have proved illuminating, if only to clarify why Mill in the *Logic* (bk. 6, chap. 10) generally defends Comte's empirical law of social development as having "a real scientific basis" in the laws of psychology and ethology, whereas Mill in the *Chapters on Socialism* rejects any grand law of social development of the Marxist variety as unscientific fatalism.

JONATHAN RILEY

Tulane University

The State. By Anthony de Jasay. (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985. Pp. 256. $24.95.)

De Jasay begins his book by saying that he is going to consider the action of the state, "as if it were a real entity, as if it had a will and were capable of reasoned decisions about the means to its ends. Hence [I try] to explain the state's contact towards us in terms of *what it could be expected to do*, in successive historical situations if it rationally pursued ends that it could plausibly be supposed to have" (p. 1).

There are a number of problems with this, the first and obvious one of course is that the state is in fact a collection of human beings and has goals of its own only insofar as its collection of human beings more or less pushes in the same direction. Further, one might well believe the different states, insofar as they are pursuing particular aims, are pursuing different ones.

Nevertheless, this kind of simplification of the real world is frequently valuable. Taking some collection of human beings, whether it is a large corporation, a branch of government, or perhaps simply a group of people who happen to have the same economic interest—the farmers for example—and considering how they can achieve goals which one might impute to that group is frequently a worthwhile exercise. It should of course always be followed by empirical investigation to find out whether the theory fits the real world. De Jasay makes no such investigation, but there is no reason why we should not have a division of labor. His theory could well be tested by other people.

The problem with his theory as far as I can see is that it fails this empirical test. De Jasay's model is one of steady government aggrandizement. The bureaucrats are assumed (quite plausibly) to continuously want to increase their power, and he assumes that they succeed. His last chapter is called, "State Capitalism" and the last section of it is subtitled, "On the Plantation." He thinks that the logical development of the state is a situation in which government administrators control everyone else for their own benefit.

It is easy to see why somebody looking at the present-day world might reach this conclusion. The growth of government is fairly close to an omnipresent phenomenon today. The problem with it as a theory is that this was not always true. In the nineteenth century the English state in essence dismantled itself. The elaborate collection of mercantilist controls, administered by a very well paid bureaucracy, with which England entered the nineteenth century was to all intents and purposes gone by 1870. The United States did not experience a similar history because it entered the nineteenth century with very little government, but certainly there was not the slightest trace of growth of government during the century. Indeed, except in war time, the government shrank fairly consistently as a share of the total national economy. The fact that the U.S. ended the century with about the same portion of GNP absorbed by government as in 1800, is essentially an effect of the immense expansion of the government during the Civil War.

As can be seen, I think the major theme of de Jasay's book is simply wrong. Governments have historically had the common tendency to aggrandize themselves, but not always—and a theory which implies that they always do is clearly refuted by the facts. However, if you turn to other aspects of the book it is indeed very interesting and one which I can conscientiously recommend. De Jasay has read an immense amount of recent writings, given them careful thought, and comments on them in an intelligent and highly critical way. Particularly impressive is his critique of Rawls.

His point of view is that of a French "liberal" which insofar as it has an American counterpart, would be called "conservative." There are however, considerable differences between the French liberal approach and the American conservative approach, and de Jasay exhibits the advantages of a French education. To sum it up, there are many acute critical comments in this book, but its main theme is, I believe, incorrect.

GORDON TULLOCK

George Mason University

Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality. By Jon Elster. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Pp. viii + 177. $29.95.)

Sour Grapes should not disappoint anyone who is acquainted with Jon Elster's earlier works. There is the same startling ability to illuminate social life by bringing disparate phenomena into a common focus and viewing the everyday from an unfamiliar perspective. In this book Elster has turned his attention to forms of individual and collective irrationality. Beginning with an introductory discussion of thin and broad theories of rationality, he then devotes the next three chapters to three types of irrational behavior: (1) intending directly to bring about mental or social states that are essentially by-products of actions undertaken for other ends, (2) changing one's preferences to accord with one's possibilities by despising the unattainable as "sour grapes," and (3) arriving at beliefs on the basis of ideology. This last chapter contains a number of useful cautions against the vogue of "ideological critique," but I shall discuss only the other chapters, since they contain the most novel and provocative ideas.

A "thin" theory of rationality, says Elster in the first chapter, places only a minimal constraint upon an agent's beliefs and desires: they must be logically consistent with one another. He is right to find this approach inadequate. A "broad" theory, by contrast, would issue in stronger constraints than mere consistency, although without making the excessive requirement that rational beliefs and desires be true or morally best. His general proposal is that "we should evaluate the broad rationality of beliefs and desires by looking at the way in which they are shaped" (p. 15). This retrospective model, according to which the rationality of a belief or desire depends essentially on its *origins*, is a very old and scarcely implausible one. But it has some disadvantages. Many of our present and deepest convictions arose, not from reasoning, but from childhood training and the early imitation of others. This is an indispensable way in which tradition is passed on, and to mark it as irrational is undesirable if that means that it ought not to occur or that each of us, as Descartes urged, should begin again from scratch and build up all his beliefs and desires rationally. Elster might have considered the somewhat different view that rationality is primarily a future-oriented matter—that beliefs and desires are rational to the extent that (whatever their origin) we are willing to elaborate and revise them suitably in the light of experience. Fortunately, his discussion of the concrete forms of irrationality is largely independent of this more abstract controversy (even the future-oriented model will be concerned with how revisions of beliefs and desires are shaped).

In the second and most delightful chapter, numerous examples from Donne and Stendhal to recent cognitive psychology, serve to make palpable the irrationality of trying to bring about directly certain desirable states of mind which are essentially by-products. Being natural or spontaneous, for instance, is not something we can become simply by trying to be so; indeed, the very attempt makes it impossible (pp. 44ff.). Of course, there sometimes exist, Elster notes, "technologies for self-management," indirect methods for becoming what we cannot directly become: although I may be unable to fall asleep merely by deciding to do so, I can successfully pursue that end by deciding to take a sleeping pill (p. 53). But he also wisely suggests that some states of mind (e.g., spontaneity) may be unattainable even by a roundabout method, since keeping in mind or remembering the use of such a method may be incompatible with being in that state (pp. 57–58). There seem thus to be at least two sorts of by-product states, those which can be pursued knowingly (though not directly) and those which cannot.

Further classifications of this sort would have been helpful, especially in his subsequent discussion of "self-defeating political theories" (pp. 91ff.). There his concern is with theories which seek publicly to justify political institutions by effects that are essentially by-products (p. 92). One of Elster's examples is Mill's idea that popular participation in political decision making is to be prized because it develops character and public spirit (p. 97). He also draws some interesting examples from Tocqueville. Now the way in which such theories would be self-defeating cannot simply be, as he first seems to suggest (p. 92), that they violate the "publicity constraint" which Kant and Rawls place upon political argumentation. It is not that no one can argue publicly (that is, knowingly and with the hope that others will knowingly do so) for democracy on the grounds of its educative effects, without undercutting himself. One surely can. Instead, such theories turn self-defeating, as Elster himself later observes (pp. 96, 98), only if they make such by-products the only public justification for a political arrangement. Politics builds character only if people are interested, not just in that, but also in making the correct decisions. This gives us a third category of states of mind that are essentially by-products—those we can knowingly achieve only if we are pursuing some other, further goal as well.

Chapter three deals with how people can irrationally adjust their preferences to their possibilities, rejecting what they cannot have as not worth having. Elster rightly insists that this phenomenon poses a deep, but neglected problem for the usual sorts of social choice theory which take preferences as simply "given" and make satisfaction of preferences the decisive criterion. Should we really say that someone becomes better off by spurning the unavailable as "sour grapes" (pp. 109, 133ff.)? His own analysis of sour grapes develops a very interesting hypothesis. Wishing to distinguish it from rational forms of adapting preferences to possibilities (such as

Stoicism), he says that "sour grapes" characteristically tends to downgrade the inaccessible, instead of upgrading the accessible (as the Stoic would counsel), precisely because it is an unconscious response, rather than a deliberate plan (pp. 117–19).

This is a book chiefly about irrationality. But it also points to why certain widespread notions about rationality—most of all, the presumption that reason entails self-mastery—must be reconsidered. It is to be hoped that Elster will now push forward with this positive enterprise.

CHARLES LARMORE

Columbia University

A Matter of Principle. By Ronald Dworkin. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985. Pp. 425. $25.00.)

These previously published essays are strongly continuous with Dworkin's earlier collection, *Taking Rights Seriously* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977). There is once again a merging of jurisprudence with moral and political philosophy, and issues in these fields are pursued by consideration of court cases and other legal materials as well as through more abstract argumentation engaging the work of other philosophers. Thematically, Dworkin returns repeatedly to his distinction between principle (rights) and policy (goals), to his claim that political theory can give right answers in "hard cases," and to the elaboration and defense of egalitarian liberalism. Application of the first distinction to questions about reverse discrimination and free expression again tends to yield the conclusion that prominent recent claims to rights in these areas are without foundation, that the questions at issue in these controversies are of policy, not of principle. On the other hand, the focus of the discussions of judicial reasoning and legal theory (or meta-theory) has now shifted from criticism of legal positivism to a defense of Dworkin's own theory, especially against charges that he has embraced an untenable version of views against which legal positivism was a reaction. A welcome new feature is a section trenchantly criticizing the "economic analysis of the law," particularly as practiced by Richard Posner and Guido Calabresi.

Terminologically, much of the continuity among the essays is given by Dworkin's repeated use of the distinctions between policy and principle, or goals and rights. But these are terms of art and Dworkin's reliance upon them reflects his singularly optimistic version of liberalism and his soaring ambitions for political theory.

Dworkin's liberalism at least appears to include the latitudinarian tendency concerning ends, purposes, and goals that is familiar from the work of a number of self-designated liberal writers. There is rarely an indisputable answer to such questions, and this in itself is reason to welcome diversity and experimentation concerning them. Dworkin is not, however, agnostic or even notably skeptical concerning these matters. He thinks they can be intelligently and profitably discussed and that there are often better as opposed to worse answers to them. For this (and perhaps for more communalist or communitarian) reason(s), he favors an active democratic politics in which such questions are debated and collectively resolved. The kinds of bias against collective decision making and against politics that are often associated with more robustly skeptical views (for example, because ends and purposes are matters of opinion they should be left as far as possible to individuals) and more dogmatic ones (because there are right answers to such questions they should not be left to the uncertainties of democratic politics) make little or no appearance in this collection.

Accordingly, and despite his allegiance to a rigorist view of rights, Dworkin frequently argues against right claims which would restrict the democratic process and the use of the authority of government to pursue desired social goals. The fact that affirmative action programs have defeated the expectations of people such as Allan Bakke and Brian Weber is not sufficient reason to prohibit or restrict them. Again, the extensions of First Amendment rights proposed by journalists such as Myron Farber are, "from the standpoint of democracy," double-edged swords. If they enhance democracy by increasing public information they also contract it "because any constitutional right disables the popularly elected legislature from enacting some legislation it might otherwise wish to enact, and decreases the general power of the public" (p. 391). Generally, theories that forbid "the majority the use of politics and the law, even the criminal law" to "influence the conditions in which they must try to thrive" are "at least *prima facie* self-defeating" (p. 349).

But these views do not reflect any disposition on Dworkin's part to leave matters of principle and of rights to the majority, to received conventions, or to a market or other procedure allegedly neutral among possible resolutions of them. "Liberalism cannot be based on skepticism. Its constitutive morality provides that human beings must be treated as equals by their government, not because there is no right and wrong in political morality, but because that is what is right" (p. 203). While it is not impossible that the views of the majority or the results of market exchanges will be approximate to or even coincide with correct principles and the proper distribution of rights, they cannot be the test or criterion of political morality. Rather, the task of delineating and defending governmental principles and rights falls to those capable of the demanding tasks of political theory (cf. p. 408, n. 1, par. 1). Struggling "against all the impulses that drag us back into our own culture," struggling "toward generality and some reflective basis for deciding which of our traditional distinctions and discriminations are genuine and which spurious, which contribute to the flourishing of the ideals we want, after reflection to embrace" (pp. 219-20), political theorists must discover the truth and must "construct political institutions" (p. 195) that embody that truth.

The most general affirmative truth that Dworkin has discovered makes up "the principle fundamental to liberalism based on equality, the principle that people must be treated with equal concern" (p. 210). Although admittedly "abstract" (p. 191), Dworkin confidently affirms that this "is not an empty requirement" (p. 190). Because it is a constitutive truth to be "valued for its own sake" (p. 408, n. 1), further truths are to be sought primarily by elaborating upon it, comparing it with proposed alternative foundational principles, and so forth.

It is through this process of elaboration that the distinctions between principles and policies, and goals and rights are given definite shape. Claims (such as Bakke's and Weber's) to rights that cannot be derived from equal concern or some principle of comparable standing are rejected. Others (such as a "right to moral independence" that "requires [among other things] a permissive legal attitude toward the consumption of pornography in private" [p. 358]) are at least tentatively endorsed. And while Dworkin allows that such reasoning will often be disputed (p. 313), even that his most fundamental claims "may in the end prove to be wrong" (p. 372), he throughout maintains that there are right answers to the deepest questions of political morality and often writes as if he has produced at least some of those answers.

Taken seriously, these latter among Dworkin's views imply that democratic (or, presumably, any other) politics are acceptable only if ordered by a constitutive political morality known—by at least some political theorists—to be true by criteria independent of such politics and indeed independent of the culture and traditions of the society in which those politics occur. The political theorists of liberalism must provide us with "convictions that we do not hold contingently" (p. 352).

Read as essays in practical reasoning about difficult and pressing issues in American and British public life, several of these papers (most particularly numbers 4, 11, and 14–19) repay close attention. Perhaps this is how Dworkin intends them to be read. As some of his meta-level remarks (especially in part two) might suggest, perhaps his talk of uncontingent truths, of right answers, and of natural rights, above all his view of political theorists as the legislators and guardians of political morality, are ways of urging all of us to vigorously self-critical thinking about our morals and our politics. However this may be, the discussions I have just summarized present views that are at once philosophically untenable and politically objectionable.

RICHARD E. FLATHMAN

The Johns Hopkins University

Morality and the Bomb: An Ethical Assessment of Nuclear Deterrence. By David Fisher. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. Pp. 136. $25.00.)

It is not surprising that Fisher is an articulate exponent of the just war tradition. His book was written while he was on leave at Oxford from the British Ministry of Defence, and most of the West's more conscientious soldiers and military officials are guided by the tradition's principles.

These principles are summarized in the first few chapters of this slender volume: There is a moral presumption against war; resort to war is only proper under sharply limited conditions; the proper conduct of warfare is constrained by the requirements of proportionality and discrimination (non-combatant immunity). Absolutists say that statesmen and warriors must comply with these norms, no matter what. Some utilitarians and self-styled "realists" dismiss the rules ("war is hell, anything goes"). Fisher prefers an intermediate position he calls "principled consequentialism" (p. 43); the rules are important and should be overridden only in extraordinary situations—situations apt to arise, alas, in the extraordinarily morally complex "post-lapsarian world we actually inhabit" (p. 44). Thus, for example, Fisher suggests softening the principle of non-combatant immunity to "the need to minimise non-combatant casualties" (pp. 49–50).

What about nuclear weapons? Do they, as Michael Walzer says, explode just-war theory? In the second half of his book, Fisher tries to apply his principled consequentialism. He can imagine some limited uses of nuclear weapons that would be licit (against combatant ships at sea, against important military targets on land). Some civilians would die, yes; but they die amidst great destruction in twentieth-century "conventional" warfare too. Their deaths could be "minimised." The leaders could conceivably keep the fracas from escalating to wanton extremes. If limited use of nuclear weapons was "the *only* way to prevent a very great harm" (p. 58, author's emphasis), then the leaders might in good conscience use them.

Fisher clearly recognizes that it would be preferable to avoid their use. This brings him to an assessment of nuclear deterrence as the cornerstone of western policy. He tries to rescue nuclear deterrence from moral condemnation by arguing, first, that there are no satisfactory alternatives. Pacifism would invite conquest or blackmail; reliance on conventional defense against a nuclear foe would result in sure defeat; defenses against nuclear-tipped missiles will not work; nuclear disarmament by the powers is unlikely; transformation of the world political structure is a utopian vision. There is no examination of civilian resistance as an intriguing alternative to nuclear deterrence. More importantly, there is too little attention paid to the political content of the East/West relationship and to the approach of rediscovering politics and employing diplomacy more continuously and effectively to improve the relationship so that both sides could move beyond reliance on primitive threats.

Second, he says, deterrence might be licit since the western leaders may not really be intending to carry out the threatened genocidal retaliation. Maybe they are just signalling to Moscow that they have not completely ruled out retaliation. So maybe they have not improperly formed a conditional intention to do an immoral act. This seems to rescue deterrence via too-clever verbal maneuvering, though, given the mountainous arsenal and the frequent restatement of the threat. And even if they have not formed the intention, the leaders have implicated thousands of subordinates on down the chain of command, people ordered to form an intention to carry out the retaliation, people wrongly ordered into an immoral posture.

JAMES A. STEGENGA

Purdue University

Benjamin Constant and the Making of Modern Liberalism. Stephen Holmes. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984. Pp. vii + 337. $27.50.)

In this brilliant book Stephen Holmes sets himself two rescue missions, saving Constant from the myth surrounding his theory of ancient and modern liberty and saving modern liberalism from its hosts of critics, be they conservative, romantic, Marxist, Straussian, participatory democrat, or *res publica* humanist. Holmes does both superbly. He illuminates the complexity and significance of Constant as a political theorist with painstaking care and in the course of doing this makes a moving case for liberal political ideas.

Mythic Constant as presented by Plamenatz, Talmon, and Berlin is an anti-democrat, whose famous essay comparing ancient and modern liberty is read as a repudiation of the classical ideal of civic participation in the exercise of public power. In its stead mythical Constant is depicted as the champion of modern liberty, understood as the peaceful and secure enjoyment of private independence and autonomy. To be sure, there is much in Constant's writings to justify this reading. Indeed, Holmes mercilessly reveals Constant as the gravedigger of the ancient city. We are given pages of Constant's deromanticization of the polis and its ideal of teleological politics. Constant's rejection of the primacy of politics, what Holmes calls "decentering politics," is seen most vividly in Constant's critique of Rousseau and his vision of a resurrected Spartan citizenry, perpetually sacrificing individual ego by ceaseless involvement in public life. Constant was too skeptical about moral certainty to see individual choices about the good life sacrificed to either the general will or to public virtue. The nightmare of Jacobin terror in the name of virtue and democracy haunted Constant.

Holmes makes clear, however, that this is but a partial reading of Constant. There is much that he admired in Rousseau, for example, his egalitarianism and his repudiation of hierarchy. Most significantly, Holmes gives us a Constant who also insists on the importance of political liberty, of civic involvement and public participation. Far from advocating only private enjoyment of individual rights, Constant insists that personal security and independence can only be guaranteed through political participation. Channeling all one's energy into private life serves the cause of tyrants and oppressors. Here Constant has in mind Napoleon and the ultrarightists of the Restoration. Constant, Holmes makes clear, goes even further on occasion. Not only does participation ensure independence, it also is an ethical end in itself—contributing to self-perfection. Here, too, one sees his ambivalence towards Rousseau.

Holmes is particularly good at showing how firmly Constant's notion of liberty and its transformation over time is grounded in historical and institutional context. He sees the content of liberty changing relative to the existence of slavery, the size and population of states, the rise of commerce, and the division of labor. But what gives this book its real cutting edge is that through Constant, Holmes offers a moving defense of contemporary liberalism.

It is often unclear in the text whether one is reading Constant or Holmes, whether the defense of modern liberty is being directed against early nineteenth century anti-liberals, like Bonald or Fichte, or against twentieth century anti-liberals, like MacIntyre, Wolin, Arendt, Taylor, or Wolff. (This is made all the more problematic because of the significance of Holmes's footnotes.) Few have written such moving praise for liberalism's egalitarian and progressive roots—its anti-aristocratic, anti-clerical, anti-militaristic ideals—as Holmes. Few have written so movingly on the perennial values of a moderate, non-teleological state whose ambitions are not to create moral consensus and educate virtuous citizens, but to develop rules and procedures for settling conflicts, solving problems, and adjusting rights and duties. What "we learn from Constant," according to Holmes, is that "a good society is one in which public success is judged by uninspiring standards such as peace, order, efficiency, impartiality, openness to criticism and procedural justice. Private life can and should embody any number of expressivist ideals: bliss, creativity, friendship, sensitivity, salvation, genius, and love. But these are best excluded from the public realm, at least for the most part" (p. 273). Whether one agrees or disagrees with him, it is clear that through Constant, Holmes has offered a resounding liberal reply to liberalism's critics.

ISAAC KRAMNICK

Cornell University

Science, Language and the Human Condition. By Morton A. Kaplan. (New York: Paragon House, 1984. Pp. 394. $27.95.)

Professor Kaplan has written an ambitious book. As he tells us in the introduction, "I hope to show, through an inquiry into science and language, that the human race has a meaningful place in the world, that similar general methods of inquiry are appropriate to the sciences and the social sciences, and that the method of *praxis*, or assessment, relates neighboring realms of knowledge" (p. 1). The key element of this project turns out, not surprisingly, to be the attempt to establish that moral judgments are not different in kind from scientific judgments, or at least from the kind of judgments deployed in producing scientific knowledge.

The best feature of the book is its praiseworthy aim. Kaplan wishes to establish the intellectual authority of a concept of science broad enough to include reasoning about "values," which means about what is good and bad for human beings. Although "restore" would be a better description than "establish," Kaplan does not mention the fact. He sees clearly, and opposes, the tendency of recent accounts of scientific method to "formalize" one or another aspect of the real activity of scientists, and then to use the formal account critically against other parts of scientific procedure. The activity of scientists, as Kaplan notes, includes what he calls "praxical" reasoning—assessments of "fit" or "coherence" which are left out of the formalized accounts. This general argument of Kaplan's cannot be repeated too often in the current state of our discipline.

But despite Kaplan's immersion—sometimes submersion—in contemporary and recent literature on science, he seems to be strangely innocent of other, perhaps more compelling attempts to come to terms with scientific reason; most notably the efforts of Hume and Kant. The book is marred by Kaplan's failure to avail himself of the deepest thinkers, or indeed of the thought of anyone earlier than Marx. And even with regard to Marx we are told that "Marx wrote before we were able to recognize that all complex systems designs, even the best, involve compromises among the goals to be achieved or restrictions on tendencies inherent in parts of the system" (p. 315). A statement this extraordinarily silly is not, fortunately, typical of the book.

There are serious substantive flaws, however. Two examples will suffice. Kaplan spends a good deal of space on Wittgenstein and his notion of language games. If I read Wittgenstein correctly, the great point of his notion of language games is precisely to prevent single-use accounts of language (e.g., language is a communications code, or language is a tool, etc.) from controlling our understanding and thus blocking from view the multiplicity of ways we use language. Yet here is Kaplan: "Language is merely an instrument designed to elicit meaning, to place meaning within a framework that shapes it" (p. 171). It is difficult to believe that anyone who had studied Wittgenstein seriously could conclude a chapter on him with this casual and dogmatic assertion. Kaplan's arguments are often sound, but he seems to make the very mistake he repeatedly complains about. He takes a part for the whole, discussing Wittgenstein's concept of language games alone as if it were the center of his thought. (Wittgenstein's notion of grammar, to suggest only one, is at least as central.)

For Kaplan there are no metaphysical traps or puzzles. "We know that others see what we see," he assures us (p. 158), or later, "adequate recognition of the correlative tasks of theory and praxis is all that is required to combat the fallacy of essentialism and to permit a consistent pragmaticist interpretation of the world" (p. 171). According to Wittgenstein, however, philosophy itself is necessary only because of the human tendency to become entangled in paradoxes or puzzles. "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language" (*Philosophical Investigations*, p. 109). Kaplan has no need of such philosophy. On the basis of a comment by Wittgenstein to the effect that we solve problems "not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known," he accuses Wittgenstein of failing to distinguish properly between description, on the one hand, and empirical investigation on the basis of hypotheses on the other. "Would Wittgenstein have argued that if a caveman lived long enough, by a constant rearranging of what he knew, he would become aware of electrons, quasars, quarks, cloud chambers, electron microscopes, microbes, and modern philosophy?" (p. 149). This is embarrassing. Wittgenstein never says that we do *science* by "rearranging what we have always known." That is how we do philosophy. The very passage Kaplan quotes is preceded by Wittgenstein's careful distinction between science and philosophy, and two lines before the quoted passage he had said "philosophical problems . . . are, of course, not empirical problems" (*Philosophical Investigations*, p. 109). The bedrock of Kaplan's understanding of these issues is only too clear. It is suggested nicely by a passage in which we are told that "the science game . . . is the master game" (p. 154). Such a conviction, however, vitiates the study's persuasiveness to those for whom the *status* of science (as well as its procedure) is part of the question.

Numerous other problems might be cited, including the fact that the lengthy chapters on Marx and Gramsci (part 4) do not seem well integrated with the earlier argument. At any rate, notwithstanding the importance of the task Kaplan sets himself the book does not live up to its promise. While it might serve as an introduction to the state of twentieth-century philosophical argument concerning science and language, it is difficult to imagine many political scientists willing to work through the long discussions of philosophical *arcana*, of Kripke, Putnam, Gödel, Linsky, Blanshard, Weiss, Glover, Donagan, Gewirth, *inter alia.* One is forced to suggest that only those unable to take seriously anything written before 1901 will find this book to be worth the effort, but since that includes many political scientists, the book deserves an audience.

JOHN W. DANFORD

University of Houston

Liberalism and its Critics. By Kirk F. Koerner. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. Pp. iv + 396. $39.95.)

For years liberalism has been under attack. Critics from the left and the right have severely questioned the intellectual credibility, moral legitimacy, and contemporary relevance of liberal political theory and liberal-democratic politics. It indeed requires no small measure of courage to declare oneself a liberal in these ideologically-charged and increasingly intolerant times.

Kirk F. Koerner has dared to go beyond a mere profession of intellectual faith. He has written a book defending liberalism and criticizing its most persuasive anti-liberal critics. Liberals, of course, have worked hard to restore the credibility of their doctrine. Koerner describes how "neoclassical liberals" such as Milton Friedman and Robert Nozick call for a renewed emphasis on liberty and thus advocate a return to laissez-faire while "contemporary positive liberals" like John Chapman and John Rawls seek to shift the prescriptive focus of liberalism toward distributive justice and greater economic equality. Yet, Koerner argues, these liberals have not confronted "the deeper problem of justifying liberal democracy itself" (p. 317). For this, liberals must first answer directly those who have denied the very possibility of such justification and demonstrate that their critiques of liberalism are "unconvincing" (p. 2).

Accordingly, Koerner selects four of the most influential contemporary critics of liberalism, representing "persistent and deeply-rooted anti-liberal tendencies in Western political thought" (p. 2). C. B. Macpherson, Herbert Marcuse, Leo Strauss, and Michael Oakeshott hold liberalism "in large part responsible for most of our present problems" and claim that "it offers little of value to modern man" (p. 18). Koerner evaluates the merits of this anti-liberal position by examining their writings in impressive detail.

Liberalism and its Critics provides new evidence to support some familiar objections to the arguments of Strauss and Macpherson. Thus it further confirms that Strauss's view of the "modern project" is only "a caricature of the liberal tradition" (p. 251), and that Macpherson fails to prove the decisive acceptance of market assumptions and of "possessive individualism" by Hobbes, the Levellers, and Locke (p. 76). Koerner finds "evident exaggerations" in Marcuse's interpretation of liberalism, including an "erroneous, perverse, and misleading" identification of liberalism with fascism (pp. 154–55). And turning finally to liberalism conceived pejoratively as "rationalism in politics," Koerner discovers only a "fictitious adversary" (p. 282). None of the liberals indicated by Oakeshott actually subscribed to the essential tenets of the rationalist creed (p. 295). These four critics, Koerner concludes, have "seriously misinterpreted" the textual origins and subsequent evolution of liberalism (p. 309).

Koerner also considers the kinds of political arrangements that these critics believe ought to replace those of liberal democracy. Marcuse's "general call for a 'non-repressive' society seems utopian, tainted by elitism and enmeshed in a theoretical inconsistency" (p. 173). Macpherson proposes a "participatory democracy" in which "both democracy and freedom may be effectively proscribed or postponed indefinitely" (p. 105). And Oakeshott's conservative "alternative to liberalism . . . provides no way of distinguishing desirable and undesirable elements in political experience" (p. 297). On the other hand, all four critics fail to acknowledge the decisive contributions of liberalism to the cause of human freedom; but Koerner serves that cause well indeed by recalling liberalism's "monumental" achievements (pp. 2–6).

The book concludes with a call for a "universal liberal world-order"—what Koerner himself terms "an impossible dream" (p. 330). Nevertheless, liberalism does offer "the only certain theoretical guarantee that freedom will be preserved," and for this reason "the liberal ideals of liberty, tolerance, and diversity . . . must once again become revolutionary in their force and implications" (p. 322). It is precisely liberalism's "fundamental, deeply-rooted, and unshakeable commitment to individual liberty and self-determination" (p. 309) that provides the most compelling justification for liberal democracy in modern times.

STEVEN MICHAEL DWORETZ

Wheaton College
Massachusetts

Churchmen and Philosophers: From Jonathan Edwards to John Dewey. By Bruce Kuklick. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985. Pp. xx + 311. $27.50, cloth.)

In this work Bruce Kuklick has presented the basis for a major reassessment of the American intellectual heritage. By rejecting the standard interpretations of nineteenth-century American thought, which he believes to be heavily biased by twentieth-century secularist predispositions, and by explaining intellectual controversies within the context of their era, Kuklick is able to provide a coherent explanation of the development of welfare liberalism as an indigenous American ideology. Thus, he contends that the important intellectual questions for most of the nineteenth century stemmed from Calvinist doctrine and that the instrumentalist philosophy of John Dewey and the social sciences which it justified had their origins in these theological conflicts.

Kuklick argues that the eighteenth-century thought of Jonathan Edwards provided the framework for much of the intellectual activity of the following century. Within the bounds of Calvinist belief, Edwards formulated a sophisticated rationalist metaphysics that was to serve as the basis for the New England Theology, in Kuklick's opinion "the most sustained intellectual tradition in the United States" (p. 43), lasting approximately 125 years. In a tightly argued and detailed fashion, Kuklick traces the controversies and schisms that occurred within this tradition, focusing primarily on debates about regeneration, free will, and theodicy. Because they discussed the issues thought to be important at the time and were associated with major theological institutions and schools of thought, thinkers like Nathaniel William Taylor, Horace Bushnell, and Edwards Amasa Park are treated as the prominent intellectuals of their day. To substantiate his argument further Kuklick accompanies his exegesis of the positions of these and other thinkers with descriptions of the roles of Harvard, Princeton, Yale, and the Andover Theological Seminary in influencing and propagating variants of Calvinism within the New England Theology.

Despite their early dominance, theologians found their status as public spokesmen eroding by the middle of the nineteenth century. The Scottish common-sense philosophy, which had supported most of the Calvinist theological positions, began rapidly to lose support to organic, historical arguments from Germany that were more compatible with new ideas in geology and biology. Equally important to the weakening of the New England Theology was the growing professionalization of religious study. Kuklick contends that the establishment of separate schools of theology was a critical turning point in the evolution of American thought generally in that it was "an early and potent symbol of the fragmentation of knowledge and culture" (p. 87). More immediately, theologians found themselves arguing increasingly over esoteric theological points while those thinkers engaged in philosophy began to establish themselves as competent to address important public issues and "emerged as the guardians of the character of college-age youth" (p. 119). Thus, the encroachments of German thought, the acceptance of evolutionary science, the narrowness of theological debate, and the social needs of the time all conspired to weaken the intellectual vigor and the social status of the disputants within the New England Theology. In Kuklick's view the end of the New England Theology as a viable intellectual force came in 1881 with the removal of Park from his post at the Andover Theological Seminary by the Andover Liberals, who espoused the New Theology, or Progressive Orthodoxy.

Kuklick argues that the success of the proponents of the New Theology had profound ramifications for the content of liberal reform in the twentieth century. The harsh Calvinist ethic of individual striving and responsibility fashioned in response to concerns about original sin and salvation was never defeated in intellectual debate. It was simply ignored because the questions around which it was framed were deemed to be no longer relevant to social issues. As Kuklick puts it, "personal responsibility for depravity" became an "unhelpful way to think about the social causation of untoward behavior" (p. 229). Instead, impressed by evolutionary science and the gravity of social problems, theologians turned to religious positions based on experiential justifications that entailed the acceptance of community responsibility for social ills.

It was this latter theological context, Kuklick contends, that influenced John Dewey extensively and was the source of essential elements of his instrumentalism. For the first 30 years of his life, Dewey was deeply concerned about religious issues. His mother was a strict Calvinist, and Dewey himself underwent a religious conversion experience in his twenties. Even more to the point, he became involved in the theological controversies emanating from Andover and wrote pieces for *Bibliotheca Sacra* and the *Andover Review*, both journals housed at Andover. Kuklick concludes that it was from the theological liberals at Andover that Dewey derived his belief in the need to ground thought in natural experience, as well as much of his attachment to the scientific approach. He further suggests that Dewey's sympathy with the New Theology led him to assume that the laws of righteousness found their being in the natural world, and that it was but a matter of applying human intelligence for their discovery.

Kuklick has rendered an exceptionally valuable service to the study of the American intellectual tradition by demonstrating that there are still opportunities for fresh and stimulating work in the field. Many readers will find unsettling his conclusions that the Transcendentalists were of marginal importance, that William James and Charles Peirce had no significant formative influence on Dewey's instrumentalism, and that for most of the nineteenth century the dominant intellectual issues were theological. Yet, as a result of Kuklick's work, these and other possibilities must now be seriously considered if social scientists are to be reasonably confident that they have an accurate understanding of the past and an efficacious conception of the present.

ROBERT A. HEINEMAN

Alfred University

Daniel Bell and the Agony of Modern Liberalism. By Nathan Liebowitz. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985. Pp. ix + 293. $29.95.)

Nathan Liebowitz has written a significant book for political and social theorists, coming to terms with the crisis of contemporary liberal thought. Set in the framework of an analysis of Daniel Bell's writings, the book explores two major themes. First, it addresses the question: "[I]s Bell an ideologist of the end of ideology who is attempting through the development of the theory of the postindustrial society to rationalize the ideological perspectives embedded in the end of ideology?" (p. 203). Second, the book highlights the contradictions and tensions in Bell's efforts to develop a theory of contemporary American society, a theory of the postindustrial society.

Much of the book discusses the end of ideology thesis. Bell's own contribution (*The End of Ideology*) is seen as reflecting his experiences with socialism, journalism, and academia in the 1930s and 1940s. In that work, he rejects his earlier vulgar Marxism as well as leftist political and economic analyses. He is skeptical about the capabilities of reason and planning, and he doubts the merits of a liberalism that fails to understand the vicissitudes of American society. Above all, he asserts that ideological politics has no place in the complex modern world. Bell's effort to finalize the ideological debates of his youth eventually ends in a call for a limited form of planning. As Liebowitz notes: "The solution of pragmatic planning thus enables Bell not to reject the heritage of liberal humanitarianism in response to his horror at the inhumanity of totalitarian planning."

This conclusion regarding the end of ideology highlights the major tension Liebowitz discovers in Bell's thought. Bell's work constitutes an effort to reconcile the rationalist activism and optimism of John Dewey with the theological restraint and pessimism of Reinhold Neibuhr. Nowhere does this effort appear more clearly than in Bell's more recent work on the postindustrial society and its problems —problems related to the development of a communal, knowledge society within the context of corporate capitalism and an adversary culture.

In Bell's analysis, American society faces a crisis of belief. The New Deal liberalism designed to legitimate society has instead undermined it in various ways. It has fostered a revolution of rising entitlements that encourages groups to make ever-increasing demands for social and political rights. It has given birth to a new sensibility that relies on feelings as the touchstone of experience and judgment, that abjures rational thought and criticism. Most importantly, liberalism's focus on economic growth has left it unable to provide any mechanism for limiting private wants for the sake of the public good—for allocating benefits and burdens across society. In short, liberalism has failed to develop a new integrative public philosophy, a philosophy of the public household.

Once Liebowitz has sketched the outlines of Bell's views on the end of ideology and on the problems of postindustrial society, he moves to answer the question of whether or not Bell is an ideologist. Bell justifies the need for a new public philosophy on grounds provided by his analysis of postindustrial society. Scarcity, human nature, the limits of reason and planning, as well as the need for civility prohibit any political economy more radical than the welfare state in the United States. Hence, Bell is more than an ideologist, for his prime concern is to lay the conceptual foundations for generating a new integrative public philosophy (p. 243). Yet in the final analysis, the results of Liebowitz's investigation "indicate that Bell is an ideologist because his writings . . . serve to rationalize the necessity for creating a new public philosophy" (p. 249).

But as Bell attempts to justify that new public philosophy, his work develops many contradictions and tensions. Chief among them is the tension between Deweyian optimism and Niebuhrian pessimism, between the Hellenic ("spontaneity of consciousness") and the Hebraic ("strictness of conscience") traditions. Throughout his intellectual odyssey, Bell remains a conciliator. He is an intellectual who has tirelessly worked at reconciling contradictions and tensions in his own life and in American society, culture, and politics.

Despite the importance of its subject matter, Liebowitz's book suffers from several flaws. First, the book's focus is not always clear. For example, in his introduction, Liebowitz first calls the question of whether Bell is an ideologist the "central problem" and then a few pages later describes it as "not the most important" question (pp. 1, 7). Then, near the end of the book, he says the question has relevance "only to the extent that efforts to resolve it provide a useful and (probably) necessary framework for discerning the contradictions and tensions that frame [Bell's] efforts to develop a philosophy of the public household. . ." (p. 243). And at the end, Liebowitz acknowledges that his study is "aimed less toward the resolution of the problem of whether Bell is an ideologist and more toward understanding the contradictions and tensions that frame his work. . ." (p. 249). But why not proceed to analyze the tensions rather than bothering with a question which does not really matter? Indeed, when Liebowitz focuses on the question of Bell's ideologism he often loses the point and falls into conceptual nitpicking about the terms "ideology" and "utopia," as well as truisms about the ideological nature of social and political thought.

Second, Liebowitz fails to be sufficiently critical of Bell. He does not fully explore some of the contradictions that tend to undermine Bell's theoretical perspective. For instance, how does Bell's antipathy for the revolution of rising entitlements fit with his acceptance of pluralism, planning, and the broker state? And how can Bell legitimately claim to be a "socialist in economics" when welfare state capitalism is all we can (or even should) hope for?

Despite the flaws, Liebowitz's book helps set the terms of debate for theorists pondering the fate of contemporary liberalism. Indeed, the virtue of the book is that it provides an explication of some leading ideas (shared by both neoconservatives and neoliberals) that must be acknowledged as we search for a new public philosophy.

LEONARD WILLIAMS

Manchester College

The Rise and Fall of Economic Justice, and Other Essays. By C. B. Macpherson. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. Pp. iv + 154. $19.95.)

These essays from the past decade are all "concerned in one way or another with state, class, and property—the essential constituents of the theory of possessive individualism." This statement from the author's preface might lead the casual reader to expect what is by now the standard Marxian critique of liberalism. In fact, the essays rather highlight C. B. Macpherson's original contribution to democratic theory; that is, the uniquely distinctive blend of Marxism and classical liberalism that should properly be associated with his name.

In an essay on theories of the state, Macpherson divides political theorists into three categories: (1) "those who on the whole accept and uphold the existing liberal-democratic society and state. . ."; (2) "those who accept and would promote the normative values that were read into the liberal-democratic society and stated by J. S. Mill and the nineteenth- and twentieth-century idealist theorists, but who reject the present liberal-democratic society and state for having failed to live up to those values"; and (3) "those who reject both the idealist normative theory and the present liberal-democratic society and state, and would replace both of them totally by Marxian theory and practice" (p. 56). His own message to political scientists, theorists, and citizens is simple and clear: "I place myself in category 2, and because I believe that some contemporary liberal theorists are inclined to move from category 1 to 2 . . . I shall . . . preach to them. A preacher must have a message. My message is, learn from those in category 3" (p. 62).

Almost every one of these 12 essays constitutes an effort to show idealist liberals what can be learned from Marx and various contemporary Marxians, whether the topic is private property, the state, human rights, economic democracy, pluralism, or neoclassical economics. In a sense these are all the same topic. Macpherson's chief complaint against contemporary liberalism of all kinds is its immersion in irrelevantly conceived categories drawn from what Marx called bourgeois economics, such as the concept of the rational economic decision maker, or of "trade-offs" between social utilities, or of equilibrium models, or of market relations as a description of social reality. "Twentieth-century economics has . . . rendered itself incapable of illuminating political theory. Economic ideas which are confined to relations between things, or to relations between disembodied persons who appear only as the holders of demand schedules, cannot enter into political theory at any fundamental level, since political theory is about relations of dependence and control between people" (p. 102). Specifically, idealist liberals are generally in agreement (with Marx) that "the human essence is to be realized fully only in free, conscious, creative activity"; and that "human beings have a greater capacity for this than has ever hitherto been allowed to develop." But from Mill onward they have failed to grasp "that a capitalist society denies this essential humanity to most of its inhabitants, in that it reduces human capacities to a commodity which, even when it fetches its exchange value in a free competitive market, receives less than it adds to the value of the product, thus increasing the mass of capital, and capital's ability to dominate those whose labour it buys" (p. 64).

What Macpherson brings from liberalism to Marx is just as important as what he brings from Marx to liberalism, in this version of democratic theory. The most significant elements are an emphasis (shared with Christian Bay) on human rights and civil liberties; a vindication of property right legitimated as a human (welfare) right in a broad Lockean sense ("lives, liberties, and estates") rather than in the narrowly exclusivist and possessive form it has since taken on; and an idealist-liberal version of participatory democracy, which he calls "developmental pluralism," and which would signify "the transcendence of capitalism."

It would be misleading not to mention the serious difficulty for historical and theoretical analysis inherent in this blending of disparate, even opposed, elements. Macpherson himself notes that "twentieth-century liberal-democratic theory comes off badly" because it fails to think "in terms of laws of motion." He never makes this mistake, and each of his essays on the revival of some component of idealist liberalism concludes with an evaluation of whether "the laws of motion" are moving capitalist (or non-capitalist) societies in the desired direction. But his conclusions are neither very helpful nor always consistent. With respect to the broadening of property right, his contention that courts and legislatures in various capitalist societies have been engaged in piecemeal extensions of its sphere is familiar by now. However, the implication he draws from that material has been sharply questioned by many jurisprudentialists, who would argue that the expansive tendency is already in decline, and that furthermore any version of property right in a capitalist society is in the end supportive more of the worldview of unrestrained accumulation than of the idealist liberal version of "human rights." Otherwise, Macpherson's laws of motion give us—with respect to, for example, human rights—the prognosis that "the prospects are not good anywhere . . . there is only one ray of hope for the future of human rights. That is that we in the West may realize before it is too late that the expectation of our sustained economic growth is a delusion." As for industrial democracy, its future depends, "directly or indirectly, on the probability of the increasing incompetence of capitalism."

Again, "can any of the values of original seventeenth-century liberalism be saved?" Only if "the strength and mobilization of the democratic forces" prevents "relapse into a less democratic or anti-democratic state." And again, "it would be idle to speculate on the possible extent and timing of what I have loosely called the transcendence of capitalism," but "the incompetence of late twentieth-century capitalism works for us." As laws of motion go, in sum, this one is less than powerful. To be sure, these are only occasional essays; none of them is a full-length analysis of its subject. But it does not seem likely that, even at greater length, Macpherson would have a more satisfying account than we find here, of a specifically progressive dynamic inherent in "incompetent capitalism"; a dynamic that might lead us toward a more human society, rather than a competently bureaucratic autocracy or a catastrophic descent into barbarism.

Of course this difficulty is not Macpherson's alone. It is common to all contemporary democratic theorists who are not orthodox Marxists. Marx himself had a dogmatic and obsolescent understanding of the scientific character of "scientific laws of motion," but he derived from it a surpassingly coherent and inspiring theory of social change. His discussion of how capitalism, in the course of its development, gestates a protosocialist society that will ultimately rupture and transcend it may have been (so far) inaccurate, but it remains the model of analysis for all visionary social thought. Contemporary democratic theorists have achieved a more sophisticated understanding of what constitutes "science," but at the cost of being left with a much cloudier and much less compelling vision of how progressive social change might come about. Given that for now insuperable limitation, Macpherson does democratic theory as excitingly as it has been done for several decades. Both those who have followed the previous trajectory of his work, and those to whom it is unfamiliar can only benefit from a reading of these essays.

PHILIP GREEN

Smith College

Inalienable Rights: A Defense. By Diana T. Meyers. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985. Pp. ix + 215. $35.00.)

This is a bold and ambitious book. While the prose is somewhat turgid, it is clearly argued and well organized. Without overreaching, the book shows how much can be done with some carefully pruned intuitions about particular cases—once the argument is raised to a certain level of abstraction.

Meyers begins with the notion of what would be required for a moral system not to be "self-defeating." She employs that starting point to develop two necessary conditions for inalienable rights: (1) an inalienable right has an object that it is never obligatory, though it may be supererogatory, to sacrifice altruistically; and (2) an inalienable right protects a good that individuals require in order to function as moral agents, that is, to choose and to adhere to a code of conduct sensitive to the interests of others (p. 52).

From these two conditions, she makes a plausible argument that there are at least four rights which should be considered inalienable: (1) the right to life, i.e., the right not to be killed; (2) the right to personal liberty—that is, the right not to be forced to execute another person's dictates; (3) the right to benign treatment—that is, the right not to suffer gratuitous acute pain; and (4) the right to satisfaction of basic needs—that is, the right to adequate food, water, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment for survival. Each of these rights seems to define a necessary condition for a person continuing to function as a moral agent. Furthermore, to give up any of them would seem to constitute a sacrifice so great that to do so would usually be considered heroic, supererogatory, or "beyond the call of duty."

However, the connection between these conclusions and the more basic requirement that a moral system not be self-defeating is open to serious question. Meyers tells us that one way in which a moral system can be self-defeating is when "its prescriptions eventuate in circumstances that preclude further moral activity altogether" (p. 37). To define "self-defeating" this broadly opens the door to major difficulties. Let us imagine that some systems include what might be called a system-saving duty; i.e., that when the society is in great peril, it becomes obligatory for anyone who can make a crucial difference to sacrifice, if necessary, any of his rights on Meyers's list. Under conditions of such danger, any moral system which did not include the system-saving duties would be self-defeating. But including such system-saving duties would render the sacrifice of those rights obligatory (or a matter of moral requirement) and not supererogatory (heroic) as Meyers requires. In other words, to accept Meyers's proposed rights as inalienable—so that they are invulnerable to sacrifice according to the system-saving duties—would, in itself, render the system self-defeating on this scenario. The self-defeating condition does not have the implications Meyers alleges. However, even if this critique is correct, there is a great deal of value in the book. It should be read by anyone who wants a fresh approach to the justification of human rights, natural rights, or as Meyers terms them, "inalienable rights."

JAMES S. FISHKIN

University of Texas at Austin

Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticism. By Michael Rosen. (Cambridge: Cambridge Universty Press, 1982. Pp. xiii + 190. $27.95, cloth; $12.95, paper.)

Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticism is a rare and most welcome addition to the discussion of Hegelian philosophy—an argument against Hegel based on a careful and sympathetic reading of his most difficult and speculative texts. Michael Rosen's evaluation of Hegel's philosophy is clear and forceful. Hegel "has, in the highest measure, two out of the three cardinal philosophical virtues: he is *rigorous* and he is *original*. But he is *wrong*, and those very virtues ensure that he is thoroughly and consistently so" (p. 179). Rosen's appreciation of Hegel's rigour sets him apart from the majority of Hegel's detractors. His willingness to address and evaluate Hegel's systematic claims sets him apart from the majority of Hegel's contemporary admirers. His book is thus an original and refreshing re-evaluation of Hegel's philosophic enterprise.

Rosen makes his case against Hegel by trying to demonstrate that we cannot make sense of Hegelian dialectic apart from the speculative idealism upon which Hegel himself founded his arguments. The repeated attempts by neo-Marxists and contemporary hermeneuticists to separate the living kernels of Hegelian philosophy from its dead metaphysical husk are, he argues, doomed to incoherence and inconsistency. Of particular interest to students of social and political thought will be Rosen's powerful critique of Charles Taylor's "expressivist" interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of spirit (chap. 5) and of Theodor Adorno's attempt to construct a materialist "negative dialectics" (chap. 7). "The interpretation of Hegel is too important to be left to Hegelians," Rosen suggests; for, by attempting to demystify Hegel, his admirers only succeed in mystifying their own arguments (p. 180). The reluctance of Hegel's contemporary admirers to part with common sense may make their reformulations of Hegelian ideas less discordant to unmetaphysical modern ears, but only by rendering those ideas even less coherent and consistent than in their original formulation.

Rosen presents a very strong case against contemporary reappropriations of Hegel's arguments. That case may not be decisive, but nowhere near as strong or as rigorous a case has yet been made on the other side. All too often Hegel's revisers concentrate on realizing or demystifying Hegelian concepts without asking whether one can still invoke such concepts outside of an expressly idealistic system of thought. Hegel's contemporary admirers "have been reluctant to commit themselves to the full-blooded neo-Idealism that would make such ideas as 'milieu' or 'basic question' epistemologically fundamental, and so have tended to use the concepts without explicit justification, or else to salve their materialist consciences by renaming them (as *epistemes* or *problematiques*, for example)" (p. 8).

I find Rosen's critique of Hegel, however, less compelling than his critique of Hegel's interpreters. Rosen's interpretation of Hegel's philosophy is very persuasive. Indeed, this book provides a much better introduction to Hegel's works than most written by his admirers. But Rosen proceeds as if demonstrating that the fact that Hegelian philosophy is inextricably linked to a form of speculative idealism proves its inadequacy. I shall not dwell on this point, since most of Hegel's contemporary readers admire him in spite of, rather than because of his philosophic idealism.

But I also disagree with Rosen's claim that "nothing" in Hegelian philosophy is still "living" for those of us who do not subscribe to his brand of speculative idealism. Indeed, I would argue that we can learn more from Rosen's Hegel than from the less outrageous neo-Marxist or expressivist Hegel. The former challenges us with original ideas, while the latter tends to lend authority to familiar opinions. Nothing in Rosen's argument rules out the possibility that Hegel may have developed insights into ourselves and our world that we cannot obtain anywhere else. That he derives these insights by speculative means should lead us to wonder about the limitations of our own —presumably, non-speculative—standards of judgment. As long as Hegel's texts afford us such insights there will be something living in Hegelian philosophy.

By exposing the inconsistencies in the attempts to realize Hegelian dialectic, Rosen forces us to confront the Hegel who consciously sacrificed common sense in the name of philosophic consistency. In this way, Rosen serves Hegel far better than most of his friends and admirers. This bold and insightful book deserves attention from both Hegel's admirers and his detractors. It has much to say to both groups.

BERNARD YACK

Princeton University

Policy, Power and Order: The Persistence of Economic Problems in Capitalist States. By Kerry Schott. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984. Pp. ix + 206. $20.00, cloth).

Who can doubt the poverty of contemporary economic policy prescriptions for the advanced capitalist nations? Schott, however, is less interested in debunking the policies than in correcting the source of their failure. The result is a stunning combination of rational choice and class analysis and one of the best books recently published in political economy.

Schott begins with a an attack on economists' theories of policy. She takes both the neo-classical, including monetarist, and neo-Keynsian advocates to task for failing to understand that the success of their policies depends crucially on the responsiveness of the economy, which in turn depends on the relative power and compliance of powerful interest groups in the society. Her assessment of changes in working-class power since World War II and her analysis of the links between those changes and macroeconomic performance lead her to conclude that the working class has grown more powerful in all the advanced capitalist countries and that its power varies across time and country. The first finding implies that wages and prices are likely to be "sticky in a downward direction" (p. 26), which means that neo-classical policies will be ineffective. Even in countries such as the U.S., where the working class is relatively weak, there will be little fall in prices or real wages. From the second finding she concludes that neo-Keynisan expansionary policies will be effective only where the working class consents to an incomes policy; that is, where the working class is *both* strong and centralized, where it has developed what Mancur Olson labeled encompassing interest groups.

Schott's major task is reconstruction, but she first debunks the current theories of the state on which so many economic policy prescriptions rest. The contemporary policy model inconsistently assumes self-interested actors and a public-spirited state. The Marxists wrongly assume that all power rests with capital. The so-called mainstream economic theories, including public choice, do not pay "...heed to the importance of interest groups and their changing power resources over time and across countries" (p. 121).

Schott's alternative model draws on rational choice to analyze polities in which the major actors are interest groups: capitalists, workers, and the state. For Schott, the state's principal role is to promote social order, but it is also a self-interested actor in the policy game. Using a static, three-person, Nash bargaining model she illustrates how the major groups can maximize payoffs without conflict. She then develops a dynamic model of the trade-off between worker consumption and capitalist investment over time, drawing heavily on the work of Kevin Lancaster.

Her use of bargaining models produces some extremely interesting implications and hypotheses. First, she concludes that even a self-interested "state cannot be an unconstrained Leviathan, as such behavior would conflict with its overriding objective of order maintenance" (p. 159). Second, she argues that the more powerful the working class, the more likely it is to practice "rational quiescence," *if* it can expect long-term gains from capitalist investment and consequent economic growth. Third, she hypothesizes a relationship between the levels of militancy and investment. Finally, she claims that a restructuring of the economy will be most possible where the working class is weak, but difficult even then due to the state's incapacities in a stagnant economy. Her economic predictions for the advanced capitalist world are dismal, except possibly where there is an encompassing working class; namely Austria, Norway, Sweden, Japan, and Switzerland.

Schott is not totally successful in linking working-class power and macroeconomic performance. She treats minor Marxist scholars and major writers equally while neglecting some of the more relevant American radicals scholars (e.g., Bowles, Edwards, Gordon, Reich, and Weisskopf). Most importantly, the state seems to drop from her dynamic analysis except as a mediator of conflict; it is no longer one of the key polic actors.

Kerry Schott has given us a book that is both numerate and literate. Statistical and mathematical analyses enrich the text while quotes from Auden set the tone for each chapter. But her most important contribution is a provocative new approach to understanding the economic problems of the advanced capitalist world.

MARGARET LEVI

University of Washington

AMERICAN POLITICS

Assessing Tax Reform. By Henry J. Aaron and Harvey Galper. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985. Pp. xii + 145. $22.95, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

Political Origins of the U.S. Income Tax. By Jerold L. Waltman. (Jackson, Miss.: University Press of Mississippi, 1985. Pp. x + 124. $12.50, cloth)

Jerold Waltman is a political scientist concerned with the politics of the early income tax. Henry Aaron and Harvey Galper are economists concerned with the complexity of the contemporary income tax as a tool of fiscal policy. Although these perspectives and projects vary, the implications of their analyses ultimately converge on a fundamental issue for tax policy and politics.

Waltman's slim book leaves the reader wishing for more. Chapters 1-4 contain outlines of the politics surrounding the first four 20th-century revenue bills that included an income tax (1913, 1917, 1918, 1921). Chapter 5 provides the basic argument of the book. Waltman believes the income tax should be understood as a function of multiple political processes, and suggests different political models to explain different provisions of the internal revenue code. For example, the politics of a broad redistributive issue such as the setting of rates involves political actors situated at various points in the political system, and argumentation that is different from that involved in the opening of a hole in the regular tax structure to benefit a particular subset of taxpayers. Understanding the income tax consequently requires dividing the internal revenue code into types of provisions and exploring the varied political dynamics associated with each subset of the tax.

This conclusion is persuasive, hence the desire for more. An application of these models could be quite interesting. Waltman describes each of his models of tax politics in a paragraph and illustrates them with historical examples. These models could be the basis for a systematic breakdown of the internal revenue code, and analyzing the politics of each category could enrich the description as well as test the validity of the approach. Applications over time could reveal changes in the dynamic of tax politics and policy that would be a fundamental advance in our knowledge of the development of the income tax.

Aaron and Galper's book is inspired by recent proposals to reform taxes by trading off base-broadening for lower nominal rates. They describe the problems of the current tax in Chapter 1, then analyze criteria for reform and the proposals commonly referred to as Treasury I, Bradley-Gephardt, and Kemp-Kasten in Chapters 2 and 3. In Chapter 4 their alternative, the cash flow income tax, is outlined in some detail. Chapter 5 considers the expanded use of consumption taxes, Chapter 6 explores short term options for reducing the deficit. Chapter 7 is a primer on the realities of tax politics and the obstacles in the way of tax reform. Their argument is built on several observations: (1) tax reform cannot be a placebo for the deficit problem, and must address the shortfall of revenue in this country, (2) strong political forces oppose sensible tax reform and proposals must be devised to avoid the ill effects of these interests, (3) U.S. political institutions and procedures exacerbate the problems of tax reform and steps must be taken to ensure that any gains are not subsequently lost. These observations of political reality place this effort far above most discussions of tax reform, but the authors are more cognizant of such obstacles in the status quo than in their own proposals.

The cash-flow concept aims to tax income when consumed, with the result that income is taxed no more than once during the recipient's lifetime, but all income is taxed at the full nominal rate. The authors argue that this approach will remove almost all of the current inequities and distortions of the income tax. Further, it will also reduce incentives to avoid taxation by reducing marginal rates. This is an attractive proposal, but it places tremendous weight on accurate recording and reporting of transactions. Historically, the effectiveness of the income tax in producing revenue in this country and elsewhere has been closely associated with developing systems of stoppage at source; i.e., by taking accounting and compliance decisions out of the hands of taxpayers. Avoidance and evasion are functions of opportunity as well as of marginal rates. Most of the current problems with avoidance and evasion occur where income is not subject to withholding, and resistance to extending this system suggests that the beneficiaries of these schemes understand the advantages of doing their own accounting. A complete accounting and reporting system involving all financial institutions would provide the information required by the cash flow income tax, but the enactment of such legislation is not likely. Without it this proposal may invite increased evasion and consequently decreased revenues.

A more fundamental issue lies beneath the surface of both books. The current eroded state of the tax base is explained by Waltman's analysis. There are many different tax politics operating simultaneously, hence the morass of tax policy is ultimately a function of lack of coordination. The Aaron and Galper proposal would simplify tax policy in a way that should force it into a single political arena. It would be as if Waltman's varieties of tax politics were collapsed into one. This is necessary for comprehensive tax policy making, but is it realistic given current political institutions? Aaron and Galper recognize the importance of unifying tax decision making, and suggest that the President must take a greater role, that reform must come in a single comprehensive bill, that limitations must be placed on amendments, etc. But will attention to marginal changes in procedures obviate the complexity of political instituions that has produced the problems of tax policy in this country? The combination of these analyses suggests that fundamental reform of political institutions is a necessary prerequisite for meaningful tax reform. Aaron and Galper demonstrate that comprehensive plans for tax reform are available; what is lacking is a political system that can enact them.

JAMES L. CURTIS

The Pennsylvania State University

Religion on Capitol Hill: Myths and Realities. By Peter L. Benson and Dorothy L. Williams. (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982. Pp. xii + 218. No price.)

Religious beliefs have predictable consequences for political attitudes and actions. This argument gained considerable credibility through the San Francisco Bay area studies of the 1960s, probably best known to political scientists from Charles Glock and Rodney Stark's *Religious Beliefs and Anti-Semitism.* Two decades of research have generally shown that the more orthodox the (Christian) religious beliefs, the more conservative the politics. Yet critics have noted a variety of measurement problems. When appropriate controls are exercised, Hoge argues in a recent summary of these two decades, we can clearly see that degree of orthodoxy and salience of religion are related to traditional sexual ethics and family values, but orthodoxy and salience show weak relationships to economic policies and political attitudes.

The fundamental problem in the Glock-Stark tradition, to paraphrase Yinger, is that scholars examine to what extent a person is religious, but fail to uncover *how* a person is religious. In short, they deal with the manifest doctrinal symbols of a person's public self, but fail to penetrate the foundational beliefs that shape perceptions of both the world and the "realities" that ultimately matter to people. About the same time Yinger wrote, Clifford Geertz, the eminent anthropologist, offered a conception of religious phenomena that some scholars tried to translate into appropriate measures.

This little book, *Religion on Capitol Hill: Myths and Realities* by Peter Benson and Dorothy Williams, is the first successful effort to overcome the problems of the Glock-Stark studies, to put the Geertz conceptualization to work in measures and analytical reductions, and to link foundational religious beliefs with political ideology and public policy positions *through behavioral dependent variables.*

Benson and Williams toil at a Minneapolis-based research institute well known in church and sociology of religion circles but little known among political scientists. This study, done on a grant from the National Endowment for Humanities, involved 80 completed interviews with demographically controlled sample of Senators and members of the Congress in 1980. A ten-member advisory committee of respected Capitol Hill people helped them gain access to respondents. The semi-structured interviews lasted 35 minutes and were recorded. Information was coded into theoretically-informed categories, resulting in 124 variables including scales and typologies.

The book debunks a number of stereotypes offered by the New Religious Right: that Congress is a hotbed of secular humanism; that its members are less religious than the people they serve; that political conservatives are more religious than political liberals; that apart from abortion and school prayer, members' religious beliefs have little impact on how they vote; that Evangelical Christians form a united conservative front in the two houses; and that members of Congress who affirm fundamental Christian values and practices support the conservative legislative agenda of the New Religious Right, while secular humanists support liberal legislation. The design and data are quite convincing in dismissing these stereotypes and, thus, offer those politicians and members of the press corps who are interested in it an accurate picture of politics and religion on Capitol Hill. Manifest destiny and election by God do not yield a uniform legislative blueprint.

But that is not the significance of this book. Its principal contribution is to scholars who want to untangle the culture/religion/politics nexus. Through a series of interlocking chapters deeply rooted in Geertz' conception of religion, Benson and Williams develop a typology of six types of religionists: legalistic, self-concerned, integrated, people-concerned, non-traditional, and nominal. These typologies grow out of the respondents' pictures of God, descriptions of ethical principles and responsibilities, theological emphases, and the importance of religion and religious institutions in public life. Most importantly they derive from themes that appear in answers about the fundamental problems of human existence, the process of overcoming problems, and the outcomes. Themes recur along four dimensions: agentic, communal, vertical, horizontal, restricting, releasing, and comforting, challenging. Self-concerned religionists score high on the agentic-vertical-comforting end, for example, while integrated and people-concerned religionists score moderate or high in the opposite direction. (Interestingly, denominational affiliation predicts poorly to foundational beliefs; the latter exist beyond dogmatic symbols.) Benson and Williams then develop a series of theoretically-based predictions linking these types to political ideology and to votes on specific foreign and domestic legislation, identified by others as significant roll calls. Predictions are sustained, and the magnitude of relationships is rather large, suggesting that the results are more than a fluke of the sample. The authors conclude with a discussion of three theoretical frameworks that could interpret the language between religion and politics.

I look for this book to be seminal, a point of departure for those political scientists who think religion is every bit as important as class (or interest) in understanding American politics. There are nagging problems. The coding scheme does not always make intelligible to the reader the classification decisions. For those interested in replication on mass populations, the semi-structured and recorded interview procedure may be ineffective and inefficient. But it may be possible to translate the lessons of the study into standardized, yet ipsative instruments. And, if so, the case might eventually be mounted for their inclusion on national surveys.

The most serious problem, however, has been the unavailability of the book. The publisher, in effect, gave the market 15 months to buy, failed to advertise it widely among political scientists (note that only now is a late-1982 release being reviewed in the *APSR*), and pulled it off the market just before teachers could make classroom adoptions. Fortunately, the book will be rereleased in paperback by Oxford University Press (New York) in August 1986. It should receive wide classroom use not only in religion and politics courses, but as collateral reading in legislative behavior, voting, and public opinion, and perhaps even American government course.

DAVID C. LEEGE

University of Notre Dame

Schooling and Work in the Democratic State. By Martin Carnoy and Henry M. Levin. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984. Pp. 307. $32.50, cloth; $10.95, paper.)

This book describes the relationship between schools and the workplace to each other and to the state. It seeks to generalize about these relationships in advanced industrial democracies, but restricts most of its illustrative material to the United States. Its theoretical predelictions are to reject traditional and Marxian views. They believe traditional views consider schools as autonomous institutions whose goals (equality and social mobility) can be pursued despite the inequities of capitalist societies. Traditional Marxism holds that schools have a state designated function of providing labor to be exploited by capitalism.

I have no problem with the authors' description of what schools do according to traditional Marxism, but I do not believe that there is widespread support (among political scientists) for the "traditional" view. This view is more characteristic of the education "establishment," which argues polemically for independent schools. Political scientists, on the contrary, generally believe that schools do indeed perform political services for the state. They indoctrinate each generation with the values of the previous one (or at least try to); they introduce children to the essential idea that power is often arbitrary; and they train future elites and future followers, each according to his or her station.

The authors do not speak much of this sort of theory, preferring instead to argue about the state as an arena in which two politically opposed points of view compete for primacy. One set of political forces argues for equity and democracy, the other for the creation of wealth, irrespective of its distribution. They assert that at any given moment either side may be dominant, thus negating static traditional or Marxist perspectives. During the great egalitarian reforms of the late 1960s, clearly the egalitarians were in command and schools were forced to become agents of social change, a role for which they were ill suited. During the 1980s, the second set of political values are making a comeback, and schools are being asked to stop seeking equity and start producing skilled workers. The battle is never completely won, and historically each group wins some and loses some. Here again I found much to be compelling and much to be troublesome. Take the values of the first group—equity and democracy. Although these two goals are frequently part of the same dogma, they are really incompatible. More democracy rarely leads to more equity.

The concept of work links schools, workplaces, and the state—a compelling way to describe the functions of each. Schools and workplaces are dominated by respect for expertise and for formal authority. However, the claim that schools are more democratic and more equal than the workplace seems a bit overdrawn. Schools are not governed very democratically, indeed the reform movement so well treated in this book made sure of that. The authors deal with virtually none of the governance literature. Had they done so, I suspect that they would not have been so generous in their praise. For example, they speak of schools as independent from "the direct control of capitalist firms" (p. 154), but do not carry the argument to its logical conclusion: schools are independent of political control too. True, they are not as independent as private corporations, but they are a lot more independent than many other public enterprises.

The analysis of the workplace is a good deal more rewarding, both because it is more comparative and because it is more informed by recent research. Students cannot strike, but employees can. Their prediction that national and industry-wide unions will diminish seems reasonable; the recent failure of nationally originated strikes supports the authors' argument quite well. Especially intriguing is that the economic conditions of the 1970s demanded an increased role for the state. The failure of the state to alleviate economic problems contributed to the defeat of an incumbent president by Ronald Reagan: "The 1980 election represented, by and large, not so much a rejection of the democratic and egalitarian gains of the previous decades as a demand for respite from their costs and a request for economic growth and jobs with stable prices. The two are coupled because Americans seem to believe that economic growth is still the single biggest contributor to solving social problems" (p. 253). I think that the authors are imposing an interpretation upon the election that substantially exaggerates the information-processing abilities of the average voter, but nevertheless it is plausible.

The authors believe that Reagan's "neoconservative" policies strike "deep roots" in the American character. Unfortunately, the authors do not follow this point with evidence, but rather revert to the process of imposing sophisticated interpretations upon an unsophisticated electorate. Still, the arguments are intriguing. Take for example the conclusion that the Reagan administration's determination to increase military expenditures favors white, male, highly skilled labor. The "militarization of the economy" (p. 257) means discrimination in the labor force—"racism and sexism." This compelling argument has yet to penetrate the debate, but this book may remedy that situation. Once having made such a provocative argument, however, the authors once again slip into unsupported rhetoric.

The authors do not like Reaganomics and think that schools can be enlisted in the struggle against the obsessive interest of the current administration in wealth acquisition rather than its distribution. "Democratic struggles for just and meaningful schooling are effective counters to the economic forces that are attempting to gain primacy over American schools and the formation of our youth" (p. 367). This is so because Carnoy and Levin believe schools to be more democratic than the workplace and "many other institutions" (p. 108). Perhaps the argument is in need of a clear statement of what is meant by democracy. They believe democracy, at least in schools, to consist of the opportunity to participate in decisions and of the ability of schools to assist in upward mobility. Democracy is thus an internal process, one consequence of which is to challenge the capitalist quest for wealth and hence of exploitation. The most important role for schools is to remain independent of the "capitalist imperative."

Teachers and school administrators are not conspicuous in their advocacy of resistance to capitalist ideology, however, and today's college freshmen are a good deal less liberal than was the case a decade ago. Thus schools must form coalitions with other movements for schools cannot, by themselves, induce people to escape the trap of the "attitudes and values" of the workplace (p. 109).

This book is both argumentative and optimistic. Although it has its flaws, the overall result is pleasing. The linkage between the workplace, the school, and the state, portrayed as an ever-changing one, is a welcome modification to the rigidity of traditional class-based analysis of political and social institutions. It is an interpretation which makes good sense, and allows us to think in systemic terms.

HARMON ZEIGLER

University of Puget Sound

Women as Candidates in American Politics. By Susan Carroll. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985. Pp. xv + 236. $25.00.)

Sometimes a book is written that is based on data so unique and rich that it almost would not matter whether the book itself is good. *Women as Candidates in American Politics* is based on just such a data set. Happily, in addition, Susan Carroll has written a good book.

The data base is the 1,212 responses to a questionnaire sent to all 1,936 women who "ran as major party candidates for state legislative, statewide, and congressional offices in primaries and/or general elections in 1986" (p. 7). The book is set in the context of democratic theory and theories of representation and seeks to identify remaining impediments to the recruitment of women to elective office. Carroll focuses on both the characteristics of women who are candidates and the characteristics that distinguish winners from losers. In the tables and text Carroll consistently disaggregates the sample according to the office sought, thus allowing comparison of state house, state senate, statewide, and congressional candidates.

Carroll identifies and compares a number of competing explanations for the low levels of women in elective office. Among these are the often explored "internal" aspects of women's own personalities, gender role socialization, and levels of ambition; various aspects of campaign structures, resources, and processes; and levels of support offered by political parties and the structural opportunities offered by the state of the political system. Her conclusions offer reason for both hope and dismay. On the hopeful side she finds, as others have, that women's own attitudes, personalities, and ambition do not explain low levels of recruitment. She also argues that campaign structure and party support do not go far to explain women's absence. The less happy side is that even if discrimination and harmful socialization effects were to disappear today (and she does not argue they have disappeared yet), the opportunity structures of elective office would make us wait a very long time to see parity of representation. For the most part, the "new kids in town" have to wait for open seats to appear in the right places to begin to take their place in great numbers. Without special efforts to recruit women into these positions progress will continue, but it will take considerable time.

The main problem with the book is that it obviously can only go part of the way toward explaining the relative degree of success of men and women. It is, after all, a survey just of women. Although this fact should lead us to take its conclusions with a degree of caution, it remains valuable, especially in the context of the extensive literature on political recruitment.

Women as Candidates in American Politics adds significantly to the literature on women and politics. It will prove useful in courses on women and politics or with themes devoted to this topic—particularly if the book were to be published in a paperback edition. This book, however, should gain wider attention and use than this. Although the sample on which the book is based is composed only of women, its comprehensiveness in terms of the number and types of candidates questioned should make it staple reading for those interested in political recruitment, elections, and candidacies in general.

VIRGINIA SAPIRO

University of Wisconsin
Madison

The New Directions in American Politics. Edited by John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985. Pp. xv + 409. $26.95, cloth; $9.95, paper.)

This book is interesting and valuable. It belongs in the library of every self-respecting student of American politics. It is among the best of a new class of books that identify an important development or issue for treatment by a distinguished group of scholars. The assignment for each contributor is to apply political science lore to a particular aspect of the book's basic theme so as to contribute to the understanding of a contemporary development.

Among the books of this class, *The New American Political System* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), edited by Anthony King, has been widely acknowledged as outstanding. In fact, a new edition is presently in the works. But many others have been published in recent years, sponsored by various institutes, centers, and universities. The quality varies, of course, but many of these collections provide very useful stocktakings as well as impressive applications of political science to contemporary issues.

In the present volume, two Brookings staff members, John E. Chubb, senior fellow, and Paul E. Peterson, director of the Governmental Studies Program, oversee analyses of the Reagan era. They invited several scholars to join Brookings senior fellows and staff in producing essays that attempt to explore and explain the remarkable changes that are occurring in American politics, government, and policy making. According to Chubb and Peterson in their introduction: "The American political system, during the presidency of Ronald Reagan, has been transformed to an extent unknown since the days of Franklin Delano Roosevelt" (p. 1). Their purpose in this book is to cast light on the causes and dynamics of this transformation.

The book is divided into two parts. Part 1 focuses on voters and elections. It includes two essays on the national parties, two on the 1984 presidential election (one devoted exclusively to economics), and one each on congressional elections and the Republican advantage in campaign finance. They are all of high quality and confirm that there is, indeed, important change in the land. The strength of the Republican Party is demonstrated and discussed in most of the essays yet the authors are reluctant to observe an all-out realignment. Properly enough it is left to the authors of the congressional elections chapter, John A. Ferejohn and Morris P. Fiorina, to refer to "split-level realignment" in which "some voters swing between parties at different levels of government" (p. 115). More than most accounts, this set of essays acknowledges the healthy signs in the party system rather than overgeneralizing from the problems the Democrats have experienced since 1968.

Given my positive reaction to these essays, I trust the editors will forgive me for registering a critical note. Several of the chapters cover the same ground. Each has an individual contribution to make, to be sure, but there is considerable overlapping of topics. The redundancy that results is a consequence of the some fine-line distinctions in chapter topics. Thus, for example, there is probably no way for separate authors to write chapters on "The New Two-Party System," "The Republican Advantage in Campaign Finance," and "The Rise of National Parties," without repeating material. Meanwhile other topics important for the subject are not included—most notably the changing role of the media but including as well interesting developments in group participation in elections (e.g., the contrasting roles of labor and the religious right in 1984). I understand, of course, that not all topics can be covered. My only point is that some points are covered too well and that different planning would have allowed additional topics.

Part 2 is devoted to selective topics on "institutions and policy." Two essays are on national political institutions, one each on Congress and the presidency; one essay analyzes the current status of federalism; two review developments in critically important policy areas—entitlements and national security; and one tackles deficit politics—the dominant force in policy making during the Reagan era.

Readers will have favorites among these excellent essays but they will find them all interesting and useful. Each is full of supporting data for well-developed central themes. And though one may wish to have additional topics covered (the Supreme Court doesn't even make the index), there is no redundancy in this second part. My particular favorites are Terry M. Moe's noble effort in "The Politicized Presidency" to identify a path of development for this important institution and Paul E. Peterson's superb review of "The New Politics of Deficits."

Every such collection has at least one essay that comes to be quoted frequently because it provides new insights. Hugh Heclo's chapter in the King volume, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," is a case in point. I predict Moe's chapter will capture this honor for the present volume. He undertakes the difficult task of trying to separate the person who is president from the presidency so as to establish the political and administrative context within which the occupant of the White House must operate. He marks a politicization and centralization that "have grown over time not because of who presidents are or what they stand for, but because of the nature of our institutions and the role and location of presidents within them" (p. 269). Moe sees the Reagan administration as particularly successful in directing policy making and politics from the White House. Trust me. This is a stimulating essay for you and your students.

Peterson's review of deficit politics may be appropriate as chapter "13" but I would have placed it much earlier in the book (rearranging chapters is endemic to former editors). It is surely basic to the new direction in American politics. It even dominated much of the 1984 presidential politics, if not necessarily the campaign itself. Peterson provides such a literate and common-sensical analysis of this topic that one can only hope that it is read widely in Washington and among other opinion leaders outside. He acknowledges many of the in-town explanations for the emergence of deficit politics in 1981. But he adds changes in the structure of public opinion and the effects of deficits as interpreted by professional analysts. In other words, this essay, like many in this book, fights resolutely against oversimplifying a set of very complex phenomena.

Taken together, this book and the King volume referred to earlier would make fine texts for a course on post-Watergate America. So much has happened in a decade. And works like these reassure me that political scientists have a great deal to say about "who" has gotten "what, when, how" during that time.

CHARLES D. JONES

University of Virginia

The Politics of Deregulation. By Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985. Pp. xii + 265. $28.95, cloth; $10.95, paper.)

Conventional wisdom in political science and economics has long held that regulatory agencies are captured by the regulated industries. Examining three recent cases of deregulation, *The Politics of Deregulation* adds substantial weight to the growing evidence against what has been termed the capture theory or the economic theory of regulation. The three cases examined in depth in this book—airlines, trucking, and telecommunications—demand study because they illustrate a rare form of politics where broad general interests are able to defeat more narrow producer interests. In each case, according to the authors, powerful interests benefited from regulation: airlines from the pricing policies of the Civil Aeronautics Board, trucking companies from the legalized cartels of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and AT&T from the lack of competition in telecommunications services and equipment.

Derthick and Quirk argue that these powerful interests were overcome by the advocates of more diffuse interests for several reasons. First, a large body of economic research detailed how consumers were hurt economically by regulation that limited competition. The conservative economic challenge to regulation in this case was consistent with the neopopulist view of Ralph Nader and others that only the industries benefited from economic regulation. Second, leaders in the executive and Congress used this consensus to press for reform of the regulatory system. These political leaders were aided by aggressive bureaucrats, particularly Alfred Kahn who deregulated portions of the airline industry by administrative action. Third, absence of the dire consequences predicted by industry then emboldened Congress which passed more far-reaching legislation in two of the three cases. Derthick and Quirk contrast the results of these three successes with five deregulation "failures," natural-gas pricing, air pollution, Davis-Bacon, milk marketing, and merchant-marine shipping.

The Politics of Deregulation is more than a carefully researched set of case studies; the cases are used to document three important theoretical arguments. First, regulatory policy responds to changes in the political and economic environment. Unlike many past studies of regulatory policy that ignore macropolitical forces, Derthick and Quirk illustrate how economic forces such as inflation, and political forces such as consumerism, anti-government opinions, and the ideological makeup of political parties changed the results of regulatory policy. They give much credit to the politics of ideas. Second, they directly confront the argument that the behavior of individual members of Congress can best be explained by their need for reelection. They argue convincingly that the only explanation of deregulatory attempts is individual members' conceptions of what good public policy is. Third, they challenge economic notions of interest groups that hold larger groups are more difficult to organize and keep cohesive. Their cases reveal that 16,000 trucking firms were far more cohesive in support of regulation than the handful of major airlines.

Although the book is a strong effort to illustrate the commonalities of deregulation, the reader is left with the impression that each case of deregulation is idiosyncratic. Airline deregulation might easily have failed without Kahn's aggressive leadership, without the inflationary growth in the economy that permitted airlines to prosper under deregulation, and without Stephen Breyer's suggestion to Ted Kennedy to get involved in the policy area. Without airline deregulation as an example of success, trucking deregulation might not have been attempted. The telecommunications case is even more unusual in that competition was established more by courts than by Congress. In one sense the successful deregulations may share more in common with earlier efforts to establish social regulation than the five deregulation failures discussed in the book.

Some minor flaws exist but do not detract from the value of the book. General congressional coalitions for deregulation are illustrated with simple percentage figures from the Senate when the analysis needs a multivariate approach to separate out the influences of ideology, constituency interest, and other factors. In this process voting patterns in the House are ignored. The author's argue that industry benefits when it recognizes the futility of opposition and makes compromises with deregulation advocates. Trucking interests who did so, however, fared no worse than airlines who did not; and dairying interests who rarely compromise fared best.

Perhaps the most serious problem is that the telecommunications case does not fit the pattern of deregulation. Bureaucratic innovations were in trivial areas. The key innovators were the courts who permitted long distance competition via a procedural decision and who presided over the AT&T antitrust suit. One might even argue that the antitrust decision was to AT&T's long-run benefit.

These minor problems, however, do not detract from a solid, theoretically driven group of case studies. The detail of information would benefit students of Congress, interest groups, and public policy as well as those interested in the more narrow area of regulation.

KENNETH J. MEIER

University of Wisconsin
Madison

Capitalism and the American Political Ideal. By Edward S. Greenberg. (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1985. Pp. 288. $30.00, cloth; $12.95, paper.)

Over the last fifteen years the way most political scientists write about business has changed markedly. Through the late 1960s and early 1970s, business was most commonly described as an interest group, competing with other interest groups in a highly fragmented political system. Since the mid-1970s, however, this perspective has virtually disappeared from the discipline. Now nearly every student of American politics who writes about business characterizes its political position as "privileged."

Capitalism and the American Political Ideal echoes what has become this new conventional wisdom. According to this perspective, business has not only successfully resisted each new challenge to its prerogatives, but its interests and values have themselves defined the boundaries within which these challenges have taken place. Greenberg develops this thesis by presenting a concise, but extremely well-written history of business/government relations in America from the Founding Fathers through Ronald Reagan.

Nothing in this book has not been said countless times before, though Greenberg does demonstrate an impressive ability to make this position seem fresh and interesting. Where he attempts an original contribution is by purporting to explain, "How. . . a large, expensive, and interventionist government with a vast and variegated range of functions and responsibilities emerged in a society so committed to the ideas of limited government." Greenberg considers four explanations; those offered by reform liberals, free-market conservatives, neo-conservatives and Marxists. He finds the latter most persuasive because it alone recognizes the critical role played by government in maintaining the imperatives of capitalist growth.

Unfortunately Greenberg's definition of Marxism is so vague that he never really tests its explanatory powers. Granted that America is still a capitalist system, dominated by a number of large companies, it does not necessary follow that each significant expansion of the role of government over the last century has been functional for American business. Perhaps had government been either more or less active—or intervened in different ways—American corporations might be more internationally competitive than they are now. Greenberg's analysis also does not explain why the American government is still less interventionist than any other capitalist state.

The principal strength of this book is its historical narrative. Its primary weakness lies in its treatment of business/government relations over the last two decades. Greenberg writes knowledgeably about the dynamics of reform during the Progressive Era and the New Deal. But, curiously, he completely ignores this century's most recent reform period—the one that began in the mid-1960s and ended in the late-1970s. That decade witnesses a geometric expansion in the scope of government control over corporate decisions in the areas of consumer and environmental protection, personnel policies, and occupational health and safety. In fact, no other capitalist nation has witnessed a more determined—or more successful—effort by trade unions and public interest groups to limit the ability of managers to determine what was produced, under what conditions, where, and by whom.

Greenberg overlooks this recent challenge to management prerogatives, for to do so would require him to question the central assumption of his book, namely that business has always been politically dominant in America. Greenberg also cannot make sense of the resurgence of corporate power since the late-1970s, since his analysis prevents him from recognizing the extent to which it ever declined. As a result, his concluding discussion of the collapse of corporate liberalism and the triumph of Reaganism is the weakest part of the book.

Greenberg's analysis of contemporary economic developments is equally static. For example, his figures on corporate concentration do not take into account the penetration of virtually all domestic markets by foreign producers over the last 15 years. He attributes inflation to the ability of corporations to control the prices they charge, but then says nothing about the extraordinary price stability of the American economy since 1980. He claims in a footnote that businessmen "have remained impressively silent about traditional regulatory policies beneficial to (their) market domination," thus overlooking the deregulation of markets in telecommunications, banking, airlines and trucking since the late-1970s. And his view that American producers are unwilling to engage in highly competitive practices ignores both the entrepreneurial explosion that the United States has experienced since the early-1970s as well as the unprecedented number of bankruptcies and hostile takeovers since 1980.

In just two decades, political scientists have gone from systematically minimizing the political power of business to grossly exaggerating it. Hopefully over the next decade, we can begin to formulate a more balanced—and accurate—appraisal.

DAVID VOGEL

University of California
Berkeley

The Politics of Insurgency: The Farm Worker Movement in the 1960s. By Craig Jenkins. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985. Pp. xvi + 261. $30.00.)

Farm Workers, Agribusiness, and the State. By Linda C. Majka and Theo J. Majka. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982. Pp. xi + 346. $29.95.)

The case of the United Farm Workers (UFW) challenges common knowledge about interest groups in general and about labor unions in particular. Mancur Olson's work suggests that the logic of collective inaction can only be overcome through selective benefits, but farm workers' willingness to risk imprisonment, beatings, and death during the period of initial organization does not seem to be explained by their cooperative gas station and funeral insurance. Union membership has been declining, yet the UFW was able to organize workers often considered unorganizable. And within a labor movement that has been characterized as exclusively concerned with job security and wage increases, the UFW has emphasized control issues such as labor contracting and pesticide use.

Why did the UFW succeed at creating a durable farm workers' union when previous efforts had failed? Why did the UFW adopt the approaches that differentiate it from "bread and butter" unions? *The Politics of Insurgency* and *Farm Workers, Agribusiness, and the State* offer similar answers to these questions. Both books emphasize the conjunction of organizational strategies appropriate for farm workers' internal resources with a favorable external political environment. The authors of both sympathize with farm workers and, rejecting Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward's arguments against the transformation of insurgent movements into permanent organizations, support the UFW. Majka and Majka provide a longer historical overview, tracing class conflict through the Chinese, Japanese, International Workers of the World (IWW), and Depression periods, as well as the UFW era. Jenkins concentrates on postwar efforts to organize farm workers and provides more detail about the failures of the National Farm Labor Union (NFLU) and the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC).

The authors of both books reject classical theories of social movements for the resource mobilization approach identified with sociologists such as Charles Tilly, Mayer Zald, and William Gamson. The differences are explained more fully by Jenkins, whose first chapter is a good introduction to the social movement literature. The classical model treated social movements as irrational responses to individual discontents. Within the resource mobilization approach, in contrast, "Grievances were seen as collective and derived from structural antagonisms built into social institution. Grievances were real and significant, but the central factors explaining the emergence of social movements were the increases in organizational capacities and political opportunities, not the intensity of individual discontents" (p. xiii). Class conflict is thus inherent in agribusiness production of specialty crops; its outcome has depended upon farm workers' economic power, ethnic solidarity, and external support.

As both Jenkins and Majka and Majka show, farm workers' economic power has varied with immigration policies. For example, the bracero program of 1942–1964, which imported Mexican workers, weakened organizing efforts by increasing labor supply and by providing a pool of workers who could be used as strikebreakers. Organizing strategies are examined more closely by Jenkins, who explains how the UFW used selective, material incentives to bring workers into local units where ethnic and religious ties could generate solidarity. Students and clergy motivated by purposive incentives served as volunteers for strikes and boycotts. Jenkins traces the shifts and tensions between strategies aimed at building community organizations and strategies aimed at building external support. He shows vividly how Cesar Chavez was able to use nonviolence to turn repression against the growers and their governmental allies.

For Jenkins and for Majka and Majka, the UFW's successful boycotts and its ability to benefit from its own repression demonstrate the importance of the union's external support. While the authors of both books analyze external support in terms of state intervention, Majka and Majka do so more completely. Drawing upon neo-Marxist theories of the state, they portray the state as capable of simultaneous repression and reform, and argue that reform rechannels insurgency as it provides tangible, and perhaps structural, gains for farm workers. Their conception of the state includes such quasi-governmental institutions as the land grant college system and takes into account the division of authority between federal, California, and local governments. Within this framework, Majka and Majka explore the origins and implications for class conflict of the bracero program, the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act, and attempts to cover farm workers under national labor legislation. The termination of the bracero program in 1963–64 suggests the specific interconnections between state and social movement they trace. The NFLU collected information about the program's abuses, which led other unions, religious and political organizations, and, significantly, a CBS television documentary, to demand reforms. The Department of Labor responded to this pressure by enforcing rules on bracero contracts more strictly. This enforcement made the program less attractive to growers, so their opposition to efforts by liberal members of Congress to end the program was weaker than it would have been in earlier periods.

Jenkins' discussion of external support offers many of the same conclusions, but he gives less attention to California state government and tends to treat elite responses as more simplisticly either pro-grower or pro-worker. For these reasons, he exaggerates the significance of "center-left" electoral success. Liberal Democratic control of the presidency and Congress after the election of 1964 did not produce gains for farm workers comparable to the new civil rights legislation of the War on Poverty. George McGovern, Harrison Williams, and Eugene McCarthy were farm worker allies at the national level, yet within California Governor Pat Brown, also a liberal Democrat, sought to continue the bracero program and ignored the UFW until his 1966 election campaign. Jenkins does, however, place the UFW's success within the context of the generalized politics of turmoil during the 1960s.

The Politics of Insurgency is marred by some factual errors. Truman's Secretary of Labor was Maurice, not James, Tobin, and he had been mayor of Boston, not New York (p. 110). No legal restrictions prevented Ronald Reagan from seeking a third term as governor of California in 1974 (p. 195). And Charles Hardin, the political scientist, is not Clifford Hardin, Nixon's first Secretary of Agriculture (p. 64). These mistakes are trivial in themselves, but they raise questions about the reliability of details less easily checked.

Overall, though, *The Politics of Insurgency* and *Farm Workers, Agribusiness, and the State* effectively combine theory with case study, anger with objective scholarship. Anyone studying farm workers will need to read both; anyone studying interest groups, labor unions, or agriculture policy will learn from reading both. Either would be an excellent choice for courses on any of these subjects.

KENNETH FINEGOLD

Vanderbilt University

The Party Goes On: The Persistence of the Two-Party System in the United States. By Xandra Kayden and Eddie Mahe, Jr. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1985. Pp. 256. $17.95, cloth.)

This book is important for what it symbolizes and for what it says. It symbolizes transition from an era in which American political scientists were beguiled by the themes of party decline and party demise, to an era of recognition of the durability of the two major parties as important forces in electoral politics and perhaps even in government. The authors, a political scientist noted for her work on American political parties, and a former Deputy Chairman of the Republican National Committee ("the prototype of the modern party" [p. 5]) find that the parties command resources and have built organizational structures that enable them to exert influence over nominations, to operate as strong forces in the electoral process, and to seek to influence public policy. These are the indicators of effective political parties (p. 25).

We are told that the two national party committees resemble each other today much more than they do their predecessors of a decade or two earlier in that both perform functions not earlier attributed to parties (pp. 5, 60–61). The contemporary parties are served by "better educated and more professional staffs" than earlier, and are (or are in process of becoming) masters of new technologies for mobilizing public support (p. 87). "The resources the national party can amass and distribute today cannot be matched by any other actor in the political process. . ." (p. 93).

The authors exorcise three *betes noires* of contemporary parties: the private, for-hire purveyors of campaign services to candidates in competition with and possible corrosive effect upon parties; political action committees popularly thought to constrict party sources of funds and supplant party influence over nominations; and the federal legislation of the 1970s which frequently is depicted as harmful to the parties. Campaign consultants may well have been introduced to their crafts while employed as party staff, and the parties may refer clients to them (p. 88). For a variety of reasons to be gleaned by the reader from a somewhat diffuse chapter on interest groups, the political action committees "will never dominate the parties" (p. 126). The two major parties are beneficiaries rather than victims of the Federal Election Campaign Acts.

Effective application of party resources in a flow from the top down (p. 84) enables the national parties to influence candidate selection and to shape campaign issues and government policy (pp. 129, 189). National party programs are also credited with responsibility for changing patterns of party identification (p. 177). The impact of the new order of politics on the state parties seems as yet unclear to the authors, but the new professionalism and associated centralization of control discourage volunteerism and weaken the local parties (pp. 109–10). The reader must accept much of the content of the book on the authors' authority. For the description of the contemporary national parties Kayden's scholarly record and Mahe's online experience justify our confidence in the accuracy and balance of their perceptions. But the reader inclines to be more exacting when informed that attributes of national party organizations are casually related to such "consequences" as centralization of party control, influence over candidate selection, and changes in party identification. Such relationships cannot be established *ex cathedra*. So, too when the authors move away from the present and seek to ground findings of change in today's parties on party conditions in an earlier time, or to hazard predictions for the future, the reader frequently would like more supporting evidence or reasoning than is offered.

The Party Goes On reconciles the conventional wisdom on the decline or demise of party with findings of strong and vibrant national parties by invoking the metaphor of death and rebirth. The national party organizations of today represent a "rebirth"—"Phoenix . . . risen from the ashes" (p. 3). This interpretation is singularly inappropriate to the national party organizations, which took on the character of continuously functioning party headquarters as recently as the 1920s. If national party organizational strength were graphed for each party and the peaks and troughs of their experience as organizations since the 1920s were smoothed, I am convinced the result would be a curve depicting a gradual upward slope, providing little justification for the imagery of rebirth from ashes.

If, as suggested, a continuous line of development characterizes the modern history of the national party organizations, we would expect that different as the parties of today may be from those of the 1950s, the distinguishing features of the parties of the 1980s are adumbrated in the party experience of the 1950s. The authors establish the 1950s as the "base period" for examining change (pp. 60, 70), but they make no effort to present systematic data on the national or state parties of that era. Such data for the base period are available at reasonable expenditure of effort. Three sources come to mind: published studies, dissertations, and archives—most typically the party records in the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy Presidential Libraries. Much of Alexander Heard's, *Costs of Democracy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960) could have been exploited toward this purpose, yet it is not referenced. Heard's chapter on "Fund-Raising and Party Cohesion" dealing with transfer of funds among party committees and raising the possibility of conceiving of "financial management as a way to develop party unity and to build a stable organizational structure" (p. 294) is in point. While he found no evidence party leaders so conceived of party finance, his survey of the experience of the 1950s evokes in the reader's mind the agency relationships among party committees reviewed in *Federal Election Commission* v. *Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee*, 454 U.S. 27 (1981) The authors' finding of higher levels of education and professionalism for today's party staffs (cited above) included state committee staffs, which suggests the relevance of attempting to draw upon R. H. Ebel's dissertation on *The Role of the Professional Staff in American State Parties* (Michigan State University, 1960—see Table 1 [7], p. 114) for base-line comparison data.

Party records in the presidential libraries indicate many of the party practices of today are reflected in the party experience of the 1940s and 1950s. The Democratic National Committee (DNC) was, by the mid-1940s, investing in congressional campaigns (Official File, Box 940, Truman Library), and in the early 1950s the DNC was allocating funds to the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (Butler Files, Box 435, Kennedy Library). The DNC may have pioneered direct mail sustaining fundraising under Mitchell's leadership in the early 1950s (Mitchell Papers, Box 126, Truman Library). In summary, the tendrils of today's "modern" parties reach back into the 1950s—a happy choice of decade for comparison for a study which, if bromidic in some chapters and neglectful of opportunities in others, is compelling in its interest and significance.

CORNELIUS P. COTTER

University of Wisconsin—
Milwaukee

Artful Work: The Politics of Social Security Reform. By Paul Light. (New York: Random House, 1985. Pp. ix + 255. $8.95, paper.)

Case studies have long been accepted as one of the best ways to learn and teach about the policy-making process. This study of the social security reform enacted in 1983 is based on an even broader premise, that "anyone who wants to understand American politics must first understand social security" (p. ix). The cost and number of people directly affected by social security is enough to guarantee its continuing presence on the political agenda. The electoral relevance of social security is sustained by partisan and ideological disagreements on such fundamental matters as the purpose of the program itself. But the importance of understanding social security and the value of Light's case study go beyond this. It is a study of "dedistributive" policy making, of how elected political leaders go about raising taxes and cutting benefits without cutting their own throats. To understand American politics of the 1980s, a politics of resource constraints and budget cuts, we must indeed understand what Congress and the President did about social security in 1983. Paul Light draws on his own experience as both a participant and observer along with extensive interviews with key players to describe the politics of social security reform. His account is one that will engage the interest of students and teachers alike. It is an excellent case study, one that explains not only who got what, but when, where, and how. The book certainly has the potential for meeting another criterion put forward by its author, that of providing a lesson for political leaders faced with dedistributive policy decisions.

Another standard for judging this book, as Light suggests, is what it teaches us about American politics, about the political context of policy making. The nature of public opinion, the structure of Congress, life cycles in the presidency, and the overriding incentive of reelection are identified as factors that determine the shape of dedistributive policy making. As described by Light, this type of policy making is characterized by: the presence (or creation) or an "inescapable crisis" (p. 138); low staff involvement and limited information on members' opinions as a result of the issue being "politically hot" (p. 15); legislative action early in a session, "at the point furthest from the next campaign" (p. 15); and limited participation. In this case, public participation was limited by a number of devices that permitted policy makers to find "an occasional hiding place" (p. 5), "some shade from the sunshine" (p. 195), or even to "confuse the public with complicated packages at the subterranean levels of government" (p. 84). The number of executive and legislative participants directly engaged in working on a reform package went from the "Gang of Seventeen" involved in the 1982 budget negotiations, to the 15-member National Commission on Social Security Reform, to the ultimately successful "Gang of Nine." "One thing we learned," a White House staff member points out, "was to keep the number of players down to a minimum" (p. 146).

But this type of policy making, as Light points out, is not typical of American politics. Indeed, he characterizes passage of the social security rescue bill as "a legislative miracle" (p. 3), a term he also uses for the 1982 tax increase (p. 26). This is a case study, in other words, of an extraordinary political event. Throughout the book we are reminded that social security reform "was no longer an issue for the normal legislative process" (p. 127), that budget negotiations "had to be outside normal procedures" (p. 142), that the Gang of Seventeen was an "attempt to leave the normal legislative process in search of a compromise on a very difficult issue" (p. 146), that the conference committee (like all conference committees) would be "outside the normal legislative process" (p. 217), and that "eventually, most of the crucial decisions came outside the normal process" (p. 233).

What can we learn from this case that will help us to understand American politics? Light draws on characteristics associated with "normal" policy making in American politics to explain this atypical case. We see this in Light's conclusion that an agreement was reached "more out of mutual fear than the public interest" (pp. 3, 192), in his committee-jurisdiction explanation of Senator Domenici's call for a "truthful budget" (pp. 149–50), and in the familiar "electoral connection" descriptions of congressional and presidential behavior in chapters two and three. But what about the guiding principle of equity that served to bring together the two sides divided over benefit cuts or tax increases (p. 172), the overlapping interests of all members in passing a bill (pp. 128, 134, 160, 204, 209, 225), and the public-interest reference in the observation of one participant that "we all had to believe that the negotiations were important for something more than immediate political gain" (p. 181)? To understand the 1983 social security reform one must be aware of this agreement on certain governing principles and shared ideas about the public interest. The greatest value of Paul Light's analysis of this legislative "miracle" might be that of leading us to look for similar patterns in other cases of dedistributive policy making and in other policy areas. Instead of using a fixed, "normal" framework of American politics to explain the case, we can use case studies such as this to adjust that framework and to better understand American politics.

DAVID VOGLER

Wheaton College

The American Dream and the Popular Novel. By Elizabeth Long. (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985. Pp. 243. $22.50, cloth.)

Intent on shortening the distance between concepts and experience, Elizabeth Long impels her readers to realize that social scientists who want to comprehend the drift of American values tend to absorb the metaphors employed by America's renowned social critics. Their metaphors refer to catch-all attitudes such as "other directedness" or "narcissism" rather than to the welter of rhythms tapped and articulated by popular novelists. Focusing on the three decades after World War II, Long has taken note of the accounts of American value systems provided especially by David Riesman, Daniel Bell, and Christopher Lasch. As frozen categories, the pivotal metaphors of their prose tell social scientists what we all regard as success and how submissively we all deal with malaise, alienation, boredom, and anxiety. Yet when one searches, as Long has done, for evidence for this state of affairs by meticulously reading best-sellers of the period, "we all" turns out to be only that precious group of upper middle-class academics whose elitism is betrayed by our nostalgia for a culture that excludes complexities expressed in music, movies, television, and popular novels—novels ranging from historical sagas and spy fiction to the tales spun by Bellow, Heller, Updike, and Mailer. Best-selling novels in particular tell a story, one summarized by Long, which is more contradictory, more equivocal, and above all more telling than the one presented as novel by the most prominent of social critics.

Not that the social critics should be dismissed. They successfully reduce the complex, intricate aspirations and predicaments of Americans to dimensions congenial to duly educated readers. The critics tell their stories in terms of autonomous, discrete categories which signify the changes from, say, an "entrepreneurial ethos" to "the spirit of conformity." They provide useful typologies however much they thereby distort cultural processes, suppress the crosscurrents that are the stuff of social change, and limit the present by schematizing it as the antithesis of a postulated past. True, they may not allow one to make sense, for example, of the popularity of Ronald Reagan or the vacuity of so-called public life. But they assuredly have their uses. With what I take to be irony, Long appreciates how the personal discontents of their authors give energy to critical inquiry: their own class-based malaise inspires partisan, ideological, polemical activity.

The argument for turning to popular novelists so as to resist the tacit reductionism of academia is hard to make. No wonder that almost one third of Long's concisely written book is taken up by a defense of her methodology. Her case, I am persuaded, is compelling, doubly so because she details the process of best-seller production (a sociologist now, she had worked for Simon & Schuster as well as Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.). What is more, she appeases skeptics by not advertising that social critics are no less storytellers than popular novelists, each merely following different epistemological conventions to keep readers engaged. Nor does she irritate by proclaiming, as she might, that popular novelists tell us more about ourselves than social scientists manage to accommodate during duty hours. She surely realizes that the account she provides of changes in American values can scarcely become the basis for the austere enterprises of social scientists. After all, political scientists (to select but one subculture) would have to attend to ambiguities and complexities deleted from their training and their textbooks. They would have to open their publications, classrooms, convention panels, and analytical frameworks so as to provide a home for phenomena throbbing at the margin of consciousness.

American public life offers but meager space for discussing and testing the changing circumstances of our existence, for symbolizing and enacting new definitions of success. Noting that "the novelistic landscape of private life and interiority has grown in complexity as success loses its transcendent meaning" (p. 117), Long implies that in this submerged, seemingly private sector political process remains alive. Unlike the social critics who treat the populace as a homogeneous, univocal object manipulated by institutionalized forces, the authors of best-sellers give expression precisely to a political world unseen by the custodians of high culture. In this world, moral sanctions may have faded. The boundaries between reality and fantasy may have eroded. And yet a multitude of Americans—their tenured critics notwithstanding—are ingeniously coping in various identifiable ways. They maneuver in open-ended space misleadingly called private—a space George Kateb in his recent book on Hannah Arendt envisaged as "the unstructured immensity in which people idle, observe, ruminate, imagine, move about, encounter, travel down the open road; in which, in short, they experience." Elizabeth Long allows for the perception that it is this unaccredited political arena which is screened out by current academic practices.

Which America is more real—that depicted by the social critics or that depicted by popular novelists? The answer depends of course on one's epistemology, one's interest. The America of the popular novelists is richer and more various, certainly more difficult to manage. Suspicious of the austerity imposed by epistemologies, I'd opt for the novelists. Their fictions legitimate the enactment of richer lives, perhaps of new ways of failing. Tolerating more disorder in the midst of the prevailing order, being more generous, they hold out promise for the extension of politics and, with luck, the extension of the scope and methods of political science.

HENRY S. KARIEL

University of Hawaii
Manoa

The Arms Race: Economic and Social Consequences. By Hugh G. Mosley. (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company, 1985. Pp. xiv + 203. $22.50, cloth.)

In view of the massive resource commitment that has been made to the defense sector in the Reagan Administration, this book addresses an important and timely subject. Its focus is suggested more accurately by its subtitle—it is concerned with the domestic economic consequences of investment in the defense sector, and is in large measure an attempt to estimate the true economic burden of military spending rather than examine the arms race per se.

The central argument made in this book is that "military Keynesianism," which the author defines loosely as "a diffuse set of ideas and assumptions about the compatibility, and even beneficial effects, of a high level of military spending and economic prosperity" (p. 5), does not produce benefits for the economy, and in fact is harmful to economic growth, employment, and price stability.

The first three chapters of the book are concerned with the historical background of military Keynesianism and with clarification of some conceptual issues regarding the measurement and burden of defense spending. In this section, the author takes issue with several of the conventions in measuring defense benefits. For example, he disputes the use of GNP accounting in measuring the contribution of military outlays to economic growth, pointing out correctly that the military's contribution to GNP is by definition larger the larger the defense budget is, because GNP measures government output in terms of expenditure inputs. This tautological relationship between GNP and military spending gives a misleading impression of the contribution of defense to economic growth. The author also argues that the size of military spending is grossly underestimated because it excludes the budgetary burden of such items as foreign military assistance, veterans pensions, and retirement payments for the civilian employees of the Department of Defense. In calculating the burden of defense, he differentiates the budgetary burden from the societal resource burden, but concludes that both are approximately 50-70% greater than the figures reported in the annual federal budget or in the National Income and Product Accounts. The interpretations in these chapters are for the most part cogent and persuasive.

Most of the remainder of the book is devoted to a consideration of the effects of military spending on employment, inflation, growth, trade, and other economic indicators. It contains a useful survey of previous research findings to support the arguments that defense spending contributes less to economic growth and employment than equivalent amounts of expenditure for many domestic purposes; that it contributes more to inflation than do other types of spending; and that it does not promote technological innovation to the degree commonly asserted.

The evidence cited in support of the arguments tends to be drawn mostly from the literature critical of defense spending, although there is occasional reference to authors whose findings are contrary to the critical position. In some cases the conclusions seem to overstate evidence, which detracts from the argument. For example, after citing some studies that suggest a negative relationship between the military share of GNP and economic growth, and others, using different measures, suggesting a positive relationship, the author concludes that they show that "military spending. . .has been used as an instrument of economic policy," a conclusion which is unsupported by the data. Mosley concludes that military spending inhibits productivity and, therefore, economic growth, relying primarily on evidence of the decline of U.S. productivity growth and high investment in military R&D, which he concedes is circumstantial at best.

The author seems to argue that military spending is inflationary because the mix of DOD purchases—particularly for specialized purposes—comes from sectors with high inflation rates. But he then shows that the inflation rates for procurement and RDT&E are just as often less than the composite inflation rate for DOD, suggesting that it is not primarily the specialized goods which are most inflationary. He also notes that military spending, like other government spending, is not necessarily inflationary if it is financed by increased tax revenues or borrowing rather than money creation. But he nonetheless concludes that "military expenditures have a strong inflationary bias, which is rooted in the political-economic characteristics of military spending" (p. 130).

Despite this tendency to overstate what the data shows, the author has provided a useful and informative survey of the critical literature on the economic impacts of defense spending.

JOHN R. GIST

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Images of Voting/Visions of Democracy. By Peter B. Natchez. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1985. Pp. xv + 287. $21.95, cloth.)

Although vastly increasing knowledge of electoral behavior, the early voting studies failed to develop political theory about the role of the electoral process and mass participation in constitutional democracy. While advancing empirical theory with survey-based investigation, the pioneering works slighted normative inquiry. In articulating these failures to realize the promise to advance understanding of both voting behavior and democratic theory, *Images of Voting/Visions of Democracy* calls researchers and theorists to bring together philosophy and empirical analysis in the more discerning examination of politics.

Part of the problem with the early electoral studies, in Natchez's view, was their under-emphasizing of the truly political and governmental, while highlighting the sociological and psychological. In demonstrating the importance of social background and psychological identifications for political behavior, those studies, initiated by sociologists and social psychologist, relied on consumer behavior models and stereotypical images of a rational, informed, and activist citizenry. These ideas lacked actual roots in classical democratic theory (tied since Aristotle to the role of the Many), and blamed citizens for failing to attain a putative, individualized ideal. Political research, for Natchez, should elucidate the roles and values of leaders and citizens, and advance the electoral process in democratic society.

The book makes other suggestive contributions. It comprises an initial intellectual history and critique of the voting studies, as well as Natchez's own analysis of voting, political participation, and democracy. Chapter 3 is a fine overview of political socialization and group bases of politics. The introduction to the second part on electoral issues, which might better have extended the initial chapter, cogently identifies the theoretical failings of the predecessor works. Drawing on unpublished correspondence, chapter 7 puts in context V. O. Key's contributions to the issue bases of public opinion, voting, and popular government, while elucidating his involvement with quantitative electoral analysis.

Although provocative, the book is uneven. A major weakness consists in largely identifying the voting studies with *The People's Choice* and *Voting* from Columbia, *The Authoritarian Personality,* and *The Civic Culture.* The latter explore possibilities for (anti) democratic personality and culture, but hardly discuss voting. Though Chapter 6 critiques the Survey Research Center's failure to extend normative political theory, the book devotes little specific attention to the central voting study, *The American Voter,* and its more systemic sequel, *Elections and the Political Order.* This is all the more surprising because those efforts in certain ways fit Natchez's critique—despite touching on electoral theory, they are far more models of extraordinary normal science than of normative inquiry. Classic works forged by a quadrumvirate of scholars, only two of whom had their original training in political science, tended to approach political behavior and party identification as essentially similar to other social behaviors and attitudes.

Planned originally for two books, the history, critique, and contributions by Natchez intermix, though often without clear cumulation. The final chapter presents the author's conception of the intentional, reasonable voter. (It also discusses Milgram's study of obedience to authority in the context of mass/elite relations in a democracy, but overstates the extent of blindly following orders.) Perforce incomplete and left to able editing, the chapter suggests approaches to questions of rationality in issue and retrospective voting, and how normative concerns might integrate with political investigation.

Natchez came to study government with Key at Harvard, but the senior scholar's untimely death left the younger to pursue indirectly the lessons of intertwining philosophical and quantitative scholarship. Unfortunately, like *The Responsible Electorate,* this book had to be posthumously completed by a colleague. A poignant account by Lois Wasserspring Natchez and an introduction and editing of the final chapter by John C. Blydenburgh describe the course of the author's political studies and clarify the meaning of his work. Had Key and Natchez lived longer, visions of philosophically inspired electoral study might currently be more fully developed. This promising study should inspire political scientists and philosophers today to pursue voting research which extends beyond images of candidates, enriching the meaning and understanding of electoral democracy.

RICHARD SOBEL

Smith College

Political and Economic Migrants in America: Cubans and Mexicans. By Silvia Pedraza-Bailey. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985. Pp. viii + 242. $27.00, cloth.)

Scholars of assimilation have paid little attention to the role of the state. They have focused instead on non-political social processes that may "naturally" lead toward assimilation. This is not surprising inasmuch as political scientists have not contributed substantially to the literature of assimilation, leaving it mostly to other disciplines.

Sociologist Pedraza-Bailey, a Cuban immigrant, argues convincingly that assimilation cannot be understood in a political vacuum because state policies may either inhibit or facilitate it. This thesis is developed around a comparison of Cuban and Mexican migration to the United States.

Using census data, the author tests the popular belief that migrants from Cuba have undergone more rapid assimilation than those from Mexico. Explanations for her findings center around two concepts: "economic migrants" and "political migrants." This classification is based on three criteria: whether political disaffection or economic concerns comprise migrants' primary motivation for migration, and whether the countries of origin and destination define them as economic or political migrants. According to Pedraza-Bailey, the significance of this distinction is that political migrants assimilate more rapidly because the country of destination extends more assistance to them.

The book concludes that Mexicans have long come to the United States as economic migrants, while Cubans entered as economic migrants until Castro's rise to power and as political migrants since then. Thus the author expected that among migrants who entered the United States during the Castro era, Cubans would have undergone more extensive assimilation because they were political migrants, while the Mexicans were economic migrants. For those arriving in the pre-Castro era, she expected no significant difference between Cubans and Mexicans because both came as economic migrants. Using such indexes of assimilation as job prestige and income, and controlling for differences in status at the time of arrival, both hypotheses were confirmed.

The book argues that the United States has never really tried to assimilate economic migrants, and much of its details the national government's neglect of Mexican migrants. Economic migrants are admitted to supply cheap labor, so assimilation with its accompanying rise in economic status would be self-defeating. In sharp contrast, the United States has made extraordinary efforts to assist political migrants because they are refugees from countries hostile to this country and with whom the U.S. is locked in competition for world opinion. A very informative chapter is devoted to the numerous programs the United States designed to assist Castro-era Cuban migrants.

I have some reservations about this book. The author does not clearly indicate the methodology for determining whether motivation for migration is primarily political or economic. Nor does she tell us how to categorize migration that is political by some of the three standards but economic by the others (e.g., if the migrants' motivation is primarily economic but they are defined by the United States as political migrants). There seems to be an assumption that the Cuban-Mexican-United States situation is typical, but is it? Do the two categories of political and economic migrants really exhaust all the possibilities? What about religious migrants, for example?

Despite these reservations, this book is on balance a substantial contribution to the literature. The reorientation it calls for is long overdue and the author's statistical analysis is a convincing demonstration that the distinction between economic and political migrants is a step in the right direction. This book has implications for several subfields of Political Science, including international relations, foreign policy, and the politics of minority groups. If political scientists in these areas will build on Pedraza-Bailey's innovative book, our overall understanding of assimilation should increase markedly.

GEORGE C. KISER

Illinois State University

State and Local Government Administration. Edited by Jack Rabin and Don Dodd. (New York and Basel: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1985. Pp. xiv + 446. $55.00, cloth.)

Most edited books are carefully designed and integrated into a presentation that builds a central message from among several independent thoughts. This is usually accomplished through the selection of topics and by an organizational format that leads the reader to the primary theme(s). Commonly, editors assure this by providing introductory summaries that highlight their objectives and how each of the contributed articles adds to the achievement of the goal.

Whereas Rabin and Dodd offer 21 original essays (only one is cites as having partially appeared previously in print), their opportunity to make a significant case on state and local administration is lost in the absence of clear goals. Nowhere do the authors counsel the reader regarding how each contribution relates to the purpose of the text. The collection takes on a meaning that only the reader can define. With that said of the book's basic shortcoming, a focus on the book's worth is in order.

The initial section offers three articles on the organization and management of state and local administration. Of the three, the lead article's focus on reorganization is a very good summary of state and local efforts at restructuring administration (Garnett). The other contributions on the distinction between chief administrative officials and chief executive officers in city government (Reed) and the emerging role of court administrators (Hays) offer solid discussions.

From this short section, the authors turn to eight articles on budgeting and financial management. State expenditure budgeting practices get attention (Chapman), as does municipal budgeting (Moore), before attention is turned to issues of revenue restraint by Florestano ("State Limitations on Local Fiscal Authority"), Gargan ("Fiscal Dependency and Governmental Capacity in American Cities"), and Rebovich ("Fiscal Stress in the American States"). These five are to the point and paint a good overview of budgetary and fiscal issues. Especially noteworthy is Chapman's grasp of the absence of neutrality in the budget process. The articles on information systems (Jackowski) and productivity (Hatry) offer only minimal additions to this section. Placed in more appropriate contexts however, they might be useful for understanding state and local administration.

Policy making in state and local governments is the third thematic focus. The internal process subtheme of policy making offers articles focusing on the significance of personnel staff selection and roles in the governor's office (Wyner), the growing liability exposure issue of government officials (Hildreth and Miller), the budget process as a control device (Skok), and an overview of the functions performed by legislative staffs in policy making (Balutis). The final two articles bring attention to service delivery: Hagebak on the integration of human services and Morgan on alternatives in approaches to local service. Although disjointed as a unit, this section does give the reader the best article in the book. James Perry's discussion of the governor's leadership as having a critical impact on organizational change is timely and stimulating, and pinpoints the central nerve in the policy-making process.

The concluding section in the book brings attention to the personnel administration segment of state and local government. Included are a look at accountability and merit in performance measurement (Finkle), training as a vital investment in organizational effectiveness although expediently reduced or eliminated in difficult time (Sumek), and a review of issues of public pension funds and their liabilities in state and local governments (Klinger and Nutter). The last two articles (Finkle and Gross) trace the growth of union activity and labor relations in subnational and grassroot governments.

The gap in state government administration literature is partially filled through these essays that summarize much of the relevant research. Local government which has received more extensive treatments is given worthwhile attention, especially on the issue of state-local interrelationships. The information is summarized well, but offers very little original research or thought.

ROBERT T. PERRY

Ball State University

Environmental Politics and Policy. By Walter A. Rosenbaum. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press (a division of Congressional Quarterly, Inc.), 1985. Pp. ix + 328. $10.50, paper.)

Thirteen years ago, serious doubts were expressed in this *Review* about the possibility of writing textbooks on environmental politics and policy. There seemed at that time to be not enough learning, too little "accumulated political wisdom," to allow textbook writers to integrate their findings with those of their predecessors (*APSR*, 66: 593–94). It was in this context that Walter Rosenbaum published and later revised *The Politics of Environmental*

Concern (Praeger Publishers, 1973 and 1977). He is still the only American political scientist who has tried to deal with a broad range of environmental issues in the framework of a single analysis. I think those who teach environmental politics on a regular basis have always admired his willingness to tackle a large and difficult subject in one reasonably short (and reasonably priced) volume. However, I think it is also fair to say that the strength of his writing, and the value of his book for teaching, has stemmed more from its summary analyses of the recent political history of selected environmental issues than from its original and skilled deployment of disciplinary insights.

This latest book will, I believe, evoke the same balance of judgments. It is different enough in form and content from the previous work to be properly marketed by its new publisher as a new book, rather than a revised edition of an old one. The substantive focus is changed, for example, by giving air and water pollution control separate chapters instead of combined treatment. Rosenbaum has also emphasized toxic and hazardous wastes, and, in a chapter on the environmental impacts of energy development, has supplemented a much abbreviated discussion of the environmental impacts of surface coal mining with an excellent section on nuclear power issues. What used to be a chapter on the politics of timber, and became a 1977 essay on the new politics of land use, has now become a review of issues affecting the public lands—particularly in the light of James Watt's tenure at the Department of the Interior.

At the same time, there are elements of continuity between this book and its predecessors. This is most obvious in chapter 2, "The Politics of Environmental Policy," where Rosenbaum tries, as he did in a single chapter of his first book, to summarize what modern political science has to say about the "common constraints shaping governmental response to environmental issues throughout the policy cycle" (p. 33). His earlier willingness to speculate about the impact the environmental movement has had and is likely to exert in the future on policy makers, the political system, and the policies they produce is also displayed, this time in a final chapter called "An Agenda for the 1980s" (chap. 9).

What the reader cannot clearly discern in this mixture of old and new, however, is an explanation of how and why it is that Rosenbaum thinks his selected topics are coherently tied together. In an effort to find an answer, I did what I think many others familiar with Rosenbaum's work would find it sensible to do. I remembered that his book, like his subject, has a history, and I tried to compare the intellectual premises of this new book with those he relied on twelve years ago.

The first thing driven home by this comparison, and perhaps not fully appreciated before, is the enormous influence exerted by Lynton Caldwell (*Environment: A Challenge for Modern Society*, Natural History Press, 1970) on Rosenbaum's early thinking. And the second is the way Rosenbaum has abandoned this earlier, and very radical, approach to his subject in favor of a wholesale and apparently wholehearted incrementalism. Twelve years ago, Rosenbaum was prepared to argue, with Caldwell and others, that the effective resolution of environmental problems required a fundamental transformation of American political and administrative institutions. Now we find him arguing for modest, even pedestrian, structural reforms of the Environmental Protection Agency, for the infusion of institutional risk assessment into the appraisal of new technologies, and for the broader application of incentive devices, rather than command-and-control regulation, to bring environmental pollution within socially acceptable limits (chap. 9).

What happened to environmental politics and policy in the United States in the last decade and a half to warrant this dramatic (but unacknowledged) shift in the analytical orientation of one of its principal chroniclers? Rosenbaum flirts with the idea that people in government and environmental leaders have begun "to learn from experience and mistakes" (p. 312). He offers a primer of the lessons that a decade and a half of policy making, implementation, and evaluation have taught (pp. 6–17). He also identifies several factors that might have caused this policy learning to occur. These include the ideological reappraisal of policy design provoked by the Reagan presidency (*passim*), the special relationship of business to government (pp. 38–39, 117–23, 286–94), and the changing role of science and scientists in defining environmental problems and policy alternatives (chap. 3). His discussion of this last topic is a major positive feature of the book, and one of the best short treatments of the subject in print.

Whether and how policies change for the better as a result of learning are questions quickly coming to the center of policy analysis. Rosenbaum has offered some tantalizing thoughts in this book about the impact learning from experience might be having on environmental policy. But we shall remember his bringing us up to date on the events that have prompted speculation about environmental policy learning—more than his ability to explain how political change can sometimes make policies different and sometimes both different and better.

GEOFFREY WANDESFORDE-SMITH

University of California
Davis

Secrets of State: The State Department and the Struggle Over U.S. Foreign Policy. By Barry Rubin. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985, Pp. ix + 335. $25.00.)

Secrets of State deals primarily with the role of the State Department in the formulation and execution of American foreign policy. Starting with a cursory review of the making of U.S. foreign policy from the republic's early days until 1933, it proceeds to devote almost equal attention to the policy-making processes in the administrations of Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy-Johnson, Nixon-Ford, Carter, and Reagan. One of its main themes is the growing weakness of the State Department *vis-a-vis* the National Security Council (NSC) in the policy-making process. A second theme emphasizes the increasing personal and bureaucratic infighting in the government. In this regard, Rubin feels that the Carter and Reagan administrations, for all of their many differences, are similar in terms of their high personnel turnover, lack of direction at the top, clashing personalities, and serous differences among State, Defense, and the NSC. As a result of these continuing problems, he finds American foreign policy to be increasingly controversial, inconsistent, difficult to sell at home and abroad, and ineffective.

Rubin is not totally critical of American foreign policy. High praise is given to a few individuals (e.g., Dean Acheson), and the period from 1947-1952 is found to be one of creativity and unusual effectiveness. Nevertheless, despite the author's attempts to balance his criticism with merited credit, relatively little is considered worthy of praise.

In a study that finds so much to criticize, it is surprising that almost no proposals are offered for reform. The author cogently argues that most proposals for institutional reform would not be useful because America's difficulties reside far less in its institutional arrangements than in the too-frequent lack of sufficient enlightenment among the top six hundred foreign policy decision makers and in their general inability to work together. But because Rubin also acknowledges that providing an optimum blend of genuinely qualified persons probably cannot be arranged by elaborate reform, he is left with almost no concrete suggestions for improvment. And so despite its scattered praise for a handful of State Department officials, the dominant thrust of the study coupled with its lack of recommendations gives the impression that not only does America have a badly flawed foreign policy apparatus but that it probably cannot be significantly improved by human design.

Many will not fully share this gloomy assessment and for good reason. Nowhere in Rubin's book is the American foreign policy-making process carefully evaluted either against what was feasible in any given situation or against the quality of operation of the foreign ministires of other major states. Indeed, the chief flaw of the book is that it contains no clear, explicit standards by which the performance of the U.S. State Department can by systematically evaluated with reasonably objectivity. For all we know, the U.S. State Department might be doing a fine job compared for example, with the performance of the French or Soviet foreign ministries. Based on the material in *Secrets of State*, the State Department cannot be compared with anything. So, because its criticism is not based on any explicit, realistic criteria of excellence, there is not reason to take it at face value.

Rubin's book has a number of virtues; it is interesting and well written. It also can serve almost as a compendium of the problems attributed to the State Department for the last nearly two centuries. Regrettably, it is no more than this. Is there a need for yet another book devoted principally to criticizing the State

Department? This reader has not been persuaded that such a need exists.

JOSEPH M. SCOLNICK, JR.

Clinch Valley College
University of Virginia

Liberalism and American Constitutional Law. By Rogers M. Smith. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985. Pp. 328. $22.50.)

The dual aim of this ambitious, lucidly written study in constitutional law is to "clarify liberalism's theoretical precepts and difficulties and to identify the notions that are actually forces in current affairs" (p. 6). Smith's analysis begins in general agreement with Louis Hartz' thesis about the "corpse of philosophy" upon which law has flourished in the American liberal tradition. He recognizes many other early sources of American ideals beyond Locke, to be sure, but argues that all of these served primarily to support and to supplement an essentially Lockeian liberal body of ideas at the center of our political tradition. Part 1 of the study is devoted to a brief and rather schematic outline of these core ideas, focusing upon the priorities of peace, intellectual progress, economic growth, and personal liberty. But Smith goes beyond Hartz in contending further that this philosophical corpse of "early liberalism" has been a restless one fraught with important difficulties from the beginning. He cites in particular the troubling aspects of consent-based obligation, egoistic individualism, and sufficient moral purpose which have long plagued liberal theory. Moreover, he recognizes three alternative strands of critical thought—communitarian, romantic, and egalitarian—which have emerged to challenge, supplement, and ultimately modify that liberal framework throughout our history.

Part 2 then examines four constituional policy areas—due process, free speech, apportionment, and economic welfare—to illustrate the ways in which law has developed from liberal origins to accommodate this variety of critical challenges. These chapters provide mostly cursory summations of the central cases and controversies in each area, and hence constitute in some ways the least original part of the book. However, both the author's command of the material and his interpretive judgements are sound. Moreover, he successfully demonstrates his point that most doctrinal innovations have amounted to little more than "a superficial patchwork of often contradictory solutions that have temporarily cloaked but never resolved the continuing dilemmas of the liberalism expressed in American law" (p. 4). Although more sensitive to quasi-democratic, egalitarian, and utilitarian values, constitutional law in these areas thus has also been rendered more ambiguous, incoherent, and lacking in sustained purpose as well. Smith's discussion of the Burger Court's moderate "democratic relativism" in this regard is especially convincing, if again not particularly novel.

It is in the final part of the book that the argument becomes the most ambitious, original, important, and predictably problematic. Beginning from a critique of the three primary "alternative theories" urged by others to solve the dilemmas of liberalism, Smith advances the argument that "we should reformulate early liberalism's substantive purposes so as to be politically desirable and philosophically credible today" (p. 170). Specifically, he points to the core liberal value of "rational liberty" as a guidepost for redefining and legitimating the many now confused doctrines of modern egalitarian position of Rawls and Dworkin, but differs somewhat in its important distinction between two notions of egalitarian self-worth. Rather than aiming for the goal of equal "self-esteem," which implies excellence in achievement, Smith advocates the promotion of "universal, equal respect," which implies only a minimal standard of personal moral attainment and reflective self-determination. This principle of "rational liberty," he suggests, offers the unique advantage of providing a practical solution to the problems of liberalism without abandoning the liberal tradition itself. The author demonstrates the logic of this claim with regard to both the larger theoretical dilemmas of liberal ethics and the specific areas of modern constitutional law criticized earlier.

These arguments are beautifully developed, but are still likely to be troublesome for many critics and defenders of liberalism alike. For example, the author's admittedly traditional quasi-interpretivist approach to constitutional policy making is vulnerable to criticism from several influential contemporary jurisprudential perspectives. In particular, many scholars might rightly question the value of such a traditional analysis of law cast primarily in terms of moral philosophy largely independent of discussion about the long-developing context of unequal social and political power in capitalist America. Moreover, the author's attempted severing of the "rational liberty" principle from its property-based, individualistic, and inegalitarian implications in traditional Lockean liberal theory involves a host of related problems. Above all, it is simply not clear what is left of liberalism or gained for doctrinal clarity, given that the author expects the standards of "rational self direction" to be defined differently by each community. Smith may be right that the new ethic promises a potentially moderate route to legitimating progressive advances in existing doctrines. But it seems more probable that the "rational liberty" principle would continue instead to justify mostly inconsistent yet conventional policies not unlike those of the Burger Court that he criticizes. Indeed, the author admits that his own application of the new principle to contemporary constitutional policies produces few changes, and even those are quite debatable according to varying conceptions of "liberty." All in all, many readers thus are likely to remain unconvinced that liberalism possesses the resources to heal itself, at least without drawing heavily from other contending traditions of political commitment as well.

Despite these and other reservations, however, this is a very challenging and important book. Impressive in scholarship and ambitious in scope, Smith's volume represents a sophisticated attempt to develop from our limited tradition a purposive theory for reorienting contemporary constitutional debates which deserves a broad and serious scholarly reading.

MICHAEL W. MCCANN

University of Washington

Constitutional Inequality: The Political Fortunes of the Equal Rights Amendment. By Gilbert Y. Steiner. (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985. Pp. 110. ($22.95 cloth; $8.95 paper.)

This slim volume seeks to determine the reasons for the failure of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to become a part of the U.S. Constitution. Steiner reviews the relatively long history of the amendment, first introduced in 1923, and opposition to it, largely from organized labor. The vicissitudes of the amendment in Congress, including the well-known hostility of Chairman Emmanuel Cellar, Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, and the key roles played by two Congresswomen, Edith Green and Marth Griffiths, are highlighted.

The major portion of the book, however, examines why the amendment finally faltered, although its easy passage in the Congress in 1972 appeared to assure early success. Steiner points to several problems: the difficulties inherent in the amendment process for issues dealing with substantive change, the relatively lukewarm support of successive presidents, and the possibility that legislative or judicial policy making might provide viable alternatives to the ERA.

Ultimately, Steiner concludes that the course of ERA's ratification was complicated by a newly emerged opposition to abortion (in the wake of *Roe v. Wade* in 1973). Additional issues raised by the Vietnam War and the subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan related to the ERA's impact on American women. Steiner also questions the decision to extend the ratification period limit for an additional three years in 1979, as of doubtful legality, and addresses a similar theme with regard to suspect procedural strategies in Congress which unsuccessfully attempted to renew the ERA after its failure in 1982. Nonetheless, he concludes that the three-year extension, at least, was irrelevant to the final outcome.

Indeed, the nature of the opposition that emerged, remains the most interesting puzzle of the ERA experience, particularly in light of the fact that within a year of congressional passage of the amendment, 30 states had ratified, often by large majorities. By 1975, 34 of the 35 states that were going to ratify the amendment had already done so. Only one state ratified thereafter, and it proved impossible to gain support in even one of the three more states needed to pass the amendment during the 39 month extension period. While disagreements over priorities and lack of unity between the National Organization for Women (NOW) and other groups existed, the reason for ERA's demise clearly lies in the emergence of a determined opposition, which managed to escalate the level of conflict and transform the issue from one of "equity" to one involving a transformation in lifestyles and values. The rise of the New Right and the ascendancy of conservatism in the Reagan era —utilizing sophisticated interest group and campaign tactics involving PACs, direct mail, and the media—changed the nature of the debate over the ERA and made it politically costly for legislators to support the amendment. It is not simply enought for Steiner to mention Phyllis Schlafly and antiabortion politics. Surely an analysis of the failure of the ERA ought to examine the sources, significance and future of organized opposition to feminist politics as manifested in the ERA ratification conflict. Regrettably, this book sheds little light on such issues; in order to deal with them we need to refer to works such as Janet Boles' on the ERA and Kristin Luker's on abortion attitudes and politics.

As it stands, Steiner's book remains an interesting factual account but one which does not illuminate the political dynamics that animated this controversy. Particularly in the absence of reference to any primary sources, the author's final conclusion that the ERA struggle might be forgotten if only the Supreme Court would declare sex a "suspect classification" seems unrealistic both in terms of current judicial politics and the politics of the womens' movement.

JOYCE GELB

City College of New York

Public Policymaking in the American States. By Jack Treadway. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985. Pp. 193. $35.95.)

Richard Dawson and James Robinson's seminal article on public policy in the American states was the first systematic comparative state policy analysis by political scientists. It also framed the question that would dominate twenty years of research—the relative imporance of political and socioeconomic variables in the development of public policy in the American states. Subsequent studies took diverse approaches to this central concern, developing a variety of theoretical conceptualizations and applying diverse analytic techniques.

In this volume, Treadway attempts to organize and sort out developments in this field. He provides a reasonably thorough, comprehensive review of this body of work as it has developed in the writings of political scientists. *Public Policymaking in the American States* is a literature review that is organized to discuss four major relationships: (1) the influence of the socioeconomic environment on the political system; (2) the influence of the socioeconomic environment on policy outputs; (3) the influence of the political system on policy outputs; and (4) the relationship between politics and the environment in the determination of public policy outputs. The book is very similar in purpose and format to Brett Hawkins' 1971 treatment of *Politics and Urban Policies* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill). It contains no original empirical research.

Treadway draws upon more than 120 studies that appeared from 1963 to 1984. While he does not discuss the surge and decline of productivity in the comparative study of public policy in the American states, his review contains the data for such an analysis. The literature started slowly; single articles were published in 1963, 1964, and 1965. Then it began to take off—five pieces were published in 1966, ten in 1969. Such analyses peaked in 1973, when 15 items were published. Sixty-four percent of the published itmes covered by Treadway appeared in the years from 1968 to 1976. Since 1976, publishing activity has been light, averaging less than four items per year. In addition, relatively few of the articles in recent years have appeared in leading journals of political science. The *APSR* published none from 1980 to 1984. This pattern reflects the absence of major empirical findings or theoretical developments in recent years.

Treadway provides a careful account of the literature, presenting the major findings and discussing disputes over the appropriate conceptualization and specification of the systems model that guides so much of the research. He discusses a number of studies that diverge from the dominant framework, and he identifies contradictory empirical findings among the various studies.

Treadway is most impressed with studies emphasizing the force of incrementalism and national policy in state policy processes. He also emphasizes (1) studies which suggest that the determinants of policy depend upon the policy or policies analyzed and (2) studies that indicate that the determinants of policy vary over time or that they vary depending upon whether one examines policy across systems or over time. He believes that available findings provide the basis for a contingency model of state policy systems. He concludes that "the exact mixture of politics and the environment . . . (that determines policy) depends on what policy area is being examined and how the environment, the political system, and policy outputs are being measured" (p. 179).

The strength of this volume is its fairly comprehensive coverage of the political science literature on comparative state policy analysis and its attempt to organize and make sense of the diverse findings in that literature. Treadway has organized the material well. He provides concise descriptions of the various studies and their findings. He writes clearly. The book makes accessible a large and scattered body of literature.

The book is limited in what it provides. It offers little in the way of new theory. Its criticisms of various studies are the standard criticisms that appear in the literature. It offers no new empirical evidence. In addition, Treadway it is not particularly sensitive to the validity or reliability of individual studies. While noting some criticisms and shortcomings, he reports the findings of various studies as if they were of equal value. Part of the problem is that he does not establish a set of standards by which to assess contributions to the literature. Thus, it is hard to tell how much weight to attach to various studies in formulating a set of hypotheses or a model for futher exploration.

Despite his relatively comprehensive coverage of the literature, Treadway misses a number of important contributions. Like most political scientists working in this area, he virtually ignores the work of economists, except for the early studies by Sacks, Harris, Bahl, and Fischer. Nor does he draw upon the contributions of scoiologists such as the fine study by Kristen Gronbjerg, *Mass Society and the Extension of Welfare: 1960–1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1977).

EDWARD T. JENNINGS, JR.

University of Missouri
Columbia

The Breakdown of Democratic Party Organization, 1940–1980. By Alan Ware. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. Pp. xii + 275. $29.95)

Consciously in the tradition of James Q. Wilson's *The Amateur Democrat* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), this book is a case study of Democratic parties in three cities. The cases are well-chosen, ranging from a traditional "machine" city (New York) to an urban area with "non-partisan" traditions (East Bay, California, where Oakland and Berkeley are located) and in between, a city with a history of moderately strong parties (Denver). Employing archival research, interviews and surveys of party leaders and activists, the author dates and describes the disintegration of the local Democratic parties. Well written and researched, this book markes an important contribution to the literature on party organizations.

The "decline of party" thesis is perhaps the most widely agreed to proposition in American political science, but as Ware points out, there is little agreement on when and how party decline occurred. Ware finds the process to have been varied, uneven, but thorough at the local level. Of the three most widely-cited causes of party decline—socioeconomic change, modern campaign technologies, and party reform—he finds the first to be the most important and the third, the least. Indeed, decline was precipitous and catastrophic only when all three factors operated at once, in the early 1960s. Ware likens the process to a person with heart and bronchial ailments who is involved in a traffic accident: urban decline damaged the heart of the Democratic parties, allowing modern campaign technology to cut short their breath, and the "accident" of institutional reform completed their demise.

In Ware's view, the necessary condition for party decline was the inability of local party leaders to recruit activists, the "heart" of party strength at mid-century. Changes in urban society and government reduced dramatically the numbers of "professional" activists available to the parties, though initially the same trends produced "amateurs" were gone as well, so that local parties could not muster enough manpower for effective campaigns. Though the dearth of activists had many causes, Ware suggests that the absence of solidary incentives was critical. The decline of "regular" and "reform" clubs occurred simultaneously, as potential activists found alternative social outlets.

The same forces that sapped party manpower also weakened the allies of local Democratic parties—labor and black organizations, which might have helped replenish the party labor pool. Instead, these organizations withdrew from local campaign activity, just as a number of conflicts endemic to party politics appeared with great intensity; factionalism, issue extremism, and reform efforts. Such "accidents" further depleted the pool of activists. When calm was restored, the party organizations had been largely replaced by those who could campaign effectively, namely individual candidates. While the reforms did little to restore party strength, Ware sees them as inevitable given the collapse of local parties.

If the inability to recruit activists was a necessary condition for party decline, modern campaign technology was a sufficient one. Strong local parties might have slowed the use of television and campaign consultants, but the growing impotence of local parties hastened their employment. And the increasing use of modern technology exhausted the parties further. As with party reform, Ware claims that new campaign techniques were inevitable once local decline was far advanced. Candidates now have many means of campaigning, which they employ according to their particular circumstances, making some elections more competitive (usually state-wide and national contests), but other much less so (mostly local races). Thus, highly atomized, "party-less" politics has appeared in formerly Democratic strongholds.

What needs to be explained then, is the persistence of party politics in the absence of viable organizations. One reason is the development of alternatives to local parties. Ware reports a number of examples among Democratic candidates: organizations based on the perquisites of incumbent legislators, single-issue concerns, and popular officials (who act as "warlords" locally). Another reason is competition from the Republicans, who have developed strong national party organizations. Adept at the use of modern campaign technology and dedicated to grass roots party-building, the Republican organizations may represent a new support for party politics. Given the quality of this study, one hopes Ware's next book is "The Development of Republican Party Organization, 1940–1980."

JOHN C. GREEN

Furman University

Administrative Rulemaking: Politics and Processes. By William F. West. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985. Pp. 217. $35.00, cloth.)

This book depicts the temper of the political times. As American society reflects the dilemmas of government regulation vs. deregulation and as the American Political Science Association focuses upon organization of power as the theme of the 1986 annual meeting, both politicians and political scientists express more interest in formal rules, structures, and procedures.

West has authored a book which, in brief fashion, gives succinct and appropriate detail to the expansion of the delegated authority of American public institutions. The author analyzes administrative rulemaking for implementing statutes and evaluates requirements utilized to guide and delimit rulemaking decisions.

He critiques the role of structural mechanisms in the policy-making process and emphasizes political determinants and effects of procedural choice. This text is both timely and valuable for the study of political, bureaucracy in its examination of pervasive rulemaking thoughout the federal bureaucracy, of tension resulting from the growth of administrative policy making, and of broad delegations of discretionary authority sanctioned by the courts.

The author maintains that the constitutionality of delegated authority has never been resolved by the courts. He summarizes that acceptance of delegated legislative authority in almost any form by the courts is a response to policy needs instead of legal considerations. West concludes that rulemaking is widely accepted as a means of implementing authority.

He describes pressures to reform the administrative process, delineates rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and spells out exemptions from the APA. In explaining formal and informal rulemaking procedures in the APA, West elaborates on structuring rulemaking discretion.

The author analyzes legislative policy making and evaluates institutional rulemaking with a case study of the Magnuson-Moss Act of 1974 and its impacts upon the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). West points out that the Magnuson-Moss legislation encouraged reliance on rulemaking and that such rulemaking has profound effects on the FTC's relationship with its political environment. Noting that rulemaking was adopted by the FTC in early 1960s and emphasized in the 1970s in order to police unfairness and deception and to enhance consumer protection, West concludes that the FTC's experience confirms the potential superiority of rulemaking as an effective implementation procedure. According to the author, rulemaking emphases force the FTC to confront complex and controversial issues.

In writing this definitive volume on politics, processes, and administrative policy making, West emphasizes that two basic perspectives—the causes and effects of formal structures and the competing interests of group politics—should guide political scientists' conceptual analyses of administrative institutions.

West sees the rulemaking process as involving the tension between rationality, embodied in formal structures, and responsiveness to group demands. Within this conceptualization West offers a valuable contribution to the literature of political bureaucracy by analyzing the dramatic expansion of delegated legislative authority of recent years and the proliferation of requirements structuring the exercise of bureaucratic discretion.

JOHN E. ROUSE, JR.

Ball State University

The Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax. By John F. Witte. (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985. Pp. xxii + 437. $25.00.)

Political scientists have generally paid much less attention to tax policy than to the spending side of the budget. This imbalance has been significantly narrowed by John Witte's masterful study of the federal income tax. The virtues of the book are stylistic, methodological, and substantive. In the course of learning a great deal about taxes, readers also get a model lesson in how to gather and use data. Witte is a lucid, careful writer whose findings are consistently grounded in the evidence at hand.

Witte is guided by the principle that the method of inquiry must be appropriate for the issue being studied. The book, accordingly, offers a medley of approaches that are not typically combined in the same study. Historical research (which accounts for about half of the book) is employed to show how tax legislation has evolved over the past century; survey data are used to compare public opinion and the incidence of tax burdens and benefits; roll call analysis is brought into play to explain recent tax activity in Congress; statistical measures are devised to analyze the type and distribution of tax expenditures; and economic and normative analyses provide a basis for assessing competing theories of taxation. Witte is adept in using—and explaining—each of these approaches. This reader came away feeling that the right approach was selected for each area of inquiry.

Witte retrieves historical research from the discard pile of political science to explain why the tax code is so complex and fails to redistribute income from wealthier to lower-income classes. The story is told in a lively manner, as each period's increment of legislation brings tax policy closer to its current predicament. Witte convincingly argues that the nominally progressive tax structure was more an accident of wartime needs to raise revenues than an instrument of economic redistribution. Progressive rates meant higher middle-class tax burdens and fueled pressure for relief. In peacetime, tax legislation has typically been tax reduction, sometimes through adjustments in the rates, but often through the extension of tax expenditures. All sectors and classes have benefitted from this behavior, though not always to the same degree.

Increased complexity, it turns out, has often been a byproduct of efforts to make the tax code more equitable rather than of blatant catering to narrow interests. Congress has had an active role in shaping tax policy; it has frequently disregarded or altered presidential recommendations concerning the amount and mix of taxes. Sometimes, Congress has favored capital formation; other times, it has sought to ease the burden on low-income taxpayers. The lack of policy consistently is mirrored by a lack of theoretical cohesion. Witte dissects several leading theories of taxation, demonstrating that none is a fully-adequate guide to policy.

The book takes a close look at tax expenditures, and Witte's findings have a bearing on recent efforts to reform the tax system. Tax expenditures have grown because tax burdens have increased. Over the years, as Congress has raised tax rates, it has faced pressure from middle-income payers pushed into higher brackets, as well as from various interests seeking financial subsidies. Many big preferences date back to the formative years of income taxation, though some recent ones have been narrower than those of long standing. Tax expenditures are hard to take away because they have characteristics similar to open-ended entitlements: the benefits are conferred on a broad swath of the population and their value grows automatically without new legislative action. Wealthy persons receive more tax breaks than do those who make less money, but only because they pay more taxes.

Despite widespread general disenchantment with the tax system, public opinion data do not stray widely from actual tax policy. Although Witte is careful not to push his findings too far, he suggests that effective tax rates are pretty close to what taxpayers think they should be.

The evolution of the tax system validates the incrementalist claim that major policy developments can cumulate from numerous small adjustments. "Never has there been," Witte exults, "more convincing evidence for Braybroke's and Lindblom's contention that incrementalism can lead to massive change..." (p. 129). In this reviewer's judgment, descriptive incrementalism is not an issue worth fighting over, nor is it a matter that can be settled empirically. Just about all social behavior is an incremental extension of the past and present into the future. Taxation is not significantly more incremental than other, less measurable, public policies. Because the size of increments is indeterminate, anything but the most revolutionary change can be said to conform to this model. Witte regards the truly massive tax increases imposed in World War II as incremental; so, too, have been Congress' numerous tinkerings with the tax laws in the postwar era.

It is as a norm for assessing policy processes or outcomes that incrementalism is an important issue. Witte's conclusions, coming in the final chapter, after a book full with "the system works" comments, are surprisingly adverse. He suggests that incrementalism "may produce unpleasant policy outcomes when extended over a long time frame" (p. 367); "the income tax as a fundamental and ostensibly equitable means of raising revenues has been slowly but continuously eroded" (p. 369); and that "the politics of income taxation follow a self-destructive path." (p. 377). Witte's solution is to insulate tax policy from democratic politics by giving the executive greater influence, strengthening internal congressional controls, such as closed rules and markups, and having more stable policy that would not be altered to satisfy immediate pressures on Congress. "Lasting tax reform," Witte argues in the book's final words, "will not come without lasting tax reform" (p. 386).

This may be a valid conclusion but it does not flow directly from the study. Having examined the development of tax policy with painstaking care, Witte failed to consider whether different political arrangements over the past century significantly affected the outcome. The linkage of institution and policy is always difficult to forge; it is a measure of John Witte's accomplishment that this work can be put to a test that can be applied to few recent studies in public policy.

ALLEN SCHICK

University of Maryland

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

The Nordic Parliaments: A Comparative Analyses. By David Arter. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. Pp. x + 421. $30.00.)

In this welcome volume, David Arter undertakes to describe, analyze, and compare the roles of the Nordic parliaments in the policy process. In seeking to accomplish these purposes, he examines in considerable detail not only the Danish *Folketing*, the Icelandic *Althing*, the Norwegian *Storting*, the Swedish *Riksdag*, and the Finnish *Eduskunta* but also the "home rule" legislatures (the *Landsting* of Greenland, the *Lagting* of the Faeroe Islands, the *Landsting* of the Aoland Islands) and the Nordic Council, the regional consultative assembly. This is an ambitious project, especially since along with intra-Scandinavian comparisons the author touches upon relevant features fo the United States Congress and the parliaments of Britain, France, and West Germany.

The result is a compendium of information, most useful in providing in one book an almost encyclopedic description of legislative structures and procedures in Northern Europe. After an introductory survey of the institutions, their members, and, in an abbreviated discussion, the party systems, Arter considers the parliaments under three headings: policy making (the influence of commissions of inquiry, the role of civil servants, the impact of cabinets and prime ministers), policy adoption (plenary sessions, agendas, presiding officers, standing and "upper tier" committees, the adoption of measures), and policy implementation (parliamentary questions, motions of no confidence, legislative oversight through investigating and review committees, advisory committees on foreign relations, ombudsmen). Frequent examples illuminate these topics, though some may not be entirely enlightening to those who lack familiarity with Scandinavian politics. Arter is not unconcerned with broader questions—the "decline of parliaments" thesis, for example—and reaches some general conclusions from the Nordic experiences. He finds a lack of direct involvement by parliamentarians in policy formulation, except in Sweden. Because most measures adopted are government proposals, the Nordic parliaments, with the possible exception of Iceland, clearly belong to the family of deliberating, rather than legislating, assemblies. Their influence lies more in the scrutiny and control of the executive, but their impact on policy implementation is weak when compared to that of Congress or even the House of Commons. Political changes in the 1970s and 1980s—realignments in party systems, the regular incidence of minority cabinets (especially nonsocialist ones), and challenges to the consensus by organized groups raising new issues—have created conditions for a modest revival of Nordic parliamentary power.

Valuable as the book is, it suffers from a number of defects. In his attempt to include almost everything, Arter pays a price in style and clarity; the reader sometimes feels that he is plodding through a dense forest. The treatment of the political and party contexts within which the parliaments operate is brief and cursory. As is almost inevitable in such an extensive survey, some important studies are overlooked; *Folketingsmedlemmer pa Arbejde* by Erik Damgaard and colleagues, for instance. There is no reference to the many useful publications of the various parliaments, such as Denmark's *Folketingets Handbog* and the annual *Folketingsarbog*. Particulary to be regretted are the inadequacy of the index and the complete absence of a bibliography. In the skimpy index, nearly three-fourths of the entries are names of individuals; there are no entries for such basic topics as "committees" or "electoral systems," despite their extensive coverage in the book. If one wants to make a quick check on aspects of the Norweigan parliament, there is no entry for "Norway;" one would have to track down a number of separate references to the *Lagting*, the *Oldesting*, the *Storting*, assistant ministers, and so on. This holds true for the other parliaments as well. The lack of bibliography is frustrating and a hindrance to anyone wanting to look beyond this study or to pursue a topic in greater depth. Wading through the footnotes is hardly an adequate substitute.

Despite these criticisms—meeting some of them would have required Arter to write a longer or a different book—*Nordic Parliaments* is a treasury of information on the legislatures of Northern Europe. As such, it is a valued addition to the small but growing body of literature in English in the region's political systems.

KENNETH E. MILLER

Rutgers University
Newark

Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania. Edited by Joel D. Barkan. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984. rev. ed. pp. xviii + 375. $34.95, cloth; $13.95, paper.)

This book, an update of a work published in 1978, consists of a set of comparative studies of political institutions and public policies in Kenya and Tanzania. Development, political parties, legislators, bureaucracies, the link between ideology and objective conditions, class formation, rural self-help, rural development policy, urban policy, education policy, and foreign relations are compared. It remains the most comprehensive comparative study of these countries available. Yet, the objectives of the book are more than the presentation of a collection of insightful studies.

In the preface to the first edition, reprinted in the volume under review, the editor suggested that the book "is intended to be a discussion in which the participants attempt to speak, and argue with themselves and with each other, within the rubric of a single set of questions..." (p. viii). The four questions he set out were (1) How successful has each country been in achieving its developmental goals? (2) Which policies have been most effective? (3) What internal and external factors have affected the efforts of policy makers? and (4) How useful are Kenyan and Tanzanian experiences likely to be as a guide for other Third World societies?

Although several authors consider some of these questions, they do not determine either the organization or the content of individual studies. As a result, the book does not have the kind of coherence the editor sought. More significantly, there is virtually no interaction or discussion among contributors. The reader is left with a wide variety of conflicting interpretations and questions. For example: who is more correct in his description of class structure in the two countries, Holmquist or Leonard? Is Stren's attempt to interpret urban policy without serious consideration of class conflict appropriate? Is policy such as self-help just a "sideshow" only "significant for what it reveals about the overall structure of power..." (p. 193), as Holmquist suggests? Should the party in Tanzania be considered an entity separate from the bureaucracy as Okumu implies, or grouped with it as Leonard suggests? If class struggle within each country is as important to policy decisions as several writers suggest, should not Gordon's review of foreign policy make more of a connection between the two? Such questions indicate continuing disagreement among scholars over both the best units of interpretation and the proper specification of those units in the East African context—fundamental concerns whose resolution is of great importance for the advance of social science research. Yet, the absence of direct interaction among the authors has left many questions unanswered. The goal of the editor in achieving a high degree of coherence and interaction has not been fully realized—a criticism as true of the first edition as of this revised one.

Indeed, the revised edition differs only marginally from the first. Leonard's article on class formation was added, while Okumu's on foreign relations was dropped and replaced by Gordon's work on the same subject. Okumu was dropped as co-editor, and Holmquist revised his article on political parties. The extent of revisions within existing articles varies, with no fundamental changes in the arguments presented. None of the authors changed his principal analytical variables or findings, suggesting that interaction among authors outside the pages of this book has produced no convincing arguments or data on matters of disagreement. The updated material does lend credence to observations of trends previously made, such as the increasing difficulties Tanzania has faced in its attempts to break radically from its colonial heritage.

Despite the problems mentioned above, Barkan's edited work brings together the insightful views of 10 fine scholars who have spent many years studying Kenya and Tanzania. The footnoted material at the end of each chapter and Holmquist's bibliography at the end of the book present the reader with an excellent set of sources for further reading. Also, the differing views of the authors about politics and policy in Kenya and Tanzania challenge us to seek a resolution of the contraditions.

DEAN E. MCHENRY, JR.

Claremont Graduate School

The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process. By A. Doak Barnett. (Boulder: Westview Press with the Foreign Policy Institute of the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1985. Pp. xiii + 160. $18.50, cloth; $10.95, paper.)

Analysts of Chinese foreign policy have traditionally relied on communist ideology, official media statements, and the views of selective leading cadres (e.g., Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping) to explain the twists and turns in Peking's conduct of external relations. Because of the relative inaccessibility of Peking's policy processes, they have not, until recently, generally focused on the institutional context in which Chinese foreign policy is formulated and decided. *The Making of Foreign Policy in China* goes a long way to fill this lacuna. Combining his long-standing expertise in Chinese politics and his extensive contact with members of the Chinese foreign policy community, A. Doak Barnett offers us an extremely useful picture of Peking's foreign policy structure and process. He sheds light on important questions such as where in the party and governmental bureaucracies major foreign policy issues are dealt with, who the key decision makers are, and how different parts of the Chinese foreign policy machinery are related. This "mapping" has been informed by interviews with a variety of Chinese officials who are directly and actively involved in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. They included Premier Zhao Ziyang, vice-ministers and desk heads in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, and leading members of the diplomatic corps, research institutes, press organs, and major cultural exchange organizations.

The recent changes in the Chinese foreign policy apparatus, as reported by Barnett, have been in the direction of greater institutionalization and professionalization. The older leaders have generally assumed the "second line," with "first line" responsibilities being taken over by a younger generation headed by Premier Zhao Ziyang and Party General-Secretary Hu Yaobang. Many of the new leaders have specialized knowledge and administrative experience in their respective fields. Concomitantly, the Politburo and its Standing Committee have withdrawn from dealing with day-to-day policy making. Instead, the Party Secretariat and the "inner cabinet" of the State Council, working in cooperation, have become the key centers for policy making. Only the most important and perhaps controversial issues are referred to the highest echelons of the party.

Barnett's study shows that despite recent reforms, the Chinese foreign policy apparatus still appears to be relatively weak in several areas. Institutionalized coordination among the diplomatic-political, economic, and military organizations involved in foreign affairs—especially at the lower working levels—seems to be insufficient. In sharp contrast to the U.S., the defense establishment is poorly represented in the key bodies for making and formulating foreign policies. Also, despite recent trends toward greater specialization and professionalization, Peking still faces a shortage of expert personnel. This constraint affects the quality and quantity of information the Chinese leaders can draw on. Although policy-related research is being emphasized, there continues to be heavy reliance on "raw" or "unevaluated" data. *Reference Materials,* a compilation of news articles in foreign newspapers, appears to constitute the main source of current information about international developments for many Chinese officials. There is nothing comparable to the large U.S. intelligence community in China. The Ministry of State Security is relatively small, and seems to play a more indefinite role in the councils dealing with foreign affairs.

On the other hand, various mass organizations (e.g., the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries) and the news agencies (e.g., the New China News Agency) play a much more active and authoritative role in the foreign policy process than their American counterparts. People-to-people diplomacy has been a traditional part of Peking's foreign policy, and Peking's press representatives have sometimes served as de facto diplomats in areas where China has no formal ties. In addition, with the adoption of its "open door" policy, foreign economic issues have gained greater importance in Peking. The recently established (in 1982) Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade has consolidated in one organization functions (e.g., foreign trade, investment, aid) that are dispersed among many agencies in the U.S.

In summary, Barnett's study makes a very valuable contribution to our knowledge about the institutional context of Chinese foreign policy. It clarifies many questions that heretofore have been assigned to the policy-making "black box" in Peking. It should be read by all students of Chinese foreign policy, and by those interested in comparative foreign policy as well.

STEVE CHAN

University of Colorado
Boulder

Language Policy and National Unity. Edited by William R. Beer and James E. Jacob. (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985. Pp. x + 244. $34.50.)

This volume of essays contributes to the slowly growing body of literature called *the politics of language, politico-linguistics* or even *glottopolitics*. The editors have included essays from four continents. Mature and younger scholars write about the United States, Canada, Belgium, Finland, Spain, France, Algeria, Malaysia, China, India, and Bangladesh in order to provide empirical data on the rise of language issues and policy responses. The editors have written a careful introduction to make sense out of the data and a conclusion in order to build theory in this developing area of comparative politics.

Beer and Jacob's preference for unity over disunity is strong and practically unquestioned by the authors. They wish to understand how government can preserve unity in multilingual societies through policy when language becomes an issue. All the essayists agree with this assumption that big is better except for Jyotirindra Das Gupta, a pioneer in scholarship on the politics of language. Das Gupta challenges the notion of unity as a good per se by examining the case of Bangladesh and Assam. The unity of Pakistan meant domination, he believes, while independence for Bangladesh meant a step forward in human development. At odds with the assumptions of many political scientists, but compatible with the assumptions of many sociologists, he concludes, "There is nothing intrinsically destructive about language politics, including language demands which affirm autonomy" (pp. 213–14).

Equally provocative for other reasons is the chapter on the United States by Edward Sagarin and Robert J. Kelly, who insist that multilingualism is and will remain an important feature of the American polity. They do not believe the ethnic revival will ever end. They support the notion that America has no official language, which is a bit like saying that Great Britain has no constitution. It seems clear to me that precedent and practice make English the official language of these 50 states.

Milton Esman, veteran scholar in the analysis of ethnic and national movements, writes clearly about bilingual policies of the Canadian federal government. He believes provincial unilingualism is an inexorable trend, but recent court cases have established bilingualism in Quebec and Manitoba, or at least more of it than provincial authorities wished. The wealth of detail, the analysis, and the conclusion are useful for others interested in Canada. Although bilingual foreign policies at the federal level "have not insured the unity of Canada, that unity would have been at much greater risk without official bilingualism" (p. 54).

Matthias Hartig's short summary of issues in Belgium covers the main points well. Erik Allardt, well known in the U.S. for his studies of ethnicity, analyzes the place of Swedish in Finland and the policies designed to protect this minority. The focus of policy is the commune, where services must be provided in the language of the residents. A commune must provide services in both Swedish and Finnish if the minority equals at least 8% of the total, or 3,000 persons (p. 93). Attitudes of both groups support mutual respect, a more important contribution to unity than is policy, it seems.

James Rial's analysis of Spain naturally focuses on the Basques and the Catalans. James E. Jacob and David C. Gordon, who know the history of French language policy very well, provide many historical details about language policy, and conclude that the government is now willing to allow a greater place in schools for regional languages, because they have declined in importance and are no longer perceived as a threat to national unity. Gordon's separate essay on Algeria and Lebanon before 1975 points to the continuing importance of French outside Europe and the dilemma of Algeria in asserting its authentic Arab-Islamic culture while building a modern secular state that uses French.

Diane K. Mauzy explains how the Malay, fearful of being overwhelmed by the Chinese and Indians, use language policy to stamp Malaysia with their identity and to insure jobs for themselves. She concludes that the Malay language is now safe, but that ethnic divisions are a threat to peace and unity.

Pao-chien Tseng offers a discussion of linguistic complexity in China. Although Chinese speakers are 93.3% of the population and share a common written language, they speak 10 different dialects that are not mutually comprehensible. Since 1911 all Chinese governments have promoted the Beijing variety as the Common Spoken Language, or *Putong Hua*, and in 1960 the policy makers decided that beginning in the third grade students would use *Putong Hua*.

In his conclusion William Beer, building on his own previous work on ethnicity in France, contributes to a theory of linguistic mobilization. Why do language differences become a focus for group organizing and demands? Decline of the nation-state, "rapid development of previously backward regions" (p. 223), and a feel of "dislocation" and relative deprivation among educated elements are the principal factors, he writes. One might have wished for a conclusion about policy, but Beer's ideas are welcome. And so are the bibliographies at the end of each chapter.

The editors make clear that they wish their book to suggest studies by others. In what areas can political scientists appropriately work to enlarge an appreciation of the politics of language?—language planning as an example of the policy process and public administration; interest group behavior; political parties, which sometimes have been organized expressly to promote language demands; elite behavior, particularly literary elites; the effects of culture; and many other subjects. Some political scientists have already made important contributions in these areas, but more are needed. The Beer and Jacob volume is required reading for those who enter this fascinating area of scholarship.

BRIAN WEINSTEIN

Howard University

The Indian Foreign Policy Bureaucracy. By Jeffrey Benner. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985. replica ed. Pp. xiii + 305. $19.50, paper.)

India Under Pressure: Prospects for Political Stability. By Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984. replica ed. Pp. xiii + 214. $18.50, paper.)

In the last 10 years the study of Indian politics has shifted increasingly and usefully toward an analysis of India's political economy. Francine Frankel's *India's Political Economy*, Ron Herring's *Land to the Tiller*, Pranab Bardhan's, *The Political Economy of Development in India*, and the Desai, Rudolph, and Rudra volume, *Agrarian Power and Agricultural Productivity in South Asia* offer a sampling of the change in subject and approach. The two volumes under review here take us back to an earlier era when the focus was on the more strictly institutional: the organization of bureaucracy, the capacity for coalition building, party strategy, etc.

This more institutional approach has its strengths. It can provide a full description of political actors whose identities are too easily lost in more abstract treatments of economy, society, and "the state." However, the approach can also risk slippage into an excessively descriptive genre of analysis that treats governmental bodies as entities whose importance is not fully demonstrated.

Jeffrey Benner's description of the Indian foreign policy bureaucracy demonstrates both the advantages and problems of a largely institutional approach. As a predissertation publication, it shows remarkable skill. Benner has the stamina and capability to ferret out through extensive interview, documentary, and secondary analysis a clear and comprehensive portrayal of the organizational origins of Indian foreign policy. For scholars or diplomats who want a good, sound, but not pedantic description of both pre- and post-Independence foreign policy bureaucracies, this book is an important tool. Benner's description of the British-Indian bureaucracy—its structure, its responsibilities, the shifting locus of decision making—is brief but well-researched. The story is always engaging. Drawing on data collected elsewhere, Brenner reports, for instance, that the slow rate of Indianization meant that of 36 initial recruits to the future Indian Foreign Service at Independence, only 4 had international experience. His well-chosen comparisons with foreign policy establishments elsewhere are also revealing: in 1981, 2.5% of the American Foreign Service came from minority backgrounds. By contrast, 11.2% of the highest cadre of the Indian Foreign Service, Class I, came from Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe backgrounds. Benner's description of the service's procedural hierarchy, reform efforts, research and intelligence, and his occasional depiction of particular foreign ministers and secretaries provide an excellent close account of a bureaucracy about which little has been written.

The main weakness of this book is acknowledged explicitly by Benner in the preface. Although it began as an account of how bureaucracy shapes policy (and Benner promises a subsequent study that will deliver on the promise), the present study does not explore this causal linkage. It sets, instead, a good descriptive foundation for a subsequent study of the role bureaucracy may play in steering policy formation.

Hardgrave's analysis of past trends and prospects for political stability in India provides the best of the genre of well-elaborated "political risk analysis." The study, supported under contract by the U.S. Department of State, is balanced, informed, careful, and supremely economical in its presentation of the multiplicity of forces that bear on the continued stability of India's democratic institutions. Hardgrave looks at economic pressures, regionalism, communalism, ministerial instability, and foreign policy. Every important section of the political landscape is sketched. Although each political problem (the Punjab, for example) receives no more than a few pages of discussion, Hardgrave zeroes in on the critical, defining issues. For example, he argues that the Punjab is not a problem of religions in conflict, but is rather, primarily, a political matter whose outcome will depend heavily on the future political role of the regional party, the Akali Dal.

For anyone seeking a quick, expert guide to the history and future of particular political issues and events, this book is a fine reference tool. Complicated changes in class stratification are summarized, the unfailingly complex issues in Assam are outlined, and key developments in state politics are enumerated. The book's greatest strength lies in its superb "briefing" of the reader. It is not, however, the useful research tool it might have been, due to the absence of a bibliography and the existence of only the most limited footnotes (due no doubt to the required format of a State Department report). The reader who may want to follow up on Hardgrave's consistently interesting argumentation about particular issues will feel frustrated by the lack of guidance to references. Because, too, of its "briefing" format, the reader does not come away with a clear theoretical perspective on the determinants of political stability. The pieces are there but not the theoretical specification of how they fit into a whole.

Despite some of these limitations, both Hardgrave's and Benner's analyses offer rich and careful accounts of their chosen subjects. Both books demonstrate that much can be offered by a comprehensive account of the structure and operation of governmental institutions.

MARY FAINSOD KATZENSTEIN

Cornell University

Political Parties in Western Democracies. By Klaus von Beyme. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. Pp. 444. $39.95.)

As Beyme states at the outset, political parties are one of the central themes of political science; parties were one of the first concerns of our discipline, remain a common topic of research interest, and are relevant to nearly all other aspects of our field. His goal in this book is to survey these multiple aspects of parties in a broad comparative perspective. Such a book has been needed for several years as the older classics have aged.

Beyme's book is structured around the comparison of party types, grouped by their ideological tendance: Liberals, Radicals, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, Communists, etc. This is an innovative approach; it highlights the historical evolution of party forms, and emphasizes comparison of party groups rather than separate descriptions of national party systems. An early chapter defines these ideological groupings, and these types are then used effectively to frame the discussion in chapters on party organization and the structure of party systems.

Another chapter deals with electoral politics, and the changing bases of voters' electoral decisions. This material includes a discussion of the importance of social cleavages and the role of party attachments in guiding citizen behavior. To complete his survey, Beyme hurriedly covers several topics toward the end of the volume. A quick review of coalition formation literature introduces the topic, but does not progress much further. Similarly, a section on policy output is intended to determine whether parties do matter, but the presentation leaves the question unanswered.

Probably the most interesting chapter is Beyme's conclusion on the future of Western party systems. Running counter to the conventional wisdom, he argues that the present crisis of party legitimacy occurs because parties are expanding their roles and performing more functions in the modern welfare state. While Beyme's argument needs further development, it provides a thoughtful counter to standard predictions of party decline.

I think scholars and students will share one criticism of this work: it is simultaneously too broad and not broad enough. On the one hand, Beyme tries to cover almost the entire field of party research, which leaves too little time for many topics, especially when a large sample of Western European parties are included. On the other hand, in an attempt to avoid overgeneralizing, he often errs in the opposite direction. The presentation frequently focuses on the deviant cases while avoiding discussion of general tendencies. Competing causal theories are presented without an attempt to identify primary and secondary forces. This hesitancy to generalize is reflected in Beyme's frequent criticisms of empirical research, which is interestingly labeled "analytic" research in the book. This study could benefit from more analysis, empirical or otherwise.

This book was originally written as a West German text, and St. Martin's has done a good translation. However, the origins of the book might pose two minor problems for adoption in American university courses. First, the book presumes substantial prior knowledge of the political systems in Western Europe. It would be difficult, for example, for a student to abstract a good understanding of the British party system solely from the material presented here. Second, the literature citations often overlook major research publication in English, in preference for German-language alternatives.

This will not become a classic study of political parties. It was not Beyme's intent, and he studiously avoids the synthesis of party research that would make this a more theoretical volume. He cites Weber to justify the lack of theorizing given the present state of our knowledge! Instead, this is a rich descriptive study of what we do know about political parties. The tabular material, appendices on electoral results in two dozen democracies, reference materials, and Beyme's descriptions of this evidence makes this a basic reference for the comparative study of political parties.

RUSSELL J. DALTON

Florida State University

The Politics of Rapid Urbanization: Government and Growth in Modern Turkey. By Michael N. Danielson and Rusen Keles. (New York and London: Holmes and Meier, 1985. Pp. xviii + 286. $34.95, cloth; $19.50, paper.)

The conceptual framework of this study of urban growth and politics in Turkey is adapted from Danielson and Doig, *New York: The Politics of Urban Regional Development* (1982). From this perspective, governments are not regarded as mere handmaids to private economic interests, but are seen as capable of playing an independent role in channeling and influencing patterns of urban development. In fact, it is argued in both books that the role of government may vary along a continuum from a very passive stance, which merely ratifies decisions made in the private sector, to a highly active role in which government initiates development. It is also suggested that government agencies vary in terms of both areal and functional scope in their urban activities, and that their ability to concentrate resources, which varies from agency to agency, from case to case, and from country to country, can be a critical factor in urban development.

Danielson and Keles have concentrated their resources in this book almost exclusively on a descriptive account of the role of government in Turkish urban growth, with only minimal comparisons with other societies. This is unfortunate, for it is difficult to imagine two urban systems more different than those of New York and Turkey. Thus, if the patterns of governmental involvement in urban affairs are indeed similar, then comparison on the basis of "most different systems" ought to provide some useful insights. The absence of more explicit comparisons of this sort is the more lamentable in view of the fact that the coauthors are eminently qualified to carry off such an effort. Danielson undoubtedly needs no introduction to the American political science community. Keles is one of the most talented Turkish political scientists currently working on urban problems, and has gained considerable international recognition as well.

Danielson and Keles set themselves a twofold task. First, they seek to assess the effect of urbanization on government, with attention to such phenomena as government structures, finance, intergovernmental relations, bureaucracy, participation, parties, elected officials, interest groups, and public policy. Second, they are concerned with the impact of government on patterns of urbanization, involving such factors as migration, settlement patterns, distribution of jobs, housing, and the location of such facilities as transportation. They undertake this task by outlining first the context of rapid urbanization in Turkey during the recent past, then briefly sketching the major types of cities that exist in the country, and finally assessing the relationships between cities and central government on the one hand, and political interests on the other. With the stage thus set, they then examine the interrelationship between the forces of urbanization and the political system by looking in some detail at three policy areas: urban services, housing, and planning.

Danielson and Keles point out repeatedly that the Turkish political system is highly centralized. Thus, urban leaders are hamstrung. There is very little they are able to do without the agreement or authorization of central government ministries or agencies. They have few resources and less authority. On the other hand, central government agencies are not much better equipped to deal with the enormous problems of rapid urbanization. They, too, lack trained personnel and adequate financial resources. Moreover, they are plagued with overlapping jurisdictions and lack of coordination. In short, Turkish governmental structures involved with urban problems are characterized by centralization of authority and fragmentation of function. The result is that attempts to deal with the scourge of uncontrolled urban growth have been largely ineffective.

Perhaps the most dramatic—certainly the most visible—symbols of urbanism in Turkey, as in most Third World countries, are the mushrooming squatter settlements that ring every city of significant size. Danielson and Keles recount the numerous efforts of Turkish governments, especially nonelected regimes less subject to the pressures of democratic politics, to bring these ugly eyesores of modernism under control. All such attempts fell victim to the chronic ills of Turkish government and politics: inadequate resources, untrained personnel, complexity of government, and pressure from private interests, including, of course, corruption. Indeed, despite the claim set forth by their conceptual approach (that government makes a difference in urban development), a reading of this book leaves one wondering what difference government really does make.

The authors make a number of recommendations, some of which are all too familiar. They suggest that unless future governments are willing to allocate at least 5% of annual budgets for housing, they will be no more successful in bringing the hydra-headed urban monster to heel than were their predecessors. They urge the adoption of clearer planning objectives, and suggest that ways be found "to use the inherent advantages of a centralized political system to focus resources in ways that encourage local initiative, leadership, and adaptation" (p. 232). They argue for greater autonomy, resources, and authority for cities, so that they may more effectively assert control over rapacious private interests and imperious central government agencies.

In short, this book is a carefully phrased, well-documented account of the failure of yet another government to control urban growth and development. Unfortunately, the common theme which seems to link the Turkish urban experience to the American (less so, perhaps to the European) is the timeless question the journalistic wag has put in the mouths of the putative builders (past as well as contemporary) of another sprawling metropolis, Chicago: "Where's mine?"

FRANK TACHAU

University of Illinois
Chicago

Introduction to British Politics: Analysing a Capitalist Democracy. By John Dearlove and Peter Saunders. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984; New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985. Pp. 458. $45.00, cloth; $14.95, paper.)

State and Society in Contemporary Britain: A Critical Introduction. Edited by Gregor McLennan, David Held, and Stuart Hall. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984; New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985. Pp. ix + 384. $34.95, cloth; $9.95, paper.)

The word *introduction* appears in the title of both of these books, and both are intended to be texts—McLennan et al. is an outgrowth of an Open University course in Britain. Good luck to anyone trying to use either for instructional purposes in the United States. Dearlove and Saunders do include such topics as parties, interest groups, and the judiciary—subjects almost totally absent from McLennan et al.—but their coverage hardly is comprehensive. These are not texts, but interpretations of British politics and society.

Both books share an almost Germanic obsession with "the state" and seek to reveal how oppressive British society is. Typical of their idiosyncrasies is Dearlove and Saunders' discussion of the civil service and the judiciary under the melodramatic title "The Power of the Secret State." Although both books are infused with Marxism, they are better described as left-wing radical. Dearlove and Saunders grant that "to be a good political scientist you must be keenly aware of the marxist tradition, and to be a good Marxist you must know 'bourgeois' social science" (p. 6). Know it, yes, but the actual use of it in these books too often is more a matter of scholarly trappings than a method of obtaining knowledge.

Dearlove and Saunders present alternative perspectives that have been offered to explain British politics, assess their logical consistency, and ascertain the extent to which they fit the facts. Somewhat similarly, McLennan et al.'s collection of 10 original essays is intended "to connect a review of relevant empirical material to central theoretical questions about the state and thus to the main traditions of political theory" (p. 2).

The alternative approaches frequently are strawmen, and much of the discussion is fairly predictable. Hall's chapter in McLennan et al. defines representation as "all the ways in which classes or other social forces in society win power in or influence over the state, so as to make it conform more closely to their interests" (p. 7). He concedes that as the franchise was expanded "the popular forces *did* get wider representation in the state: but at the price of remaining a subordinate, rather than the leading or hegemonic element" (p. 44). While the book is not riddled with jargon, the approved phraseology is fairly pervasive.

The heart of Dearlove and Saunders is a discussion of class, gender, and racial inequalities in Britain designed to show that the elite enjoys "the exclusive right to use, control, dispose of and benefit from crucial resources" (p. 181). Much of the evidence in this chapter actually supports the concept of pluralism. "Power, it seems, *is* to some extent, dispersed, fragmented and cross-cutting" (p. 205). But Dearlove and Saunders can't accept this, and press on to show that "systems of domination" do prevail. Eventually they concede that this concept is virtually incapable of empirical investigation. So after nearly 50 pages they conclude that "the sociological analysis of power will always involve controversial and personal judgements about what power is and how it is to be analysed" (p. 217). This hardly is a profound or useful insight; but it all has been worthwhile because "the cosy world of traditional political science" has been left "a long way back."

Four essays in McLennan et al. trace the growth of state intervention in economic affairs in Britain from the 1880s to the present. They conclude that Britain continues to be a capitalistic system—hardly a surprise. Three other essays consider the state's role in provision of health care, family life, and the organization of science. Another explains how public opinion was manipulated during the interwar period through control of the BBC. McLennan's contribution seems to promise a bit more, since it focuses on parties and the decline of class voting, but his comments prove to be superficial, and he ignores much of the relevant literature.

The final chapter by held, although excessively long, does provocatively challenge the standard view of Britain as a system with high legitimacy derived from consensus on basic values. In contrast to Dearlove and Saunders, who see legitimation as "the direct or indirect control over people's ways of thinking and acting other than through the use of physical force" (p. 338), Held recognizes that "legitimacy implies that people follow rules and laws because they *think* them right, correct, justified—worthy" (p. 302). Dearlove and Saunders maintain that the "soft" means of manipulating legitimacy—such as the Church, the press, and the educational system—can be effective only temporarily. Held argues that the British system long has rested more on instrumental or conditional acceptance than one true legitimacy. The basic goal of Thatcherism has been to reduce peoples' expectations of receiving benefits from the government and to use symbolic gratification—pride in being British for its own sake—to generate legitimacy. Since the success of this strategy is uncertain, Held, like Dearlove and Saunders, sees a strengthening of the more coercive means of obtaining compliance in order to protect capitalism.

The fundamental problem with these books is that their writers seem ignorant of Macridis's generation-old distinction between grand and middle-range theory. Dearlove and Saunders justify their approach by asserting that "a political theory which focuses on 'politics' alone will always be limited in its analytical capacity and trapped within the system it needs to explore" (p. 434). On the contrary, grand theory of the type infusing these books is inherently abstract and incapable of validation. Only use of Macridis's more limited middle-range theory offers hope of generating reliable knowledge. Failing to understand that, these books provide little more than a point of view.

What is most interesting about them is what they reveal about the condition of both British politics and undergraduate instruction. Traditionally the Labour party sought equality of status and protection for the working class. Now Labour is increasingly dominated by middle-class intellectuals seeking to transform Britain. If this movement has an archetypical figure, it is the sociology lecturer at one of the polytechnics. Three of the five authors and editors of these books are in departments of sociology. While none is poly faculty, Dearlove and Saunders are from one of the newer universities, Sussex, whose reputation for left-wing enthusiasms even exceeds that of many polys. And McLennan, Held, and Hall, plus four of the other contributors to their volume, are associated with the Open University, which often is seen as sharing the orientation of the polys. If one is interested in such a perspective, these two books are as good a place as any to get it. Despite the pervasive commitment to a particular ideological framework, there are elements of scholarship as well.

JORGEN RASMUSSEN

Iowa State University

Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World. By R. Hrair Dekmejian. (Syracuse University Press, 1985. Pp. xi + 249. $26.00, cloth; $12.95, paper.)

The Islamic resurgence has been a visible part of global affairs for a number of years. It is now possible to go beyond tentative speculations about the resurgence and base interpretations on a growing body of detailed studies and primary source material. R. Hrair Dekmejian's study of fundamentalism in the Arab world is an important contribution to this "new generation" of analyses of the current Islamic situation.

In this book, Dekmejian's basic interpretation of the Islamic revival remains the same as it was in his 1980 article on this subject (*Middle East Journal* 34(1980): 1–12): the resurgence is a product of a multifaceted crisis situation in the Islamic world. In general terms, "Islamic fundamentalism is perceived as a cyclical phenomenon which occurs as a response to acute and pervasive social crisis" (p. 6).

Dekmejian, however, goes beyond the confines of his original interpretation in a number of ways. More attention is given to the historical roots of Islamic fundamentalism, and greater emphasis is placed on motivations that are more than sociopolitical or economic in origin. He concludes that "the Western and Marxist practice of approaching the fundamentalist phenomenon from a socioeconomic perspective can provide at best partial answers" (p. 178). The dimensions of spiritual crisis and moral authority are recognized as important.

Islam in Revolution begins with five chapters of general analysis. The cyclical pattern of the rise and fall of fundamentalist sentiments throughout Islamic history, parallel to periodic social crises, is described. Then a broad portrait of contemporary Islamic fundamentalism in the Arab world is painted. In this, reasons for the appeal of fundamentalism, the major groups involved in revivalist movements, the ideological content of those movements, and taxonomy of fundamentalist organizations are all clearly presented, often in schematic and list form. This latter aspect reflects both a strength and a weakness of this presentation. These lists and charts are very helpful as summaries, but they can give the unwary reader a sense of comprehensiveness and concreteness that is unwarranted.

The second part of the book presents case studies of Islamic resurgence in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab/Persian Gulf area. Dekmejian utilizes recent specialized studies of Islamic developments in these areas. However, he goes beyond these in presenting descriptions of the ideologies and programs of movements whose writings are not easily accessible. For example, for the group that killed Sadat, and the ideas of Juhayman al-Utaybi, who was a key leader in the movement which took over the Great Mosque in Mecca in 1979.

Part 3 of the book is a discussion of "consequences and prospects" for Islamic fundamentalism. In this, Dekmejian considers the implications of the Islamic resurgence for United States policy. In his view, what can be expected is "the persistence of protracted conflict between U.S. interests and Islamist objectives. Indeed, theoretically there can be no ground for mutual accommodation" (p. 173). However, he suggests that a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and significant progress in social reforms could lessen the tension by "amelioration of the crisis milieu" (p. 174) within which fundamentalism thrives.

The book closes with three helpful appendices. The first is a table providing information about the 91 Islamist organizations on which the study was based. Appendix 2 is an extended glossary of Islamic terms, and appendix 3 is a statistical analysis of the Islamist groups, presenting a general profile of the category, based on the 91 groups studied.

Dekmejian's conceptual framework is clearly laid out for the reader. Because of this, it is surprising that Dekmejian has chosen as a basic unit for analysis a concept that does not seem to be appropriate for his data. He has rather artificially confined his discussion to "the Arab world" in this book, in contrast to his 1980 article, in which he also gives some attention to the important Islamic experiences in Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan.

The underlying analysis for the book depends significantly upon the Iranian case. Dekmejian's discussions of Iraq and the Gulf clearly show that it is not possible to exclude Iran from consideration. The Iranian experience is an important part of each of the case studies. It might have been better to have included Iran in the basic unit of analysis, since it plays such an important role in Dekmejian's presentation. One wonders, for example, if the statistical profile presented in appendix 3, on which important aspects of the study are based, would be altered by the inclusion of Iranian data.

Dekmejian's book is a sophisticated handbook for the political analyst who needs a good summary picture of Islamic fundamentalism in the Arab world. However, it is more than that. It has a breadth of analysis that should be helpful to specialists in modern Middle Eastern and Islamic studies as well.

JOHN O. VOLL

University of New Hampshire

The Rise and Fall of Chilean Christian Democracy. By Michael Fleet. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. Pp. 264. $35.00, cloth; $14.50, paper.)

Michael Fleet's study of the Chilean Christian Democratic Party helps fill a noticeable void in the literature on Chilean politics and society. The PDC has played an undeniably central role in the Chilean political arena for the past several decades; yet there are few studies that offer a careful examination of the party's historical political fortunes. Fleet sets his analysis apart from Marxist interpretations of the role of the PDC (especially since 1970) that characterize the party as a mere tool of the bourgeoisie. In addition, he critiques pluralist analyses that stress primarily ideological/institutional considerations to the exclusion of class analysis. Rather, Fleet asserts that a "modified class analysis" that highlights the "interdependence of class, cultural, ideological, and political factors" (p. 42) can best explain the rise and fall of Christian Democracy in the Chilean context. In chapters 2 through 5 Fleet examines the actions of the PDC during the pre-1964 period, the 1964-70 Frei government, the 1970-73 Allende government, and the 1973-83 period under military dictatorship. Drawing on his analysis of the Chilean case, Fleet's final chapter highlights certain common characteristics of Christian Democracy in Latin America and Europe.

This study has several significant strengths. The author's use of Eduardo Hamuy's survey data lends weight to his critique of crude Marxist or pluralist interpretations of the PDC's role in the breakdown of democracy in Chile and the institutionalization of a military dictatorship. Fleet shows that elite decision making has reflected the profound internal contradictions between the class and ideological cleavages evident in the party since its early days as the Falange Nacional. His multidimensional analysis makes an important contribution to our understanding not only of the rise and fall of the PDC, but also the dynamics of the Chilean political arena over the past several decades.

Fleet's analysis, however, ignores several critical actors that have influenced the fortunes of the PDC—most noticeably, the Catholic Church. Until 1958, the majority of ostensibly "nonpolitical" Church elites continued to legitimate the Conservative Party's claim to be the exclusive representative of the Catholic vote in Chile. The hierarchy's dramatic change of alliance to the PDC between 1958 and 1964 evidenced by the open recruitment for Frei in Catholic labor organizations was a critical factor in the rapid increase in party followers. In fact, Fleet's exclusion of the Church from his analysis is a serious omission throughout his study, especially with regard to the Church's central role in base-level mobilization under the Pinochet regime. Particularly since Frei's death, many within the hierarchy have taken a far more critical stance toward the party leadership. Fleet, with his emphasis on class and ideological cleavages, does not address the impact that the changing relationship with the Church has had on party recruitment on legitimation.

On the other hand, Fleet's emphasis on examining the PDC in terms of the broader Chilean context de-emphasizes several important developments within the party. The author fails to offer new insights concerning the changes in internal party alignments that were critical in the party's historic shifts from support to opposition, both to the Allende government and to the military regime. This study could have benefitted from a closer analysis of the internal party debates, congresses and elections that resulted in significant shifts in PDC strategy in the past two decades. The chapter on the post-1973 period also leaves the reader with nagging questions about the effects of the authoritarian experience on internal party structures and alignments. How has repression affected the party leadership and their strategies for institutional maintenance? How has the opposition to Pinochet affected doctrinal disputes within the party? What is the nature of the PDC's relationship with the newly emerging organizations at the base?

In spite of these problems, Fleet succeeds in his purpose of offering a more subtle and balanced account of the historic role of the PDC in Chile. This study is a welcome addition to the literature, in that it helps refine the historical debates concerning the PDC's contribution to the breakdown of Chilean democracy and the surprising staying power of the Pinochet regime.

HANNAH W. STEWART

Duke University

1986 Book Reviews: Comparative Politics

Comparative Resource Allocation: Politics, Performance and Policy Priorities. Edited by Alexander J. Growth and Larry L. Wade. (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1984. Pp. 247. $28.00, cloth; $14.00, paper.)

The Welfare State and Its Aftermath. Edited by S. N. Eisenstadt and Ora Ahimer. (Totawa, NJ: Barnes and Noble, 1985. Pp. x + 329. $27.50.)

Reviewing an edited book is invariably difficult; reviewing two is all the more difficult. The two books to be discussed here contain a total of 32 articles, with at least as many purposes and themes, and it is virtually impossible to develop a common basis for description and evaluation. Unfortunately, neither set of editors appears to have undertaken such an integrative effort for their single volume.

Comparative Resource Allocation, as the name implies, purports to be a collection of studies about the allocation of resources between the public and the private sector, and secondly among programs within the public sector. Unfortunately, the majority of the essays contained in the volume are not comparative (Rose and Karran, Rothchild, and Montgomery stand out as contrary examples here) and the editors have done little or nothing to attempt to provide a comparative framework that could attempt to integrate the diverse topics and approaches of the authors of the individual essays. The essays cover countries ranging from western industrialized countries through the Soviet Union to Third World countries. The editors' introductory essay, rather than providing a means of integrating the allocational issues raised in the individual articles or a framework to which the authors might have reacted, attempts to demonstrate that regimes can be classified by their pattern of resource allocation. The variables selected to predict the location of the 91 countries appear somewhat unusual as ways of assessing the role of the public sector (Why passenger kilometers per capita, or industrial employment per 1000 population?), and the approach seems to conflate those variables with the more political characteristics of regimes inherent in concepts such as polyarchy. At the other end of a quantification spectrum, several of the essays were almost totally descriptive. The remaining essays (especially Rose and Karran, Rothchild, and Most) showed some attention to descriptive detail, but also with some interest in addressing important political questions, and are useful individual efforts that have not been brought together into a real book.

The Welfare State and Its Aftermath is a more (though far from totally) integrated set of essays all having something to do with the welfare state in industrialized political systems, and the problems that currently appear to beset these political and economic arrangements. While the title of the book, as well as the first essay, tends to beg the question about the waning viability of these arrangements, the book does address an important question, and generally does so in an informed and interesting manner. One must comment, however, on the extreme unevenness of the essays in length and scholarly content. It is certainly interesting to have the comments of practicing politicians directly involved with making policy for the welfare state, but an "article" of two pages with a few tables of data appears to add little to our understanding of the complex issues involved. The book is the product of a seminar, and it would appear that at least some of the essays went directly from the tape recorder to print.

There are, however, several other things that commend this book. One is the large number of data tables presenting interesting and useful information. Too often publishers refuse to print such copious amounts of data. A second point to be commended is the emphasis on the normative and intellectual elements of the "crisis" in welfare states, as well as on the economic problems of financing growing expenditures. Financing the welfare state is easy—it only requires money. The more difficult task appears to be to understand the intellectual and moral basis of the system and the attacks on those values. In regard to the last comment, it is interesting to note the extent to which commentators of all ideological stripes represented in the book have at least some doubts about the moral basis of the claims of the welfare state on the money and interests of citizens.

Another important positive point of the *Welfare State* is its analysis of programs and prospects in politics systems, which are not usually given much space when the welfare state is the topic of discussion. There are interesting discussions of Japan and Switzerland, as well as a briefer discussion of Austria. These are in addition to an excellent discussion of more commonly analyzed Scandinavian countries, and several interesting discussions of the Anglo-American systems. There is also an extended set of articles about welfare state programs in Israel that demonstrates the difficulties of attempting to be a welfare state and a warfare state simultaneously.

Perhaps the most interesting point in this volume is the importance of the public bureaucracy and public employment in the welfare state. Martin Rein discusses this as a dependent variable and points to the importance of the employment generated—directly or indirectly—by welfare state programs and the special role of those programs in providing employment opportunities for women. Several articles point to the negative reactions generated in clients by the "bureaucracy" surrounding welfare state programs. However, Johansen and Kolberg point to the importance of government employees in maintaining the welfare state in the face of attacks. While some or all of that defense is obviously self-protection rationalized in the interest of the client, it may have the effect of preserving benefits for the very clients who complain of being mistreated by public employees.

Both these books address important topics, and each contains interesting and informative essays. What both lack is greater integration and a common framework for analysis.

B. GUY PETERS

University of Pittsburgh

Ethnic Groups in Conflict. By Donald L. Horowitz. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. Pp. xiv + 607. $25.00.)

It is only underscoring the obvious to note that the early optimistic expectations of both scholars and politicians that ethnic differences would dramatically dcline in the face of national homogenization or class consciousness were at least premature. Rather, the world has experienced a wide range of ethnic conflicts which have frequently resulted in violent confrontations. As the author asserts, "A bloody phenomenon cannot be explained by a bloodless theory" (p. 140). While Professor Horowitz does not quite provide us with an overarching theory to explain ethnic conflict, he does give us a very rich volume in terms of scholarship and analysis. The questions he seeks to answer and the conceptual frameworks he provides are stimulating and reinforced by extensive research. While the specialist on particular areas may quibble with specific interpretations of the facts or differ with regard to some of the author's assumptions, they are presented with care and a realization of the complexity of his subject matter.

The units of analysis are relatively large ethnic groups from severely divided societies in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean that are separated by vertical cleavage and defined by ascriptive differences. The first section seeks to define the meaning of ethnicity and the scope of the problem, assessing the wide range of strife and convulsions attendent thereto, in addition to the causes and characteristics of ethnic conflicts. His analysis is comprehensive in its review of possible factors responsible for the multifaceted nature of the problem, and posits a series of interesting hypotheses and conclusions. For example, he finds ethnicity is frequently more compelling than class, and not merely a mask for social class conflict; questions assessments of modernization as an explanation for severe ethnic conflict; and argues that the theory of group entitlement can be a strong forecasting tool.

The second major section of the volume analyzes the relationship of ethnicity to party systems, emphasizing the importance of ethnic parties and showing under which conditions different patterns emerge. These party systems are composed of (1) ethnic parties, (2) ethnic parties and coalitions of ethnic parties, (3) ethnic parties and multi-ethnic parties, and (4) multi-ethnic single parties. The author provides lengthy case studies to exemplify his categories, including Guyana and Trinidad, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Uganda, and Malaysia, as well as shorter examples primarily from Afro-Asia.

The third sections covers an area about which Professor Horowitz has already written extensively, the military. As he points out, the military is both a source and object of ethnic conflict, and "ethnic coupmaking" can have profound effects upon the composition of both military regimes and the armed forces themselves. Here he begins to turn to ways of ameliorating ethnic conflict, in this case considering strategies to prevent ethnically oriented coups.

These include homogenizing the armed forces, balancing within the officer corps or balancing by creating new units, employing foreign forces, and kinship control.

The final major part is in instructive analysis of possible means of reducing ethnic conflict in the modern nation state. The author critically examines the employment of European models such as consociational democracy, finding little relevant for the Third World. He also gives relatively short shrift to such solutions as comprehensive agreements, partition, and international integration. Treated more seriously and extensively are federalism and devolution, electoral systems (although there are few Afro-Asian states where competitive voting is very meaningful), and preferential policies. In each case these possibilities are examined with caution, giving proper consideration to possible costs and benefits. Professor Horowitz terms the problem of ethnic conflict intractable, but not absolutely so. Even that assessment may be overly optimistic, however, as evidenced by the author's own analysis.

This is an important and comprehensive contribution to our understanding of ethnically based conflict. The wide range of emphasis, particularly those made in passing, may confuse the uninitiated, and the book could use either a bibliography or an index of authors. However, these are minor criticisms of a work that is stimulating, well researched—the extensive footnotes are worth reading in themselves—and thoughtful.

FRED R. VON DER MEHDEN

Rice University

Government and Politics in Islam. By Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael (New York: St. Martin's Pres, 1985. Pp. vii + 177. $27.50.)

The title of this book is bound to be misleading. It will disappoint those readers expecting to find an overview of Islamic political institutions or analyses of the contribution of Islamic ideas to contempory government. One finds nothing resembling a comparative study of legal systems, the adaption of representative structures, or Islamic prescriptions for modern social and economic problems. The book is not in fact concerned with all Islamic states, but only with the Arab countries—most notably Egypt—and with Iran. A more accurate title would have been "A Brief Examination of Popular Islamic Thought and Political Activism in Selected Cases." Viewed in these terms, the volume provides an often useful survey of what Islamic political theorists have written through the centuries on such themes as political succession, legitimacy, and accountability. The study also examines the reformist tradition in Islam: essentially what several major thinkers have said about such topics as modernization, westernization, and socialism.

Description of the Islamic Brotherhood and other militant fundamentalist groups in Egypt comprise much of the second half of the book. The Iranian case is also explored in synopses of the ideas on government of Ayatollah Khomeini, Ali Shariati, who sought to fuse Islamic principles with socialism, and former president Bani-Sadr. A final chapter offers capsule accounts of the current status of Islamic activism in a number of Arab countries. Official regime responses to the challenges presented are, however, of far less interest to the authors, and no attention is given to the defensive reactions of establishment *ulema*. The present Egyptian government's policies in coping with religious militants are ignored, as is the control of the Shi'ite opposition in Iraq. Also curiously absent are any mention of the Islamization program of Pakistan's Zia ul-Haq and stranger still, attention to the ideas of Abdul Aala Madoodi, which have contributed significantly to activist thought in the Arab world as well as in Pakistan.

If Ismael and Ismael eschew writing a more comprehensive text, they have nonetheless opted for a textbooklike approach in another sense: they venture few independent judgments. Theorists are sometimes compared, but only rarely are their ideas dealt with critically or their impact assessed. In the same vein, a thin treatment of contemporary international Islamic organizations in the final chapter concludes without a word about their effectiveness or role in Islamic revitalization. The authors append newspaper interviews with three Arab heads of state and an address by Anwar Sadat that are intended to illustrate religious symbolism at work. Yet with these materials analytically detached from earlier discussions, they seem to be mostly filler. Ismael and Ismael have succeeded in describing accurately the intellectual foundations of Islamic political activism, and have highlighted the activities of some important militant groups. Yet even within their limited conception of the task, the book is incomplete and unprovocative.

MARVIN G. WEINBAUM

University of Illinois

Portugal's Political Development: A Comparative Approach. Walter C. Opello, Jr. (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1985. Pp. xii + 235. $21.00.)

It is unfortunate when younger scholars feel they must "make it" in the profession over the backs of their predecessors by misrepresenting and "straw-manning" their positions, presumably thereby making it easier to knock them over or blow them away.

In this book the author refers to a particular group of scholars as "corporatists," as though that represented their own political and personal preferences. This is false and misleading. Quite a number of scholars in the profession have used a *corporatist approach* without being themselves, corporatists; in fact, most of us who have written on these themes have been in our own writings quite critical of various corporatist regimes. Such guilt by association cannot be allowed to stand.

The author is also strongly critical of what he calls "culturalist" interpretations. It is never made clear what precisely, he means by that, but again there is a lot of misrepresentation and straw-manning. No serious scholar in recent times has sought to elevate political culture to the status of a single and all-inclusive explanation. Rather, those who analyze the political culture variable tend to see it as complementary to other variables. At times political culture may itself shape or even cause certain structural outcomes; at other times it is determined by them. Such causative webs tend to be complex, and their interrelations may vary over time and circumstances. They are not usually the simplistic schemes the author of this book suggests.

Curiously, despite this earlier criticism, the author himself concludes by emphasizing the importance of cultural variables. He talks at length about the creation of an "official culture" in Portguese history—precisely what earlier scholars emphasized. His research findings emphasize strongly the continuity of Portuguese political culture despite the upheavals and structural changes occasioned by the Portuguese Revolution of 1974. His concluding position, after repeatedly waxing both negative and positive ont he subject, seems remarkably akin to the more complex statement of multicausality of Gabriel Almond, Sidney Vera, and other scholars who have written in sophisticated ways about political culture.

Actually, once all this methodological and ideological baggage and heavy posturing are stripped away, this is an interesting and quite good book. It seeks to examine Portuguese political development in the broader and comparative context of Western Europe. It uses an appraoch borrowed from *Crises and Sequences in Political Development*, by Leonard Binder et al., and does so provocatively and imaginatively. The author says that his purpose is to contribute to the "maintenance and betterment of democratic government itself" (p. 3)—a laudable goal, but one that sometimes biases his approach and leads to his neglecting some not-very-democratic features of Portuguese political life.

This life nonetheless goes on to make a significant contribution. The author usefully surveys 10 centuries of Portuguese history and provides a quite sophisticated analysis of contemporary Portuguese politics. The book contains an excellent analysis of the Portuguese administrative state system, which is imaginatively combined with a survey of the administrative elite. It provides interesting data on local government structures and institutions.

In his conclusion Professor Opello suggests both how little the Portuguese administrative-state machinery has changed since the Revolution and, concomitantly, how weak are the Portuguese attachments to their new liberal and democratic institutions. In his stress on the persistence of administrative structures and an elite-dominated, top-down decision-making process, the author repeatedly points to the elements of continuity prevailing both before and after the Revolution. These are valuable research findings, but they are precisely those of the earlier authors whom Opello criticizes. Hence, while this is a useful study of a country to which political scientists have paid insufficient attention, it is marred by the animus and misrepresentations with which its author began.

HOWARD J. WIARDA

University of Massachusetts and
American Enterprise Institute

The New Mediterranean Democracies: Regime Transition in Spain, Greece and Portugal. Edited by Geoffrey Pridham. (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1984. Pp. viii + 193. $29.50.)

Successful transitions from an authoritarian political system to a liberal democracy require the prudent hurdling of numerous obstacles. While potential barriers are often specific to the country in question, comparative analysis helps to cull behavioral patterns characteristic of these transitions. This collection of essays, which originally appeared as a special issue of *West European Politics* (vol. 7, no. 2, 1984), considers three European cases that almost simultaneously experienced a democratic transition. It gives specifics on each case, and presents comparative insight into the processes of this type of political change.

The volume contains an introductory essay by Pridham and three sections of three essays each. Part 1's historical chapters describe Spain's, Greece's and Portugal's political antecedents and their paths to democratic rule. Part 2 focuses on these three countries' party systems, the changes they have undergone in response to their often volatile context, and the role different parties played in the reforms. Part 3 is the book's strongest analytical section. It comparatively considers selected topics pertinent to the transitions, such as socialism, the international context, and government performance.

The comparative perspective offered by Pridham's introductory chapter and the essays in part 3 by Salvador Giner, Alfred Tovias, and Guiseppe Di Palma make this book a strong improvement over similar works on Southern Europe—e.g., Bete Kohler's *Political Forces in Spain, Greece and Portugal* (London: Butterworth, 1982). Pridham's introduction sets the tone with an excellent discussion of a model, inspired by Dankwart Rustow, that questions theories of democratic transitions. This essay also frames later discussion of the three cases in a strong analytical context of broader questions of political change, the art of comparison in political analysis, and models of political systems. Giner's chapter in part 3 on socialism in Southern Europe, with its struggles, adaptations, and differences in these countries, adds to the strong comparative orientation of *The New Mediterranean Democracies*. The same applies to Tovias's comparative discussion of international influences on these transitions such as economic difficulties, the EEC, and NATO, and to Di Palma's essay, which, like Pridham's, seeks a theoretical perspective though which to evaluate these and other cases. Di Palma analyzes the likage between government performance and political legitimacy.

The case study chapters cover less original ground. In part 1, Kenneth Medhurst presents a concise overview of the major events and forces in Spain's nascent democracy, referring with varying emphasis to the parties, the Church, the monarchy, the military, and Spain's regional diversity. He emphasizes the flexibility of Spain's 1978 constitution as a framework within which difficult decisions could be resolved or temporarily postponed. P. Nikiforos Diamandouros's chapter, on the other hand, is not as optimistic. With more convoluted prose, Diamandouros emphasized Karamanlis's role in the Greek transition, the political *carte blanche* handed to Karamanlis after the discrediting of Greece's authoritarian rulers following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, and the importance of Karamanlis's and Papandreou's charismatic and politically dominant personality. While more analytically interpretive than historically descriptive, Diamandouros's belief that the new Greek system is more presidential than parliamentary does not seem to be confirmed by Prime Minister Papandreou's recent successful showdown with President Karamanlis. Such questioning contrasts with Thomas C. Brumeau's insightful description of Portugal as a semipresidential system, closer to the French Fifth Republic than the Westminister model of parliamentary democracy. Brumeau cautiously yet optimistically suggests that despite widespread participation, Portugal's democratic system has not fully developed its structural arrangements.

In part 2, Mario Caciagli, Christos Lyrintzis, and J. R. Lewis and A. M. Williams discuss the party systems of Spain, Greece, and Portugal, respectively. Utilizing Sartori's model, Caciagli emphasizes the late start of the Spanish parties during the transition and their relative lack of historical continuity. He suggests that the parties' policy convergence and ambiguity makes them consistent with West European party systems. Such behavior, however, has come at the price of little support for the parties themselves, and led internal crises in several parties. Lyrintzis, in comparison, believes the Greek party system is a "combination of new elements and old practices" (p. 116). He questions whether Greece's transition has taken it beyond clientalism to the politics of mass parties. He suggests other factors, such as Greek foreign dependence, class cleavages, and growth in the state bureaucracy, have also influenced Greek party behavior. Lyrintzis adds that the Socialists' newness has prevented the structural permanence of a European mass party, that the communists are prisoners of an "ideological ghetto," and that the rightist New Democracy failed to develop a mass party structure because, prior to its 1981 defeat, it relied on "bureaucratic clientalism." Lewis and Williams, for their part, argue that the Portuguese political parties are socially and territorially based: conservative in the rural north and leftist in the south, with its urban centers and large rural landholdings. They suggest that, as in Greece, personality plays a strong role in Portuguese party politics. Coalitions among parties, given changing relationships between themselves and the Portuguese presidency, however, are the most important developments to watch.

This book's 10 chapters are well integrated. Pridham has done a commendable job of avoiding many failures of essay collections. Both the sections on specific cases—while under topical umbrellas of historical processes and party systems—and the broader comparative analysis of his own introduction and the third section's three essays are well chosen. Some inevitable uneveness in prose nevertheless appears, and several chapters repetitively analyze certain events. These weaknesses, however, do not seriously tarnish the otherwise excellent writing, compiling, and editing that went into this book.

In sum, *The New Mediterranean Democracies* is an important contribution to our substantive understanding of the recent transitions to democracy in Southern Europe. It will be useful to both scholars and advanced students interested in contemporary Spain, Greece, and Portugal, and to area specialists of Southern and Western European politics, especially since Europe's southern nations are increasingly standing shoulder-to-shoulder in international affairs with their northern counterparts. This book also adds to the growing comparative literature on transitions to democracy as a particular type of political development—a concern equally important beyond the Mediterranean.

THOMAS D. LANCASTER

Emory University

Decentralization: The Territorial Dimension of the State. By Brian C. Smith. (Winchester, MA: Allen & Unwin, Inc., 1985. Pp. 227. $25.00, cloth; $12.00, paper.)

Brian Smith's topic has been labeled "one of the great, resonant themes of contemporary politics" by Nelson Polsby. Throughout the developed and developing world, decentralists argue for deliberate efforts to counteract the centralizing tendencies in modern political systems, tendencies that undermine political democracy and impede economic development. Many isolated case studies of decentralist policies exist— for example, in collections edited by L. J. Sharpe (*Decentralist Trends in Western Democracies;* Sage, 1979) and Peter Merkl (*New Local Centers in Centralized States;* University Press of America, 1985)— but there is little comparative theory.

This book's jacket promises "the first book to provide an analytical framework for the comparative study of decentralization." What Smith offers instead is a catalogue of most of the observations about, and rationales for, decentralization existing in the literature on intergovernmental relations. He defines decentralization as the "delegation of power to lower levels in a territorial hierarchy" (p. 1), and concentrates therefore on the institutional relationships between higher and lower levels of government.

A well-published authority on this topic, Smith displays an encyclopedic knowledge of the literature and assembles a bibliography that is surely one of the most comprehensive of its kind. At some points in the text he demonstrates impressive skill in summarizing large bodies of material, as in his chapter on "Financing Decentralized Government," which contains an excellent survey of recent trends in local government taxing and spending in Western Europe. Another strong section is the early chapter on "Decentralization in Theory," in which Smith surveys the theoretical views on political decentralization held by three ideological schools: liberal demographic theorists, public choice economists, and Marxists. He criticizes the "romantic idealization" of decentralization in liberal democratic theory, and also finds public choice theory inadequate as a defense of decentralization. Surprisingly, he takes a completely uncritical stance toward Marxist interpretations of intergovernmental relations, never openly acknowledging the Marxists' central dilemma: that although they decry centralized political power as the handmaiden of monopoly capital, they are nevertheless suspicious that attempts to decentralize power may produce conservative outcomes, because economic elites often dominate lower-level units of government and because governmental fragmentation inhibits the redistribution of resources.

Despite Smith's wide-ranging knowledge of the subject, the book suffers from the common affliction of such surveys—it offers little more than a hurried and uncritical run through a vast literature. Indeed, many of the chapters read like annotated lists: of the forces compelling decentralization in the modern state (chapter 3); of the criteria commonly used to draw subnational boundaries (chapter 4); of the factors contributing to centralist trends in modern states and the indicators commonly used to measure degrees of decentralization in governmental systems (chapter 5); of the types of local government institutions used in different systems (chapter 7); of the reasons why central administrative bodies set up field offices and the types of field administration commonly used (chapter 8); and so forth.

Fundamentally, this book is an exercise in classification; Smith's primary contribution lies in devising the categories and sorting the information. Once sorted, however, the information is not used to draw conclusions, to construct hypotheses, or even to speculate about relationships between categories. In fact, Smith explicitly disavows any theoretical ambitions in his preface.

Smith's determination not to take a theoretical stance prevents him from fulfilling the tantalizing promise that appears early in the book. From the preface onward, Smith reiterates his conviction that a nation's choice of decentralized institutions is essentially a political rather than a technical one. Yet he provides no insight into the relationships between political and institutional variables. He only notes vaguely that the relative degrees of centralization and decentralization in societies reflect "the power of different groups to promote and defend their interests" (p. 59); that "conflicts within local communities will include different reactions to central interventions, depending on whose interests the centre is perceived as promoting" (p. 98); and that choices of local government institutions "are made in political circumstances—that is, when interests are in conflict" (p. 141). The reader gains little understanding of which groups are likely to favor which intergovernmental forms under different sets of circumstances.

The one intriguing exception is Smith's brief discussion of the political interests that have shaped Nigeria's institutional choices. He observes that, in general, the emerging bourgeoisie in developing countries depends on national political power, and therefore opposes decentralization (p. 194), and then describes the Nigerian case, where a realignment of state and local relations was crafted expressly to contain the power of traditional political elements in the countryside, and to assure the new entrepreneurial class better access to the investment capital sources that are controlled by state governments (p. 195). This brief section on Nigerian politics, one of the best in the book, shows what Smith might have achieved had he used his broad knowledge to advance the theoretical debate instead of merely to codify the existing literature.

CAROLYN TEICH ADAMS

Temple University

Shop Floor Bargaining and the State: Historical and Comparative Perspectives. Edited by Steven Tolliday and Jonathan Zeitlin. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Pp. vii + 261. $34.50.)

Shop Floor Bargaining and the State is a collection of seven essays on the complex and contradictory relationship between states and industrial relations. Jonathan Zeitlin's introductory chapter critically reviews theories of industrial relations and theories of the state. Skeptical of the possibility of adequate general theory, he suggests some tentative understandings that he believes should underlie empirical research. The other essays, informed by these understandings and located firmly within more specific historiographical and sociological debates, are empirical studies of public policy and industrial relations in particular historical periods.

The overall argument of the book is that there is an ambiguous relationship between the state and the shop floor. Zeitlin argues against the prevailing political and theoretical consensus that there is an inherent deep and pervasive conflict between the state and labor movements has been a central feature of modern politics, so has the enactment of public policy that enhances the autonomy of workers' organizations and undermines managerial prerogatives. Zeitlin suggests that liberal and Marxist theories of the state and of industrial relations are prevented, by their reductionist and determinist assumptions, from accounting for the contradictory relationship between the state and shop floor bargaining.

Liberals and Marxists alike, Zeitlin suggests, have analyzed the state as a passive respondent to pressures and imperatives generated within civil society. Drawing critically upon the realist tradition, he suggests that states pursue goals that cannot simply be derived from the play of interest groups, the needs of the economy, or the class structure, and that the autonomy and coherence of states vary greatly over time and space. States are distinctive, often internally contradictory structures with specific histories. In addition, he argues that liberals and Marxists have concurred that official trade union organization and formal collective bargaining procedures inherently tend to institutionalize conflict and contain industrial disorder, and that collective bargaining is determined by market constraints. Zeitlin suggests that, in fact, shopfloor bargaining cannot be understood in so determined and fixed a manner, without reference to social actors' own definitions of their situations, the limits of managerial strategies for controlling work, or the complexities and variability of market competition. The book, then, is an argument for more historically informed understanding of the contingent encounters between public policy and shop floor bargaining.

The case studies present extensive, carefully collected, and well-interpreted evidence in support of the book's key arguments about the state and the shop floor: that particular states have acted to restrain management and enhance workers' bargaining power, as well as to constrain labor; that different sections of the state have different, sometimes conflicting orientations towards labor; and that state policies toward labor do not necessarily produce intended or unchanging results. Alastair Reid discusses the relationship between the British state and industrial relations in shipbuilding during the First World War, Noel Whiteside discusses British public policy and port labor reform between 1911 and 1950,... Steven Tolliday discusses government, employers and shop floor organization in the British motor industry between 1939 and 1969. Howell Harris discusses the roles of politicians, bureaucrats, employers and unions in the shaping of federal labor relations policy in the United States in the 1930s and 1940s, and Bryn Jones compares the impact of the state on labor control in the British and American aerospace industries. Giovanni Contini surveys changing public policy and shop floor bargaining in postwar Italy.

The book, however, does not make explicit why certain historical cases have been selected and what their analytic significance is. Many of the studies, for example, focus upon "strategic" industries—shipbuilding, docks, motors, aerospace—and upon wartime history. Realist theories which assert the independence of the state from civil society and stress its security fucntions, are likely to be strongest in these particular cases. However, the book also shows that the exigencies and legacies of war are present in more "normal" historical periods. Jones' interesting essay on aerospace shows how British and American states have shaped product markets and industrial structure, as well as labor relations directly, in a war industry, and many of the essays show how institutions and forms of regulation initially established in wartime are maintained. Similarly, the cases that illustrate division and conflict within states are studies of what are generally regarded as uncoordinated or "weak" states, Britain and the United States, and Harris himself regards the New Deal as a period of exceptional policy incoherence even for the American state.

The case studies also seem unrelated to one another, though the Jones essay offers some reflections on the legalistic industrial relations framework whose emergence Harris so interestingly describes. Only the Jones essay is itself comparative, in the sense of systematically addressing similarities and differences and trying to generate an interpretation or explanation based upon comparison. It is also located within current debates over the labor process rather than in historiographical currents.

While the principles of selection and assessment of the case studies are not entirely clear, the essays offer a valuable set of perspectives on the theory of the state, the labor process, and particular episodes of public policy and labor history. Individually the essays are models of clarity and careful scholarship.

PEGGY KAHN

The University of Michigan-Flint

The Three Worlds: Culture and World Development. By Peter Worsley. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. Pp. xiv + 409. $28.00, cloth; $12.95, paper.)

This extended essay by a senior British sociologist is a contribution to development theory or, as the author puts it, "meta-theory." In spatial terms the coverage is comprehensive, notably in the final chapter devoted to a critique of the current convention of dividing the world into three parts. The author recognizes that, for a long time, the prime focus of loyalty will be the state. Worsley is, nevertheless, a determined adherent of holism, not only in terms of the ultimate unity of human society, but in his search for a unified theoretical approach. Convinced of the "relative autonomy of subcultures," he seeks all the same to avoid the earlier sociological relegation of society to "at best, a mosaic or aggregate of subcultures" (p. 53). Chronologically, Worsley's range is not quite so wide; essentially concerned with modern development, he concentrates on the last century and a half.

Because it touches on hundreds of contemporary and historical topics, the book is not easy to assess in a brief review. Even the conceptual framework, which unrolls in a leisurely and occasionally contradictory fashion, requires close scrutiny. For example, while Worsley sometimes draws on anthropological usages, he ultimately resorts to a residual definition of culture as "that which lies outside the sphere of political economy" (p. 60). Perhaps the author could have avoided such a loose definition by using recent explorations like Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann's *The Social Construction of Reality*, or, still better, by resorting to examinations of specific culture contexts that especially interest Worsley, such as Roger Bastide's *Les Réligions Africaines au Brésil* [African religions in Brazil]. Apparently the residual definition is intended to be an instrument to combat "economistic" brands of Marxism and neo-Marxism (Worsley cites Immanuel Wallerstein's center-periphery theory among others) and to reject the deterministic dichotomy of base and superstructure. "Only by an act of supremely economistic intellectual violence can a mode of production be thus wrested from its social and cultural matrix, and, by fiat, given the status of a causally prior social sub-system" is Worsley's (p. 105) trenchant criticism of Marx's own neglect of the religious factor. Instead of such reductionism, the author is convinced that one must begin by ascribing equal importance to cultural and material factors.

Nevertheless, Worsley—who readily admits his Marxist antecedents—continues to draw heavily on Marxist categories. He stresses that two of his five chapters are devoted to conventional "underclass" categories—peasants and workers. His preferred interactionist approach tends to locate exploiters and exploited in every social situation, and even to sympathize with the notion that "people fight the class struggle every day of their lives" (p. 180). More significant is the way the author treats ideas and movements, if not "culture" itself, as reflections of group interests: "Ideas, that is, become significant social forces...because they legitimize, ideologically, the privileged position of those who profess those beliefs" (p. 240). Believing, as I do, that the concepts of false consciousness and ideology are the most enduring elements of Marx's legacy, I should not wish to reject applying this interesting interpretation *to some situations.* At one point, moreover, Worsley does briefly indicate the problematic nature of "ideology." In his frequent practical applications, however, he fails to stipulate the kinds of privileges and privileged groups that may turn ideas into ideology. This lacuna, plus his use of terms like "incipient class consciousness," leads one to suspect that Worsley has slipped back into assuming the Marxist interpretation that makes cultural factors epiphenomenal.

The tendency is most apparent in chapter 4, Worsley's most extended discussion of a non-Marxist category, ethnicity. Although recognizing that cultural attitudes that produce ethnic identities are historically prior to class alignments or even interest motivations, he argues that

> cultural traits are not absolutes or simply intellectual categories, but are invoked to provide identities which legitimize claims to rights. They are strategies or weapons in competitions over scarce social goods. . . . Ethnic identities, tribal or national, may be retained or shed, old ones invested with new meanings, new ones may emerge and become readily adopted; the crucial *consideration being whether they are useful.* (pp. 249–50)

Pursuing this explanation, which he recognizes to be Marxist, Worsley scarcely explores the alternative—that long-term ethnic attachments, although not truly "primordial," retain their strength precisely because the human condition makes them irreplaceable sources of psychic security rather than mere "nationalist mystifications."

For the author's theoretical aspirations, a more serious problem is how to develop a prescription for attaining the "infinitely better society" he believes it is possible to create. Like many Marxists before him, he documents, by innumerable illustrations, the extent of contemporary misery. After demolishing, ostensibly, most of Marx's theoretical structure, Worsley remains convinced that Marx's "normative and conative" elements remain his real contribution. In particular, Marxism has inspired "the dedication to working out better ways of living together in the future of getting rid of institutions and habits of thought developed over the centuries" (p. 40). Without Marx's "motor" of history, it is rather hard to see how those he inspires can know what to retain and reject from the world's cultural heritage. At one point, Worsley turns to Herbert Marcuse's fashionable emphasis on exploitative consumption. Elsewhere the author worries about environmental deterioration, drawing the conclusion (equally fashionable among some British socialists) that "the problem, moreover, is not one of mobilizing people in order to create wealth, but the equitable distribution of the wealth that already exists" (p. 344). None of this seems very likely to appeal either to orthodox Marxists or to pragmatic leaders in developing countries. To what extent does wasteful consumption really reflect long-established cultural patterns as contrasted with values imposed from outside, and how much does population growth arising from the inertia of family patterns *require* the creation of new national wealth? In this context, too, close analysis of specific cultural traits in lieu of treating the category as residual would have been rewarding.

In the final analysis, it seems to me that Worsley's notable contribution is his flexible critique and openness to new ideas from numerous schools of thought, rather than theory-building. He cogently warns against "what anthropologists will recognize as avoidance and incest: reading nothing but the growing volume of specifically Marxist literature" (p. 40). *Mutatis mutandis,* this is a warning the non-Marxist theorist can equally take to heart. Worsley's own reading is most illuminating for recent Ibero-American social criticism. One might wish he had used the riches of the *Annales* school, particularly Fernand Braudel's last great production, *Civilisation Matérielle, Economie et Capitale* [Material civilization, economy and capital], which seems a natural counterpoint to Worsley's essay. Nor am I convinced that one can really grasp the impact of Marxism on culture and historical interpretation without access (unfortunately only via German and the East European languages) to recent Hungarian, Polish, and Czech works such as Ferenc Tökei's four volumes. As Braudel dryly comments, "the only thing lacking in this first part of the twentieth century is a masterpiece of Marxist history which might have served as a model and a rallying point. We are still waiting for it"—and it seems the wait will be long. All the same, Worsley's openness, combined with a fearless critical spirit, has provided a powerful stimulus for getting the meta-theory of development off to a fresh start.

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG

University of Wisconsin
Madison

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade. By Vinod K. Aggarwal. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. Pp. xii + 302. $27.50.

Aggarwal's *Liberal Protectionism* documents the unraveling of the liberal trading system in international textile trade. This is an important book, in that it offers both a theoretical and empirical analysis of the international textile regime from the perspective of international politics. While domestic political factors play a role in this analysis, they are combined with systemic-level explanations as well as with learning on the part of individual negotiators to explain changes in the international regime governing textile trade. *Liberal Protectionism* first develops a theoretical framework for understanding regime transformation, and then tests the theory using the creation, maintenance, and destruction of the international textile regime to determine its validity.

Aggarwal asks three key questions in this study: Why are regimes developed? What accounts for the strength, nature, and scope of regimes? And finally, what effect do regimes have on national behaviors and transactions? (p. 4). The structure of the international state system provides the context for Aggarwal's theory of regimes. He argues that the incentives for states to create regimes rather than impose unilateral controls or negotiate restrictive bilateral agreements include "nesting"—that is, the need to prevent larger institutional arrangements from being undermined—the need on the part of a state to control the behavior of other states through a system of rules, and the need to reduce transaction and information costs in negotiations.

Aggarwal argues that the strength of a regime is accurately explained by the theory of hegemonic stability, which predicts strong regimes when a single power is dominant (p. 4). The nature of a regime in this context refers to the degree of "openness" supported by the regime, which varies between liberalism and protection to the range of issues and products regulated by the regime. This is an important variable in textile trade, because the regime began with the regulation of cotton textiles and then was expanded to include wool and man-made fibers. The behavior of countries refers to the bilateral negotiations restricting textile trade that occurred in the wake of changes in the multilateral textile regime. Transactions are the trade introduced by the restrictive agreements.

Aggarwal adds to the theoretical debate on international regimes through developing a distinction between regimes and meta-regimes. International regimes are multilateral systems of rules and procedures designed to regulate national actions. These rules and procedures are embedded in "meta-regimes," which are the principles and norms that inform the development of regimes. This framework makes it possible to analyze changes in the rules and procedures of a regime while the norms and principles remain constant, and allows for the synthesis of cognitive and structural explanations of regime change. Aggarwal argues that while structural explanations can best explain changes in the regime (the rules and procedures that regulate national actions), cognitive theories can best explain changes in the meta-regime (principles and norms). Thus, hegemonic stability theory and transactions cost explains the creation of regimes, while the development of consensual knowledge among states permits the creation of meta-regimes.

Aggarwal then carefully traces the creation, maintenance and destruction of the regime in textile and apparel trade. He begins his account with the negotiation of the first postwar voluntary restraint agreement with Japan. The remainder of the empirical analysis focuses primarily on the negotiation of the Short and Long Term Arrangement on Textiles, the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA), and finally the destruction of the Multi-Fiber Agreement due to the inclusion of the mutually agreed-upon departures clause. This clause allowed textile importers to negotiate bilateral agreements with exporters, which were more restrictive than the provisions of the MFA.

The strength of the book lies in its careful empirical analysis of the interests and negotiating positions of the major actors. Aggarwal also provides a rich portrayal of the interrelationships among the major actors: the U.S., the European Economic Community, Japan, newly industralized countries, and the less competitive industrializing countries. Lost, however, in this empirical discussion is the theoretical framework. The shift from liberal protectionism to protectionism is explained primarily in terms of the decline in U.S. hegemony as a consumer of imported textile and apparel products.

The real test of this theory is whether it can predict the creation of regimes in other industrial sectors to restrict international trade. To date, we see none. The international trading system is under strong attack, but it has not yet crumbled. A sharper focus on meta-regimes and the interests supporting this consensus may help explain the prospects for future liberal or protectionist collaboration on international trade.

STEFANIE ANN LENWAY

University of Minnesota

World Politics and International Law. By Francis A. Boyle. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985. Pp. xii + 366. $32.50, cloth; $14.75, paper.)

Professor Boyle has successfully produced an erudite analysis that develops "a philosophy of international relations on the basis of international law and organizations that is designed to preserve and extend world peace, while at the same time to protect the vital national security interests of states" (p. 57). Throughout his study Boyle posits a fundamental theoretical and empirical conflict between "international legal positivism" and "international political science." The former he finds too often irrelevant to what should and has to be done, while he believes the latter to be not only immoral in its stress on Machiavellian power politics, but often disastrously in error.

His solution is what he calls a "functionalist analysis." By this he means a set of theoretical propositions based upon empirical analysis of the various roles or functions played by international law and organizations in times of crisis. He identifies five of these roles, along with their attendant, theoretical propositions, as (1) definition, (2) decision, (3) adjudication, (4) resolution, and (5) redefinition (pp. 157–59). "A functionalist analysis," Boyle explains, "examines the dynamic interaction between law and politics throughout the course of the crisis, its successes and failures at each stage, and, more importantly, the reasons responsible for the entire process" (p. 156).

To develop his thesis, Boyle divides his analysis into three major parts and a very short, rather unnecessary conclusion. In the first part he discusses the schism between international legal studies and international political science in some detail. Despite his criticisms of "legal positivism," he clearly comes down on its side here when he states that "around the turn of the twentieth century, the mainstream attitude of American international lawyers...was acutely realistic and relatively sophisticated in its comprehensive of the dynamic interrelationship between power and law in international affairs" (p. 22). Interesting, Boyle also points out that although Hans J. Morgenthau is clearly the father of modern international political science—which at various times in this study is scathingly equated with Machiavellianism and power politics—towards the end of his life he abandoned this school for a renewed stress on international law and organization.

In part 2 Boyle uses the 1976 Entebbe raid by Israeli commandos to develop the "functional" theoretical propositions mentioned above. Among numerous other useful findings, he argues well that the U.N. Security Council debates on the Entebbe raid led to "a general consensus. . . that the taking of hostages violates a fundamental principle of international law and international politics" (p. 136), and generated the will to draft a convention establishing this rule. Since the confines of this review prevent further analysis, let it suffice to say that Boyle admirably demonstrates "why and how considerations of the international law and organizations are of critical relevance to real world crisis management decision makers" (p. 74).

In part 3 Boyle uses the Iranian hostages crisis and a number of other crises faced by the Carter and Reagan administrations to offer some very strong criticisms of the policies that were pursued and his own prescriptions for what should have been done. Although his analysis here is both lucid and at times penetratingly accurate, it is, in my opinion, the least satisfactory part of this generally admirable book.

Boyle's problem here is twofold. In some places his facts and/or conclusions are simply incorrect, and at times his criticisms of the Carter and Reagan administrations tend toward abrasive, *ad hominem* name-calling. It is simply incorrect for Boyle to describe Carter as a president who "willfully provokes the [hostages] crisis in the first place" (p. 184), or contend that "a fairly compelling argument could be made that the seizure and detention of the American diplomats was a legitimate exercise of Iran's right of individual self-defense under article 51 of the U.N. Charter" (p. 189). In addition, I find it incongruous to write about "the Reagan administration's illicit intervention into El Salvador's civil war" (pp. 284–85), but then declare that "Cuban troops are in Angola at the lawful request of the legitimate government of Angola" (p. 288).

With regard to name-calling, Boyle refers to the Carter administration's policy on the MX missile as "absurb" and "harebrained" (p. 210), and its top lawyers in the Iranian hostages case as "either grossly incompetent or else completely corrupted by the expectation of significant economic gain" (p. 221). Kissinger, Brzezinski, Haig, and Kirkpatrick are called "practitioners of Machiavellian power politics" (p. 295), which elsewhere Boyle informs us "amounts to nothing more sophisticated than a flimsy philosphical justification and transparent rationalization for pursuing a foreign policy that basically consists of waging a permanent and universal war of aggression" (p. 173).

On a more general, substantive level, Boyle's entire analysis also suffers from his understandable aversion to the employment of force and war in international politics. In arguing as he does, however, he manifests a lack of appreciation for the fact—documented admirably by Adda B. Bozeman elsewhere—that force and war remain viable attributes of cultural norms throughout most of the world. In addition, it should be noted that on a general, procedural level Boyle's use of a total of 955 footnotes in his study is, while in part commendable scholarship, also somewhat tediously pedantic.

Despite these criticisms, it must be reiterated in closing that Boyle has produced a rich and provocative study that should prove to be a very important addition to the literature.

MICHAEL M. GUNTER

Tennessee Technical University

Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict. By Steven J. Brams. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985. Pp. xvi + 176. $6.95, paper.)

In *Superpower Games,* Steven Brams examines some of the critical strategic problems facing the two superpowers: the credibility problem inherent in the deterrence strategy, the inability of the superpowers to cooperate and control the arms race, and verification problems associated with arms control. As the title suggests, Brams approaches these problems from a game theory perspective. Those who have tired of the standard two-person noncooperative game approach to modeling behavior in international politics will be refreshed by the innovative adaptations and new formal concepts Brams introduces. These provide more descriptively accurate and more theoretically meaningful game theory models of superpower conflicts. The analysis is theoretical and rigorous, which does present some problems for readers unsophisticated in mathematics although a helpful glossary of terms is provided, Brams's emphasis on the insights drawn from the models and prescriptive implications for reducing conflict, rather than on the details of the game theory models themselves, should be appealing to a broad readership.

Brams's game theory analysis of three types of strategic games among superpowers reflects the analytic and prescriptive strength of this approach. The innovative formulations capture the underlying logic of the conflict, allow the derivation of the best or most appropriate strategies available to the players, and provide a rigorous way to analyze the possible strategies that the participants can employ to revolve or minimize the conflict. For example, a major problem with the strategy of deterrence is credibility. Brams tackles this problem first by persuasively arguing that it should be cast as a Prisoners' Dilemma rather than a Chicken game. By introducing the notion of *probabilistic threats*—responding to a major provocation by the opponent by cooperating with a probability P, and not cooperating with a probability, $(1 - P)$—and examining the game in extensive form, he shows that probabilistic strategies are optimal in an expected payoff sense, and more credible and effective than the standard mutual assured destruction strategy.

Brams also formulates the superpower arms race in a Prisoners' Dilemma format. By introducing *detection probabilities*—the likelihood that each participant can detect the strategy of his opponent correctly—and a sequential aspect to the game with the notion of a leader and a follower, Brams derives the conditions under which it can be rational (expected payoff-maximizing) for the players to choose conditional cooperation and avoid the noncooperative arming equilibrium.

Brams casts the arms control verification problem in the form of the truth game, a two-person, nonconstant-sum game of imperfect information played between a signaler and a detector, where the signaler must choose between telling the truth and lying, and the detector must decide whether to believe him. Brams derives some interesting optimal strategies for both players. He shows that optimal strategies are mixed for both players: the signaler should mix telling the truth and lying, and the detector, rather than always believing his detection equipment and responding in a tit-for-tat fashion, should mix believing and not believing, even if his detection equipment is highly reliable.

Based on the assumption that "game theory captures a substantial part of the logical basis and empirical reality of superpower conflict" (p. 145), Brams attempts to show how the various game theory formulations can be used to describe and explain superpower conflict. Readers will find themselves questioning whether the specific formulation makes sense or is more appropriate than other possible formulations for particular substantive examples. It is always easy to criticize whether the particular formulation of a problem—the specific game, the payoff structure, the alternatives available to the players, the assumptions about the player's knowledge of the payoffs, etc.—is substantively meaningful or "correct." I leave such criticisms, which are in part a matter of taste, to others.

Two other problems are more bothersome. First, Brams develops a model of deterrence in chapter 1, but then proposes and uses two entirely different models when he examines two case studies of deterrence, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and the 1973 crisis brought on by the Yom Kippur War. There is little effort made to justify one model over another, or to compare each of the three models across the two substantive cases. This is unfortunate, since it makes the various game formulations and the conclusions derived appear quite arbitray. Second, deterrence, the arms race, and verification issues in arms control are all substantively connected problems. Yet, each is analyzed with distinctly different models, and it is unfortunate that neither the theoretical or substantive implications derived from each model are linked. For example, how one plays or should play the arms race game will both affect and be affected by how one plays the verification game. The lack of linkage across models and strategic problems creates a choppy and somewhat disjointed overall presentation.

Nonetheless, readers will find that Steven

Brams has presented an innovative set of game theory formulations of three important strategic problems facing the superpowers. The models provide an extremely useful template to assess the logical basis of superpower conflict. The substantive conclusions drawn from the analyses regarding how the superpowers should act in the various forms of conflict and how they might reduce or resolve conflict are often counterintuitive and certainly controversial, and should spur others to refine or create alternative models and explanations of superpower conflict.

STEPHEN J. MAJESKI

University of Washington

Deterrence in the 1980s: Crisis and Dilemma. Edited by R. B. Byers. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. Pp. 235. $29.95.)

Nuclear Deterrence—Does it Deter? By Honore (Marc) Catudal. Foreword by Martin J. Hillenbrand. (West Berlin: Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz, 1985. Pp. 528. No price.)

Each of these books examines contemporary notions of deterrence with skill and refinement. The collection edited by R. B. Byers probes these notions as they concern nuclear and conventional weapons technologies, while Honore Catudal's volume is limited intentionally to the nature and evolution of nuclear deterrence. Both books are commendable and worthwhile additions to the proliferating genre of strategic studies. The only problem is the genre itself: it explores the moves, mechanics, and manifestations of global insecurity, but ignores the origins of prevailing competition and conflict.

This is not a trivial problem. Whatever we might to do improve deterrence, it can never amount to more than fine-tuning our preparations for Armageddon. To survive into the future, all nations will have to embrace an altogether different pattern of thinking. Spurred on by recurrent visions of a vast chaos from which there could be neither escape nor sanctuary, they will have to reject the banal syntax of Realpolitik and its associated forms of "deadly logic." In the final analysis, such rejection will require prior transformations of self. Before it becomes possible to preserve our planet, individuals everywhere will have to look our approaching disappearance in the face.

In all likelihood, however, we will continue to cultivate thoughtlessness (in the sense offered by Hannah Arendt), preferring the illusion of collective immortality to the prospect of perishing. Desperate to demonstrate our "power" as nations because of our impotence as persons, we will continue to surrender to the most vacant intuitions of our leaders. Not surprisingly (in light of that degrading recitation of failures we call history) we will remain in stupor, content to tinker with the very weapons and policies that assure oblivion. Throughout this process of disintegration, cadres of accomplished political scientists will side with hallucination, assiduously suppressing "idealism" wherever it might appear.

In the opening chapter of his anthology, "Deterrence Under Attack: Crisis and Dilemma," R. B. Byers presents the standard "realist" position: "Given the cruel dilemmas posed by nuclear weapons, deterrence is the only viable security option for the future—what remains in doubt is what form it should take and what military capabilities are required to support it (p. 10). This is merely argument by assertion. Even if deterrence were the only security option for the future, its "viability" would surely not be self-evident. Indeed, because nuclear war would be a unique event, any statement ascribing viability to nuclear deterrence is necessarily fallacious. At the same time, this chapter's particular assessments of current nuclear deterrence, especially the discussion of NATO Euromissile deployments, are lucid and helpful.

Janice Gross Stein's chapter, "Deterrence in the 1980s: A Political and Contextual Analysis," examines the "apolitical and acontextual" attributes of deterrence, and thus contributes to a better understanding of the concept. Recognizing the dangers of interpreting deterrence exclusively in military terms, her essay points importantly to new political visions for security.

George Quester's chapter, "The Strategy of Deterrence: Is the Concept Credible?" offers a clear and insightful look at assumptions and trends, but its concluding observation that we may decide to stay with "deterrence by punishment" is less than productive.

The remaining chapters cover the entire range of deterrence issues and will make useful reading for specialists and students alike. In view of current popular concern over Star Wars, the chapter by George Rathjens on "Space Based Defense" will be very timely.

The issues raised in this book suggest it would surely be a mistake of enormous proportion to confine our attention to problems of deterrence. Yet evaluated within its own narrow sphere of strategic studies, *Deterrence in the 1980s*—is both comprehensive and generally well reasoned.

Honore Catudal's book, *Nuclear Deterrence—Does It Deter?*, displays an impressive range of political and historical erudition, and will prove informative to students taking courses on contemporary international relations and American foreign policy. Seeking answers to questions about the basic assumptions of nuclear deterrence and the prospects for rationality in a nuclear world, the author concludes that *"there is a growing body of evidence that suggests that nuclear deterrence does not deter—at least not as U.S. policymakers think it does"* (p. 485). Although this conclusion is hardly original—indeed, it appears in parts of the volume edited by Byers—it hints strongly at the need to go beyond deterrence to some other more enduring pattern of safety. What we need now are not more and more indictment of deterrence, but rather some carefully articulated attempts to define such a pattern.

LOUIS RENE BERES

Purdue University

Black Box: KAL 007 and the Superpowers: By Alexander Dallin. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. Pp. xii + 130. $14.95.)

Before dawn on September 1, 1983, a Soviet Air Defense Command pilot shot down a Korean Air Lines 747 commercial jet bound for Seoul on a flight from New York. All 269 people on board perished. In its flight across the Pacific, KAL flight 007 deviated significantly from the well-established route. It crossed in and out of Soviet territory for nearly two hours.

Alexander Dallin carefully sifts through the limited available evidence and competing claims to address two questions: Why did the Korean jet liner depart from the established route? and Why did the Soviets shoot it down? As Dallin observes, "there is no smoking gun that would clinch the argument" (p. 55), but in addressing the first question he succeeds in differentiating the plausibility of various explanations. He makes a strong case for dismissing mechanical failures, crew incapacitation, or hijacking. The case for willful, nonpolitical action by the crew (e.g., to save fuel or beat another KAL flight to Seoul) seems by the author's analysis to be scarcely more plausible. Dallin finds somewhat more possible an explanation based on innocent—but extremely careless—errors by the crew in setting the navigation equipment. Subsequently simulations have reproduced the plane's flight path by inputting the wrong coordinates into one of the three inertial navigation systems and failing to cross check the setting with the other two, and by neglecting to make any inflight radar checks.

The other explanations that Dallin finds difficult to dismiss assume the aircraft participated in an intelligence mission. One version involves "tickling the PVO" (forcing the Soviet air defenses to high status alert for purposes of observation); another concerns aiding with the monitoring of a new Soviet ICBM test scheduled for that night. Dallin reviews the objections raised to such intelligence missions and the possible responses to those counter arguments. He reminds us here, as elsewhere, that logic may be a poor guide for reconstructing human motives, and that the requirement of good judgement may not be an adequate guide for actual decision making.

For each hypothesis, arguments for and against a possible explanation are thoughtfully examined. The serious reader will find it necessary to refer continuously to the extensive endnotes, some of which would have seemed to warrant treatment in the text (e.g., discussion of KAL's apparent change in course just before reaching Sakhalin Island). Occasionally, the author dismisses matters abruptly without reproducing his reasoning (e.g., that the Soviets may have led the aircraft off course, or that Marshall Ogarkov's dismissal as Chief of the General Staff had any connection with the incident). To Dallin they may have appeared obvious or minor points, but their neglect grates against the book's usual thoroughness.

No rival hypotheses are examined in addressing the possible reasons for the Soviet destruction of the Korean airliner. Instead, Dallin enumerates the variety of factors that disposed the Soviet military authorities to shoot it down. His survey of contributing factors is extensive—from the ambiguities in international law to Soviet perceptions of the pervasiveness of American intelligence; from Soviet military vulnerability in the Far East to Soviet political culture (e.g., suspicion of outsiders, fear of ridicule) and bureaucratic style (e.g., refusal to give others the benefit of a doubt, strict adherence to the rules). At the outset of this section we are warned that "in retrospect the course of history all too often seems inevitable....we must guard against making the case so overdetermined that in our analysis we deprive the actors of any reasonable choice" (p. 70). Yet the presentation gives exactly that impression. All the Soviet participants followed "a rigid mentality of 'going by the book'—following the rules in a defensive, almost mindless fashion" (p. 84). As described, the Soviet actors' choices seemed predetermined, if not overdetermined. How adequate is such an interpretative approach to Soviet decision (or nondecision) making? More importantly, if this military action seemed reflexive and automatic, are there other conditions that might have resulted in real acts of choice? The author leaves himself open to the charge that he has not adequately helped the reader locate this episode in a somewhat bounded set of Soviet military behavior.

Be that as it may, Dallin offers much to ponder. Consider his disturbing main conclusions. The weight of the available evidence makes an intelligence mission by the airliner on behalf of one of the superpowers one of the explanations most difficult to dismiss. The other superpower destroyed the aircraft in almost robot fashion without knowing or caring whether it was a commercial flight. What report could be more alarming at a time when the crisis stability of both sides' strategic deterrents, may be declining?

As an unsolved detective story or as a grim revelation of current behaviors of the superpowers in unexpected, urgent situations, Dallin's essay provides fascinating reading.

CHARLES F. HERMANN

Ohio State University

The Soviet Union and Cuba: Interests and Influence. By W. Raymond Duncan. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985. Pp. xv + 220. $12.95, paper.)

Because the Cuban Revolution has always had a unique ability to inspire or infuriate, books about it have been prone to polemics as authors have promoted their preconceived partisan views. The result has too often been simplistic treatments of complex phenomena, an excellent example being the Surrogate Thesis, which reduces Havana's international role to that of a pliant spear carrier for Soviet expansionism. Fortunately, W. Raymond Duncan avoids such pitfalls as he examines the subtle nuances of the Cuban/Soviet relationship, stressing the interface (both complementary and contradictory) between their foreign policy interests, especially each country's ability to influence the other's international behavior. Consequently, he has produced one of the best contemporary macrosurveys of Cuban foreign policy. The book's analysis is thorough and balanced; its topical coverage, while not complete, is quite satisfactory; and it is extremely well written.

Duncan's work draws heavily on William LeoGrande's "convergence analysis" of Cuban/Soviet cooperation in foreign affairs and on David Ronfeldt's "superclient" concept. Incorporating these two elements into his "reciprocal influence" model, Duncan concludes that both Havana and Moscow have demonstrated an ability to exert leverage on the other's international policies, and even to draw one another into joint ventures abroad. According to this scenario, "the Soviets and Cubans derive mutual benefits from the relationship and influence-seeking is likely to be utilized in an effort to balance the benefits with the costs if and when either Cuba or the Soviet Union believes that they have become unbalanced" (p. 17). Appreciating the dynamics of this process is, says Duncan, the key to understanding much of Havana's foreign policy behavior.

Factually there is nothing particularly new in this book; its basic information is readily available elsewhere. However, in contrast to many other policy studies, which are often conceptually disorganized, Duncan's volume merits high praise for its coherence. By consistently employing reciprocal influence as his unifying analytical thread, Duncan has created a finely-honed study that is especially effective when dealing with the ongoing Cuban/Soviet controversy over armed struggle in Latin America, Havana's dramatic involvement in Africa, and the Cuban/Russian responses to increased radicalism in the Caribbean Basin. There are, howver, some weaknesses that must be noted.

Duncan focuses perhaps too heavily on Cuba's attempts to use its superclient status to influence Moscow's foreign policy positions, thereby enhancing the probability that the Fidelistas will be able to count on Russian cooperation as they pursue their international interests. Admittedly Havana does this, but since Duncan himself stresses the crucial role nationalism plays in the Cuban Revolution, it is somewhat perplexing that he does not devote much attention to the equally plausible proposition that Havana's behavior is often geared toward redefining its relationship with the USSR in order to acquire more political space in which to operate independently. For example, Cuba's efforts to exercise leadership in Third World affairs, which dominated its international agenda during the 1970s, can be seen as indicative of a desire to develop new centers of political/economic support which could, by supplementing its Kremlin connection, give Havana more options and more freedom of action overseas.

Cuba's campaign in the Western Hemisphere to normalize and/or expand its relations with an ideologically wide variety of governments—which recently has involved trying to utilize the debt issue as a catalyst for greater Latin unity—is also consistent with the hypothesis that Havana is seeking to maximize its international flexibility by nurturing new networks of solidarity. Cuba does have, as Duncan heavily emphasizes, a long tradition of commitment to armed struggle and revolutionary politics in Latin America, but the normalization dimension of its activities there has been equally important. By somewhat neglecting the latter, Duncan does not convey the full complexity of Havana's hemispheric policies.

Undoubtedly the book's main shortcoming is its failure to probe deeply into the impact of the war in Afghanistan. The entire thrust of Duncan's reciprocal influence approach demands that this episode be spotlighted, for Moscow's intervention would seem to represent a classical illustration of the limits of Cuban influence on the Kremlin. Indeed, the Russians apparently did not even bother to inform Havana beforehand that they had decided unilaterally to pursue a course in Afghanistan that eventually would seriously tarnish the Fidelistas' prestige abroad and wreak havoc with their Third World leadership aspirations, which in turn may have undermined Cuba's superclient stature and thereby reduced its leverage over future Soviet policies. Afghanistan is a prime example of Moscow creating strong incentives for Havana to diversify its international relations and thus acquire a broader expanse of independent political space.

Despite a few analytical lapses, Duncan has written an outstanding volume. This is a book into which readers can sink their scholarly teeth and come away satisfied that they have been provided not only with an unusually sophisticated perspective on Havana's foreign policy and the often unique nature of the Cuban/Soviet relationship, but also a fascinating case study of superpower vulnerability to manipulation by astute smaller countries that are unwilling to accept docilely their supposedly inevitable subordinate status.

H. MICHAEL ERISMAN

Mercyhurst College

In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied. By James Eayrs. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980. Pp. xi + 431. $27.50 (Canadian), cloth; $17.50 (Canadian), paper.)

This is the fourth volume in James Eayrs's history of Canadian diplomatic and defence policies since the First World War. In this study, which covers the period from 1945 to 1955, Eayrs examines Canada's role in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While Canada's involvement has been largely overlooked in most histories of the Cold War, Canada played an influential part in laying the alliance's philosophical and organizational foundations. Eayrs also documents how Canadian foreign and defence policies were transformed by the process of alliance building.

In deciding to participate in creating the alliance, Canada made a decisive break from the policies of the past. Under Prime Minister Mackenzie King, Canada scrupulously had avoided foreign involvements, and its first instinct was cautious isolationism. The conscription crises of both world wars had brought bitter internal divisions along linguistic lines, and avoiding any reoccurence was the highest domestic priority. Canada's principal association in world politics was with the Commonwealth. This link to British power was still seen by many Canadians as the country's primary international identity.

According to Eayrs, Canada's disposition changed in response to the specific circumstances of the postwar period. First, in 1948 Canada and the United States had negotiated an agreement on free trade. On further reflection, however, Prime Minister King decided that "complete reciprocity" could be a dangerous political move, and he sought a means to reverse course. The alliance was one method "to get off the hook of reciprocity" (p. 64), as King could now argue that a North Atlantic free trade zone was conceivable. Second, Canadian officials believed that the alliance could enhance Canada's bargaining position with the United States. In a multilateral setting Canada would be subject to less pressure and could, by acting with others, establish "a coalition of constraint" (p. 67) to contain what were often seen as headstrong American actions.

The third impetus towards alliance was the strong anti-Communism that developed during this period, a sentiment that was as much apparent in isolationist Quebec as in English-speaking Canada. Indeed, a French-Canadian Prime Minister, Louis St. Laurent, who took over from King in November 1948, was to be an ardent crusader in favour of new international commitments.

Canada's major contribution in the creation of the alliance was article 2 of the treaty. The Canadian belief was that adherence to democracy and Christian virtues should be promoted as a collective heritage, because an alliance based only on military interests could not endure. The balance of forces would inevitably shift. While this view was not shared by the Americans and others, in principle at least Canada got its way. Article 2, which speaks of free institutions and the development of "a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded" (p. 128), became the philosophical premise on which the alliance was based at the time of its founding.

Among Eayrs's main arguments, however, is that this Canadian conception was not to prevail. Those who viewed NATO as being exclusively a military pact were to triumph. The United States, in particular, anxious to bring together the strongest combination of military forces, sought early membership for the Federal Republic of Germany and then for Portugal, Greece, and Turkey. Although Canada acquiesced, there were feelings of disquiet that NATO was not longer to consist only of North Atlantic countries that were democratic and Christian. Eayrs also stresses that in the years following the alliance's founding, Canada did little to ensure that NATO institutions would reflect something other than military concerns. The author contends that the government was immobilized by conflicting points of view, and lacked the conviction necessary to follow through in a meaningful way.

Based largely on original sources, Eayrs has written a first-rate history. For scholars interested in images of the Cold War, constraints on middle-power actions, and the fashioning of the alliance, there are rich insights and documentation. The world views of the policy makers associated with what has often been described as the "golden age of Canadian diplomacy"—Lester Pearson, Louis St. Laurent, Brooke Claxton, Escott Reid, and Hume Wrong, among others—are skillfully portrayed.

Yet despite these strengths, some may find the book disappointing. Although nominally a political scientist, Eayrs makes no attempt to analyze how decisions were made, or to use analytical tools. Bureaucratic politics, the power relations between states, and techniques of diplomacy are never focused upon as distinct concepts. Indeed, there is not even a concluding chapter to summarize the positions of the main actors or the overall pattern of events. Presumably the author will attempt to do this in another volume in this series.

For those studying Canadian foreign policy or the founding of the alliance, the volume is of considerable value. Eayrs has, in this fourth volume, added to the weight of our knowledge.

DAVID TARAS

University of Calgary

Arms and the African: Military Influences on Africa's International Relations. Edited by William J. Foltz and Henry S. Bienen. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985. Pp. xv + 193. $22.50.)

This is a useful, well-edited, and above all eminently sensible collection of essays on what the editors call "the militarization of Africa's international relations." Put together under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations, the book understandably stresses the phenomenon's consequences and implication for U.S. foreign policy. While each of the seven essays in the collection examines a different aspect of the problem, all document what is perhaps the book's most important theme: that as military factors have become increasingly important in African international politics, so have those factors "helped turn seemingly parochial African disputes into occasions for superpower competition" (p. 171), and, it should be added, intervention. The proposition is hardly news, but it is here given new emphasis and validation by the skill with which the several authors muster the evidence and argue their cases.

Louis George Sarris, who examines Soviet policy and arms activities in Africa, argues that the Soviet Union, despite the costs and burdens on Soviet resources, had made net political gains on the continent and will continue to seek opportunities to provide arms and other military assistance "so long as their actions continue to focus on guidelines generally acceptable to most sub-Saharan countries" (p. 53). Citing David Newsom in 1979, he reminds the Reagan administration that "Africa's search for international alignments is driven by premises that further Africa's own central priorities" (p. 57), and that in this respect (quoting Reagan's chief Africa advisor, Chester Crocker) they are not pro-Soviet, "pro-American, or pro-Western. They are pro-African" (p. 57).

George E. Moose reviews French military policy in Africa, finds the French to be singularly adroit in finding acceptable ways to further their privileged position in their ex-colonies, and concludes that despite Western criticisms of their actions, "to the extent that French activities are perceived to serve broader Western interests, they can be expected to encourage, and where appropriate, lend active support to French efforts" (p. 97). Walter L. Barrows focuses on Africa's changing and increasing military capabilities, and warns that Africa's international life may well become increasingly militarized, and hence more dangerous, as a consequence. Robert S. Jaster's analysis of South Africa's defense strategy is perhaps the most interesting piece in the book. He argues that the regime uses and intends increasingly to use its formidable military capability both internally to suppress resistance and externally to cow its neighbors and attack ANC and other guerrillas targeting the Republic. Thus, the Republic's leaders "will hope to postpone Armageddeon." They will be under no illusion, however, that this strategy will solve the problem of trying to exist as an apartheid state in a world that condemns apartheid as morally unacceptable" (p. 152). Henry Bienen, who considers African militaries as foreign policy actors, reinforces Sarris's conclusions by finding that they do not "align themselves in any clear-cut fashion in either inter-African or global politics" (p. 170).

Finally, William Foltz, in his concluding essay, offers some useful propositions to help guide American policy making on the question of arming Africans. First, he suggests Africa, as well as the United States, is better served by economic than military assistance. Second, he argues that excessive "arming of African security forces can produce rather than reduce disruption" (p. 190). Third, increasing levels of African armaments may well threaten the security of economic installations in which the United States has an interest; and fourth, "military competition provides an easy way for the Soviet Union, which cannot compete effectively in the economic realm, to augment its political and physical presence in Africa" (p. 191). Thus, it is in American interests to limit further arms provision to Africa, to be careful about becoming militarily involved in situations that could evolve beyond their local or regional scope, to help avoid creating rigid splits between moderate and radical states by providing weapons in large quantities to the so-called moderates, and, by exercising restraint in arms assistance, to refuse to play the Soviet game of attempting to polarize African affairs along an East-West dimension. It all makes very good sense.

The book is worth serious consideration and study, especially by the makers of our foreign policy.

VICTOR T. LE VINE

Washington University

The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition? Edited by David Holloway and Jane M. O. Sharp. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984. Pp. 290. $29.95.)

In late April 1985, shortly after *The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition?* was published, the Warsaw Pact was quietly renewed for at least another 20 years. Most journalistic commentaries concerning that event failed to recognize the central point made by this volume; namely, that the Warsaw Pack is no longer a mere transmission belt for orders from Moscow, and that, in David Holloway's words, the pact is now a "complex mechanism for coordinating the military and foreign policy activities of its members" (p. 37). This book is important, if for no other reason than the prominence given to such an argument.

David Holloway and Jane Sharp have taken a disparate group of papers and molded them into something far more coherent than seemed possible in May 1982 at the Cornell conference for which these papers were originally written. Holloway's introduction sets the stage nicely for the nine contributions, alerting the reader to main points, agreements and disagreements. He and Sharp have organized the book around three general foci: the pact's international evolution and "intra-pact relations," the divergence of East European interests from Soviet policies, and finally, "future" prospects for the Pact.

The theme of this book is worthy of attention. We do, indeed, need to "measure the extent to which the [Warsaw Treaty Organization] WTO has developed into a genuine alliance over the past three decades" (book jacket). Despite this need, and the success of Holloway and Sharp in bringing together scholars known for their study of the Warsaw Pack and Eastern Europe, the "set of rarely explored questions" to which the editors allude never emerges from these contributions. In none of these chapters does one find an innovative effort to measure any phenomenon or any behavior; in none of these chapters is there any substantial effort made to develop conceptually the idea of a "genuine alliance" into which the editors (and I) think the WTO has evolved. This is not so much an indictment as it is an expression of disappointment, since the volume could have been a forum for less standard fare.

Part 2, "Intra-Bloc Relations," begins with a historical overview by Malcolm MacKintosh, reviewing the institutional development of the Warsaw Pact. Condoleeza Rice discusses "Defense Burden-Sharing," and describes many details about East Europeans as arms producers and suppliers. She does not, however, come to grips with the concept of "burden sharing" as applied to the Warsaw Pact; what is "defense burden," how do we measure it over time, and how can we gauge burden relative to capacity or world standards? Christopher Jones' chapter posits the arguments he has made elsewhere—that national formations in the Red Army during World War II guide how the Soviets now deal with East European Warsaw Pack members, and that the "primary mission...of the WTO is to deny national control over national armed forces" (p. 109). Stephen Larrabee's paper on "Soviet Crisis Management in Eastern Europe" concludes part 2 of the book. The idea of "crisis management"—which is intriguing because of all it implies about Soviet behavior within the alliance—deserves much more thorough consideration. What are the components of "crisis" in the Soviet "bloc," and how can we measure those elements? If some crises are more severe than others, as Larrabee suggests, how can we distinguish empirically between and among these cases (Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, Poland 1980–81)?

In part 3, Edwina Moreton describes a wide range of issues in which East European and Soviet interests are divided. Jane Sharp emphasizes the East European arms control positions vis-a-vis the Soviets. The descriptive elements in both chapters are valuable, but neither Moreton nor Sharp offers more than the most general explanatory comments. For example, Sharp notes that "East European attitudes toward CSCE and MBFR vary according to the orthodoxy of their regimes" (p. 191). This hypothesis deserves attention in her study. If one were to identify criteria of "orthodoxy," would they vary over time with "distance" from the USSR in arms control positions—or other elements of international behavior?

J. F. Brown, Paul Marer, and Jonathan Dean, all seasoned observers of Eastern Europe, contribute three chapters in part 4, "Future Prospects." While all three are wary of their predictive task, these analysts do not offer the reader the insights one might have hoped for. Brown, for example, identifies three approaches the Soviets might take regarding Eastern Europe. These are, however, vaguely identified as decolonization, repression, and "muddling through" (the latter, not surprisingly, being the most likely prospect). Paul Marer, writing about "Intrabloc Economic Relations and Prospects," argues that "increased instability in the domestic economies of [Eastern Europe] and in Soviet-East European relations" is likely, and that "economic prospects. . .are not conducive to the Warsaw Pact moving toward greater alliance cohesion" (p. 234). Marer makes it clear that the Soviet Union, by reducing its implicit subsidization of East European economies, will have less freedom to "enforce alliance cohesion." Unfortunately, "alliance cohesion" remains a vague concept, not considered by Marer because it was not his task to do so, but not operationalized elsewhere in the volume either. Jonathan Dean concludes with a final chapter in which he offers a highly speculative assessment of future Warsaw Pact developments. In Dean's view, communist parties will remain dominant, but "individual aspects of more pluralistic polities will be built into East European political systems" (p. 261).

Throughout these contributions, one is struck by the questions raised but left unanswered. Certainly, the Warsaw Pact is an alliance in transition, but what are the principal components of its transformation? How has the WTO's cohesion changed over time? Has the reliability of its forces been enhanced or reduced? Has the distribution of defense burden changed across countries and over time? And, most importantly, what explains these changes? Although *The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition?* raises such issues in passing, the reader finds no head-on confrontation with conceptual and measurement issues inherent to the study of alliances. The "unexplored questions" that one is told this book considers are never brought into clear focus.

DANIEL NELSON

University of Kentucky

Beyond China's Independent Foreign Policy: Challenge for the U.S. and Its Asian Allies. Edited by James C. Hsiung. (New York: Praeger Publishers, Special Studies, 1985. Pp. vii + 215. $32.95.)

The major catch-phrase of the early days of Sino-U.S. normalization was the "China card"—the presumption that a "united front" between the U.S. and the People's Republic of China would strengthen the U.S. position against the USSR. The initial relation did result in some mutual consultation, and the significant reduction of barriers between the two countries. From the Soviet perspective, the international situation was becoming more critical, especially with the anti-hegemony treaty between strongly pro-U.S. Japan and anti-Soviet China. Following the crises in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Vietnam in the late 70s, the various international actors sorted out the available options. Even if the Gorbachev leadership does not embark on major changes in foreign policy, the funerals of Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko provided opportunities of quasi-summit diplomacy.

Professor Hsiung's volume addresses not only the Sino-Soviet relationship and its continuing evolution, but Beijing's interests and behavior in Asia. He sees China's use of the term "independent" foreign policy to mean Chinese aims to improve relations with the USSR and continue good relations with the U.S., but not to establish an alliance; and to seek common interests with the Third World. The contributors examine the new independent policy of China and its operation and implications for the USSR, the U.S., Japan, Southeast

Asia, and Taiwan. The volume omits the south Asian subcontinent and the Korean peninsula.

The central thrust of the study is the strategic triangle of the U.S., the People's Republic, and the USSR, and its dynamics. Peter Berton notes that Beijing's "breakout from the Soviet-Communist alliance system has given it the opportunity to play an independent role in the global strategic balance of power, a feat that neither Western Europe nor Japan has been willing or able to perform" (p. 7). He sees a bipolar relationship with tripolar tendencies, which may be complicated by a more independent role of Japan in the future.

In another chapter, Berton studies Sino-Soviet relations and sees Moscow as attempting to lure Beijing away from the West with economic incentives. Soviet inflexibility on the three crucial issues of Afghanistan, border forces, and Vietnam will make full normalization difficult, according to Berton. Soviet policy is to hinder or prevent China from becoming a major power, and thus it is not likely that major breakthroughs will occur.

The editor looks at the strategic triangle from the perspective of game theory (especially the Stryker-Psathas game), measuring costs and gains, and concluding that "triadic harmony" is in the best interests of all. This condition is unlikely to materialize because of mutual distrust, the very novelty of the ideal, and the necessity that short-term interests be submerged under long-term interests. The approach reminds us that there is nothing permanent in any of the coalition patterns.

Gavin Boyd's essay examines the domestic and international linkages in Chinese foreign policy, and cautiously concludes that Soviet expansion of influence will probably produce strains in Chinese foreign policy, that frustrated party and military figures may regard renewed revolutionary ideals as imperative, and that the regime requires greater capacity to cope with issues in foreign policy. Steve Chan provides a provocative examination of U.S. perceptions, or "credos," about Sino-Soviet relations. A similar examination of Chinese perceptions would have been welcome in this volume.

James Hsiung concludes the volume with an examination of the consequences of China "playing the pivot" in the triadic relationship. A major consequence is that U.S. policy must undergo a realistic reappraisal in light of the new independent policy. This development also means that the role of Japan and other allies will become more valuable.

The book is a significant analysis of a major development in Asian relations and their implications for American foreign policy, and most timely in examining future developments in Chinese diplomacy.

ROBERT E. BEDESKI

Carleton University

The Export of Hazard. Transnational Corporation and Environmental Control Issues. Edited by Jane H. Ives (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985. Pp. xviii + 229, $19.95.)

This book is the updated product of a 1979 conference on U.S. hazard exports to the development world. It seeks "to provide the global community with substantive information. . .on the issues concerning occupational safety and health, environmental protection, international relations, and regulatory issues" (Ives, p. 1). It largely focuses on the first item, whose regulatory and international dimensions are discussed. Environmental protection is barely considerered.

Hazard export refers to the establishment of "hazardous industrial processes in one country to serve markets in another country where those processes would not be allowed to function" (Castleman, p. 62). The 16 authors who contributed 14 papers, each ranging from 5 to 30 pages, hold a broad perspective that includes consumer protection and environmental protection. They have written descriptive and reflective pieces on the dimensions of the problem and on our moral and political responsibility for dealing with it. U.S. and international regulatory actions are examined by King, Waldo, and Ruttenberg. Ives and Castleman effectively document the extent of the hazard. Several authors raise important ethical and policy questions (e.g., Waldo, Noble), and remedies are suggested (e.g., Ashford, Janasoff). Michaels et al. contribute an interesting review of the obstacles to the implementation of Western standards in the developing world. Waldo also identifies many key issues that deserved more extensive treatment in subsequent chapters. The recommendations offered include issuing warnings of potential hazards to developing countries, training and mobilizing the affected populations, and establishing governmental standards restricting the manufacture and sale of these products.

These papers adequately fulfill the modest objective of the editor. They provide useful, if not rigorous, information on a topic that has not been extensively researched. The bibliographies will be helpful. Several authors clearly identify the political and economic dimensions of the problem.

As a treatment of the issue, however, this book has several shortcomings. There is much overlap. Several papers add very little to our understanding of the topic. More importantly, the general focus remains unclear. What are we trying to understand? Are we concerned with the exportation of hazardous substances (e.g., DDT), or with the manufacture of these substances abroad? Should we focus first on occupational safety and health, or on the protection of ecosystems? Should we restrict our concern to chemicals (as most authors seem to assume) or expand it to other products? Is consumer safety to be included? The contributors to this volume do not share a common scope, which makes their respective remarks difficult to integrate.

This book adds little to the explanation of the policy problem and lack of progress. Political constraints are identified, then ignored. After having documented the failure in defining and implementing effective warnings and regulations, the authors basically ask for more of the same. Why should the prospects for success be greater now? There is a general tendency to overlook the political origins of safety and health standards, as if American norms were absolute and universally applicable. Furthermore, LDC's "inaction" is also often the result not only of their incapacity, but also of deliberate political choices. Most authors find the multinational corporations' search for profits at the root of the problem. However, the desire to avoid costly environmental regulations contributes only a little to the decision to transfer activities abroad. The degree to which multinational corporations have contributed to the deterioration of the health of the local population compared with the effect of local industries in this regard is also unclear. One should finally recognize the positive contribution that multinational corporations can make to environmental protection and safety in developing countries. For example, large businesses tend to be more amenable to improvement than smaller ones, which cannot afford the antipollution technology.

This book is torn between mobilizing for action and analyzing a problem. It deserves a revised and expanded version, perhaps including contributions from political scientists. In the meantime, the information it contains and the problems it identifies can be mined by researchers and activists alike.

PHILIPPE G. LE PRESTRE

Wells College

After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. By Robert O. Keohane. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. Pp. 290. $30.00, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

The "major puzzle" Robert Keohane sets out to answer in *After Hegemony* is the following: "How can cooperation take place in world politics in the absence of hegemony?" In the background of that question is the theory of hegemonic stability according to which (1) order in world politics is typically created by a single dominant power, and (2) the maintenance of that order requires continued hegemony. While disclaiming authorship of that theory, Keohane tests a version of it against post-1945 evidence on the functioning of international cooperation (in the form of regimes) in trade, money, and oil, and finds that the "decline of the American hegemony provides only part of the explanation" for the weakening of such arrangements, for even after about 1970 (when, on his count, hegemony ended), the advanced industrial counties have continued to coordinate their policies in the world political economy, "albeit imperfectly." To explain that continued cooperation, and in answer to his puzzle, he proposes a "functional theory of international regimes" that asserts that cooperation is possible even in the absence of hegemony, because regimes are superior to nonregime situations in several respects, especially for organizations pursuing bounded rationality, leaders who wish to bind their successors, and governments that empathize with others. He hastens to add that his is not a complete explanation, but rather one that needs to be supplemented by a theory of learning, yet to be developed (p. 132).

This is a well-argued and carefully constructed book, sophisticated in its reasoning and aware of its limits. The thought deployed on behalf of international regimes is strong, and the analogies drawn from economic literature (for instance, on market failure) illuminating. After the theoretical chapters, however, I must confess my interest began to flag. The stories of GATT and the IMF, situated though they are amidst the experience of the most explosive growth in world trade ever experienced, proved less than compelling, and the penultimate account of the new oil authority was something of an anticlimax. What, then, does the book really tell us about the larger issues it raises—cooperation, hegemony, and the world political economy?

How surprising is international cooperation, and does it require elaborate theoretical explanation? In truth, it is surprising only to those for whom world politics is an anarchy. If, however, our conception of normal (or ideal) world politics admits of stability at the global level without calling for a world state, then anarchy is hardly the right term for describing it, and cooperation in a variety of forms—regime and nonregime, governmental and nongovernmental, bilateral and multilateral—becomes as unsurprising as conflict. Keohane is, in any event, well aware of the "sugary-sweet" aspect of cooperation, and seeks to give it some tartness; reaching beyond realism, to institutionalism, he rejects the dichotomy between anarchy and hierarchy. However, even though he knows, too, that cooperation is hardly a transcendental value (witness the conspiracies of monopolists and of cliques of vested interests), he persists in embracing this vague and slippery term. If anarchy is in fact a deceptive concept, then cooperation does not really call for special explanation, except for special cases. These last concern innovation and learning, and the book does not really have much to say about either.

What about hegemony? Even for those using that concept, can we be so sure of its passing? (Bruce Russett entered a strong caveat in a recent article in *International Organization*.) Maybe only if we take a rather narrow view of "preponderance of material resources." If we espouse broader views that include politico-strategic resources, the dichotomous picture proposed here—either there is hegemony or there is none—becomes much less clear. If we resort instead to a concept of global leadership, such a broad approach becomes imperative, and must be seen to include not only economic and political resources, but also capacity for community (or empathy) building, and for innovation.

Which brings us, finally, to world political economy, the subject of this book, even though the author's puzzle centers on world politics proper. The former, viewed as the interplay of politics and economics, is a currently fashionable subject, and a welcome corrective to earlier isolationist concepts of the international system. Keohane's command of the temporal (historical) dimension of that field could be firmer. The pre-1945 world hardly seems to exist at all, and as a student of leadership, or at least of hegemony, he should be able to draw freely on earlier instances of that phenomenon (e.g., one article written in 1948 is hardly an adequate basis for judging aspects of the Dutch experience). A historical-evolutionary perspective, in turn, would have taken much of the surprise out of the story of international regimes that must, in the first place, be accounted for as products of functional differentiation in the world system.

Is world political economy, in the long haul, a satisfactory basis for a theory of world politics or a conceptual foundation for political science? On the evidence of this book, it cannot really cope with politico-strategic questions—which is what hegemony and leadership are just as much about—and it leaves out altogether a variety of other systems, such as solidarity, or culture, whose interplay must also be accounted for. What we need, in other words, is an ordered analysis that goes beyond "political economy" toward a truly social-science approach to the world system.

What, then, of Keohane's puzzle? I would rephrase it as follows: in a world of declining leadership, cooperation per se is not necessarily in danger. However, innovation to respond to new global problems—in part, for instance, through the creation of new international regimes to cope with the threat of another global (nuclear) war—might well become an endangered species. The question then becomes, Is such innovation possible?

Keohane could be read as reassuring us that it is.

GEORGE MODELSKI

University of Washington

International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory. Edited by Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1985. Pp. 245. $25.00.)

International Relations: British & American Perspectives. Edited by Steve Smith. (Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985. Pp. xvi + 242. $29.95.)

Each of these volumes makes a useful contribution towards understanding the current state of international relations as a discipline. Each is a collection of specifically commissioned essays, and the diverse selections form an integral whole that introduces students to most of the literature on international relations and to various types of theoretical approaches.

Light and Groom's volume is a set of bibliographic entries well selected; however, the volume does not quite serve as "a handbook of current theory." Most theoretical approaches are referred to, but one senses a need for more comprehensive analytical and evaluative presentation than is available.

Smith's volume is more satisfying in terms of analysis, but suffers somewhat from the pretense that it compares "British and American Perspectives." The authors apparently were under constraints to dichotomize along an essentially false dimension, resulting in rather repetitive construction of strawmen ready for deft destruction. As becomes abundantly clear, the authors strain to contrast two supposedly nationally-based perspectives when there are, in actuality, as many perspectives as authors. Interestingly, only one essay in the volume is authored by American scholars—William Olson's excellent piece on "The Growth of a Discipline: Reviewed," updated by Nick Onuf.

The major impact of what may really serve as a contrast in perspectives follows from the reliance upon verbal, analytical scholars all drawn from the British academy. There is a complete absence in the volume of econometric modelers and other quantitatively oriented scholars. This results in omission of many of the scholars (mostly but not exclusively American) who perform quantitative research or even read what others write. Curiously, Morton Kaplan and James Rosenau emerge as part of the cutting edge of American scholarship, while Zinnes, Rummel, even Singer are barely acknowledged. This may be quite satisfying to those of us who prefer verbal, comprehensive theories to quantitative extrapolations remote from events; however, assaying the field of international relations and omitting such approaches, as do the editors of both volumes under review, limits the usefulness of the collections.

EDWIN FEDDER

University of Missouri
St. Louis

Food Trade and Foreign Policy: India, the Soviet Union, and the United States. By Robert L. Paarlberg. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985. Pp. 265. $29.95, cloth; $12.95, paper.)

Paarlberg's book is lucid and informative, but I think he excludes by definition the main manifestation of "food power," his subject. For Paarlberg, food power is displayed through exports and imports, but governments are seeking food power mainly through developing food self-sufficiency.

Readers will learn much from Paarlberg about food policy making in the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and India. He treats these countries in separate chapters and then presents two case studies: U.S. food aid to India to avert famine from 1965 to 1967; and the 1980 embargo on U.S. grain to the U.S.S.R.

Paarlberg examines—or rather, seeks to refute—two presumptions about food power. The first is that national governments regularly manipulate food imports or exports in search of external advantages. These advantages may be economic, such as improving the trade balance, or political, such as rewarding allies with food aid and punishing adversaries with embargoes. The second presumption is that, when nations do seek food power, exporters rather than importers will more likely succeed. Paarlberg concludes (p. 213) that the three nations studied seldom altered their food trade policies in search of external gains; when they did, the exporter (the U.S.) did not gain an expected foreign policy advantage.

India, he finds, was usually ready to sacrifice foreign policy goals in order to improve its domestic food situation. The Soviet Union moved away from a Czarist/Stalinist policy of expropriating food from citizens to be used in foreign trade to a policy of buying grain—even from enemies—to upgrade Soviet diets. Trade policies for the U.S. were dictated, for the most part, by agricultural interests rather than by foreign policy makers.

When these nations did seek food power they were usually disappointed. However, Paarlberg grants that food power seemed to work when exercised quietly and for developmental ends, as when the U.S. insisted that India take larger steps to develop its own agriculture as a condition for receiving U.S. famine aid. When President Johnson then went on to demand that India support U.S. military action in Vietnam, U.S. food power backfired. So did the 1980 U.S. embargo against the Soviet Union, an effort to convert a successful economic policy into a heavy weapon of geopolitics. The lesson seems to be that food power can work for exporters, if used constructively. Raymond Hopkins and Donald Puchala, in their book *Global Food Dependence* (Columbia University Press, 1980), found that the U.S. exercised food power responsibly in a wide range of agricultural trade, aid, and developmental initiatives.

It seems to me that Paarlberg's categories exclude the major current thrust of food power: domestic agricultural development. Paarlberg sees nations as increasingly interdependent, and casts them as food exporters or importers, but instead they are determinedly achieving self-sufficiency in food. Europe, China, and India are prominent and unlikely examples. Paarlberg indeed notes that self-sufficiency in wheat was a "foremost policy objective" for India's successive governments, but he is obliged to conclude that the Indian government, in yielding to domestic demand by importing grain, had thereby given way on its self-sufficiency objective. A more realistic conclusion is that wheat was imported to maintain a stable environment in which agricultural growth and self-sufficiency could come about.

Nations are more reluctant than ever to be dependent for food, for a number of reasons. One reason is that international grain markets are indeed undependable because of weather and other variables, including the occasional exercise of food power politics. Another reason is that food self-sufficiency has become a mark of status and national pride, especially for populous countries. In addition, increasing food production to meet domestic needs is a feasible way to save foreign exchange. Europe's Common Agricultural Program, championed by Europe's farms and denounced by U.S. agricultural economists, has apparently gained the support of Europe's governments and people despite its cost in program budgets and higher food prices.

With the emergence of prolific agricultural technologies, nations and nation groups are finding food self-sufficiency to be a rather easy goal. For them agricultural trade, though frequently large in quantity, is simply one means of adjusting to the enormous variability which weather and other factors impose upon agricultural production. Exceptions to this move toward self-sufficiency may be found in a few nations with limited agricultural resources, such as Japan, and in a larger number of less-developed countries whose governments have been unable to manage any economic development. Even for these nations solutions may be forthcoming from technology development following the so-called Green Revolution. Particularly for less-developed countries, food self-sufficiency may be a politically feasible strategy superior to pursuing food power through agricultural exports.

After nations expand their agricultures to meet their own effective demand they must also accept the task of managing their abundance. The U.S., which has long coped with the problem of abundance, has tried to regulate production through production controls and price disincentives, while expanding effective demand through measures such as food stamps and Food-for-Peace. India's system of "fair price shops" is another kind of management program described by Paarlberg. Political leaders have, then, already forged large-scale management programs apparently compatible with the interests of producers, consumers, and the nation. Still more ingenuity will be needed if nations, as they achieve the food power goal of self-sufficiency, are not to be embarrassed by the problem of abundance.

DON F. HADWIGER

Iowa State University

Soviet Perceptions of the Developing World in the 1980s: The Ideological Basis. By Daniel S. Papp. (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath/Lexington Books, 1985. Pp. xiii + 177. $20.00.)

Daniel Papp's book provides an extremely thorough discussion of Soviet civilian writing on the Third World. After reviewing the development of Soviet thought on this subject through the 1970s, the book concentrates on the period from 1980 to 1984. For this study, Papp has explored a vast amount of Soviet material, set forth clearly the various aspects of Soviet thinking about the Third World, and identified debates among academicians on several issues.

If there is anything to criticize about this book, it is not what the author examined, but what he did not. It would have been interesting, for instance, if the author had as carefully examined Soviet military literature on the Third World during this period to see what sort of policy implications this had. In addition, a discussion of just what role or influence these Soviet academicians who write about the Third World have on actual Soviet foreign policy would be useful. Can their views actually influence policy, or do they merely reflect the policies and ideas of the foreign policy leadership?

The answer to this question is important in those instances when there is disagreement among scholars about various issues regarding the Third World. Often these differences over theoretical issues imply very different policy prescriptions. An examination of these debates compared with current and subsequent Soviet foreign policy actions may or may not tell us something about how influential Soviet academics are in policy making, but it could inform us about whether the occurrence of these debates and subsequent changes in Soviet foreign policy are common, and hence, whether we can expect future academic debates to signal foreign policy changes.

Papp makes the point that events in the Third World seem to provide a growing challenge to what Marxism-Leninism envisions as "historical progress" in the less-developed countries. Specifically, there are now a number of young Marxist regimes facing armed internal opposition that they have been unable to defeat, even after many years of fighting: for example, Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Nicaragua. In addition, there are new revolutionary ideologies, such as Islamic fundamentalism, that directly compete with Marxism-Leninism for adherents in the Third World. Finally, Soviet foreign policy actions—such as the invasion of Afghanistan—have themselves alienated many in the Third World.

Papp mentions that all these developments may serve to shake the faith in the USSR concerning the utility of Marxism-Leninism in explaining change in the Third World. A fruitful area of research for other scholars would be what the views of different governments, intellectuals, officers, and others in the Third World regarding Marxism-Leninism and the USSR have been, and how they have changed. The success or failure of Soviet foreign policy in the Third World undoubtedly depends more on how Third World audiences regard the USSR than how Soviet academics regard the Third World.

It must be emphasized that Papp's study is an excellent one. It is a credit to his work that it gives rise to other questions that will be much more difficult for scholars to answer.

MARK N. KATZ

Kennan Institute for
Advanced Russian Studies

The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy from Truman to Reagan. By Steven L. Spiegel. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985. Pp. xv + 512. $24.95.)

Originally, the author of this book intended to analyze the impact of interest groups and bureaucracies on the U.S.'s Middle East policies. After 200 pages, he decides that neither interest groups nor bureaucracies have much of an impact on those policies. He further concludes that, contrary to common belief, American policies regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict are not primarily reactions to events in the Middle East. Rather, Speigel argues, "American foreign policy can be understood only by studying the ideas, the attitudes, and the experiences of the 'people at the top'" (p. 390). He develops this thesis through a detailed analysis of the processes of foreign policy regarding the Middle East in the administrations of Truman through Reagan.

The thesis is not convincingly developed, in my view. This is partly because of the cursory treatment of alternative approaches, such as systems theory, bureaucratic politics, and pluralist theory. These are all discussed in one brief chapter at the conclusion of the book, but the discussion does not do justice to the richness of the literature (pro and con) on those approaches. This may well be attributable to the suspicions of the publisher (shared by the author?) that the policy-oriented audience for this book would not be terribly interested in a prolonged theoretical debate.

The book's major thesis also seems contradicted by evidence presented by Speigel himself, especially, if the reader (such as, to be honest, this reviewer) is not inclined to agree with it. The dust jacket of the book announces that Spiegel challenges the belief that U.S. policy on the Middle East primarily reacts to events in that region. However, throughout the volume one reads such statements as "Johnson's policy emerged as an improvisational reaction to events" (p. 125); "After Nixon's second election, events at home and abroad dramatically altered the formulation of foreign policy, especially toward the Middle East" (p. 219); and, finally, "Carter selected associates who would pursue a common Mideast strategy....Events swamped that strategy" (p. 315). There are similar statements about Kissinger and Reagan. Spiegel claims that "what explains American policy after a crisis are the assumptions and attitudes held by U.S. policymakers before the external event" (p. 384). He shows quite clearly, however, that those assumptions and attitudes are largely a function of previous external events.

None of the critical comments, however, should be allowed to obscure that this book is a magnum opus as well as a tour de force. Spiegel began working on this project in 1973. In the ensuing years he interviewed over 300 people intensely involved in American foreign policy and Middle Eastern politics, many extremely well placed to provide insights into both, such as Clark Clifford, Harold Saunders, James Schlesinger, Yitzhak Rabin, and even Ronald Reagan (before he became president). The book has over 1600 footnotes. Admittedly, these might constitute a monument to pedantry, but in this case they are an accurate indicator of the meticulous care with which Spiegel has addressed a mountain of complex information. Furthermore, he did so in a relatively dispassionate, even if not exactly disinterested, fashion. The result is that each chapter on policy making in the different administrations contains a masterful analysis of the interplay of external factors, domestic political forces, bureaucratic struggles, and the ideas and desires of presidential elites, however debatable Spiegel's assessment of the relative impact of these may be.

This reviewer would challenge several of Speigel's assumptions and assertions. For example, if Israel is as valuable an ally, for strategic reasons, as Spiegel suggests, why is it that virtually no country in the world other than the United States takes advantage of the opportunity to establish close relations with it? Might that not have something to do with the impact of the pro-Israeli lobby in the United States, which Spiegel argues (p. 388) does not have great leverage on U.S. policy in the Mideast? It is nonetheless a tribute to Speigel's essential fairness that a reader can disagree with his outlook and never feel that he is manipulating his data in a misleading way to buttress his own point of view. In short, this is an important book, certain to be of great interest to all students of the U.S.'s Mideast policy, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the international politics of the Middle East.

JAMES LEE RAY

Florida State University

Making the Alliance Work: The United States and Western Europe. By Gregory F. Treverton (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985. $24.95.)

Continuity of Discord: Crises and Responses in the Atlantic Community. Edited by Robert J. Jackson (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985. Pp. 288. $33.95.)

Both the books under review take as their backdrop assertions and assumptions that trans-Atlantic relations, and particularly NATO relations, have been in a state of crisis during much of the post–World War II period. From there the two part company. *Making the Alliance Work* challenges this view. Treverton sets out to provide a single framework for understanding the repeated ups and downs that have characterized relations between Western Europe and the United States, and emerges in a fairly sanguine mood. *Continuity of Discord* approaches the subject of its subtitle, "Crises and Responses in the Atlantic Community," differently. It is an edited collection of papers presented at the 1983 annual conference of the Committee on Atlantic Studies, with contributions by scholars from both sides of the Atlantic and several different disciplines. Thus we have many points of departure for describing the vagaries of the alliance, and for living together in relative harmony within the context of the unwieldy entity that is NATO.

In the past few years, as Jackson points outs, we have been swamped by books and articles devoted to alleged crises in the Atlantic Alliance. Testimony to this, in a footnote extending well over a page, is a list of many prominent names from the European and American scholarly communities, journalism, and government. Almost all the citations are to articles, many of them published in *Foreign Affairs.* Of the five books cited, only A. E. W. De Porte's *Europe Between the Superpowers* and Earl Ravenal's *NATO's Unremarked Demise* are works by single author's. It has long been a puzzle why there have been so few good, meaty books on NATO in recent years, and why most of the articles say roughly the same things at fairly regular intervals. It was encouraging, therefore, to have Treverton's work, and refreshing to read that he intends to provide us not only with a conceptual framework for understanding what has happened between the Western allies during the past three and a half decades, but also with some guidelines for the future—an ambitious undertaking.

Treverton deals with the nature of the alliance, the nuclear dilemma, defense and detente in Europe, defense beyond Europe, the impact of economics, and managing alliance politics. It is broad ranging, historically well documented, and clearly written. In each area the author asks, What has changed in the structure of the alliance? How different are the interests of the Europeans and the United States? How similar do the policies of allies need to be? The answers to these questions are not exactly new, although presumably they cannot be left unsaid. There are many differences in every sphere: changes in the political balance of power within the alliance, with American dominance diminished; changes in the nature of the security concerns and their place in the transatlantic relationship; and, finally, changes in economic concerns in both Western Europe and North America, with economic concerns now taking precedence over security concerns, and much more intermingled than in the early days of the Alliance.

Examples of past difficulties (converted into successes when viewed in retrospect) are nicely documented, but, by the very nature of the subject matter, there is much familiar material. However, Treverton is interesting in the chapter on defense beyond Europe and in his constant reminder that we must not neglect the domestic side to allied political and economic concerns. Unfortunately, his conclusions are a let-down. Although this will be an extremely useful book in graduate schools because it is clear and comprehensive, the reader does not really need to go through nearly 200 pages of history and analysis to be left with the prognosis that the alliance will last for 30 more years because it is better than the alternatives, and that the main prerequisites for longevity will be a modest amount of luck and sensible management.

Given what was said at the beginning of this review about the abundance of articles on the Atlantic Alliance and the paucity of good monographs, this reviewer was not very happy to go through yet another edited collection of papers originally designed for presentation at a conference. With all the editorial skill in the world and a firm hand on the contributors, such books almost always suffer from three serious deficiencies: first, with as many as 12 essays there is a disconcerting unevenness in breadth and depth of treatment; second, since all the contributors are well-known authorities in their respective fields and have published extensively, their essays run the risk of repeating what they have written or said in other contexts; third, the kind of contemporaneity that is reasonably possible in a monograph becomes exceedingly difficult to maintain in a collection of conference papers.

Bearing in mind all the differences in style, background, and discipline of the contributors, the coverage of *Continuity of Discord* is excellent. After a most interesting theoretical introduction on the concept of crisis by editor Robert J. Jackson, the book goes into the historical background to current crises and responses with informative pieces by two contributors. It follows with two sets of four essays; one under the heading "Military Crises and Response," the other on "Economic Crises and Responses." The book concludes with a thought-provoking theoretical essay by Nils Andrén on the possible future of Europe, in which he provides six different models for the 1970's in his *Europe's Futures, Europe's Choices: Models of Western Europe in the 1970's* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).

At least Andrén does partly overcome one of the most serious deficiencies in the literature on the Atlantic Alliance: the great lack of imagination in prescriptions for the future. By and large, when authors do venture into that admittedly dangerous territory they opt for either a little bit more of the status quo or a little bit less. The kind of boldness and sweep evinced by Helmut Schmidt in his recently published *A Grand Strategy for the West* can probably come only from a retired statesman answerable to few critics.

GLENDA G. ROSENTHAL

Columbia University

WOMEN GUARDING MEN

Lynn Zimmer

"This book vividly illuminates the legal, structural, and interpersonal dilemmas of women guards in men's prisons, and the various adaptations the women used to overcome these barriers."—Susan E. Martin, author of *"Breaking and Entering": Police Women on Patrol*

Cloth $25.00 288 pages

PROFESSIONAL POWERS

A Study of the Institutionalization of Formal Knowledge

Eliot Freidson

"A new book by Eliot Freidson is an event in sociology. This one will not disappoint. [Freidson] lucidly works his way toward a general sociology of occupations." —Magali Sarfatti-Larson, Temple University

Cloth $20.00 260 pages

HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE STATE IN LATIN AMERICA

Private Challenges to Public Dominance

Daniel C. Levy

"Levy's work fills a significant void in Latin American studies. It will deservedly become an indispensable source for scholars and practitioners."—Guillermo O'Donnell, University of Notre Dame.

Cloth $27.50 452 pages

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
5801 South Ellis Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637

THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN

Joseph Vining

"In this remarkably wide-ranging meditation Professor Vining explores some profound issues of hierarchy, encompassing law, bureaucracy, and theology."—Paul A. Freund, Harvard Law School

Cloth $25.00 288 pages

HEGEMONY AND CULTURE

Politics and Religious Change among the Yoruba

David D. Laitin

Laitin explores the politics of religious change among the Yoruba of Nigeria and develops a theory of hegemony from the work of Antonio Gramsci to explain why this change did not result in political conflict.

Paper $13.95 (est.) 272 pages
Library cloth edition $30.00 (est.)

CLAIRE BRETECHER © LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR

WRITING FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS

How to Start and Finish Your Thesis, Book, or Article

Howard S. Becker

With a Chapter by **Pamela Richards**

Becker offers eminently useful suggestions for ways to make social scientists better and more productive writers. Throughout, Becker's focus is on the elusive work habits that contribute to good writing, not the more easily learned rules of grammar or punctuation.

Paper $6.95 180 pages
Library cloth edition $20.00
Chicago Guides to Writing, Editing, and Publishing



ANTHROPOLOGY AS CULTURAL CRITIQUE

An Experimental Moment
in the Human Sciences
George E. Marcus *and*
Michael M. J. Fischer

"A remarkable and very important book. It considers the present state of anthropology, situating that state in its recent history and in relation to other social sciences and to the major features of the social and intellectual scene—art, literature, literary criticism, cultural criticism, relativism, and the various states of *Zeitgeist* from the 1900s through today."—David Schneider, University of California, Santa Cruz

Paper $9.95   220 pages
Library cloth edition $22.00

New paperbacks

THE DYNAMICS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Stephen M. Meyer
With a Foreword by **Joseph S. Nye, Jr.**
$8.95   246 pages

HEGEL, HEIDEGGER, AND THE GROUND OF HISTORY

Michael Allen Gillespie
$8.95   234 pages

THE POLITICAL THEORY OF *THE FEDERALIST*

David F. Epstein
$9.95   244 pages

THE WHALE AND THE REACTOR

A Search for Limits in
an Age of High Technology
Langdon Winner

Considering a wide range of issues, theories, and social movements, Winner explores the philosophical, political, and social implications of technology. He demonstrates that choices about the kinds of technical systems we build and use are actually *political* decisions, involving profound choices about power, liberty, order, and justice.

Cloth $17.50   214 pages

SRI LANKA —ETHNIC FRATRICIDE AND THE DISMANTLING OF DEMOCRACY

S. J. Tambiah

"Stanley Tambiah's passionate analysis of Sinhalese-Tamil conflicts in Sri Lanka represents a model for explaining much of the political violence in our time."
—Milton Singer

Cloth $17.95   216 pages   1 map

ASSESSING THE NUCLEAR AGE

Edited by **Len Ackland**
and **Steven McGuire**

"This collection is indispensable for anyone who seeks a serious understanding of international security and arms control."—Donald Kennedy, President, Stanford University

Paper $12.95   384 pages
Library cloth edition $29.00   384 pages
Distributed for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
5801 South Ellis Avenue,
Chicago, IL 60637



NORMAN JACOBSON

PRIDE &

SOLACE

THE FUNCTIONS AND LIMITS

of

POLITICAL THEORY

The Development of Plato's Political Theory

George Klosko, Univ. of Virginia

"Professor Klosko has thus made an important contribution to the field of political theory. He has provided a complete, deeply reasoned account of Plato's political thought, which is likely to become the standard commentary for many years to come."—Professor Julian H. Franklin

Giving life and interest to the central strands of the *Republic,* George Klosko traces the development of Plato's political thought around his life-long preoccupation with moral and political reform. He draws connections throughout between changes in Plato's politics and changes in other aspects of his philosophy, especially epistemology and moral psychology.

March 263 pp. #9754 $29.95/cloth
#9759 $11.50/paper

Now available in paperback

Pride and Solace

The Functions and Limits of Political Theory

Norman Jacobson, Univ. California, Berkeley

"A passionate book written by one who feels the need to confront, deal with and then put into words the dilemmas ...of modern political beings who must set limits and retain their humanity in a chaotic world not in the least conducive to these goals. The quibbles which one may have about particulars in the book often pale before its rhetorical and poetic power."
—*The American Political Science Review*

Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau are the points of departure for this unique exploration of political theory through the twin themes of pride and solace.

April 190 pp. #9788 $8.95/paper

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PLATO'S POLITICAL THEORY

GEORGE KLOSKO

Also of interest...

Socialism, the State and Public Policy in France

Edited by ***Philip Cerny***
and ***Martin Schain***

1985 220 pp. #9384 $29.95/cloth
#9416 $12.95/paper

Methuen

29 WEST 35th STREET, NEW YORK, NY 10001

LibertyPress



ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAW

By Arthur R. Hogue

First published in 1966 by Indiana University Press Arthur R. Hogue's *Origins of the Common Law* looks at the deep medieval roots of our legal system during the early formative period of the common law. Between 1154 and 1307, from the reign of Henry II to that of Edward I, common law experienced a spectacular growth as a legal system enforced in the English Royal Courts. Paraphrasing Professor Hogue: in the form of writs, judicial decisions, treatises, royal ordinances, and parliamentary statutes, the common law, in large part the definition of established customs, emerged into explicit written form and formal procedure to order better such ordinary relationships among Englishmen as those between landlord and tenant, merchant and money lender, and buyer and seller.

In his final chapter, "From Medieval Law to Modern Law," Hogue concludes, "The rule of law, the development of law by means of judicial precedents, the use of the jury to determine the material facts of a case, and the definition of numerous causes of action—these form the principal and valuable legacy of the medieval law to the modern law." And one might add, to the growth of the concept of liberty as well.

This thoughtful, lucid account is a work of history, not a technical legal treatise, and should be of interest to the general reader and the specialist alike.

Hardcover $10.00	ISBN 0-86597-053-X
Paperback $ 4.50	ISBN 0-86597-054-8

Prepayment is required on all orders not for resale. We pay book rate postage on prepaid orders. Please allow 4 to 6 weeks for delivery. *All* orders from outside the United States *must* be prepaid *in U.S. dollars*. To order, or for a copy of our catalogue, write:
Liberty*Press*/Liberty*Classics*
7440 North Shadeland, Dept. S103
Indianapolis, IN 46250

BROOKINGS

Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics

William B. Quandt

The Camp David Accords represent a watershed in modern Middle East history. William Quandt, a participant in the Camp David negotiations, draws on his experiences, access to public records, and interviews to produce this in-depth study of American policy in the Middle East from 1977 to 1979. He explains the success of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and the inability of President Carter to resolve the Palestinian question. "Bill Quandt has written a splendid book. I commend it to expert and novice alike. He tells the intriguing story of Camp David and the Middle East peace negotiations with the skill of a master storyteller and the insight of an outstanding scholar."—Cyrus R. Vance. "The most authoritative account of a major historic event, written with scrupulous scholarship by a key behind-the-scenes participant."—Zbigniew Brzezinski.

March 1986/426 pages/$12.95 paper/$32.95 cloth

Constitutional Reform and Effective Government

James L. Sundquist

As the United States prepares to celebrate the bicentennial of the Constitution, politicians, statesmen, and scholars, frustrated by the recurrent conflict and deadlock between the president and Congress, are debating whether the time has come to change the fundamental structure of our government. Sundquist, a distinguished analyst of Congress and the party system, reviews the debate and examines what changes might work best. "This is a remarkably good book. It is cool, thoughtful, insightful, balanced, and wise. It has anticipated what will undoubtedly be considerable public debate... the book is splendid and should find a wide audience."—Aaron Wildavsky. "No one has worked out the need for constitutional change, and the obstacles to it, with more surgical skill and human understanding. This is 'must reading' as we enter an era of constitutional celebration and reassessment."—James MacGregor Burns.

January 1986/262 pages/$9.95 paper/$26.95 cloth

The Ultimate Insiders: U.S. Senators in the National Media

Stephen Hess

In this book, the third volume in the highly acclaimed Newswork series, Stephen Hess examines which Senators are seen on the television networks' nightly news, written about in leading newspapers, interviewed on the Sunday morning programs—and why. His well-documented conclusions will surprise those who believe that the future in American public life belongs to the "blow-dried" politicians. "*The Ultimate Insiders* is one of the more entertaining and informative exercises in political science I have read in years. . . . It is a pleasure to read. . . . This is a richly informed study and a solid piece of professional work."—Gary C. Jacobson, University of California, San Diego. ". . . a tour de force. . . . A model for media studies."—Everette E. Dennis, Executive Director, Gannett Center for Media Studies.

May 1986/c. 150 pages/$8.95 paper/$22.95 cloth

Religion in American Public Life

A. James Reichley

Focusing on the continuing controversy over the separation of church and state, this timely book examines the historical interaction of religious groups, governments, and the courts in America. It considers the values that public life and religion share and discusses how they can continue to interact without threat to civil liberties or religious freedom. "It would be virtually impossible to find a better summary of the history, law, and current controversy about religion in the American public life. . . . Those who are expert in the field will find *Religion in American Public Life* a useful summary and handbook. Those who wish to learn more about the field will find it a superb introduction . . . . Mr. Reichley is to be applauded and congratulated."—Andrew Greeley, *Political Science Quarterly*.

1985/402 pages/$11.95 paper/$31.95 cloth

The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 797-6258

BROOKINGS

BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSIBILITY

John P. Burke

*H*ow are we to make those bureaucracies upon which government relies both accountable and responsive? John Burke's answer lies in his linkage between individual responsibility and the notion of democracy. Responsibility lies not so much in the formally defined terms and obligations of a particular office as in its relation to the institutions of American democracy and to the public consent. In framing his argument, Burke brilliantly joins descriptive analysis with political theory and prescriptive speculation—and makes a significant, timely case for a more responsible bureaucracy.

$28.50

ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS

Sotirios A. Barber

"*B*arber takes constitutional interpretation to uncharted depths of meaning where it must penetrate some of the toughest and most enduring questions of political authority."—*Stanley C. Brubaker, Constitutional Commentary*

"Enlightening and provocative, an argument of considerable moral force yet of exemplary nonpartisanship."—*G. Alan Tarr, Perspective*

Now in paperback, this book abandons the usual point-by-point perspective and confronts the Constitution as a whole. Blending various approaches, Sotirios Barber proposes a theory of constitutional aspirations and assesses how well the framers expressed their view of constitutional order.

$8.95 ***paperback***
$20.00 ***hardcover***

THE
JOHNS HOPKINS
UNIVERSITY PRESS

701 West 40th Street, Suite 275, Baltimore, Maryland 21211

FIRST-CLASS POLITICAL SCIENCE BOOKS FROM PRAEGER

THE UNTAPPED POWER OF THE PRESS

Explaining Government to the People

Lewis W. Wolfson

Foreword by **John Chancellor**

"This is a first-class examination of the way the press covers government as well as political issues."

—Albert Hunt, Washington Bureau Chief, *The Wall Street Journal*

An absorbing picture of how the news of Washington is generated and how that process can be enriched.

paperback: $9.95 1985
cloth: $28.95

MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT

Male and Female Interpretations

Jean Bethke Elshtain

(Women and Politics Series)

By defining how the major Western philosophers—from Luther to Arendt—defined "private" and "public," "politics" and "family," this book provides students with an analysis of the role women have played in the State throughout history.

paperback: $11.95 (tent.) May 1986
cloth: $23.95 (tent.)

Forthcoming . . .

PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION

Description and Analysis

Robert E. Denton, Jr. and **Robert E. Hahn**

paperback: $14.95 (tent.) August 1986
cloth: $36.95 (tent.)

Also of Interest . . .

THE EGALITARIAN CITY

Issues of Rights, Distribution, Access, and Power

edited by **Janet K. Boles**

cloth: $34.95 February 1986

STAR WARS

The Strategic Defense Initiative Debates in Congress

Senator Larry Pressler

cloth: $19.95 June 1986

CLASS, STATE, AND DEMOCRACY IN JAMAICA

Carl Stone

cloth: $32.95 March 1986

Praeger PUBLISHERS
A Division of Greenwood Press, Inc.
88 Post Road West • P.O. Box 5007 • Westport, CT 06881

New. Significant. Basic.


The RISE of MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW
From Constitutional Interpretation to Judge-Made Law
Christopher Wolfe

The Rise of Modern Judicial Review

From Constitutional Interpretation to Judge-Made Law

CHRISTOPHER WOLFE

This sweeping history of judicial review shows how the power to enforce the Constitution evolved into the power to adapt it to new ends. Christopher Wolfe, a brilliant young Constitutional scholar, illustrates how judicial review originated in the writings of the Founding Fathers and was dramatically transformed by 19th- and 20th-century judges. Wolfe describes how judicial review has become another variant of legislative power, and his study raises important questions about the Constitutional underpinnings and political consequences of this vast expansion of judicial authority.

"A sober and serious defense of a traditional perspective that has been too lightly dismissed in recent years."—JEREMY A. RABKIN, Cornell University

"At once comprehensive, historically rich, and theoretically deep. It is a book, to put it simply, that merits the attention of everyone."—GARY McDOWELL, *The Washington Times*

$24.95

Who Profits

Winners, Losers, and Government Regulation

ROBERT A. LEONE

Whether coping with a new health ordinance or weighing a new tax, corporate managers daily confront an "iron law": all goverment policies create winners and losers. The signal contribution of this extraordinarily useful book by a Harvard economist is that it shows policymakers how to identify the winners and losers of particular policies while helping business managers to maximize their gains (or at least limit their losses) arising from such policies.

"A valuable guide to the indirect and sometimes unintended consequences of government regulation."—WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, The Cato Institute

$17.95





Checks Unbalanced

The Quiet Side of Public Spending

HERMAN B. LEONARD

A Harvard scholar provides an eye-opening account of the billions of taxpayers' dollars that are not subject to Congressional scrutiny—how such programs came into being and what can (and cannot) be done to make them more accountable to the public. "Read *Checks Unbalanced*: It's good for you. Leonard shows that our true public debt is double what we think. Readers will find new truths here that exacerbate old problems and initiate needed changes."—PAUL SAMUELSON

"There are practical, real lessons here for those involved in developing public policies."—GOVERNOR MICHAEL DUKAKIS

$18.95

Basic Books, Inc. **10 East 53rd St., New York, NY 10022**
Call toll free (800) 638-3030

Public Schooling and the Education of Democratic Citizens

By RICHARD M. BATTISTONI

A sound and ideologically balanced analysis of civic education and its malaise in present-day America. "A much needed contribution . . . Mr. Battistoni has done his homework, both ancient and modern." —David Matthews
$20.00

Political Origins of the U.S. Income Tax

By JEROLD L. WALTMAN

A timely analysis of how politics has shaped the codes regulating the U.S. government's major source of revenue. "Exceptionally good at analyzing the difficulties in determining just what is considered to be income and at what rate it should be taxed . . . provides a clear description of how politics affects tax laws." —*Booklist* $12.50

Metropolitan America

Urban Life and Urban Policy in the United States, 1940-1980

By KENNETH FOX

An urban history of contemporary America that charts the rise and maturation of the metropolitan area as the prevailing form of American community.
$27.50

A "Scottsboro" Case in Mississippi

The Supreme Court and Brown v. Mississippi

By RICHARD C. CORTNER

An absorbing analysis of the litigation in which the Supreme Court made a pathbreaking decision in 1936 showing the unconstitutionality of coerced confessions. A case that exonerated three black sharecroppers tortured into confessing to a murder they did not commit. $17.50

University Press of Mississippi
3825 Ridgewood Road / Jackson, MS 39211

New...
from Syracuse University Press

Hanna Sheehy-Skeffington
Irish Feminist

Leah Levenson and Jerry H. Natterstad

An "excellent biography of an exceptional, determined woman.... Irish patriot-feminist seems a contradiction, but in Levenson and Natterstad's revelatory resurrection, Sheehy-Skeffington, who died in 1946, embodies not only both commitments but also leftist politics which caused her to disavow her Roman Catholicism."—*Publishers Weekly*

240 pages, 23 photos, index $22.50

Women in Egyptian Public Life

Earl L. Sullivan

Egypt is the most progressive of all the Arab countries, a fact reflected in the role and position of women. Sullivan discusses women in parliament, the political opposition, and business.

248 pages, index $29.95

Women Farmers in Africa
Rural Development in Mali and the Sahel

Edited by Lucy E. Creevey

"Fills a real need.... An unusual and valuable contribution to the literature on women in rural development."—Barbara Lewis, Rutgers University

232 pages, 14 photos, map, index
Cloth $29.95 Paper $14.95

Development and Social Change in Rural Egypt

Richard H. Adams, Jr.

Adams spent nearly two years living and working with peasant farmers and agricultural officials in two villages in upper and lower Egypt. His findings reveal that the Egyptian government's planned rural reform program has been far from a success.

248 pages, 27 photos, tables, index $29.95

Religion and Modernization in Southeast Asia

Fred R. von der Mehden

A revisionist analysis of the impact of religion on modernization in five Southeast Asian countries.

232 pages, tables, index
Cloth $29.95 Paper $14.95

Syracuse University Press
1600 Jamesville Avenue
Syracuse, New York 13244-5160

The Ties That Bind

Intelligence Cooperation Between the UKUSA Countries

Jeffrey Richelson and Desmond Ball

"This book deals with the cooperation of the intelligence services of the US, Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The almost encyclopedic early chapters describe in detail the history and structure of the many intelligence organizations, their purposes, locations, and leading personnel. . . . The authors examine noncooperation, withholding and deceit among allies. . . . domestic covert action and surveillance, break-ins, and dirty tricks. . . . A revealing, highly informative, and penetrating analysis." **Choice** *1986 402pp. HB $29.95 0-04-327092-1*

The Dominican Republic

Politics and Development in an Unsovereign State

Jan Knippers Black

This timely work offers a general introduction to the Dominican Republic, and places the nation's current economic and political crises in perspective. The text begins with a comprehensive overview of the nation's history, social and economic structures, political institutions, and international ties. It then addresses the political tension generated by the contradictory demands of the Dominican Republic's impoverished population and the representatives of U.S. political, military, and economic interests. *1986 160pp. HB $22.95 0-04-497000-5 PB $11.95 0-04-497001-3*

Sikh Separatism

The Politics of Faith

Rajiv A. Kapur

Separatist demands by India's Sikh community have become a serious threat to the country's unity and stability. Yet Sikh separatism did not appear suddenly; it has deep social, historical, and religious roots in a reform movement that helped mold contemporary Sikh identity. This book examines not only the movement, but also its resulting — profound — political implications. *1986 240pp. HB $29.95 0-04-320179-2*

The Essential Left,

Second Edition

Five Classic Texts on the Principles of Socialism

Edited by David McLellan

Each of these writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Mao is a classic in its own right. Together they illustrate the broad scope of Marxist thought, and form an excellent and indispensable introduction to Marxist thought over the last 150 years. *The Communist Manifesto; Value, Price, and Profit; Socialism: Utopian and Scientific; The State and Revolution;* and *On Contradiction* are reproduced here in their entirety with clear introductions and lists for further reading. *1986 320pp. PB $6.95 0-04-335056-9*

Population Growth in Latin America and U.S. National Security

Edited by John Saunders

This volume analyzes the demographic dimensions of Latin America's rapid population growth, and then considers the consequences these dimensions may have for American security. The interrelations between these two issues are discussed for the first time in this comprehensive text by noted scholars in Latin American demography and national security studies. *1986 224pp. HB $24.95 0-04-497002-1*

Sovereign Statehood

The Basis of International Society

Alan James

The states which engage in international relations vary enormously in size and strength. The one thing they have in common, however, is their sovereignty — and it is this sovereign status which makes them eligible to participate in international activity. By drawing on copious examples, James deals with many of the most far-reaching events and issues since the Second World War, and so brings to vivid life the meaning and significance of what is, arguably, the most elemental concept in international relations. *1986 272pp. HB $37.95 0-04-320190-3 PB $14.95 0-04-320191-1*

Key Concepts in International Relations

Allen & Unwin

8 Winchester Place, Winchester, MA 01890

Toll Free: (800) 547-8889 in Canada and the U.S.: (617) 729-0830

Princeton University Press

Placing Parties in American Politics

Organization, Electoral Settings, and Government Activity in the Twentieth Century

David R. Mayhew

"This book will be *the* leading contemporary study of party organization, and one of the leading studies of that subject, period."

—Stanley Kelley, Jr., Princeton University

Illustrated. P: $9.95. C: $38.50

Planning the Capitalist City

The Colonial Era to the 1920s

Richard E. Foglesong

"*Planning the Capitalist City* will become on publication the most important book on the history and development of planning in the United States."

—Thomas Bender, New York University

$25.00

First Things

An Inquiry into the First Principles of Morals and Justice

Hadley Arkes

This book restores to us an understanding that was once settled in the "moral sciences": that there are propositions, in morals and law, which are not only true but which cannot be otherwise.

P: $11.95. C: $50.00

Political System and Change

A *World Politics* Reader

Edited by *Ikuo Kabashima* and *Lynn T. White III*

Many essays in this anthology are concise summaries of later books that are now famous landmarks in the study of comparative politics.

The volume contains essays by *Lynn T. White III* and *Ikuo Kabashima, David Easton, Gabriel A. Almond, J. Roland Pennock, Samuel P. Huntington, Ted Gurr, Robert D. Putnam, Claude Ake, C. S. Whitaker, Jr., Howard J. Wiarda, Ikuo Kabashima; Harry Eckstein,* and *Tony Smith.*

P: $8.95. C: $32.50

The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830–1980

Lisa Anderson

Moving beyond existing Eurocentric theories of state building, Lisa Anderson examines the role of state formation and disintegration in shaping social structure and political organization in Tunisia and Libya between 1830 and 1980. Her work offers an original theoretical interpretation of political change in the third world, emphasizing the relative independence of state formation from domestic social forces, its reversability, and the causal role of both state formation and state destruction in transforming society.

3 maps. $35.00

Princeton Studies on the Near East

New Limited Paperback Edition

The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism

John B. Dunlop

LPE: $13.50. C: $32.50

At your bookstore or

Princeton University Press
41 William Street, Princeton, NJ 08540

Recent Titles from Agathon Press

Political Science: The Science of Politics.

Edited by Herbert F. Weisberg, *The Ohio State University*

Published in cooperation with the American Political Science Association.

Contributors: Paul Allen Beck, Lawrence C. Dodd, Charles H. Franklin, James L. Gibson, John E. Jackson, Gerald H. Kramer, Duncan MacRae, Jr., Gary J. Miller, Terry M. Moe, Richard G. Niemi, Bert A. Rockman, Kenneth A. Shepsle, Herbert F. Weisberg

320 pp. ISBN 0-87586-066-4 (cloth) $32.00
1986 075-3 (paper) $15.00

Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences.

Edited by Bernard Grofman, *University of California, Irvine,*
and Arend Lijphart, *University of California, San Diego*

Contributors: Gordon E. Baker, Carol A. Cassel, Maurice Duverger, Richard L. Engstrom, Peter C. Fishburn, Bernard Grofman, Graham Gudgin, R.J. Johnston, Richard S. Katz, William R. Keech, Arend Lijphart, Peter Mair, Michael D. McDonald, Rafael Lopez Pintor, William H. Riker, Giovanni Sartori, Howard A. Scarrow, Yasunori Sone, Peter J. Taylor, Leon Weaver, Jack F.H. Wright

352 pp. ISBN 0-87586-064-8 (cloth) $38.00
1986 074-5 (paper) $16.50

Economic Conditions and Electoral Outcomes: The United States and Western Europe.

Edited by Heinz Eulau, *Stanford University*, and Michael S. Lewis-Beck, *University of Iowa*

Proceedings of the 1984 Shambaugh Conference, University of Iowa

Contributors: James E. Alt, Paolo Bellucci, Heinz Eulau, Stanley Feldman, D. Roderick Kiewiet, Jean Dominique Lafay, Thomas D. Lancaster, Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Ola Listhaug, Arthur H. Miller, Helmut Norpoth, Mark Peffley, Douglas Rivers, Friedrich Schneider, Marie France Toinet, Paul Whiteley

265 pp. ISBN 0-87586-071-0 (cloth) $24.00
1985 072-9 (paper) $15.00

Politics in Context: Assimilation and Conflict in Urban Neighborhoods.

By Robert Huckfeldt, *Indiana University*

An important new contribution to the literature that provides what may be groundbreaking new data in the contextual analysis of political behavior.

200 pp. ISBN 0-87586-067-2 (cloth) $24.50
1986 068-0 (paper) $15.00

Available in July

Congress and Policy Change.

Edited by Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Leroy N. Rieselbach,
and Lawrence C. Dodd, *Indiana University*

Contributors: David W. Brady, Edward G. Carmines, Lawrence C. Dodd, Richard F. Fenno, Jr., John Ferejohn, Marjorie Randon Hershey, Roberta Herzberg, Leroy N. Rieselbach, Barbara Sinclair, James A. Stimson, Gerald C. Wright, Jr.

320 pp. ISBN 0-87586-076-1 (cloth) $32.00
July, 1986 077-X (paper) $15.00

Send your orders to:
Agathon Press, 111 Eighth Avenue, New York, NY 10011 • (212) 741-3087

Institutional purchase orders accepted. All other payments must be in advance.
Visa and MasterCard accepted.

New in cloth and paper

The Art of Political Manipulation

William H. Riker

In twelve engrossing stories whose protagonists range from Pliny the Younger to Abraham Lincoln to Adam Clayton Powell, a noted political scientist and game theorist demonstrates how some of our heroes as well as ordinary folk have manipulated their opponents in order to win political advantage. Riker's **"marvelous tales . . . entertain and amaze** while at the same time revealing the substantial richness of the rational choice approach. . . . [His] **insights about the craft of the politician might even give 'manipulation' a good name."** —Kenneth A. Shepsle

"Brilliant, learned, and entertaining — only Riker could have written such a book."
—Morris Fiorina $18.50 cloth; $6.95 paper

Shi'ism and Social Protest

edited by Juan R. I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie

This timely and important book presents the first overview of Shi'i political activism in the countries where it has been most significant. The contributors present up-to-date information on the factors involved in Shi'ism's recent movement away from quietism and toward an active involvement in politics. They also discuss how Shi'i political activism will affect the struggle in and for Lebanon; the Iran-Iraq war; Soviet attitudes toward Afghanistan and Iran; and U.S. policies toward the Middle East.

"A valuable survey of contemporary Shi'i political movements in historical context."
—Gary G. Sick $40.00 cloth; $12.95 paper

Yale University Press
Dept. 249
92A Yale Station
New Haven, CT 06520

The Jesse Jackson Phenomenon

The Crisis of Purpose in Afro-American Politics

Adolph L. Reed, Jr.

In a pathbreaking analysis of Jesse Jackson's 1984 campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination, Adolph Reed shows that Jackson's candidacy revealed deep divisions within the black political community. He argues that Jackson hurt rather than helped the development of a viable black political movement and offers specific strategies for more effective black political action in the future.

Jackson
for President

"Provocative, keenly analyzed, and intellectually sophisticated. . . . [It] will influence thinking and writing about both Jesse Jackson and Afro-American politics." —Martin Kilson
$17.50 cloth; $5.95 paper *A Yale Fastback*

The Long Darkness

Psychological and Moral Perspectives on Nuclear Winter

edited by Lester Grinspoon, with essays by Henry Steele Commager, Erik H. Erikson, Jerome D. Frank, Stephen Jay Gould, Fr. J. Bryan Hehir, Robert J. Lifton, John E. Mack, and Carl Sagan

Some of the most articulate and respected opponents of the arms race describe the causes and consequences of nuclear warfare and offer explanations for the irrational behavior of political leaders who risk these consequences and for the reluctance of ordinary citizens to face the horror of the nuclear threat.

"Authoritative. . . . In a curious way, the findings about nuclear winter are comforting. They may give rise to a sudden outbreak of sanity." —Paul Warnke $25.00 cloth, $7.95 paper *A Yale Fastback*

The focus of wide acclaim . . .

Pergamon Government & Politics Series

Including:

CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING

The Supreme Court and the Art of Politics

by **Lief H. Carter**

"Congratulations on a splendid performance. . . . one of the best summaries, explanations, and arguments relating to the ancient, but recently stirred up, debate about constitution making and courts that I have found. Furthermore, it is one of the few books I intend to reread. . . . thanks for your most important contribution."

—**J. W. Peltason,**
Chancellor, University of California, Irvine

". . . terrific. Its critical analysis of other works is, in my view, far superior in both scope and depth to other available materials . . . extremely valuable."

—**Mark Tushnet,**
Georgetown University Law Center

232 pp.	1985	softcover	$12.95
		hardcover	$32.50

THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II

by **Amos Yoder**

"Very helpful in terms of its orientation to events—this is considerable help in the face of students' lack of familiarity with modern history."

—**David W. McClintock,**
North Carolina State University

256 pp.	1985	softcover	$12.95
		hardcover	$36.00

CAN GOVERNMENTS LEARN?

American Foreign Policy and Central American Revolutions

by **Lloyd S. Etheredge**

". . . imaginative and provocative."

—*Choice*

". . . Etheredge demonstrates brilliantly how a psychologically sensitive scholar can make great theoretical sense of an otherwise confused and confusing episode. . . . insightful and compelling . . . its strength lies precisely in its powerful illumination of the connection between global processes and interpersonal dynamics."

—**J. David Singer,**
The University of Michigan

240 pp.	1985	softcover	$13.95
		hardcover	$36.00

THE POLITICAL HAND

Policy Implementation and Youth Employment Programs

by **Martin A. Levin & Barbara Ferman**

"For the past fifteen years, academic critics have concluded that almost all urban programs were failures. Now Levin and Ferman break new ground by discovering programs that actually work, and by finding out what makes them work. This refreshing book offers planners and administrators alike an education in how to run successful public programs."

—**Bernard J. Frieden,**
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

180 pp.	1985	softcover	$10.95
		hardcover	$21.50

To request examination copies for course consideration, please write on institutional letterhead to the address below. Include course title, enrollment, decision date and present text.

PERGAMON PRESS
Box R4U, Maxwell House, Fairview Park, Elmsford, NY 10523

New from the Consortium of Social Science Associations....

The first comprehensive

Guide to Federal Funding for Social Scientists

Prepared by the Consortium of Social Science Associations (COSSA), a Washington advocacy group serving the major professional societies in the social and behavioral sciences. Susan D. Quarles, editor.

The federal government is a major supporter of research in the social and behavioral sciences, but until now, no single, multidisciplinary directory has been available to guide researchers through the complexities of government funding in these fields.

COSSA's inclusive new *Guide to Federal Funding* describes over 300 federal programs in impressive detail, including funding priorities, application guidelines, and examples of funded research. Introductory essays describe the organization of social science funding and offer inside views of federal funding practices and contract research.

For anyone who needs to know the ins-and-outs of government funding in the social sciences and related fields, COSSA's *Guide* will be an essential new resource.

Published by the Russell Sage Foundation

Available in June 512 pages ISBN 0-87154-699-X Paperback

Mail orders to:

Consortium of Social Science
Associations
1200 Seventeenth St., NW, Suite 520
Washington, D.C. 20036

Orders will be filled when books are available, in June. Please allow 3-4 weeks for delivery.

Please send ______ copies of COSSA's *Guide to Federal Funding for Social Scientists* (81-0699X) at the following price:

- ☐ $24.95 (for libraries and institutions)
- ☐ **$14.95 (special price for members of APSA)**
- ☐ $19.95 (for other individuals)

Enclosed is a check, money order, or purchase order in the amount of $______. Publisher pays postage on prepaid orders; New York residents, please add sales tax.

______
Name (please print)

______
Address

______

Political Representation in France

Philip E. Converse and Roy Pierce

"This book is a masterpiece in social-science analysis that will undoubtedly be greeted as a 'monumental work.'"
—Heinz Eulau, Stanford University

There can scarcely be a greater tribute to the vitality of the Fifth Republic's democracy than this work. A searching analysis of how the will of voters is translated into authoritative political decision making, this book not only uncovers political truths about contemporary France but also provides a model for the study of other popular forms of government.

69 line illus., 136 tables, 1 map
Belknap $49.50

Harvard
UNIVERSITY PRESS
79 GARDEN ST., CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138

Riveting accounts of pivotal world events

FIRE FROM THE MOUNTAIN

The Making of a Sandinista

By Omar Cabezas. Foreword by Carlos Fuentes. Afterword by Walter LaFeber. In this truly personal memoir of one man's part in his country's struggle for independence, Cabezas tells of his experiences as a guerrilla fighter in the mountains of Nicaragua. "A fascinating tale."—*The New York Times Book Review.* "Well written, witty, at times very, very funny."
—*The Wall Street Journal*
ⓟ**PLUME** 0-452-25844-8 $7.95/$10.95* (tentative)



FIRE FROM THE MOUNTAIN
THE MAKING OF A SANDINISTA
OMAR CABEZAS

THE END OF THE WORLD THAT WAS

Six Lives in the Atomic Age

A Newsweek Book

By Peter Goldman. An expanded version of the special *Newsweek* cover story, this book offers an unprecedented look at the human side of the nuclear debate by examining the lives of six people who were directly involved—a physicist who helped build the bomb, a man who loaded it onto the Enola Gay, his daughter who is now an anti-nuclear activist, the navigator who guided the Enola Gay to Hiroshima, and two Japanese who lived through the attack.
ⓟ**PLUME** 0-452-25806-5 $6.95/$9.25*



THE END OF THE WORLD THAT WAS:
SIX LIVES IN THE ATOMIC AGE
PETER GOLDMAN

TO GET RICH IS GLORIOUS

China in the 80s

Revised Edition

By Orville Schell. An absorbing view of the recent transformation of China from the land of "pure" communism under Mao to the land of personal initiative and free enterprise—albeit, Peking style—after the leader's death. "Schell writes a prose so elegant that it is a pleasure to read for its own sake... Must reading."—*Chicago Sun-Times.* "Contains some of the best recent writing on China...extraordinary."
—*The Washington Post*
Ⓜ**MENTOR** 0-451-62437-8 $3.95/$4.95*

TO GET RICH IS GLORIOUS
CHINA IN THE 80s
ORVILLE SCHELL
REVISED AND UPDATED EDITION

Write to the Education Department at the address below for a free History & Political Science Brochure.

*Price in Canada. Prices subject to change.

NEW AMERICAN LIBRARY
1633 Broadway, New York, NY 10019
NAL

New from Cambridge

East Germany and Detente

Building Authority After the Wall

A. James McAdams

Of interest not only to scholars of communist politics but to all students of East-West affairs, Professor McAdams' study demonstrates both the changing historical significance of the idea of detente, and the way in which non-superpower states can take initially adverse circumstances and turn them into instances of opportunity.

$34.50

Public Opinion and Political Change in Poland, 1980-1982

David S. Mason

This book deals with the importance of public opinion in Poland at the time of the rise of Solidarity and the workers' movement, when opinion polling and freedom of political debate were at their height. Dr. Mason's analysis is based on the most open and revealing polls ever to issue from a communist country, polls conducted by the government, the universities, and Solidarity itself on fundamental issues – the nature of the socialist state, the role of the party, popular confidence in Solidarity, the Church and the regime.

Soviet and East European Studies

$37.50

Egyptian Politics Under Sadat

The Post-Populist Development of an Authoritarian Modernizing State

Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Jr.

Military politics, economic decision making, the new "dominant party system," and the expanded role of interest-group politics, parliament, elections, press, and courts under Sadat's liberalized authoritarian regime are covered.

The author concludes that Sadat's state underwent both a retraditionalization and limited liberalization, while retaining its authoritarian essence.

Cambridge Middle East Library

$37.50

Building Democracy in Ireland

Political Order and Cultural Integration in a Newly-Independent Nation

Jeffrey Prager

Professor Prager examines the first decade of Irish independence in order to explain how the Republic of Ireland achieved democracy. In so doing, he provides a deeper understanding of the Irish case while shedding new light on the process of democratic consolidation in modern state-building.

$34.50

America's Commitment to South Korea

The First Decade of the Nixon Doctrine

Joo-Hong Nam

This book analyzes the strategic rationale of the American security commitment to South Korea in light of the palpable failure of containment in Indo-China. It identifies the principal conditions that influenced changing American perspectives on South Korea and examines some of the general problems of collective security in the region.

$34.50

At bookstores or from

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

32 East 57th Street, New York, NY 10022
800-431-1580 (outside New York State and Canada)
MasterCard and Visa accepted

Plenum: *Bringing You the Best in Social Theory*

ENVIRONMENT, DEVELOPMENT, AND PUBLIC POLICY

General Editor: **Lawrence Susskind**

CITIES AND DEVELOPMENT

Series Editor: **Lloyd Rodwin**

HERE THE PEOPLE RULE

Selected Essays

by **Edward C. Banfield**

The twenty essays collected here address compromise and reform, democratic policymakers, politics versus administration, capacities of local government, moral principles and democracy, and political economizing.

0-306-41969-6/366 pp./ill./1985/$39.50
text adoption price on orders of six or more copies: $24.50

THE ART OF PLANNING

Selected Essays of Harvey S. Perloff

edited by **Leland S. Burns** and **John Friedmann**

Harvey S. Perloff's work is a milestone in the development of urban planning. The revitalization of central cities, urban and metropolitan planning and policy, fiscal policy and planning, and planning and education are among the topics featured in this volume.

0-306-42030-9/378 pp./ill./1985/$39.50

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND PLANNING

Series Editor: **Lawrence Susskind**

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND AMERICAN BUSINESS

Dilemmas of Compliance

by **Joseph F. DiMento**

This book offers policy reforms that aim to achieve the goal of influencing business to comply with reasonable environmental law. DiMento describes classes of illegal acts and links them to characteristics of noncomplying companies.

0-306-42168-2/242 pp./ill./1985/$29.50

SOCIAL JUSTICE REVIEW

Editor: **Melvin J. Lerner**

A new forum for both traditional and novel approaches to investigating the origins, structure, and consequences of justice in human affairs. Contributors will share their research methodologies and their varied perspectives on the desire for justice, a theme central to social institutions and personal interactions.

Subscription: Volume 1, 1987 (4 issues)

Institutional rate:	$50.00
Personal rate:	$25.00

NEGOTIATION JOURNAL

On the Process of Dispute Settlement

Published in cooperation with the Program on Negotiation, an Inter-University Consortium

Editor: **Jeffrey Z. Rubin**
Managing Editor: **J. William Breslin**

Negotiation Journal is committed to the development of better techniques for resolving differences through the give-and-take of negotiation. It is intended to reach a broad audience that includes environmental mediators, lawyers, politicians, business people, public-and private-sector policymakers, marriage counselors, labor negotiators, and scholars.

Subscription: Volume 1, 1985 (4 issues)

Institutional rate:	$50.00
Personal rate:	$25.00

DISASTER POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Managing Programs under Shared Governance

by **Peter J. May** and **Walter Williams**

This study focuses on the intergovernmental implementation of selected emergency management programs. The authors analyze aspects of disaster policy and discuss federal and state management choices concerning dam safety, earthquake preparedness, flood plain management, and civil defense planning. A volume in the series Disaster Research in Practice.

0-306-42179-8/191 pp. + index/ill./1986/$29.50

Plenum Publishing Corporation
233 Spring Street
NYC, NY 10013

THE LANGUAGE OF SCIENCE
Plenum
PUBLISHING CORPORATION

NEW from South Carolina

Beyond Sovereignty: The Challenge of Global Policy

by Marvin S. Soroos

From a policy-study perspective, this is an analysis of the efforts of the international community to address global problems cooperatively. In-depth case studies include: nuclear proliferation, economic development, human rights, ocean resources, pollution, and telecommunication.

ISBN 0-87249-474-8, Cloth, **$24.95** ISBN 0-87249-478-0, Paper, **$14.95**

Disintegration of Political Systems: War and Revolution in Comparative Perspective

by Manus I. Midlarsky

. . . a study of political stability in its various guises and manifestations. Using a three-way comparative analysis—across geographic space, through time, and across political systems—Midlarsky seeks out and identifies generalizations about continuity and change. This is a technical tour de force.

ISBN 0-87249-466-7, Cloth, **$24.95**

Chinese Politics: Documents and Analysis Volume One: Cultural Revolution to 1969

by James T. Myers, Jürgen Domes, and Erik von Groeling

This first of three volumes contains 63 documents from the Peoples Republic of China (some from Red Guard publications). Both domestic and international politics are covered along with a careful analysis of events.

ISBN 0-87249-475-6, **$35**

Chief Justice: Leadership and the Supreme Court

by Robert J. Steamer

. . . an analysis of the style and substance of the 15 Chief Justices of the United States and of the particular form of leadership each provided. This is a study of the interplay between personalities and institutions.

ISBN 0-87249-482-9, Cloth, **$24.95**

Civil Liberties Under the Constitution

by M. Glenn Abernathy

. . . a detailed coverage of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, equal protection issues, voting rights, and the right of privacy. Case cuttings and descriptive material are integrated into a coherent, chronological treatment of each topic.

ISBN 0-87249-455-1, Paper, **$22.95**

University of South Carolina Press
Columbia, South Carolina 29208



Courtesy of TVA.

TRUCKING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

The Emergence of Federal Regulation, 1914-1940

WILLIAM R. CHILDS

William R. Childs' pioneering regulatory history assesses the early years of trucking and analyzes the reasons for federal intervention before the new industry matured.

260 pages. $19.95

POLITICS AND SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES

ROBERT X BROWNING

The author describes the political process as it has modified the growth and shape of a broad range of federal social programs in the post-World War II period.

220 pages. $18.95

Guerrilla Minstrels

John Lennon, Joe Hill, Woody Guthrie, and Bob Dylan

WAYNE HAMPTON

Tracing the history of protest singing in America from the union hymns of the IWW to folk-rock in the 1960s, Hampton considers these important musicians both biographically and as political heroes.

320 pages. Illustrations. $24.95

TVA AND THE TELLICO DAM

A Bureaucratic Crisis in Post-Industrial America

WILLIAM BRUCE WHEELER and MICHAEL J. McDONALD

In their critical study of TVA in the post-industrial era as seen through the prism of the controversial Tellico Dam Project, the authors examine how TVA adopted Tellico as part of a search for a new mission, only to find that the mission was outdated from its inception.

304 pages. Illustrations. $34.50

★★★

Revised Edition Available

FROM OBSCURITY TO OBLIVION

Running in the Congressional Primary

LOUIS SANDY MAISEL

In this revised edition of his book, Sandy Maisel incorporates new data from the 1980, 1982, and 1984 elections into his study of the process of choosing congressional candidates.

208 pages. $15.95 cloth, $7.95 paper

The University of Tennessee Press

Knoxville 37996-0325

LSU Press

Illusion and Reality in Franco-American Diplomacy, 1914–1945
Henry Blumenthal
Based upon exceptionally extensive research and reflecting an extraordinary scholarly range and depth, *Illusion and Reality in Franco-American Diplomacy* examines the leaders and events that shaped diplomatic relations between the United States and France in the years during and between the two world wars. $32.50

The Evidence of the Senses
A Realist Theory of Perception
David Kelley
In this highly original defense of realism, David Kelley argues that perception is the discrimination of objects as entities and is a reliable foundation for empirical knowledge. *The Evidence of the Senses* will be invaluable to anyone interested in the complex subject of perceptual theory. $27.50

Cracking the Monolith
U. S. Policy Against the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949–1955
David Allan Mayers
David Allan Mayers considers the extent to which American policy-makers were aware of Sino-Soviet tensions in the early 1950s and how they succeeded—or failed—in exploiting Chinese-Russian problems. $25.00

Louisiana State University Press
Baton Rouge 70893

State University of New York Press
announces a new series in
LEADERSHIP
edited by
Barbara Kellerman
Institute for Leadership Studies
Fairleigh Dickenson University

The Press is inviting manuscripts on a wide range of leadership topics. These topics may pertain to: the public or private sector, domestic, cross-cultural, or international perspectives, and individual leaders or leadership in small groups, organizations and large collectives. To attract a wide general readership and facilitate course adoptions, books in the series will appear simultaneously in cloth and paper editions.

All inquiries, manuscripts, and book proposals submit to:

Michele Martin, Editor
SUNY Press
State University Plaza
Albany, New York 12246-0001

Dworkin's Case For The Law

Law's Empire
Ronald Dworkin



Law's Empire
Ronald Dworkin

Here is the long-awaited, full-length presentation of Ronald Dworkin's theory of law. He begins with the interpretive process by which judges determine what the law is. He goes on to a cogent and complete explanation of how the Anglo-American legal system works and the principles on which the system is founded. Finally, he argues persuasively for his own thesis: propositions of law are properly settled upon because they answer the requirement that a political community act in a coherent and principled manner toward all its members.

Integrity as the very heart of our legal system is a theory to be deeply scrutinized. Scholars, theorists, lawyers, judges, students and political activists will debate *Law's Empire* for years to come.

Belknap $20.00

Harvard University Press
Cambridge, MA 02138

South Africa Without Apartheid

Dismantling Racial Domination

HERIBERT ADAM and KOGILA MOODLEY

"A realistic and tough-minded analysis that is also compassionate and optimistic. An important book that is being published at a critical point in the South African crisis."—Arend Lijphart

"A major contribution to understanding the complexities of South African society. The authors' analysis is exceptionally sophisticated. The ideologues of whatever hue will not approve of their approach, but those who seek enlightenment will find it here."—J. S. Galbraith

$18.95

Strategies for African Development

ROBERT J. BERG and
JENNIFER SEYMOUR WHITAKER, Editors

"This ambitious collection of essays, focused on Africa's dismal record of development—particularly during the last decade—brings together a number of distinguished contributors and some truly outstanding essays to explore the main parameters of the lack of African development and the prospects for development in the future."—Carl G. Rosberg

$39.50 cloth, $15.95 paper

At bookstores or call toll-free 800-822-6657. Visa and MasterCard only.

University of California Press
Berkeley 94720

Muslim Extremism in Egypt

The Prophet and Pharaoh

GILLES KEPEL

"The best book so far published on Egypt's Islamic movements, and [it] is essential reading for anyone interested in the wider 'Islamic revival'. The author shows an acute perception of contemporary Egyptian society."
—*The Middle East*

$18.95

Protest Is Not Enough

The Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality in Urban Politics

RUFUS P. BROWNING, DALE ROGERS MARSHALL, and DAVID H. TABB

New in paper—"A marvelous addition to the literature on ethnic politics. . . . Provides a theory that makes sense to both political scientists and political activists."—Chris Garcia

Winner of the Gladys Kammerer and the Ralph J. Bunche Awards of 1985.

$10.95 paper

Making Revolution

The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 1937–1945

YUNG-FA CHEN

"This book offers a far fuller and more convincing description of Chinese Communist wartime activities than any other secondary work. It will be of great value to scholars of Chinese history and politics."
—Elizabeth J. Perry, *University of Washington*

$60.00

Prosperity and Upheaval

The World Economy 1945–1980

HERMAN van der WEE

In this sixth volume of the prestigious series *History of the World Economy in the Twentieth Century*, economic historian van der Wee surveys the wholesale economic reforms that followed the end of World War II and traces their successes and failures through 1980.

$32.50

The Overburdened Economy

Uncovering the Causes of Chronic Unemployment, Inflation, and National Decline

LLOYD JEFFRY DUMAS

Preface by Kenneth Boulding

"This is a very important book. A statement of this kind is not always easy to justify. It may take years to prove, but it is my considered judgement."—Kenneth Boulding

$18.95

Averting Catastrophe

Strategies for Regulating Risky Technologies

JOSEPH G. MORONE and EDWARD J. WOODHOUSE

This is a nonpartisan study of the imperfect but steadily developing system for containing the risks of such technologies as chemicals, nuclear power, and genetic engineering. The book, which also offers detailed suggestions, will thus be useful to scientists, environmentalists, policy-makers, businessman, and students of government. $16.95

RESEARCH GUIDES FROM PALISADES PUBLISHERS

THE NEW RESEARCH GUIDE IN HISTORY
John R. M. Wilson

A guide in learning the techniques of finding, interpreting, and relating historical information. Outlines resource material and gives direction in organization and documentation. New, fall 1986 $6.95

BRIDGES TO KNOWLEDGE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
Carl Kalvelage, Albert P. Melone, and Morley Segal

Recommended for all introductory courses. A practical guide to sources in political science and a rational and effective approach to producing reports and term papers. $6.95

RESEARCH ESSENTIALS TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
H. B. Jacobini, Albert P. Melone, and Carl Kalvelage

Designed to help in courses in administrative law and in other public administration courses where law is a significant but not necessarily the central element. Contains a summary of the main themes in American administrative law. $5.95

PRIMER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Albert P. Melone and Carl Kalvelage

Designed primarily for the beginning constitutional law student in need of acquiring those basic skills with legal materials necessary for getting the most from the typical undergraduate course. $4.95

READY FOR FALL

NEW 4TH EDITION OF

GOVERNMENT AT THE GRASS ROOTS
George S. Blair

Meeting a requested need, this book will be off the press in time for fall classes. Write now for exam copy.

Don Bowen, University of Arizona — "Blair's sorting out of grassroot entities by type and form lends precision to understanding basic structures and process of local governments and their role in the total U.S. system." $12.95

STILL AVAILABLE AND WIDELY ADOPTED

PRAGMATIC FEDERALISM
Parris Glendening and Mavis Reeves

An analysis of the latest developments in intergovernmental relations. $12.95

COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING
Melville C. Branch

Identification and discussion of sixteen general principles of comprehensive planning. $12.95

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
2ND EDITION — Gerald Caiden

A first book in public administration, furnishing perspective and synthesis to existing public administration texts. $10.95

All these books are available in academic paperback editions.

For adoption consideration, request examination copies now. Give course number and title, estimated enrollment and when text decisions will be made.

PALISADES PUBLISHERS

P.O. Box 744, Dept. A., Pacific Palisades, CA 90272

MORE Stats & Power! NEW Data Entry & Verification Facilities! AND Presentation-Quality Graphics!

SPSS/PC+™

COMPLETE Data Analysis And Reporting for IBM PC/XT/AT's

SPSS/PC+, combined with Graphics, Advanced Statistics, Tables, and Data Entry form the most comprehensive statistical software available for a microcomputer. For nearly 20 years, the name "SPSS" has been synonymous with high quality software. SPSS/PC+ comes with everything you should expect from a market leader—a thorough, well-designed package with excellent documentation and customer support.

SPSS/PC+

- *Display manager & editor*
- *File matching & merging*
- *File transfer with popular PC programs*
- *Selective installation & removal of procedures*
- *Crosstabulation*
- *Descriptive statistics*
- *Multiple regression*
- *ANOVA*
- *Plots & graphs*
- *Flexible data transformation*
- *Customized reports*

SPSS/PC+ ADVANCED STATISTICS

- *MANOVA*
- *Factor analysis*
- *Cluster analysis*
- *Discriminant analysis*
- *Loglinear modelling*

SPSS/PC+ TABLES

- *Stub & banner tables*
- *Multiple response data*
- *Presentation quality tables and reports*
- *Full range of percentaging and statistics options*

SPSS/PC+ GRAPHICS™ FEATURING MICROSOFT® CHART

- *Presentation-quality graphics*
- *Create effective charts, quickly and easily*
- *Develop custom charts*
- *Insert text, wherever you want*
- *Move between data and graphs instantaneously*
- *Produce top-quality output and send it to a variety of devices*

SPSS/PC+ DATA ENTRY™

- *Create customized data entry screens*
- *Clean and verify data to specifications*
- *Enter, view and edit data quickly and easily*

For more information, contact our Marketing Department at:

312/329-3500

SPSS Inc.
444 N. Michigan Avenue
Chicago, IL 60611

IN EUROPE:
SPSS Europe B.V.
P.O. Box 115
4200 AC Gorinchem
The Netherlands,
Phone: +31183036711
TWX: 21019.

VISA, MasterCard and American Express accepted.

© 1986, SPSS inc.

SPSS inc. PRODUCTIVITY RAISED TO THE HIGHEST POWER™

SPSS/PC+ runs on the IBM PC/XT/AT with hard disk. Contact SPSS Inc. for compatible microcomputers. IBM PC/XT and PC/AT are trademarks of International Business Machines Corporation. SPSS, SPSS/PC, SPSS/PC+, SPSS/PC+ Graphics, SPSS/PC+ Tables, SPSS/PC+ Advanced Statistics, and SPSS/PC+ Data Entry are trademarks of SPSS Inc. for its proprietary computer software. SPSS/PC+ Graphics, SPSS/PC+ Tables, SPSS/PC+ Advanced Statistics and SPSS/PC+ Data Entry are separately packaged and sold as enhancements to SPSS/PC+. Portions registered copyright ©Microsoft Corporation, 1984, 1985, 1986. All rights reserved.

FAMILY, SCHOOLS, AND THE STATE


The AMERICAN FAMILY and the STATE
Edited by JOSEPH R. PEDEN and FRED R. GLAHE
Foreword by ROBERT NISBET
PACIFIC INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH

THE AMERICAN FAMILY AND THE STATE
Edited by JOSEPH R. PEDEN and FRED R. GLAHE
Foreword by ROBERT NISBET

This unique volume assembles a comprehensive look at the modern family and how its increasingly serious problems relate to the intrusions of government. The authors analyze major family issues including the viability and role of mediating structures, the consequences of social welfare programs, and such problems as domestic violence, children's rights and parental authority, and teenage pregnancy. Those who have advanced orthodox conservative or liberal views of the family will be both challenged and fascinated.

"I am confident that the attentive reading of this fine and salutary study of state and family will carry us, administrators, politicians, and ordinary citizens alike, a long step forward in understanding the indispensability of the family to democracy and also the complexities which attend the family's relationship to democracy."
–ROBERT NISBET
Columbia University

482 pages, Cloth, 0-936488-12-3, $34.95
Paper, 0-936488-05-0, $14.95


The PUBLIC SCHOOL MONOPOLY
A Critical Analysis of Education and the State in American Society
Edited by Robert B. Everhart
Foreword by Clarence J. Karier
PACIFIC INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH

THE PUBLIC SCHOOL MONOPOLY
A Critical Analysis of Education and the State in American Society
Edited by ROBERT B. EVERHART
Foreword by CLARENCE J. KARIER

The escalating problems of modern education have created the widely recognized need to critically reassess the public school system. This comprehensive book examines the relationship between schooling, education, and the state and how the state, through the regulation of primary and secondary schooling in the United States, restricts educational practice to an extent that is detrimental to the general public and especially to the disadvantaged. The contributions to this volume are diverse in content and approach, and range from left to right politically in their points of view. Together they provide a unified understanding of the many problems in education, and offer new directions for constructive policy reform, including alternatives to the public school system (vouchers, tax credits, private schools, etc.).

"This book is an important contribution to the question of how schools are best organized for our children's benefit. It questions the dogma that attends most discussions of education: that publicly supported education must also be provided by a state bureaucracy."
–JAMES S. COLEMAN
University of Chicago

600 Pages, Cloth, 0-88410-383-8, $34.95
Paper, 0-88410-38-9, $14.95

Available at better bookstores, or from
PACIFIC INSTITUTE, 177 Post Street, Dept. K
San Francisco, CA 94108

PACIFIC INSTITUTE
FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH

1787

Drafting the U.S. Constitution

Edited by
Wilbourn E. Benton

In this monumental scholarly work, Wilbourn Benton organizes the debates of the Constitutional Convention by constitutional article, disposing of the traditional chronological format that makes pinning down a specific topic time-consuming and frustrating. This reference work presents all the relevant arguments for each section, traced from the original idea or concept to finalization in an article. As each subject unfolds as a complete story, the interrelationships of various sections of the document also emerge. 1,600 pp. $85.00

A Search for Public Administration

The Ideas and Career of Dwight Waldo

Brack Brown
Richard J. Stillman II
Afterword by Dwight Waldo

In the arena of public-administration scholarship, one of the most prominent performers is Dwight Waldo, who has devoted more than forty years to the study of institutions and ideas. Brack Brown and Richard Stillman, both former students of Waldo, combine transcribed interviews with Waldo, separate analyses, and comments of their own and Waldo's to examine the field as a whole. They give new perspective to the events and forces that shaped public administration in the post-World War II era. 160 pp. $22.50

Special Districts, Special Purposes

Fringe Governments and Urban Problems in the Houston Area

Virginia Marion Perrenod

This ground-breaking case study of urban special-district governments in Houston provides new understanding of how small governments function and addresses two questions: Do these districts work, and if so, for whom? How do they affect the larger community? Virginia Perrenod provides an explanation for the performance of special districts and draws conclusions about their probable unwillingness to cooperate voluntarily to promote the welfare of the larger community. She also proposes realistic measures to secure cooperation for the common good. 168 pp. $18.50

Texas A&M University Press
Drawer C
College Station, Texas
77843-4354

Free shipping on prepaid orders.
Visa and MasterCard accepted.

Political Science from Cornell...

THE VANISHED IMAM
Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon

By FOUAD AJAMI. "Ajami is both a Shiite from South Lebanon and an American political scientist. In this fascinating and illuminating book he combines the understanding and concern that are the birthright of the one with the acumen and integrity that are the aspiration of the other."—Bernard Lewis, Princeton. $17.95

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR TARGETING

Edited by DESMOND BALL and JEFFREY RICHELSON. Thirteen strategists examine various facets of the actual war plans of the U.S. and its allies and adversaries. Contributors: David T. Cattell, Lawrence Freedman, Colin S. Gray, Michael Kennedy, William T. Lee, Kevin N. Lewis, F. S. Nyland, George H. Quester, Bennett Ramberg, David Alan Rosenberg, David Yost, and the editors. *Cornell Studies in Security Affairs.* $29.95

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
The Next Phase

Edited by ARNOLD L. HORELICK. "A timely and important contribution to a vital debate on the future of U.S.-Soviet relations."—Zbigniew Brzezinski. Contributors: Abraham S. Becker, Seweryn Bialer, Robert D. Blackwill, Francis Fukuyama, Harry Gelman, William G. Hyland, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Richard Pipes, Marshall D. Shulman, Dimitri K. Simes, John Van Oudenaren, Edward L. Warner III, and the editor. *A Book from the Rand/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior.* $9.95 paper; $35.00 cloth

GREAT POWER POLITICS AND THE STRUGGLE OVER AUSTRIA, 1945–1955

By AUDREY KURTH CRONIN. "Cronin conveys the authentic flavor of the Cold War era, with its mixture of often unbearable tension and pervasive frustration. Her book is likely to remain the last word on the origins of Austrian neutrality for a long time to come."—Vojtech Mastny, Boston University. *Cornell Studies in Security Affairs.* $29.95

MOSCOW AND THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
From Togliatti to Berlinguer

By JOAN BARTH URBAN. "This is a book that will stand for years as the definitive treatment of one of the most interesting and revealing relationships within what used to be called the international Communist movement."—Donald L. M. Blackmer, MIT. $14.95 paper; $42.50 cloth

THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL DEBT

Edited by MILES KAHLER. In this timely volume, seven political scientists and economists bring politics into a discussion of international debt and its management. Contributors: Benjamin J. Cohen, Albert Fishlow, Stephan Haggard, Robert R. Kaufman, Charles Lipson, Philip A. Wellons, and the editor. *Cornell Studies in Political Economy.* $9.95 paper; $29.95 cloth

NATIONAL STYLES OF REGULATION

Environmental Policy in Great Britain and the United States

By DAVID VOGEL. "An elegant and vivid portrait of differences in regulation so profound as to go to the heart of contrasts between British and American political cultures."—Aaron Wildavsky, University of California, Berkeley. "A devastating criticism of the excessively legalistic approach of U.S. regulation." —Murray Weidenbaum, Washington University. *Cornell Studies in Political Economy.* $12.95 paper; $39.95 cloth

EUROPE AND THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES

Edited by MARGARET SHARP. Focusing on the interaction among the institutional environment, policy considerations, and specific firms' business strategies, this book looks closely at six new industrial sectors that are in the throes of change. *Cornell Studies in Political Economy.* $32.50

EMPIRES

By MICHAEL W. DOYLE. "Doyle puts forward an intriguing set of arguments about the sources of imperialism in a social-scientific way. His work is erudite, broad in scope, theoretically sophisticated, and thoughtful as well as thought-provoking."—Robert O. Keohane, Harvard. *Cornell Studies in Comparative History.* $14.95 paper; $42.50 cloth

JUSTICE AND EQUALITY HERE AND NOW

Edited by FRANK S. LUCASH. Eight outstanding scholars contribute to this collection of original essays on the philosophical foundations and political implications of egalitarian justice. Contributors: Walter Berns, Allan Bloom, G.A. Cohen, William Galston, Judith N. Shklar, Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer. $7.95 paper; $22.50 cloth

New in paperback . . .

MARXISM IN THE USSR

A Critical Survey of Current Soviet Thought

By JAMES P. SCANLAN. "A delight to read and without rival in its field. The chapters on Soviet moral philosophy, political philosophy, philosophy of history and aesthetics also demonstrate the steady retreat that has taken place from the dogmatic positions of the Stalinist era."—*Times Higher Education Supplement.* $14.95

WORKERS' SELF-MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

By CHRISTOPHER EATON GUNN. "This comprehensive study is an excellent contribution to the field."—*Journal of Economic Issues.* $8.95

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS
P.O. Box 250, Ithaca, New York 14851

KENTUCKY

OPEC: The Failing Giant

MOHAMMED E. AHRARI. A great glut of oil, dropping prices, the threat of insolvency, a divided membership—these developments in the early weeks of 1985 underline the cogency of Mohammed Ahrari's historical study of the OPEC oil cartel and his argument that economic forces, not politics, will ultimately determine OPEC's actions and its fate in the world arena. 288 pages $25.00

Divided Counsel

The Anglo-American Response to Communist Victory in China

EDWIN WEBB MARTIN. A detailed, systematic comparison of the policies toward China adopted by the United States and the United Kingdom from the winter of 1948-49, when they confronted the inevitability of a "Communist" China, through the winter of 1950-51, when they confronted Chinese troops on the battlefields of Korea. 288 pages $27.00

Politics and Nuclear Power

Energy Policy in Western Europe

MICHAEL T. HATCH. An examination of the responses of public officials in three leading European nations—the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and the Netherlands—to the energy crisis. 240 pages $22.00

A Season of Inquiry

The Senate Intelligence Investigation

LOCH K. JOHNSON. "A valuable contribution not only to an understanding of that very important committee but of the Senate itself. The author chronicles the committee's flaws and problems but on balance gives it high marks"—*Foreign Affairs*. 328 pages $31.00

The Life of the Parties

Activists in Presidential Politics

RONALD B. RAPOPORT, ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, and JOHN McGLENNON, Editors. Based on a survey of more than 17,000 delegates to state presidential nominating conventions, this pathbreaking book examines the characteristics, motivations, and beliefs of a broad group of party activists in the presidential nominating process. 256 pages $24.00

Judicial Conflict & Consensus

Behavioral Studies of American Appellate Courts

SHELDON GOLDMAN and CHARLES M. LAMB, Editors. These essays by major scholars of judicial behavior explore the frequency, intensity, and causes of conflict and consensus among judges on American appellate courts. These studies provide new insights into judges' attitudes, values, and role perceptions. 320 pages $30.00

Origins of American Political Parties, 1789-1803

JOHN F. HOADLEY. Hoadley argues convincingly that discernible coalitions existed as early as 1789 and that substantial parties emerged within the first decade after the creation of the new government. 256 pages $24.00

The Future of American-Israeli Relations

A Parting of the Ways?

JAMES LEE RAY. "Ray attributes the success of pro-Israeli elements in American politics to not only Jewish activist lobbyists but also the common religious roots of Jewish and Christian Americans. . . . A well written and powerful statement"—*Library Journal*. 160 pages $16.00

Visit Us in Booth 321 at the APSA Annual Meeting

All exhibit copies 40% off during convention. Inquiries and major credit card orders, phone toll free 1-800-638-3030. Send mail orders to: University Press of Kentucky, P.O. Box 1660, Hagerstown, MD 21741. No exhibit discount on phone or mail orders.

THE UNIVERSITY PRESS OF KENTUCKY

LAW, LIBERALISM AND FREE SPEECH

D. F. B. Tucker. Under what circumstances and according to what principles may we legitimately deny or restrict freedom of speech? In this new work in applied political theory, the author considers this question both from a theoretical standpoint and in terms of political realities in present-day England and the United States. "A first rate book."—*Robert F. Ladenson, Illinois Institute of Technology*

Philosophy and Society Series
February 1986 / 224 pp. / $32.50 / $13.50 paper

CARD-CARRYING AMERICANS
Privacy, Security, and the National ID Card Debate

Joseph W. Eaton. A thorough treatment of the many issues raised by the possibility of adopting a national ID card in the United States. The author discusses the value of such cards with regard to crime, illegal immigration, terrorism, the problems of technology, the threat to privacy, and the effects of different policies on our society.

March 1986 / 240 pp. / $35.00

HUMAN RIGHTS IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA

Rhoda E. Howard. The author examines the human rights record in nine African nations—Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia—and analyzes the cultural, economic, and political factors in each that have hindered the implementation of full human rights.

May 1986 / 264 pp. / ca $34.50

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE FUTURE OF HUMANITY
The Fundamental Questions

Edited by Avner Cohen and Steven Lee. A collection of original essays by distinguished philosophers and scholars from a variety of fields who examine the outmoded assumptions implicit in our thinking about nuclear weapons. Comprehensively defining the present predicament, this volume offers recommendations for the political and social changes necessary to achieve peace.

Philosophy and Society Series
February 1986 / 512 pp. / $39.50 / $16.95 paper

GOVERNMENT AND SPORT
The Public Policy Issues

Edited by Arthur T. Johnson and James H. Frey. The first systematic look at the role of government in sport in ten years. The contributors—well-known sports authorities, practitioners, and scholars—examine such issues as anti-trust legislation, labor, violence, franchise relocation, gambling, taxation, sexual discrimination, broadcasting, and players' agents.

1985 / 288 pp. / $38.50

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DECLINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ASPIRATION

Gary J. Jacobsohn. How should the U.S. Constituion be interpreted? What were the intentions of its framers with regard to judicial interpretation, the doctrine of natural rights, and the finality of Supreme Court decisions? And to what extent are these intentions relevant to modern politics and jurisprudence? These and other issues are given a balanced and fresh treatment in this timely study. "An excellent commentary on and an insightful contribution to the current debate on constitutional interpretation."—*Walter F. Murphy, Princeton University.*

May 1986 / 192 pp. / $29.50

LATIN AMERICA
Bankers, Generals, and the Struggle for Social Justice

James F. Petras, *with Howard Brill, Dennis Engbarth, Edward S. Herman, and Morris H. Morley.* A challenging study of the various international and regional forces that are changing political and economic conditions in Latin America. Petras defines the major conflict as one that pits the majority of the population, who strive for democracy, a higher standard of living, and social justice, against the ruling elites, who are supported by the international banks, local military forces, and the United States.

May 1986 / 200 pp. / ca $32.50 / ca $12.50 paper

PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS
The Legal Framework for Policy Initiatives

John F. Murphy. It has become evident that existing means of apprehending and prosecuting terrorists are inadequate to cope with a steadily worsening situation. In this timely study, one of the foremost experts on the legal aspects of international terrorism presents a detailed assessment of the problem and offers realistic policy initiatives. "PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS should be required reading for government officials, journalists, lawyers, scholars, and concerned laymen."—*Alfred P. Rubin, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy*

1985 / 152 pp. / $24.95

THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
A Look to the 1990s

Edited by Eli Ginzberg. These essays by leading professionals focus on the major issues facing the health care community today, including the emergence of new health maintenance organizations and ethical questions raised by rapidly advancing technology. The contributors offer proposals for policy changes that will alleviate the more acute problems confronting the American medical community.

1985 / 160 pp. / $22.00 / $16.95 paper

Write for our 1986 Political & Social Sciences catalog

Rowman & Littlefield 81 ADAMS DRIVE • TOTOWA, NJ 07512

The Louisiana Republican Party, 1948-1985 The Building of a State Political Party

Stella Z. Theodoulou
Claremont Graduate School

Forward by Douglas D. Rose, Tulane University

This monograph is a comprehensive study of an American state political party. It draws upon public opinion surveys, elite questionnaires, personal interviews with party officials, voting records of office-holders, and registration, voting and demographic data on parishes (counties). Party structure, fund raising, and communication, party recruitment, funding and election laws, party identification, registration and ideology, and the party's role in the legislature and executive are all described and analyzed.

TULANE STUDIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE, VOL. 18
$18.50

Other Notable Volumes in this Series:

William B. Gwyn, *The Meaning of the Separation of Powers* (1965) $11
James D. Cochrane, *The Politics of Regional Integration* (1969) $11
Robert S. Robins (editor), *Psychopathology and Political Leadership* (1977) $11
William B. Gwyn and Richard Rose (eds.), *Britain: Progress and Decline* (1980) $11

Please include payment with order. Convertible foreign currency accepted.

TULANE STUDIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
Tulane University
New Orleans, Louisiana 70118

INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTRIBUTORS

The *American Political Science Review* aims to publish scholarly research and writing of exceptional merit. Contributions must demonstrate the highest standards of excellence in conceptualization, exposition, methodology, and craftsmanship. Because the *Review* reaches a diverse audience of scholars and practitioners, contributors must demonstrate how their analysis or exposition illuminates a significant research problem, or answers an important research question, of general interest in political science.

Article Manuscripts

Article manuscripts should be submitted to the Managing Editor, Professor Samuel C. Patterson, *American Political Science Review*, Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, 223 Derby Hall, Columbus, Ohio 43210-1373. Four copies must be submitted, and none can be returned. Manuscripts must be typed double-spaced, on only one side of the paper. The author's name and affiliation should not appear on the copies submitted, but only on a separate covering sheet. An abstract of no more than 150 words must be sent with the manuscript. In general, the *Review* considers manuscripts of up to 30 pages in length. Moreover, the *Review* does not consider manuscripts submitted to other publications.

Manuscripts should be prepared following the guidelines of the *APSA Style Manual*, a publication of the American Political Science Association's Committee on Publications. It is available from the Managing Editor's office. Otherwise, authors should follow the *Chicago Style Manual* and the example of recent issues of the *Review*. Graphs and tables should be presented on separate pages, with their location in the manuscript indicated, e.g., the notification "Table 1 about here," at the proper places.

Book Reviews

Books intended for review and all book review correspondence should be sent to the Book Review Editor, Professor Robert H. Salisbury, *American Political Science Review*, Department of Political Science, Washington University, Campus Box 1063, St. Louis, Missouri 63130.

Other Correspondence

Information, including news and notes, for the Association's news-journal, *PS*, should be sent to Dr. Catherine E. Rudder, Editor, American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Advertising, reprint, and circulation correspondence should be sent to the Executive Director at the Washington office. Domestic claims for nonreceipt of issues must be made within four months of the month of publication; overseas claims, eight months. Advertising information and rates are available from Norinne Hessman, Advertising Manager, APSA, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Indexing

Articles and notes appearing in the *Review* before the June 1953 issue were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. Current issues are indexed by *International Political Science Abstracts*, *United States Political Science Documents*, and *Social Sciences and Humanities Index*. Microfilm of the *Review*, beginning with Volume 1, may be obtained from University Microfilms, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. A *Cumulative Index of the Review*, Volumes 1–62, 1906–1968, also may be obtained from University Microfilms. Articles appearing in the *Review* are listed in *ABC Pol Sci* and *Current Contents: Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences*. Book reviews are indexed in *Book Review Index*.

CONTENTS

ARTICLES

Market Justice, Political Justice
Robert E. Lane 383

From Tragedy to Hierarchy and Back Again: Women in Greek Political Thought
Arlene W. Saxonhouse 403

Foucault's Challenge to Critical Theory
Stephen K. White 419

Thucydides on the Causes of Athenian Imperialism
Steven Forde 433

Soviet Elections Revisited: Voter Abstention in Noncompetitive Balloting
Rasma Karklins 449

Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action
Edward N. Muller & Karl-Dieter Opp 471

Reformulating the Cube Law for Proportional Representation Elections
Rein Taagepera 489

A Partisan Schema for Political Information Processing
Milton G. Lodge & Ruth Hamill 505

Schematic Assessments of Presidential Candidates
Arthur H. Miller, Martin P. Wattenberg & Oksana Malanchuk 521

The President and the Political Use of Force
Charles W. Ostrom, Jr. & Brian L. Job 541

Candidates and Policy in United States Senate Elections
Gerald C. Wright, Jr. & Michael B. Berkman 567

CONTROVERSY

Interpreting the 1974 Congressional Election
Gary C. Jacobson, Samuel Kernell, Eric M. Uslaner & M. Margaret Conway 591

RESEARCH NOTES

Strategic Politicians and Unresponsive Voters
Richard Born 599

Who Overreports Voting?
Brian D. Silver, Barbara A. Anderson & Paul R. Abramson 613

BOOK REVIEWS

Review Essay 631
Political Theory 640
American Politics 660
Comparative Politics 689
International Relations 711